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Summary 
Raymond Williams and European Marxism: Lukacs, Sartre, Gramsci 
The Western Marxist tradition from Lukacs to Colletti is usually considered a continental 
European one, with no major British representative. This thesis presents the Welsh cultural 
critic and novelist Raymond Williams (1921-1988) as a critical Anglophone participant in 
that tradition. The development of Williams’s cultural materialism, far from being the 
product of a rigid ‘British’ empiricism, was centrally influenced by the ideas of Western 
Marxist thinkers. At the core of this influence, and of the ‘European’ rationalist element in 
Williams’s work, is the concept of ‘totality’, an abiding concern with which Williams shares 
with the Western Marxists. The three European Marxists to whom Williams’s intellectual 
development is most indebted are those whom he described, in 1972, as ‘Marxism’s 
alternative tradition’: Georg Lukacs (1885-1971), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) and Antonio 
Gramsci (1891-1937). The work of these thinkers, as it slowly appears in English, confirms 
Williams’s insistence on ‘total’ analysis and permits him to generate a Marxism capable of 
reconciling subjective experience with the complex materiality of social relations. I read the 
theoretical apparatus which results from these transnational interactions as a literary and a 
philosophical realism committed both to the aesthetic representation of the social totality and 
to the interaction of experience with objective reality. The form of political praxis engendered 
by these European influences is a ‘revolutionary culturalism’ in which the working-class 
attains hegemony by realising its experience and interests in a concrete culture. 
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1 
Introduction 
Raymond Williams: ‘Our’ Western Marxist? 
Raymond Williams’s crucial statement of affinity with the vital, internationalist tradition of 
Western Marxism came at a relatively late stage in his career, in the introduction to Marxism 
and Literature (1977): 
It was in this situation1 that I felt the excitement of contact with more new Marxist 
work: the later work of Lukacs, the later work of Sartre, the developing work of 
Goldmann and of Althusser, the variable and developing syntheses of Marxism and 
some forms of structuralism. At the same time, within this significant new activity, 
there was further access to older work, notably that of the Frankfurt School (in its 
most significant period in the twenties and thirties) and especially the work of Walter 
Benjamin; the extraordinarily original work of Antonio Gramsci; and, as a decisive 
element of a new sense of the tradition, newly translated work of Marx and especially 
the Grundrisse. As all this came in, during the sixties and the early seventies, I often 
reflected, and in Cambridge had direct cause to reflect, on the contrast between the 
situation of the socialist student of literature in 1940 and in 1970 … an argument that 
had drifted into deadlock, or into local and partial positions, in the late thirties and 
forties, was being vigorously and significantly reopened. 
… my own long and often internal and solitary debate with what I had known as 
Marxism now took its place in a serious and extending international enquiry. I had 
opportunities to extend my discussions in Italy, in Scandinavia, in France, in North 
America, and in Germany, and with visitors from Hungary, Yugoslavia, and the 
Soviet Union. This book is the result of that period of discussion, in an international 
context in which I have had the sense, for the first time in my life, of belonging to a 
sphere and dimension of work in which I could feel at home. (2009 [1977], pp. 4-5) 
This unambiguous statement of intellectual and personal connection must have been read 
with incredulity by Williams’s critics of the seventies. For Williams was viewed even by 
sympathetic commentators as an irreducibly British or, more egregiously, given his Welsh 
heritage, English thinker. Both his politics and his critical methodology were read both as 
uninfluenced by and as actively incompatible with the tradition of dissident European 
Marxism cited by Williams above. Perhaps the starkest example of this view was Tom 
Nairn’s (1972) characterisation of Williams as a ‘cultural nationalist’: ‘[Williams is] the 
outstanding contemporary (perhaps the greatest) representative of national culture: he 
represents the most valiant and unremitting effort to formulate a valid left-wing 
Weltanschauung out of the materials of national culture, through the organic inheritance of 
                                                
1 Williams is referring to a period from the late sixties to mid-seventies, in which a very large number of texts 
from European writers were made available in English for the first time (see p. 31-32). 
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2 
one rich nation-state’s heritage’ (p. 108). Now, while Williams’s broadly ‘culturalist’ 
emphasis did necessitate the production of a cultural consensus (hegemony) fit for socialism, 
English culture was definitely not its source. While the Welsh emphasis in Williams’s work 
did not properly emerge until the seventies (Nairn, writing in 1972, may be forgiven for 
missing it), Williams was from much earlier a staunch critic of ‘official’ English culture. His 
early writings on the idea of a socialist ‘common culture’2 were not inspired by the national 
images of English or British life, but by an idealised image of working-class culture, itself 
drawn from the Welsh working-class culture of his upbringing. 
It is no surprise that the same writers who missed Williams’s increasing attachment to Wales 
were also those least willing to accept his Europeanism. For by the late seventies Williams 
had come to see these two elements in his mature formation as inextricable, and as organised 
around a complexly articulated rejection of England and English culture. In the interview 
collection Politics and Letters (1979), Williams announced that he was a ‘Welsh European’, 
in another crucial expression of affinity with Europe: 
[From the late sixties] I began having many more contacts with Welsh writers and 
intellectuals, all highly political in the best tradition of the culture, and I found this 
curious effect. Suddenly England, bourgeois England, wasn’t my point of reference 
anymore. I was a Welsh European, and both levels felt different. There’s still a lot to 
work through from that, but I can hardly describe the difference of talking and 
relating now in Wales, with writers and political comrades who are all hard up against 
it – what’s seen from outside is a remarkable vitality, and so it objectively is, but there 
it’s a hard, fierce, internally contending yet bitterly communal feeling, which is also 
where I happen to be and now in the truest sense to be from. Through the intricacies 
of the politics, and they are very intricate indeed, I want the Welsh people – still a 
radical and cultured people – to defeat, override or bypass bourgeois England; the 
alternative flows from the intricacies. That connects, for me, with the sense in my 
work that I am now necessarily European; that the people to the left and on the left of 
the French and Italian communist parties, the German and Scandinavian comrades, 
the communist dissidents from the East like Bahro, are my kind of people; the people 
I come from and belong to, and my more conscious Welshness is, as I feel it, my way 
of learning those connections … when highly cosmopolitan Welsh intellectuals offer 
recognition of the whole range of my work, which literally none of my official 
English colleagues has seen a chance of making sense of, then I am in a culture where 
I can breathe. Or at least take breaths to go back and contend with capitalist Europe, 
capitalist England and – blast it, but it was there and had to be shown in Manod – 
capitalist Wales. (2015 [1979], p. 296) 
It is the idea of bypassing England, then, which connects the Welsh and European elements 
in Williams’s work, not any essential compatibility between Welsh and European modes of 
                                                
2 See, Chapter Two, pp. 165-192, for a summary and discussion of these texts.	
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thought and culture which, as Williams recognised, were themselves internally 
heterogeneous. English culture too, of course, was multiplicitous and, in Adorno’s phrase, 
‘politically polyvalent’ (2007, p. 178). E. P. Thompson, who collaborated with Williams on 
the May Day Manifesto (1967), demonstrated precisely this political polyvalence in his 
defences (1965 & 1978) of an English intellectual and cultural inheritance against Anderson 
and Nairn’s continental theoreticism in the sixties.3 We shall find in Williams’s writings on 
the European thinkers mentioned above many scathing remarks about dominant, especially 
intellectual, ‘English’ tropes and values. But his opposition to England is not based on an 
essentialising view of England any more than his Welshness or his Europeanism are based on 
reactive or displaced cultural nationalisms. What Williams wants to bypass in England is not 
its Weltanschauung or Nationalgeist but its status as dominant, the writing of dominant 
English culture over both English life and the cultures of the subordinate British nations. For 
Williams, the culture of the English ruling class represents what I will call, following Sartre 
in ‘The Burgos Trials’ (1971), abstract universality,  a falsely universal culture which seeks 
to block, alter or appropriate those cultural forms which either pre-exist or emerge in 
opposition to it. English culture claims the right to adjudicate the different values, meanings 
and practices which exist in Britain, the variegated culture of real people living contradictory 
but concrete lives. Welsh and European cultural elements, conversely, come to represent 
variants of what Williams would later call the ‘emergent’: rising meanings and values which 
signal opposition to the dominant level of a given, in Williams’s own life English, hegemony. 
If the above thesis is correct, it is perhaps no coincidence that the first critic to connect 
Williams to a Western Marxist was a fellow Welshman, Gwyn A. Williams (1960), writing 
on Gramsci’s cultural humanism in an early English-language essay on egemonia 
(hegemony): 
It is this quality which makes Gramsci such an unexpectedly congenial writer to 
readers familiar with the current British literature on social and cultural relationships, 
which owes not a little to Morris. For much of this literature is being produced by 
Socialist thinkers who, for a variety of reasons, are becoming increasingly 
preoccupied with problems of a similar character. Indeed to come from Gramsci to, 
say, Raymond Williams’s classic study of the interplay of social and cultural values in 
modern British history, Culture and Society, 1980-1950, is to experience a peculiar 
sense of contact and continuity. (1960, p. 596) 
                                                
3 See pages 13-19 and 21-23 for discussion of this debate. 
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Gwyn A. Williams’s comparison marked the first connection made between Williams and a 
European Marxist; it was by no means the last. A young Terry Eagleton (1976), who 
otherwise regarded Williams as inextricably bound by English cultural assumptions, would 
describe Williams’s work as ‘the most suggestive and intricate body of socialist criticism in 
English history – criticism for which no English comparison is even remotely relevant, but 
which must be referred for comparative assessment to the aesthetic production of a Lukacs, 
Benjamin or Goldmann’ (1976, p. 9). He would later use the more explicit phrase ‘the British 
equivalent of Lukacs’ (2009, p. 96). Anthony Barnett (1976) drew a rough biographical 
equivalence between Sartre and Williams, with which The Times appears to have agreed in an 
obituary for ‘our nearest British equivalent to Sartre.’4 Tony Pinkney (2007b), anxious to 
rescue a modernist Williams from Eagleton’s ‘British Lukacs’ thesis, ventured the British 
Bloch. Later, Bridget Fowler (2000), shrewdly connecting Williams’s ‘structure of feeling’ to 
Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ would position Williams as the French sociologist’s closest British 
equivalent. Andrew Milner (2002), in an innovative reading of Williams as a ‘post-
culturalist’ thinker, reads Williams as being to British culturalism what Habermas is to 
German critical theory and Foucault to French structuralism: a thinker both engaged in and 
moving beyond an antecedent ‘national’ problematic. 
The above interventions are only the most explicit equivalences made between Williams and 
thinkers from the Western Marxist and adjacent European traditions; as we shall see, there is 
a significant critical literature in which a variety of other comparisons and claims of influence 
are made. For now, it is worth noting the frequency with which claims roughly following the 
pattern ‘Williams = “the British X”’ are made. Why should this be so? After all, nobody 
refers to Goldmann as ‘the French Lukacs’. As I aim to show in this introduction, the answer 
is more complicated than it may appear. At the most basic level, it is because Britain is not 
generally thought to have produced a Marxist thinker, during the pre- and post-war years, of 
the calibre or influence of the major figures of Western Marxism. Where this is not read as a 
surfeit of national quality, it is read, as in Williams’s case, as a surfeit of national Marxism; 
this thesis finds its most systematic expression in the Nairn-Anderson theses of the mid-
sixties, which I address in the next section. Goldmann, then, is not ‘the French Lukacs’ 
because he is, in a self-sufficient way, ‘the French Goldmann’. I want to ask whether 
Williams might not be considered simply ‘the British (or Welsh, or even English) Williams’, 
                                                
4 This quote appears on the cover of the What I Came to Say (1990) and is attributed to a Times obituary. I have 
not been able to locate the original. 
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5 
so that, in moving through that tautology, it would no longer be necessary to append to 
another thinker’s name the word ‘British’ (or ‘Welsh’ or ‘English’) to evoke Williams’s 
connection to, or inclusion within, the Western Marxist canon. 
By 1979, something like this had almost taken place. Anderson, Barnett and Francis Mulhern 
carried out wide-ranging interviews with Williams for Politics and Letters. The following 
passage is from the foreword, authored by the three New Left Review editors: 
NLR, as it took shape in the mid-sixties, had repeatedly expressed the view that no 
autonomous or mature Marxism could emerge in Britain without taking the full 
measure of Williams’s contribution to socialist thought … Yet the Review proved no 
more able than other journals in these years to take adequate stock of Williams’s 
growing achievement. In relation to modern traditions of socialist theory, its major 
effort lay elsewhere. In this period NLR pursued a systematic enterprise of 
introduction and evaluation of the main schools within continental Marxism – 
whether those of Lukacs or Sartre, Gramsci or Althusser, Adorno or Della Volpe … 
The present volume is a natural and necessary extension of that work, turning to 
consider the pre-eminent intellectual representative of socialism in contemporary 
Britain, at a time when Williams’s own writing has consciously rejoined a wider 
international Marxist debate. (2015 [1979], pp. 8-9) 
The passage is replete with contradictions. If Politics and Letters, a wide-ranging discussion 
of Williams’s life and work, is ‘a natural and necessary extension’ of the work of elaborating 
Western Marxism to a British audience, then Williams is, by implication, a figure in that 
canon: Britain’s Western Marxist. At the same time, Williams is described not as the ‘pre-
eminent intellectual representative’ of Marxism in Britain, but of the broader ‘socialism’; the 
NLR editors evade having to spell out what was implied a moment before. They concede that 
Williams’s writings are now part of ‘a wider internationalist Marxist debate’ and yet this 
contribution is described as being to socialist, not to Marxist thought, and a British Marxism 
will emerge not in Williams’s own work, but by others taking its ‘full measure’. The tension 
between Freud’s ‘reality’ and ‘pleasure’ principles is enacted here. Williams’s interlocutors 
express a deep desire for a British, that is a ‘native’ Marxism (and for Williams’s work to be 
it), all the while grappling with the intellectual intuition that the phrase ‘British Marxism’ is 
oxymoronic, the word ‘Marxist’ itself a cipher for ‘European’. 
As a case study, it will be worth interrogating Perry Anderson’s omission of Williams from 
his canonization (1976) of the Western Marxist tradition. By 1979, after all, the editors of 
New Left Review collectively regarded Politics and Letters as the next phase of their long-
standing project of introducing and critiquing that very tradition. The most obvious 
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justification of Williams’s absence is that Western Marxism refers exclusively to a 
continental European tradition. But there is nothing in Anderson’s account, or indeed in his 
broader writings, to suggest that he would have opposed including a British thinker if he 
thought one appropriate. In fact, quite the opposite; one of the core concerns of Anderson’s 
work in the sixties and seventies was his sense of the lamentable absence of a Marxist thinker 
of stature in Britain, countable among the giants of continental Europe. 
So, what disqualified Williams? Anderson suggests a number of biographical and thematic 
similarities between the most prominent thinkers of the Western Marxist tradition, to which 
we can add at least two others (see below). I have italicized those features which I think 
Williams can reasonably be said to share with the thinkers of Anderson’s canon.5 Plain text 
designates a clear difference and bold text indicates a partial or contradictory overlap: 
Primary features of Western Marxist thinkers/tradition (Anderson, 1976) 
• Born between 1885 (Lukacs) and 1924 (Colletti) 
• Middle-class/bourgeois upbringings (exc. Gramsci) 
• From West of Vienna/Prague (exc. Lukacs and Goldmann) 
• Formed politically by either WW1 + Russian Revolution or WW2 
• Professional academics 
• Generally, from countries with a Communist party leading a militant working class, 
and a numerous and radical intelligentsia  
• Break with the organic unity of theory and practice (de-linked from revolutionary 
activity) 
• Work produced in situations of defeat/despair 
• Pessimism 
• Shift in focus from politics and economics to philosophy and ‘method’ 
• Presence and influence of European idealism 
• Rejection of the late works of Engels  
• Focus on superstructures 
Additional features 
                                                
5 Anderson’s canon, in order of birth: Lukacs (1885-1971), Korsch (1886-1961), Gramsci (1891-1937), 
Benjamin (1892-1940), Horkheimer (1895-1973), Della Volpe (1897-1968), Marcuse (1898-1979), Lefebvre 
(1901-1991), Adorno (1903-1969), Sartre (1905-1980), Goldmann (1913-1970), Althusser (1918-1990), Colletti 
(1924-2001). 
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7 
• Focus on ideology as an explanation for proletarian ‘consent’ 
• Central use of the notion of totality6 
Let us begin with the similarities. Williams would be one of youngest thinkers, but older than 
Colletti and only three years younger than Althusser. Like the younger sub-set (from Lefebre 
onwards), Williams came of age during the rise of fascism and WW2. He joined the student 
branch of the Communist Party on the eve of the war and saw combat. Anderson (1976) notes 
that only Lukacs, Korsch and Gramsci, the three oldest figures, were leaders within political 
parties; from then on, while ‘Marxism did not “stop”, as Sartre was later to claim … it 
advanced via an unending detour from any revolutionary practice’ (1987, p. 42). Williams 
joins the post-Gramsci Western Marxists in owing his political maturity largely to the period 
after that of active revolutionary agitation in Russia and Europe. Like the thinkers of the 
Frankfurt School and the younger Italian and French Marxists, Williams contributed to 
Marxist thought primarily from within academia, though he was never politically inactive, 
being in turn a member of the Labour Party (1961-66) and Plaid Cymru7. Williams wrote in a 
period marked by the long shadow of Stalinism,8 extended periods of Conservative rule, the 
disappointments of the Wilson Labour governments9 and, later, the rise of neoliberalism.10 
While Williams never succumbed to any general pessimism, this accumulation of defeats 
meant that his work was indeed produced, as Anderson (1976) writes of the Western Marxist 
tradition as a whole, ‘in situations of political isolation and despair’ (p. 42). 
These are the most obvious biographical and conjunctural similarities between Williams and 
the Western Marxists, but there is also significant overlap of intellectual themes and objects. 
Anderson (1976) argues that the ‘most striking single trait of Western Marxism as a common 
tradition is … perhaps the constant presence and influence on it of successive types of 
European idealism’ (1987, p. 56).11 Williams’s own relation to idealist thought was complex. 
He viewed his own mature theory as materialist and Marxist and was dismissive of orthodox 
                                                
6 See Jay (2004) for a book-length discussion of the concept of totality in Western Marxism. 
7 Exact dates unknown. Williams (2003c) ‘Decentralism and the Politics of Place’ states that he was a member 
for ‘a year or two’ (p. 206), probably in 1971-73. 
8 The 1956 Hungarian Revolution (in which Lukacs participated) and subsequent Soviet invasion were 
formative moments in the New Left’s rejection of Soviet-led Communism.  
9 Williams’s most programmatic political intervention, the May Day Manifesto (1968), to which E. P. Thompson 
and Stuart Hall contributed, was a response to the failures of the first Wilson government.  
10 ‘Plan X’ (p. 244) in the language of Williams’s Towards 2000 (1985d). 
11 See Anderson (1987), (pp. 56-57) for details. For our purposes, the influence of European idealism includes in 
almost all cases Hegel; for Lukacs also Weber and Simmel’s sociology, Dilthey and Lask’s neo-Kantian 
philosophy; for Gramsci, the idealist thought of Croce; for Sartre, the phenomenology and existentialism of 
Husserl and Heidegger. 
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Marxist critiques of the idealist elements in his own work and that of the Western Marxist 
thinkers that influenced him. Speaking of his discovery of Lukacs and Goldmann’s work in 
‘Literature and Sociology’ (1971), he says tersely: ‘The fact that I learned simultaneously that 
it had been denounced as heretical, that it was a return to Left Hegelianism, left-bourgeois 
idealism, and so on, did not, I am afraid, detain me. If you’re not in a church you’re not 
worried about heresies’ (2005f, p. 20). Eagleton (1976) would attack Williams in precisely 
these terms, accusing his early work of reducing the social formation to a ‘“circular”, 
Hegelian totality’ (p. 11) within the framework of an ‘idealist epistemology’ (p. 12) and 
describing the product of Williams’s later rapprochement with Marxism (an original 
interpretation of Gramsci’s hegemony12) as a ‘fraught, dissentient, intellectually unclarified 
affair’ (p. 23). However one evaluates the consistency of Williams’s later positions, it is clear 
that elements of both idealist and materialist intellectual traditions inform Williams’s mature 
cultural materialism. The idealist element originates in the inheritance of the English literary 
tradition in which Williams was trained,13 the materialist element in a more obviously 
transnational provenance: British philosophical and scientific materialism, stretching back to 
Hobbes, and Marxism itself.  
In Culture (1981), Williams would explicitly accede to his dual formation by describing his 
‘sociology of culture’ as participating in ‘a new kind of convergence’ (p. 12) between 
previously antagonistic idealist and materialist traditions in conceiving of culture as a ‘whole 
way of life’. ‘Whole way of life’ is in fact an older version, taken up afresh in Culture, of 
what for most of Williams’s career would be called ‘totality’, the irreducible connectedness 
of all elements of social life. An abiding concern with this idea of the total interrelation of 
parts within a social order was a hallmark of Western Marxism from Lukacs onward,14 as 
well as other British Marxists influenced by continental thought.15 The young Eagleton 
connected its use in Williams to Hegelian idealism but, as Milner (2002) points out, there are 
forms of materialism which also refuse to make absolute distinctions between, for example, 
culture and non-culture: ‘A rigorous materialism, such as that proposed by Hobbes and 
subsequently pursued by modern economic theory, is … fundamentally unable to conceive of 
the cultural as meaningfully distinguishable from the economic and the political’ (p. 15). 
                                                
12 See Chapter Three for an extended analysis of Williams’s theory of hegemony. 
13 See Milner (2002) for an account of the Anglo-European roots of English literary criticism, i.e. ‘English 
literary criticism was influenced by German idealism by way of English and German Romanticism, especially 
through Coleridge’ (p. 15). Coleridge, of course, was a major figure in Williams’s Culture and Society. 
14 See Jay (2004), pp. 81-127 for details. 
15 See, in particular, pp. 14-18 for discussion of the importance of totality for the ‘Nairn-Anderson thesis’. 
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Williams’s resolute focus on culture as ‘the whole historical social and material process’ 
(2005g, p. 52) and his insistence, in Culture and elsewhere, that one cannot meaningfully 
distinguish the realm of the ‘aesthetic’ from the rest of social life,16 would seem to align him 
with this ‘rigorous materialism’. But in, to cite only a few examples, his abiding concern with 
feeling and experience, his account of generative or ‘emergent’ forms of consciousness and 
his late adoption of the language of ‘signification’ (drawn from a critical engagement with 
Saussurian linguistics), there are enough idealist or neo-idealist elements in Williams’s work 
that Milner (2002) is right to describe cultural materialism as ‘the paradigmatic instance, in 
the English-speaking world at least, of precisely this new kind of convergence’ (p. 18). 
As we shall see, much of the critical literature on Williams in the seventies and eighties 
revolves around the question of whether a properly Marxist theory of culture can be 
generated from the kind of ‘irreducibility’ or ‘non-categorical’ approach that Williams 
favoured. At stake in these debates are different conceptions of the ‘functional’ nature of the 
totality i.e. the specific processes by which its interconnected parts are articulated. This is 
related, in turn, to the question posed by the traditional Marxist binary of ‘base and 
superstructure’, namely of the relation of cultural and otherwise ‘non-economic’ elements to 
what is usually conceived of as a determining material or productive ‘base’ given by the 
mode of production. Like the canonical thinkers of Western Marxism, Williams’s work is 
primarily concerned with that portion of social life traditionally placed within the 
‘superstructure’, in particular the creative arts and ‘consciousness’. The key point then, and 
here we move into the sphere of Williams’s differences from the Western Marxist tradition, is 
that the period of Williams’s work in which his engagement with Marxism is strongest (the 
seventies) is in effect an extended critique of base and superstructure as inherited from 
orthodox Marxism. The Western Marxist tradition holds a variety of ambiguous and often 
contradictory positions on this central tenet of historical materialism. Insofar as Williams’s 
critique draws heavily on the steps taken by Western Marxists beyond ‘vulgar’ or 
‘mechanical’ materialist versions of base and superstructure, he is working within that 
tradition and its contradictions. Insofar as Williams is really dismantling the theory and 
constructing something else in its place, he may be regarded as outside it. In this sense, 
Williams’s later work moves within a conceptual space which is both within and beyond the 
problematic of Western Marxism. 
                                                
16 See pp. 72-77 for discussion of Williams’s opposition to the ‘specificity of the aesthetic’ in Marxism and 
Literature.	
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A further ambiguity in Williams’s relation to Western Marxism is the fact that he devotes 
relatively little space to traditional philosophical questions. For Anderson (1976), a striking 
feature of Western Marxism was the ‘overwhelming predominance of professional 
philosophers within it’ (1987, p. 49). Williams’s training as a literary critic marks him out, 
but what is then interesting is that this did not prevent him from developing an abiding 
concern with what Anderson calls ‘method’. Indeed, The Long Revolution (1961), Marxism 
and Literature (1977) and Culture (1981) may be regarded as successive book-length 
attempts to produce a general framework for the study of the social totality; they are 
comparable, in this sense, to texts like Lukacs’s ‘What is Orthodox Marxism?’ (1919) and 
Sartre’s The Problem of Method (1957). What distinguishes Williams’s work from these 
texts, and indeed from what Anderson call the ‘obsessive methodologism’ (1987, p. 53) of 
Western Marxism, is a) that most of Williams’s critical texts are highly specific analyses of 
cultural and other objects, rather than philosophical exegeses, and b) that even the more 
methodological texts are not centrally concerned with the question of knowledge 
(epistemology), even where Williams’s cultural analyses do court ontological debates on the 
nature of material reality, social causation etc. Williams’s work is significant, however, for 
one long-standing epistemological debate of serious import for the British Left in the sixties 
and seventies: the question of empiricism vs. rationalism. In Chapter Two of this thesis I 
argue that while Williams’s early work is indeed largely empiricist, rationalist arguments 
about the limits of experience and the necessity of ‘abstract’ cognition become increasingly 
present throughout his ‘Europeanist’ period (roughly, 1968-79). 
Williams’s work also bears an ambiguous relation to Western Marxism on the question of the 
role of ideology in disciplining and adapting the working-class to its subservient position 
within capitalism; in short, whether ideology is generative of consent (Gramsci) or even, in 
stronger forms of the argument, of subjectivity itself (as in Althusser’s ‘interpellation’17). As 
we shall see, Williams is entirely opposed to the strong Althusserian view that workers are 
‘interpellated’ into a given subject-position by the ideological matrix of capitalist social 
relations, nor will he concede that the working class has been ‘duped’ into giving its consent. 
The former argument clashes with Williams’s humanism, the latter with his empiricism: 
human beings are not functions or reflections of systems of power and consciousness cannot 
be dismissed as inadequate merely on the grounds that workers misperceive their economic 
interests. It is the relatively positive valence which Williams grants ordinary experience 
                                                
17 See Althusser (2008) for a full account. 
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which renders him unable to accede to the more pessimistic accounts of culture and 
consciousness produced within Western Marxism; his affirmative account of the creative and 
generative nature of consciousness puts Williams firmly at odds with Althusser, but also, as 
we shall see, with Adorno and Horkheimer’s ‘negative’ critical theory, Marcuse’s One-
Dimensional Man (1964) and Timpanaro’s melancholic physicalism,18 among others. 
A central feature of Williams’s work is an absolute rejection of elitism.19 In large part, 
Williams’s anti-elitism accounts for his rejection of theories which deride the creative 
capacities of the working class and its potential to self-generate forms of consciousness 
conducive to socialism. It has been argued, not least by Williams himself, that this attitude 
which, paralleled in the work of Hoggart and Thompson, would come to be called the 
‘culturalist’ emphasis, stemmed from Williams’s working-class upbringing in the Welsh 
border village of Pandy; his father was a signalman active in trade union and Labour politics. 
The bourgeois formations of the Western Marxists are a far cry from Williams’s own, and he 
provides us with numerous anecdotes to indicate the resilience of this formation against the 
quite different ‘structure of feeling’ of the class situation into which he entered at 
Cambridge.20 In Politics and Letters, Williams suggested that his trajectory was a commoner 
one in Wales than in England: ‘Historically, Welsh intellectuals have come in very much 
larger numbers from poor families than have English intellectuals, so the movement is not 
regarded as abnormal or eccentric. The typical Welsh intellectual is – as we say – only one 
generation away from shirt sleeves’ (1979, p. 29). Indeed, it is Williams’s working-class 
formation (though not, indeed never, his Welshness) which Anderson, in his single mention 
of Williams in Considerations, emphasises as his unique and vital asset as an intellectual, 
prefacing the point with an endorsement of Gramsci’s well-known typology: 
The “organic intellectuals” envisaged by Gramsci, generated within the ranks of the 
proletariat itself, have not yet occupied the structural role in revolutionary socialism 
that he believed would be theirs. The extreme forms of esotericism that have 
characterized Western Marxism were symptomatic of “traditional intellectuals” in 
Gramsci’s sense, in a period when there was little or no contact between socialist 
                                                
18 See Williams (2005i) for an essay-length discussion of Timpanaro’s influential On Materialism (year) and 
The Freudian Slip (year). 
19 On the question of whether anti-elitism necessitates ‘populism’, Williams (2005h) provides a nuanced account 
in ‘Notes on Marxism in Britain Since 1945’, pp. 239-243. 
20 See Politics and Letters (2015 [1979]) for the best known of these, wherein Williams at Cambridge protests 
the Leavisite claim that the industrial revolution rendered the word ‘neighbour’ in Shakespeare 
incomprehensible to modern ears: ‘I got up and said I thought this was only differentially true; there were 
obviously successive kinds of community, and I knew perfectly well, from Wales, what neighbour meant’ (p. 
67). 
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theory and proletarian practice. But in the long run, the future of Marxist theory will 
lie with intellectuals organically produced by the industrial working classes of the 
imperialist world themselves, as they steadily gain in cultural skill and self-
importance. (1987, p. 105) 
[Then, in a footnote on the same page] 
Perhaps the most distinguished socialist thinker to have so far come from the ranks of 
the Western working class itself has been a Briton, Raymond Williams. Yet 
Williams’s work, while it has corresponded closely to the pattern of Western Marxism 
in its typically aesthetic and cultural focus, has not been that of a Marxist. However, 
its class history – steadily and confidently present throughout Williams’s writings – 
has conferred on this work certain qualities which cannot be found anywhere else in 
contemporary socialist writing, and which will be part of any future revolutionary 
culture. (p. 105)  
In describing Williams as a ‘Briton’ rather than as a Welshman, Anderson expresses the 
central desire of that younger, more militantly Marxist generation of NLR editors21 in the 
sixties and seventies: the construction of a distinctively British Marxism which could hold its 
own, in intellectual terms, with the vibrant continental European traditions then at their 
height. As we shall see, this was an enterprise fraught with contradictions, a fascinating case 
study in which is the significance of Williams for those engaged in it. For at different 
moments and in different hands, Williams appears as both a) the figure to whom a British or 
‘English’ Marxism will be most indebted and b) a symbol of the very intellectual weaknesses 
which make the prospect of a ‘native’ British Marxism impossible, and which necessitate the 
building of a Marxist tradition from scratch out of materials imported from continental 
Europe.  
For Anderson, what disqualifies Williams from the canon of Western Marxism is not that 
there is a lack of basic correspondence. The omission is explained more simply and phrased 
as though uncontroversial: ‘Williams’s work … has not been that of a Marxist’ (1987, p. 
105). What must then be noted is that Williams’s engagement with Western Marxist ideas (as 
well as those of non-Marxist radical European traditions) intensifies in close conjunction with 
a) his increasing sense of his own Welshness and deepening antipathy towards England (and 
by proxy a certain England-centric image of Britain), and b) his sense of his own work as 
Marxist. These are contradictions, relative to the views of Anderson and others, that require 
analysis in the context of those critical responses. It is to this that I know turn, as part of a 
                                                
21 See p. 13 below. 
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wider survey of critical responses, in addition to those already mentioned, to Williams’s 
interactions with European thought. 
The Meaning of Williams’s Europeanism: Critical Perspectives 
It seems there are no comparisons of Williams to continental Marxist thinkers prior to that of 
Gwyn A. Williams in 1960. Given the extraordinary lag between the publication of major 
Western Marxist texts in Europe and their translation and publication in Britain,22 this should 
not be surprising. In 1980, Williams would note the ‘inordinate time’ it took ideas to cross the 
Channel, ‘one of the longest cultural journeys in existence by comparison with the physical 
distance’ (1989n, p. 78). Two important intellectual events in the sixties structurally prefigure 
much of the subsequent critical debate: a) the shift from the ‘first’ to the ‘second’ generations 
of New Left Review,23 in which Williams played a significant role and b) the publication of 
the ‘Nairn-Anderson theses’, a body of work24 which provided the catalyst for British debates 
over the relative strengths and weaknesses of British and European socialist thought. The 
original NLR would last only two years, in which brief period Williams contributed six 
articles. From 1963 and with a new format from 1964, a younger generation of editors around 
Perry Anderson, Tom Nairn and Robin Blackburn would steer the journal in a quite different 
direction. Fred Inglis (1995) provides a concise account of Anderson’s new vision: 
Anderson had flinty views on what to do with the Review. He would ditch the uneasy 
mixture of up-to-date journalism, CND and anti-Tory polemics, investigative 
exposures and movie reviews, ULR moralising and New Reasoner economics. The 
new version of the review would be a trans-continental and trans-Atlantic journal of 
neo-Marxist theory with a strongly revisionist turn, taking its lead from Sartre and 
Louis Althusser, a name then barely known in Britain, from early Marx and the 
unheard of Italian, Antonio Gramsci. It would keep faith with the cultural emphasis 
that had made its signature, and which carried Williams’s unique authority, but attach 
it to a more exigent and rigorous sociology than the old Marxist historians had ever 
read. Weber would be as much cited as Bernstein, Levi-Strauss as Engels. (1995, p. 
185) 
While ostensibly concerned with many of the same issues (culture, the rise of ‘consumer 
society’, the legacy of Stalinism, the question of revolutionary agency), the ‘second 
generation’ of NLR set their intellectual sights squarely beyond British borders, courting the 
                                                
22 See pp. 30-32. 
23 New Left Review was created in 1960 as a merger of the editorial boards of The New Reasoner (John Saville, 
E.P. Thompson and Ralph Miliband) and Universities and Left Review (Stuart Hall, Charles Taylor and Raphael 
Samuel). While not an editor, Williams regularly contributed articles and, as Ellen Meiksins Wood (1995) 
recounts, he was ‘brought into the planning of the new journal very early’ (p. 25).  
24 See Forgacs (1989), p. 74, for a full list of the texts.	
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most contemporary continental Marxist theory. The formal editorial shift was fractious, 
effectively a purge by Anderson of several members of the old board, including Thompson, 
who responded by attempting a counter-purge. In conversation with Inglis, Anthony Barnett, 
another member of the board, recalls that Thompson attempted to enlist Williams in ousting 
the younger editors, but he refused (Barnett quoted in Inglis, 1995, p. 186). The disagreement 
was not bitter enough to stop Williams and Thompson collaborating on the May Day 
Manifesto, nor in keeping up a friendly personal correspondence. It was the spark, however, 
for what would be a long rivalry between Thompson and Anderson.  
The ‘meaning’ of Williams’s work is an element of contestation within the works comprising 
Thompson and Anderson’s rivalry, and several commentators have noted the ambivalent 
relation borne by Williams to each camp. Wood, a  Thompsonite critical of the second 
generation of NLR, suggests that Williams makes an interesting witness because ‘he never 
neatly fitted into either group and for that reason could be seen as bridging them’ (1995, p. 
25). Inglis (1995), similarly, frames Williams’s role as a personal, mediatory intervention in 
an intellectual dispute between the ‘first’ and ‘second’ New Lefts.25 Barnett (in Inglis, 1995) 
puts Williams’s refusal to block Anderson’s reforms down to an instinct for ‘survival’ (p. 
186), a desire to avoid NLR suffering the same fate as his own short-lived journal Politics and 
Letters (1947-48). Inglis and Barnett’s comments also suggest that Williams, in rebuffing 
Thompson, was demonstrating a closer theoretical affinity to the younger generation. This is 
very difficult; one of the aims of this thesis is to establish Williams’s position relative to these 
opposing stances on the salience of European Marxism to British socialist thought. This is not 
to say that Williams’s only differences with Thompson concern his ‘Europeanism’, or that his 
only differences with Anderson et al concern his ‘Britishness’. The real divisions between 
tendencies within the New Left were far more complex than any single explanatory axis can 
capture, and are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
It will be worth briefly summarizing the historical and theoretical debate around which the 
critical reception of Williams’s Europeanism has orbited. Anderson and Nairn set out their 
theoretical critique of British radical traditions in a series of historical essays in NLR. The 
opening salvo was Anderson’s ‘Origins of the Present Crisis’ (1964), published alongside 
                                                
25 Inglis (1995), using interviews with some of the participants in this debate, provides a particularly thorough 
account. 
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Nairn’s ‘The English Working Class’26 (1964). The basic argument of these ambitious texts 
was that Britain’s lack of a classic revolutionary break from feudalism severely impacted the 
intellectual development of both bourgeoisie and proletariat. Untethered from the demands of 
revolution, Britain’s bourgeois-feudal ruling class never had to develop an overarching, 
heroic revolutionary theory to justify its hegemony and, in consequence, Britain lacks a 
systematic, rationalist tradition. British intellectuals, both bourgeois and proletarian, have 
tended towards empiricism, favouring the tangible and fragmentary (particular) over the 
intangible and structural (universal). A near-total lack of ‘totalising’ theory rendered the 
English working-class corporative, rather than hegemonic in outlook, reliant on non-
revolutionary theories like utilitarianism (Fabianism). When Marxism finally arrives from the 
continent, it is ‘too late’; there is a lack of serious intellectual labour to ‘translate’ the 
totalising, rationalist perspectives of Marxism into terms that make sense to ‘the English 
mind’. Britain, then, lacks either a classical sociology or a national Marxism i.e. either an 
idealist (bourgeois) or a materialist (Marxist) theory of society as a totality. 
Anderson explicitly singles out Williams’s Culture and Society as an example of analysis 
which fails to distinguish between ‘corporative’ and ‘hegemonic’ forms of working-class 
culture and strategy (1964, p. 44). Now, Williams had argued that the solidaristic and 
communal culture of the working class could be generalised as a ‘common culture’ 
compatible with socialist goals; ostensibly, this is a hegemonic vision. Williams would later 
come to realise that this approach was guilty of a false universalism, the imposition of the 
culture of one specific kind of community (that of his own Welsh working class roots) onto 
society as a whole.27 Anderson’s criticism is different: Williams’s ‘common culture’ could 
never be hegemonic because it proceeded from the experience of a class with an over-defined 
sense of itself. The British working class, Anderson argued, knew only its own experience 
and, lacking any conception of the social totality, was ignorant of the practices and forces 
which would need marshaling for it to achieve power. The British labour movement needed 
to become acquainted with the kind of totalising reason that had found socialist expression in 
Marxism in Europe, but had failed to break through the empiricist armour ingrained into 
British culture by historical events. Williams, as it would turn out, would become perhaps the 
                                                
26 The title of Nairn’s piece may have been a materialist rejoinder to the implication buried in the title of 
Thompson’s The Making of the English Working Class, namely the ‘culturalist’ position that a national working 
class does not exist ‘in itself’, but must be ‘made’ in the course of its experiential development. 
27 See Chapter Two. 
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foremost advocate of the ‘perspective of totality’ in Britain. His conception of totality, 
however, would not rely on the rejection of experience. 
Thompson (correctly) read Nairn and Anderson’s pieces as attacks on his The Making of the 
English Working Class (1963). His acerbic rejoinder, ‘The Peculiarities of the English’ 
(1965), claimed that Anderson and Nairn were ‘model-builders’ (p. 321), substituting abstract 
theoretical models for real, fine-grained historical analysis. Thompson defended what he 
agreed with Nairn/Anderson is a native English empiricism by contrasting it with the kind of 
ahistorical abstraction he believed the younger historians to be engaging in. For Thompson, 
empiricism was to be lauded as concomitant with scientific enquiry in general, as that which 
confirms hypotheses and grants the validity of any abstract model (p. 337). A member of the 
dissident Communist Party Historians Group, Thompson wanted to emphasize the strength of 
a native Marxist tradition as a means of distancing British Marxism from the Moscow line.28 
Nairn and Anderson’s dismissal of any native British Marxist tradition is thus read as 
dismantling Britain’s only line of defence against the anti-humanism of orthodox 
communism in continental Europe. What is at stake here is the contested status of British 
intellectual traditions within the broader post-Stalinist reconceptualization of socialist 
internationalism. In both Thompson and Anderson/Nairn’s work there is a sense of necessary 
reorientation, but in different directions. For Thompson: inwards, in search of the seams of 
national strength and authenticity that might ground a more durable internationalism in the 
future. For Anderson/Nairn: outward, against both the traditions of a native imperialism and 
the ‘Foreign God that Failed’. Williams’s own reorientation, as well shall see, contains 
elements of both. 
Anderson’s furious rejoinder to Thompson, ‘Socialism and Pseudo-Empiricism’ (1966), laid 
the groundwork for the more systematic critique of British intellectual culture in 
‘Components of the National Culture’ (1968). Williams figures in both these texts in 
interesting ways. The key thesis is stated earlier in the 1966 text: ‘Britain never produced 
either a Marxism or a classical sociology’ (p. 22). What it did produce, however, was a 
relatively totalising literary and literary-critical tradition. Uniquely, in Britain, argues 
Anderson, it was literary criticism that came closest to adopting a totalising view; Anderson 
(1966) praises Williams’s critical work alongside these exceptions to Britain’s dire 
intellectual record: 
                                                
28 See Hamilton (2011), pp. 93-132, for a more detailed account of Thompson’s grievances against Anderson 
and Nairn.	
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The achievement of the English realist novel is a rare pinnacle in any comparative 
perspective. Indeed, as I remarked in Origins of the Present Crisis, it is precisely in a 
cognate literary tradition that the Victorian intellectuals came nearest to a 
philosophical vision and critique of their society – the subject-matter of Culture and 
Society. The issue, however, is whether these intellectuals produced a total political 
vision of society of the same quality or coherence. The indisputable fact is that they 
did not. (1966, p. 17) 
It is immensely significant, incidentally, that the only major theoretical departure in 
English social thought in the last decade – The Long Revolution – has derived from a 
writer trained in literary criticism. This was perhaps the only source from which it 
could have come, since the literary tradition of Culture and Society was the British 
substitute for classical sociology or a philosophical socialism in the 19th century. 
(1966, p. 23) 
Williams, on this analysis, is the only contemporary ‘English’ thinker to break free from his 
‘native’ empiricism, and to embrace a totalising, quasi-sociological perspective on social 
relations. The prevailing sense among commentators had been that Williams was indeed an 
‘empiricist’, consistently privileging experience over structural modeling and abstract reason; 
Anderson’s view is thus a dissenting one. It is explained by the concept of totality, the 
conceptual lodestone which Anderson correctly takes to be the crucial meeting-point between 
Williams and the Western Marxist tradition which he and Nairn were aligning themselves 
with in the sixties.  
Thompson had implicitly accused the younger historians, due to their apparent anti-empiricist 
disregard for historical ‘detail’ and subjective experience, of recapitulating the anti-humanist 
logic of orthodox communism. In ‘Socialism and Pseudo-Empiricism’, however, Anderson 
(1966) rejects Thompson’s critique and claims an unorthodox, transnational Marxist 
tradition: 
The theoretical lineage of our work is altogether different from Thompson’s image of 
it. It comes from the major tradition of Western European Marxism since the First 
World War – a tradition which has consistently been coeval with new forms of 
idealism, and a dialectical response to them within the evolution of Marxism itself. 
This distinctive movement has produced a Marxism which has always had an 
‘idealist’ dimension, by the canons of Engels or Kautsky. There have been three 
decisive moments in this complex history. In the early 1920’s, Lukacs, formed in his 
youth by Hegel and the neo-Kantians, Dilthey, Lask and Simmel – synthesized these 
influences with his new-found Marxism and produced Geschichte und 
Klassenbewusstsein. In the 1930’s Gramsci, imprisoned in Italy, reworked the 
philosophy of Croce and De Sanctis (themselves descendants of Hegel) into a novel 
and labile Marxism, which started from a ‘theory of the superstructures’. In the fifties 
and early sixties, Sartre – whose immediate intellectual ancestors were the 
existentialist Heidegger and the phenomenologist Husserl – reinterpreted the whole 
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trajectory of his own work and wrote the massive treatise which dominates Marxist 
discussion today, the Critique de la Raison Dialectique. (1966, p. 31) 
Most importantly for our purposes, the three thinkers Anderson aligns himself with here 
(Lukacs, Gramsci and Sartre) are precisely those whom Williams (1972) will describe as 
Marxism’s ‘alternative tradition’, a lineage which this thesis argues was centrally formative 
of his mature cultural materialism. Notice also that the Marxist tradition Anderson is laying 
claim to consists of a) thinkers who are, like Williams, thinkers of the totality i.e. of society 
as a set of mutually constitutive relations and b) thinkers who, again like Williams, develop a 
materialist position from within idealist traditions (Anderson knows he has a solid precedent 
for this in Marx’s Hegelian roots). The role Anderson then projects for Williams is as 
something like the progenitor of a late-coming, ‘native’ British Marxism tasked with 
overcoming the bankruptcy of its own intellectual inheritance. Working from the proposition 
that ‘it is virtually certain that any creative Marxist theory in England will follow the 
[European] pattern’ (1966 p. 32) he had described, Anderson implicitly portrays Williams as 
the British equivalent of the idealist precursors of the Western Marxists, the Dilthey, Husserl 
or Croce of an embryonic British, or rather English, Marxism: ‘For the most advanced 
socialist thought in England is Raymond Williams’s superbly intricate and persuasive work – 
itself the most generous and humane idealism we have yet known. Any English Marxism will 
have to measure itself against this landmark in our social thought; it will only emerge from a 
real dialogue and communication with it’ (p. 32).29  
A fascinating dynamic in Anderson’s assessment is that he appeared to view Williams as both 
the saviour and as the most powerful critic of the British intellectual tradition. Inglis (1995) 
has the right sense of this: ‘Needing as a matter of urgency a home-bred theorist who could 
rescue old English inertia (the essay is powerfully, but of course implicitly, patriotic), 
Anderson found one in Raymond Williams’ (p. 218). Anderson’s elevation of Williams, then, 
has at its root a kind of patriotism. Anderson wants to save England from itself, from its own 
history, but the paradox of his approach is that while he cannot imagine the British tradition 
itself offering much of use, he also cannot imagine a ‘British Marxism’ emerging merely 
from he and Nairn importing a foreign theoretical pantheon; this, ironically, had been 
Thompson’s concern. There is then a further irony, which is that while one of the commonest 
                                                
29 Anderson (1968) would reaffirm this positioning of Williams in ‘Components of the National Culture’, 
arguing that from within the native tradition of literary criticism, heretofore dominated by the ‘mystified form’ 
of the (conservative, organicist) totality in F. R. Leavis, ‘Williams was able to develop a systematic socialist 
thought, which is a critique of all forms of utilitarianism and Fabianism – the political avatars of empiricism in 
the labour movement’ (p. 56). 
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critiques of Williams was his ‘insularity’, or even his ‘cultural nationalism’, Williams was 
actually far less concerned than either Anderson or Nairn with the production of a specifically 
British (much less English) Marxism or materialism. He was, in this sense, the more 
consistently transnational thinker. 
I have already mentioned Nairn’s harder critique of Williams’s ‘cultural nationalism’, which 
was spurred by Williams’s initial refusal to register a view on the question of Britain’s 
accession to the European Community. Williams, Nairn believed, was cleaving to the British 
(bourgeois) nation-state. But, as Barnett (1976) would later recount, ‘when the referendum 
came round in 1975 and Williams could no longer refuse to register, he drew exactly the 
conclusion that Nairn thought he would not … Williams voted for entry into Europe, as a 
socialist’ (p. 52). This, of course, was the period of a burgeoning Welsh nationalism which, 
as I have already argued, was connected to Williams’s Europeanism by a thread of trenchant 
critique of the dominant English culture and the British state. Barnett intuits something 
similar: ‘Far from clinging to it, he began to break away when international developments30 
after 1968 made this more possible, until when the referendum came round he chose a “West 
European” identity’ (p. 52). But by neglecting the Welsh dimension of this shift, Barnett 
misses an opportunity to assess Williams’s increasing commitment to cultural pluralism, in 
effect reducing a complex development to a simple pivot towards Europe. I address this point 
in considerable detail in Chapter Two. 
Like Nairn, the young Eagleton failed to perceive the scale of Williams’s reorientation in the 
seventies, portraying his oeuvre, including the late cultural materialism, as irrecoverably 
immersed in an English tradition. By the time of his ‘Criticism and Politics’ (1976). NLR had 
practically achieved its goal of bringing Western Marxism to a British academic audience. 
Althusser had arrived and, for the young Eagleton, had superseded the residual idealism of 
the earlier Western Marxists with a more rigorous and scientific approach, grounded in a 
structuralist and anti-humanist redeployment of historical materialism. At the core of 
Eagleton’s critique was complex a more rigorously anti-humanist version of the Nairn-
Anderson theses. Thus it is Williams’s ‘insistence on experience, this passionate premium 
                                                
30 The international developments Barnett alludes to are presumably the popular uprisings of May 1968 and the 
shift towards Eurocommunism of some European communist parties in the wake of the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia. But there was also, of course, a major domestic reason for re-orienting towards Europe: the 
failure of the first Wilson Labour government to push through the contradictions of the ‘new capitalism’ 
towards a socialist future for Britain, a failure which had already been diagnosed by Williams, Thompson and 
Hall in the May Day Manifesto (1967). 
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placed upon the “lived”, which provides one of the centrally unifying themes of Williams’s 
oeuvre – which supplies at once the formidable power and drastic limitations of his work’ 
(1976, p. 8). Williams’s work is fatally limited, then, by his ‘native’ empiricism and 
humanism but, interestingly, Eagleton also provides the first explicit comparison of Williams 
to named Western Marxist thinkers since Gwyn A. Williams’s Gramsci allusion: 
The English Marxism available to [Williams] was little more than an intellectual 
irrelevance; indeed if a Marxist criticism comes about in English society, one might 
risk the paradox that one of its sources will be the fact that Williams had in his own 
time to reject it. What he did, then, he did almost single-handedly, working from his 
personal resources, without significant collaboration or institutional support. The 
product of this unflagging, unswerving labour was the most suggestive and intricate 
body of socialist criticism in English history – criticism for which no English 
comparison is even remotely relevant, but which must be referred for comparative 
assessment to the aesthetic production of a Lukacs, Benjamin or Goldmann. It is 
enough to say that any Marxist criticism in England which shirks taking the pressure 
of Williams’s work will find itself seriously crippled and truncated. (1976, p. 9) 
Eagleton, unlike Thompson, Nairn and Anderson, is writing from within the same discipline 
as Williams; the goal is not an English Marxism tout court, but an English criticism. Thus 
Eagleton’s European comparisons are thinkers with a prodigious literary-critical or ‘aesthetic’ 
output31. Note that he does not make statements of influence but of comparative impact or 
achievement. Eagleton will grant biographical and thematic similarities between Williams 
and Lukacs, but he will not grant a serious influence. Indeed, Eagleton’s primary criticism of 
Williams’s late engagement with European theory is that Williams looks only with ‘a certain 
proprietary interest to Europe, to find echoes of his own independently-produced work 
reflected back to him’ (1976, p. 18) Rather than being actively influenced by Western 
Marxism, then, Eagleton takes Williams to be appropriating European theory to ends which 
are fundamentally those of an irreducibly British empiricism. Barnett’s (1976) rebuttal is 
more an apologia for the parlous state of British Marxism during Williams’s formation than 
of Williams himself. While Eagleton attributes the absence of a strong post-war Marxism to a 
British intellectual tradition incapable of ‘thinking’ historical materialism (the tendentially 
idealist nature of Eagleton’s own position should be clear), Barnett attributed it to the 
predominance of authoritarian and pessimistic communism abroad. Ultimately, Eagleton and 
Barnett’s disagreement on the historical logic of British socialism is secondary, for both 
agreed that Williams is not in any serious way an international thinker. They agreed, 
                                                
31 Benjamin, a secondary European influence on Williams to whom he had not previously been compared, 
would be the central figure of Eagleton’s Walter Benjamin or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism (1981), from 
which the ‘British equivalent of Lukacs’ phrase comes. 
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furthermore, that Williams’s apparent lack of European influence left him dependent on a 
defunct British empiricism: ‘It can be said that, although he approaches experience in a 
historical and materialist fashion, the use to which Williams puts his notion of “experience” 
does not share these qualities. On the contrary it is given a privileged role as the determining 
organizer of knowledge’ (Barnett, 1976, p. 62).  
This thesis will argue that Williams’s deployment of the notion of totality is an attempt at 
synthesising the insights of empiricist and rationalist modes of analysis. Recall that Anderson 
had viewed totality as the integration of various forms of historical, economic and cultural 
investigation, so as to ‘make whole’ social analysis. Williams concurred but, in addition, 
viewed the divisions between individual and society and between consciousness (or 
experience) and reality as examples of the fragmentary perspective which it was the task of 
totality to integrate. For Williams, fusing these oppositions was the great achievement of 
Sartre’s late opus, The Critique of Dialectical Reason (French: 1960, English 1976) which, as 
I discuss in Chapter Two, was a key influence on Williams in the mid-seventies. Barnett 
(1976) makes an early, biographical comparison between Sartre and Williams in the NLR 
rebuttal: 
While Eagleton properly insists that Williams’s criticism should be compared with 
that of Lukacs, Goldmann and Benjamin, his political role can be contrasted with 
Sartre’s. At first sight no two figures might appear more dissimilar, but there are some 
striking parallels between the two. Both have worked on the relationship between 
politics and culture, especially literature. Both have written novels and plays as well 
as criticism and social theory. Both are fascinated by the heroic period of the 1940s. 
Both have tried to become materialists on their own terms, fighting an obstinate battle 
against the reductionism of mechanical materialism. Had Politics and Letters 
survived, rather than flickering out, after a year of publication, in 1948, it would have 
been the English cousin of Les Temps Modernes. (1976, p. 64) 
This is right, and the connection between the two journals may be closer than Barnett 
realises: one of Sartre’s pieces in Les Temps Modernes, ‘What is Writing?’ (1947)32, 
appeared in translation in Williams’s Politics and Letters (1947). This was the first English 
translation of the text; it is likely that Williams, who could read and write French, was the 
translator. That Williams found the piece valuable suggests a deeper connection to Sartre’s 
work than Barnett’s largely biographical comparison allows. The critical literature in general 
is egregiously silent on the link between Williams and Sartre. I attempt to remedy this in 
Chapter Two. 
                                                
32 This would later form the first chapter of Sartre’s What is Literature? (1948). 
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The gulf between the first and second New Lefts, which widened during the seventies under 
the influence of Althusser, was articulated around three seemingly irreconcilable oppositions: 
Britain vs. Europe, empiricism vs. rationalism and culturalism vs. structuralism33. Thus 
Thompson, the most vociferous defender of British culture and radicalism during the period, 
writes the most sustained British attack on a European Marxist with his The Poverty of 
Theory (1978). Anderson, while not an Althusserian, sees it as his responsibility to defend the 
broadly structuralist, ‘Europeanist’ and rationalist position in his Arguments Within English 
Marxism (1980). The nature of Williams’s Marxism is again contested in these texts, with 
Thompson broadly aligning him with the first terms of the above oppositions, Anderson the 
second. Centrally, Thompson claims Williams as an ally against hard-Althusserian versions 
of ‘determination’:  
The critical concept (unexamined by Althusser) is that of ‘determination’ itself; hence 
the importance - as Williams and I and others have been insisting for years (and to the 
deaf) of defining ‘determine’ in its senses of ‘setting limits’ and ‘exerting pressures’ 
and of defining ‘law of motion’ as ‘logic of process.’ This helps us, at once, to break 
out of the idealist circuit; we can no longer offer social formations as ‘society effects’ 
or as ‘developed forms’ of an immanent mode. (2013, p. 214) 
Indeed, a central tenet of Williams’s mature cultural materialism was that law-like versions of 
material determination and cultural production, whether of the base/superstructure or 
class/ideology variety, were inadequate, and that a more variegated approach was needed. 
Anderson grants this in his Arguments, but then points out that Williams at least critically 
entertained Althusser’s more subtle notion of ‘over-determination’ in Marxism and 
Literature. He goes on to argue that Williams is one inspiration, Althusser the other, for the 
complex Marxist model of determination outlined by Erik Olin Wright in his structuralist 
classic, ‘Class, Crisis and the State’ (1978). We should note that Anderson is not 
appropriating Williams for Althusserianism; he is disputing the strict affiliation which 
Thompson imagines him to have to an ‘English empiricist’ Marxism. As further evidence, 
Anderson contrasts Williams’s clear statement of affinity with Western Marxism in Marxism 
and Literature  with Thompson’s on-going disdain for European theory: ‘The “unendurable 
time for a rational mind in the Marxist tradition” [TPOT] here becomes “the first” in which 
such a mind “could feel at home” [ML]. Experience, touchstone of the Thompsonian world, 
reveals its waywardness’ (1980, p. 130).  
                                                
33 This last opposition forms the basis for Hall’s ‘Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms’ (1980), in which he links 
Williams to a broadly Gramscian (culturalist), rather than an Althusserian (structuralist) paradigm. 	
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Now, while Anderson (1980) is right to emphasise the ‘antithetical’ (p. 130) character of 
Williams and Thompson’s responses to European Marxism, he is wrong to oppose 
Williams’s Europeanism to the notion of experience. A broadly empiricist methodology, 
focussing on lived experience as central to art, culture and politics, remained the hallmark of 
Williams’s work throughout his life, even under the influence of European, ‘rationalist’ 
Marxism. In this sense, Williams was nearer to Thompson. While Williams’s work in the 
sixties and seventies cannot be read as a conscious attempt to bridge the first and second New 
Lefts, enabling a dialogue between them, however fractious, became its theoretical function, 
given the real cleavages within post-war British Marxism. But Williams’s position had 
always contained something of this synthesising impulse. His trademark concept of a 
‘structure of feeling’ was an early attempt to reconcile experience with the sociological 
abstraction required to analyse society as a totality. Later this would morph, under the 
influence of Gramsci, into an empiricist reformulation of hegemony which emphasised the 
residual and emergent experiences which coexist in social space alongside the dominant 
culture. I present a theory of Williams’s ‘empiricist Gramscianism’ in Chapter Three. 
*     *     * 
The publications of Marxism and Literature (1977) and PL (1979), in which Williams 
engaged more closely with European thinkers than in his previous work, meant that critics in 
the eighties were more comfortable making comparisons and, occasionally, claims of 
influence. Hall (1980) acknowledged Williams’s considerable late debt to Gramsci while 
critiquing his application of Gramscian concepts from a more structuralist perspective. J. P. 
Ward (1981), in the first book-length treatment of Williams, emphasised his Welsh 
Europeanism and correctly positioned him on the Gramscian rather than the Althusserian side 
of the debate around the nature of totality. John Higgins (1983), noticing the tautology 
evident in in Althusser’s notion of a subject which is both interpellated and produced via 
interpellation, convincingly defended Williams’s critique of Althusserian anti-humanism. 
Edward Said (1983)34 saw a kind of culturally mobile lineage from Lukacs, through 
Goldmann to Williams while Mulhern (1984) noticed the value of Williams’s (2005d) 
writings on the East German Marxist Rudolf Bahro. Jan Gorak (1988), with Said and against 
Eagleton, acknowledged the real influence of Goldmann and paired the French Marxist with 
Mikhail Bakhtin as important figures for Williams’s mature thought. 
                                                
34 See Chapter One, pp. 78-85 for a fuller discussion of Said’s thesis. 
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Williams’s untimely death in 1988 instigated a flurry of critical appraisals. David Forgacs 
(1989), continuing Gwyn A. Williams’s now venerable line of thought, perceived a 
Gramscian thematic not just in Williams’s early work, but also in that of Thompson, 
Anderson and Nairn. Eagleton, while not withdrawing his past criticisms, took a more 
conciliatory and respectful tone towards Williams in his edited collection Raymond Williams: 
Critical Perspectives (1989). Here Eagleton (2007a) reads Williams as actually anticipating 
more recent European developments (specifically: Bakhtinian social linguistics and 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action) and argues that Williams wisely avoided the 
hard Althusserianism and post-structuralism then tempting literary scholars (including 
Eagleton). In the same volume, Fernando Ferrara (2007) situates Williams as a significant 
contributor to European intellectual life. He recounts that Williams visited him and his 
colleagues in Italy ‘to cooperate in a project we had designed to support the introduction of 
cultural studies into the English curriculum of our university’ (p. 97). Like other critics, 
Ferrara makes Gramsci central to Williams’s thought, but he also signals the importance of 
Williams to Italian scholarship: 
Hegemonization was the longest revolution;35 it is in fact a never-ending revolution. 
This doctrine at once authenticated and added new drive to [Williams’s] own ideas. If 
Gramsci can be considered an authority in the field of cultural studies, then this is 
what Italian cultural studies have contributed to Raymond Williams as a cultural 
thinker. Perhaps it is not accidental that when he wrote Problems of Materialism and 
Culture (1980) and Culture (1981) his books were promptly translated into Italian and 
acknowledged as participating in an international discussion that went back to 
Tocqueville, Marx and Weber and extended to Gramsci, Lukacs, Brecht and 
Goldmann. (2007, p. 105) 
Central to Ferrara’s essay is a sense of mutual constitution: Gramsci provided Williams with 
the conceptual tools to develop his work within and beyond a British tradition, and Williams 
was now bringing the perspectives of British cultural studies to Italy, helping Ferrara and his 
colleagues to ‘break up the dominance of Crocian, neo-idealist attitudes still rampant in the 
[Italian] academy, especially in literary studies’ (p. 97). Anderson (2016) would later remark 
that it took a British intervention, namely that of Williams, to rescue Gramsci from his 
sterilization (p. 76) at the hands of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). Ferrara (2007) doesn’t 
go as far in critiquing the PCI, but he does note that Marxist literary theorists had tended to 
follow the PCI’s orthodox, ‘base to superstructure’ line and were unready to accept 
arguments about ‘cultural revolution’ (p. 102). In another crucial parallel between Williams 
                                                
35 In Chapter Three, pp. 206-223, I build on a variant of Ferrara’s position, linking the notion of a ‘long 
revolution’, to what Gramsci described as a ‘war of position’.			
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and a Western Marxist, then, both Britain and Italy were ‘unready’, in the post-war period, to 
receive the insights of their respective ‘culturalists’. When one broke through, so did the 
other; in both countries, a growing receptiveness to either Gramsci or Williams appears to 
have facilitated receptiveness to the other. 
At the centre of Tony Pinkney’s readings of Williams in this period is a recuperation of 
Williams as a modernist or even a postmodernist; anything but the ‘British Lukacs’. The 
‘British Bloch’ argument comes from his contribution to Eagleton’s critical collection, but 
the ascription of postmodernism to Williams comes from Border Lines (1991), a study of 
Williams’s novels. There Pinkney describes Williams as a ‘postmodern novelist’, and as 
developing from a realist into a postmodernist over the course of his career. As will be clear 
from Chapter One and the conclusion to this thesis, I take Eagleton’s side in the 
realism/modernism debate as it relates to Williams. Briefly, I believe novels like The 
Volunteers (1978) and The Fight for Manod (1979) are better served by David Harvey’s 
(1995) reading, that they evoke ‘the battle between different levels of abstraction, between 
distinctively understood particularities of places and the necessary abstractions required to 
take those understandings into a wider realm, the fight to transform militant particularism into 
something more substantial on the world stage of capitalism’ (p. 85), than by Pinkney’s 
(1991) evocation of ‘impossible totalities’ (p. 109), ‘the Lyotardian postmodernist sublime’ 
(p. 108) or ‘the impossible nature of postmodern, multinational space’ (p. 108). I read 
Williams as a realist not only in his aesthetic preferences and literary-critical insights, but 
also philosophically. Eagleton’s accurate observation that Williams avoided the lure of 
postmodernism is grounded, I think, in the recognition that Williams remains within a realist 
problematic; he maintains a space for thinking through the nature of objective reality. 
‘Representation’ and its paradoxes are not, as Pinkney comes close to arguing, the horizon of 
Williams’s thought. Williams’s few engagements with the major postmodernists (Derrida, 
Foucault, Lyotard), as well as Lacan36 and the feminist psychoanalysts of the seventies and 
eighties were scant and insubstantial, tending towards the dismissive. 
                                                
36 The most positive statement on Lacan, which is really a critique of his academic use, is the following from 
Politics and Letters (2015 [1979]): ‘I have great respect for Lacan, but the totally uncritical way in which certain 
of his concepts of phases in language development have been lifted into a theoretical pediment of literary 
semiotics is absurd, in a world in which there is current scientific work of a non-philological kind with which all 
such concepts have to be brought into interplay … What is needed is not a blending of concepts of literature 
with concepts of Lacan, but an introduction of literary practice to the quite different practice of experimental 
observation. That would be the materialist recovery’ (p. 341). 
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Pinkney’s intervention is indicative of a brief period in which several critics sought either to 
align Williams with figures linked to post-structuralism or, in stark contrast to the preceding 
period of critical reception, to critique him for being too Marxist. Thus Simon During (1989) 
reads Williams’s decentralist politics as a possible influence on Laclau and Mouffe’s post-
Marxist classic Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985) and distances Williams from 
Bourdieu and Sartre in favour of Maurice Blanchot (the latter a significant influence on 
Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze). Alan O’Connor (1989) makes an oblique comparison to 
Merleau-Ponty and notes some differences with Sartre on ethics.37 Michael Moriarty (1992), 
recalling Williams’s contention that ‘a fully historical semiotics would be very much the 
same thing as cultural materialism’ (Williams, 1984, p. 210), argues for a theoretical 
rapprochement between cultural materialism and structural linguistics; Jon Thompson (1993), 
likewise, sees a fruitful connection between Williams on literary form and Barthes’s ecriture. 
On the more concretely anti-Marxist side of things, Robert Miklitsch (1995) argues that 
Williams’s ‘characteristically proletarian, neo-Gramscian’ (p. 86-87) reworking of hegemony 
is inferior to Laclau and Mouffe’s which ‘better enables one to think the dispersion, 
fragmentation, and indeterminacy of our postmodern moment’ (p. 87). In a similar vein, John 
Brenkman (1995) argues that Williams, however ‘dissident’ he may seem relative to 
orthodox Marxism, nevertheless remains too attached to the working class and lags, 
conceptually, behind the Austrian social philosopher Andre Gorz, whose insights ‘would 
have sharpened Williams’s sense that the task of the democratization of culture and the 
struggle for socialist institutions was proceeding through new social movements that certainly 
traversed but could never unite the working class’ (p. 265). 
The minority of more post-structuralist oriented views above speak to the relative weakness 
of academic Marxism and class politics in the immediate post-Soviet years. Harvey (1995), 
whose views of Williams’s novels I contrasted favourably to Pinkney’s, restores Williams to 
a Marxist critical framework, noting his crucial affinity to Brechtian humanism and the 
message of his plays, that ‘the ways in which personal and particular choices made under 
given conditions are the very essence of historical-geographical change’ (p. 79). But it is John 
Higgins’s Raymond Williams: Literature, Marxism and Cultural Materialism (1999) which 
most explicitly positions Williams within the Western Marxist tradition: 
                                                
37 O’Connor, noting the publication in Williams’s Politics and Letters journal of a piece by Sartre (see Chapter 
Two of this thesis for further discussion), says: ‘The Politics and Letters editorial description of the institution of 
literature as human responsibility is a very different vocabulary from Sartre’s existentialism’ (p.13). From the 
general vocabulary of existentialism, perhaps, but not from Sartre’s larger account of ‘committed’ writing in 
What is Literature? (2001). In Chapter Two, I compare the ‘literary ethics’ of Williams and Sartre. 
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Certainly, The Country and the City (1973) and Marxism and Literature (1977) are 
usually regarded as key works in the Western Marxist tradition of cultural and 
aesthetic theory. With Georg Lukacs and Lucien Goldmann, Williams shared a 
commitment to teasing out the relations between history and form; alongside Sartre 
and Gramsci, he explored the ideas of commitment and hegemony; like Benjamin, 
Brecht and the Frankfurt School, he sought to understand the dynamics of 
contemporary cultural expression. Throughout his career, he argued for a better 
understanding of the constitutive force of culture in social reproduction than orthodox 
Marxist theory appeared to allow, or, to frame his achievement differently (and this is 
the turning point for Marxist assessments of Williams), he overestimated the force of 
culture in social reproduction in ways which exemplify the left-idealist tendencies of 
Western Marxism. (1999, p. 100) 
I suggest two caveats to this otherwise correct assessment. First, ‘usually’ is too strong; while 
Williams’s debt to Western Marxism has been increasingly acknowledged, there has always 
been an equal, and in the post-war decades clearly dominant, tendency to distance him from 
it. Secondly, while it is true that Williams’s work has often shared weaknesses with the ‘left-
idealism’ of some Western Marxists, this is decreasingly the case as Williams matures and 
cannot properly be said of the later developments. My position on Williams’s late work is 
closer to Fowler’s (2000), who argues that both Williams and Bourdieu sought to forge new 
methods which were ‘determinist but not economistic’ (2000, p. 110), that is, which avoided 
the pitfalls of both vulgar materialism and the idealist paradoxes of much Western Marxist 
thinking. 
The question of whether Williams can finally be called a ‘culturalist’ animates much of the 
critical discussion around his work. Andrew Milner’s innovative analysis in Re-Imagining 
Cultural Studies (2002) begins from the proposition that cultural studies was always a 
transnational phenomenon, emerging from the tripartite intellectual foment of German critical 
theory, French structuralism and ‘Cambridge English’. Milner then argues for a ‘going 
beyond’ of British culturalism in Williams, comparable to Habermas, Foucault and Bourdieu 
relative to their respective national ‘schools’: 
In short, Williams stands in an essentially analogous relation to the culturalist 
tradition as does Habermas to the (Western) Marxist, Foucault and Bourdieu to the 
structuralist. Williams’s cultural materialism is thus best understood, neither as a 
culturalism nor even a left-culturalism, but rather as what we have termed ‘post-
culturalism’. We have noted how the theoretical literature in Cultural Studies tended 
to contrast Williams’s ‘culturalism’ with the long tradition of French structuralism. 
What we now know as post-structuralism developed by way of a reaction against 
precisely this structuralist intellectual tradition. But there is an equivalently long 
culturalist tradition behind Williams, reaching back from Eliot and Leavis to Arnold 
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and beyond. And Williams’s relation to this tradition is essentially ‘post-culturalist’. 
(2002, pp. 169-170) 
Milner acknowledges the significant theoretical differences between these thinkers, but his 
point is a relative one: Williams does for the Culture and Society tradition what Habermas 
does for the Frankfurt School and Foucault and Bourdieu, in different ways, do for French 
structuralism. But what is the substance of this comparison? Milner’s analogy seems to be 
based upon what might be termed ‘postmodernization’; thus in each thinker there is a 
‘relativizing turn’ i.e. away from their respective ‘modernist’ traditions, an acknowledgement 
of the ‘intrication of power in discourse’ and a sense of ‘genuinely free communicative 
action’ (p. 170). I would argue, however, that at the root of Williams’s realism lie 
commitments a) to some form of objective material and social reality and b) to forms of 
community which, in being materially structured by a common experience, are precisely non-
relativistic. As Daniel Williams (2003) points out, Williams’s late cultural pluralism ‘cannot 
be unreservedly aligned to the views of postmodern hybridists, for Williams’s pluralism 
always involves a simultaneous gesture towards a community of belief and action which is 
hardly compatible with the cultural and political relativism of postmodernism’ (pp. xliv-
xlv).38 ‘Post-culturalist’ may be a serviceable term, but Milner’s analysis suffers from the 
assumption that the only way to be ‘post’ something is as the agent of its postmodernization. 
In this thesis I offer a different perspective on how Williams may be read as a ‘post-
culturalist’, rooted in my sense of him as a realist. Milner is right, of course, to emphasise 
that the discipline of cultural studies, as the ‘father’ of which Ferrara invited Williams to 
lecture in Italy, was the product of a thoroughly transnational and Europeanist foment.  
Paul Jones’s ambitious Raymond Williams and Sociology: A Critical Reconstruction (2004) 
is the most thorough-going attempt to rescue Williams from the ‘charge’ of culturalism, 
aligning him with a modern, sociologically-inclined Marxism. Briefly, Jones reads Williams 
as engaged in a recalibration of Marxist cultural theory away from base and superstructure 
and towards an analogy with Marx’s ‘forces’ and ‘relations’ of production.39 In exploring 
this, Jones enthusiastically asserts the influence of Western Marxist thinkers on Williams, 
paying more attention to the influence of Frankfurt School thinkers like Adorno, Benjamin 
                                                
38 See Chapter Two, pp. 180-192, for a thorough discussion of Williams’s views on community and the politics 
of place. 
39 At the core of Jones’s assessment is a rebuttal of Eagleton and Hall’s critiques of Williams’s ‘culturalism’ as 
insufficiently Marxist: ‘For it is evident that Williams resolves the arguably oxymoronic nomenclature, “cultural 
materialism”, by an appeal to a Marxian paradigm of production. He makes plain that the cultural materialism is 
not driven principally by an extended philosophical elaboration of a “materialism” but, instead, by the 
application of this production paradigm to the field of culture’ (p. 38). 
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and Marcuse40 than most previous critics. Central to Jones’s argument is that Williams 
doesn’t simply discard thinkers like Goldmann and Benjamin in favour of Gramsci in the late 
seventies, but that the influence of those thinkers are retained; this is right and, as this thesis 
demonstrates, must also be said of Lukacs and Sartre. The influence of Adorno and Benjamin 
may be overstated in Jones’s account, but his assertion of influence is welcome. Jones’s core 
argument, that Williams’s developed thought is sociology rather than culturalist ‘immanent 
critique’, is in many ways convincing.  
In recent years, during what might broadly be described as the era of postcolonial theory, 
discussion of Williams has quite rightly begun to address Williams’s relation to non-
European thinkers, ideas and formations.41 This is important not only because of the scholarly 
value in mapping such connections, but because ‘critical theory’ itself has undergone a 
significant geographical shift since Williams’s death. In his book The Left Hemisphere: 
Mapping Critical Theory Today (2013), Razmig Keucheyan argues for a process he calls ‘the 
globalization of critical thinking’ (p. 20), in which broadly marxisant critical and cultural 
theory migrates away from Europe in the eighties, first to the Anglo-American academy, then 
more recently to ‘the peripheral regions of the international intellectual field’ (p. 20). Daniel 
Williams’s Who Speaks for Wales? Nation, Culture, Identity (2003), in its close focus on 
Williams’s relation to Wales’s post-coloniality has been instrumental in promoting a 
concomitant shift within Williams studies. And again, in this new movement, Wales has 
functioned as a kind of key to relating Williams to the world beyond England, beyond Britain 
and now beyond Europe. This thesis, of course, is focussed on Williams’s Europeanism, but 
it is important to emphasise the connectivity which a modern, ‘globalised’ critical 
consciousness may intuit or construct between Williams and an even more expansive 
transnational milieu.  
Williams and European Theory: An Outline 
Not for nothing did Williams describe the crossing of the English Channel as ‘one of the 
longest cultural journeys’. A central mediating factor in Williams’s reception of European 
thinkers is the lag between original and English publications of many key works of Western 
Marxism, as well as structuralism and psychoanalysis (less so for existentialism). In orienting 
ourselves to Williams’s Europeanism, then, it will be useful to establish some key publication 
                                                
40 Mulhern (2009) has also discussed the hitherto unrecognized influence of Marcuse on Williams.		
41 See, for example, Dix, H. (2010), Masnatta, C. (2010) and Williams, D. (2003).  
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dates. The selection of texts below is based on Williams’s own published writings; Williams 
makes reference to all of the listed texts at some point in his career (this fact alone should 
dispel the notion that he was an ‘insular’ thinker).  
Publication in English of key texts by Williams (in bold) and by relevant European thinkers 
(original publication dates in brackets): 
1921 – Williams born 
1941 – Fromm’s The Fear of Freedom (U.S.) 
1943-51 – Various of Sartre’s plays published in English shortly after French publication 
1947 – Sartre’s ‘What is Writing?’ (French and English, the latter in Williams’s journal 
Politics and Letters) 
1950 – Lukacs’s Studies in European Realism (German: various, thirties) 
1950 – Reading and Criticism 
1952 – Drama from Ibsen to Eliot 
1954 – Preface to Film 
1954 – Drama in Performance 
1955/56 – Marcuse’s Eros and Civilisation (German and English) 
1956 – Marx’s Capital vol. 2 (German: 1885) 
1956 – Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (French: 1943) 
1957 – Gramsci’s The Modern Prince and Other Writings (Italian: 1950 but written 1929-35) 
1958 – Culture and Society  
1959 – Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (German: 1844) 
1959 – Marx’s Capital vol. 3 (German: 1894) 
1959 – Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics (French: 1916) 
1960 – Border Country  
1961 – The Long Revolution  
1962 – Lukacs’s The Historical Novel (German: 1937) 
1962 – Britain in the Sixties: Communications  
1963 – Levi-Strauss’s Structural Anthropology (French: 1958) 
1963 – Lukacs’s The Meaning of Contemporary Realism (German: 1958) 
1963 – Sartre’s Search for a Method (French 1957) 
1964 – Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man published in German and English 
1964 – Brecht’s ‘The Modern Theatre is the Epic Theatre’ (German: 1930) 
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1964 – Brecht’s ‘A Short Organum for the Theatre’ (German: 1948) 
1964 – Second Generation 
1966 – Modern Tragedy  
1967 – May Day Manifesto 
1968 – Drama From Ibsen to Brecht  
1969 – Levi-Strauss’s The Elementary Structures of Kinship (French: 1949) 
1969 – Benjamin’s ‘The Work of art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (German: 
1935) 
1969 – Althusser’s For Marx (French: 1965) 
1970 – Althusser’s Reading Capital (French: 1965) 
1970 – The English Novel from Dickens to Lawrence 
1971 – Gramsci’s Selection from the Prison Notebooks (Italian: 1950 but written 1929-35) 
1971 – Lukacs’s History and Class Consciousness (German: 1923) 
1971 – Lukacs’s The Theory of the Novel (German: 1920) 
1971 – Sartre’s ‘The Burgos Trials’ published in French and English 
1971 – Orwell  
1972 – Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment published in English (German: 
1944) 
1972 – Barthes’s Mythologies (French: 1957) 
1973 – Adorno’s Negative Dialectics (French: 1966) 
1973 – Marx’s Grundrisse (German: 1939) 
1973 – The Country and The City  
1974 – Television  
1975 – Goldmann’s Towards a Sociology of The Novel (French: 1963) 
1975 – Timpanaro’s On Materialism (Italian: 1970) 
1976 – Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason vol 1 (French: 1960) 
1976 – Timpanaro’s The Freudian Slip (Italian: 1974) 
1976 – Keywords  
1977 – Lacan’s Ecrits (French: 1966) 
1977 – Bahro’s The Alternative in Eastern Europe (German: 1976) 
1977 – Marxism and Literature  
1978 – Lukacs’s ‘Realism in the Balance’ (German: 1938) 
1978 – Benjamin’s The Origin of German Tragic Drama (German: 1928) 
1978 – The Volunteers 
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1979 – Politics and Letters  
1979 – The Fight for Manod 
1980 – Lukacs’s Essays on Realism (German: 1971 but essays written in the thirties) 
1980 – Problems in Materialism and Culture  
1981 – Culture  
1983 – Towards 2000  
1984 – Bourdieu’s Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (French: 1979) 
1985 – Loyalties 
1988 – Williams’s death 
1988 – The Politics of Modernism  
1989 – Resources of Hope  
1989 – People of the Black Mountains vol. 1 
1990 – People of the Black Mountains vol. 2 
1991 – Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason vol. 2 (French: 1985) 
 
As we have seen, Williams could read French and, although he could not read German, his 
academic situation will have kept him abreast of some European ideas which had yet to make 
the crossing. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that Williams encountered most of 
these texts first in English translation, and so this chronological view allows us to make some 
initial observations. As we shall see, there are numerous occasions on which Williams signals 
his enormous frustration that Britain has been impoverished for so long by the more 
egregious translation delays. 
Even excluding the extraordinary lateness of some of Marx’s texts in English, the general 
situation is one of severe cultural lag. In general, the earlier the original publication in 
German, French or Italian, the worse the delay; evidently, the cultural journey had shortened 
by the seventies (not least due to the efforts of NLR). Thus Lukacs’s History and Class 
Consciousness takes forty-eight years to cross, Bahro’s The Alternative in Eastern Europe 
just one. By the time of Williams’s first tranche of publications in the early to mid-fifties 
(Reading and Criticism to Drama in Performance), he only really had access to Fromm, 
writing in English in the U.S., to Sartre’s plays, one book by Lukacs, to Freud and some of 
Marx. By the publication of Culture and Society, we can add one further major Freudo-
Marxist text from the Frankfurt School in English (Marcuse’s Eros and Civilisation), Sartre’s 
Being and Nothingness (thirteen years after the French) and a truncated selection from 
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Gramsci, The Modern Prince and other Writings. Saussure’s Course appears in 1959, forty-
three years late. Fromm, Freud, Marx and Sartre all make appearances in The Long 
Revolution (1961); the absence reference to Saussure, Lukacs and Gramsci is forgivable in a 
British context of general disinterest - Williams was making broad contact with what was 
available. Between The Long Revolution and the mid-to-late sixties period of Modern 
Tragedy (1966) and Drama from Ibsen to Brecht (1968), more work of Lukacs and Marcuse 
is made available, along with Brecht’s theoretical pieces and Sartre’s existentialist-Marxist 
‘pivot’ text, Search for a Method. Again, Williams makes use of the material. Williams (1962 
& 1963) reviews the extant English texts from Lukacs42 and the Brecht essays inform 
Williams’s analysis of his plays in Modern Tragedy; whether Sartre’s Search for a Method 
did the same for the Sartre/Camus material is less clear.43 European theory is far from absent, 
then, in Williams’s work as of 1968, but there is nothing comparable to the statement of 
affinity already to be found in Anderson’s ‘Socialism and Pseudo-Empiricism’ (1966). 
As Barnett (1976) rightly concluded, the real shift towards Europe comes in the period 
between the May Day Manifesto (1967) and Marxism and Literature (1977). Between 1969 
and 1973, when The Country and the City (in Williams’s own words a kind of Marxist 
‘break’ (Williams, 1985a, p. 209)) appeared, major works by Levi-Strauss, Benjamin, 
Althusser, a more comprehensive Gramsci, Lukacs, Sartre, Adorno, Horkheimer, Barthes and 
even Marx (the Grundrisse) appear in English for the first time. Some of these, like 
Althusser’s For Marx and Reading Capital, are translated relatively quickly, while others, 
especially Lukacs’s History and Class Consciousness, Benjamin’s work, Gramsci’s Prison 
Notebooks and the earlier Frankfurt School material, were between twenty-five and fifty 
years overdue. Over the next four years to 1977 and Marxism and Literature, major works by 
Goldmann, Timpanaro and Lacan become available, plus Bahro’s The Alternative and 
Sartre’s late opus, the Critique of Dialectical Reason (vol. 1), which Williams 
enthusiastically reviews in The Guardian. Williams wrote a huge number of reviews of 
European writers in the sixties and seventies, primarily for The Guardian and New Society. 
Williams reviewed no fewer than forty-five texts by or about the major European thinkers 
listed above in his lifetime, at least twenty-five of these in a ten-year ‘Europhile’ window 
between 1967 and 1977. Williams’s catalogue of reviews has rarely drawn much attention, 
despite it constituting an enormous body of critical engagement. This thesis draws heavily on 
                                                
42 For discussion see Chapter One, pp. 50-56.	
43 For discussion see Chapter Two, pp. 117-128. 
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Williams’s reviews of European writers, collected among Williams’s papers in the Richard 
Burton Archives at Swansea University. 
Of course, Williams’s engagement with European thought was not confined to reviews. As 
we have seen, Williams was incorporating the insights of European thinkers into his work 
from at least TLR, with further engagements in Modern Tragedy and DFIB, but there is a 
sharp uptick in the late sixties, beginning with an essay on Marcuse for The Cambridge 
Review44 (1969) and coinciding with Williams’s lecturing on European theory at 
Cambridge.45 I offer here only a summary of Williams’s discussions of European thinkers in 
his essays and books after 1968; we will return to many of these texts later. Appropriately 
enough, many of the relevant essays appear in NLR. The first was ‘Literature and Sociology: 
In Memory of Lucien Goldmann’ (1971), first given as a talk at Cambridge in the same year. 
Goldmann had died in 1970 and Lukacs, who features heavily in the piece, passed away just 
months after Williams’s talk. In 1972, another talk of Williams’s, given in Montreal, was 
transcribed for The Listener; ‘Lucien Goldmann and Marxism’s Alternative Tradition’ (1972) 
is a crucial text for thinking through Williams’s Europeanism, and plays a structural role in 
this thesis.46 It was followed a year later by a classic text of the period: ‘Base and 
Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory’ (1973), which established the basic parameters of 
Williams’s Gramscian critique of both orthodox and structural Marxism. Williams would 
expand his analysis of hegemony in Marxism and Literature alongside discussions (of 
varying length and detail) of Althusser, Benjamin, Adorno, Brecht, Goldmann, Lukacs, 
Saussure, Bakhtin and Sartre. Rounding out the ‘cultural materialist’ NLR pieces of the 
seventies was ‘Problems of Materialism’ (1978), in effect an essay-length review and 
discursus on Timpanaro. Significant discussions of Lukacs, Brecht, Sartre, Freud and 
                                                
44 We get a sense of the importance of Marcuse for Williams in the following passage from the 1969 essay: ‘For 
historical reasons, we have been separated, in Britain, from a critical and philosophical tradition which, when 
we re-encounter it in Marcuse or in Lukacs, is at once strange and fascinating: at once broader and more 
confident, more abstract, and yet more profoundly involved than our own. I felt the size of this gap, and yet the 
interest and pleasure of a possible bridge across it, in one of Marcuse’s essays from the thirties, reprinted in this 
volume, on the “The Affirmative Character of Culture”. The particular interest of the essay, for me, is that its 
analysis corresponded so closely with a central theme of Culture and Society, and that both were historical 
treatments of very much the same problem, which were yet continents or countries apart in method and in 
language. It was a marvellous moment of intellectual liberation to read across that gap into a mind which in all 
but its most central area of concern and value was so wholly other and strange’ (1969, p. 367). 
45 In a notebook dated January 23rd 1974 and titled ‘Theories of Culture’, Williams’s lecture notes expound on 
ideas of culture in European thought from 18C to the present. The names mentioned give a flavour of the kind of 
concerted engagement with European thought Williams was making: Volataire, Herder, Montesquieu, Vico, 
Rousseau, Marx, Engels, the Frankfurt School, Lukacs, Gramsci, Pareto, Mannheim, Weber, Durkheim, Comte, 
Jung & Althusser.  
46 See pp. 37-39. 
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psychoanalysis, Timpanaro, Saussure and Bahro can be found in Politics and Letters (1979) 
alongside briefer comments on Goldmann, Althusser, the Frankfurt School, Lacan and 
Bourdieu. 
Following the period of his most concerted engagement with European Marxism, Williams 
wrote several essays assessing the state of literary and cultural theory in Britain and its 
possible futures.47 These texts, alongside Culture (1981) and a range of essays on modernism 
and the avant-garde,48 placed European theory centre-stage in Williams’s transition away 
from traditional literary criticism and towards the broader practice of cultural materialism or 
the ‘sociology of culture’. Williams had laid the foundations of cultural materialism in 
Marxism and Literature and the NLR essays of the seventies; in the eighties, particularly in 
Culture, he offered more programmatic interventions. Within what he considered the terms of 
a materialist-idealist synthesis, Williams (1981) argued for a discipline which would combine 
‘the anthropological and sociological senses of culture as a distinct “whole way of life”’ and 
the sense of culture as ‘all the “signifying practices” – from language through the arts and 
philosophy to journalism, fashion and advertising’ (p. 13) to produce an overarching 
sociological enterprise. Williams emphasised that such a project had only been made possible 
because of the interventions of European Marxist critics, among them Lukacs, Goldmann, 
Benjamin, Adorno and Marcuse, who had provided ways of studying the relations between 
‘forms’ and social relations, and between material conditions, signifying practices and 
aspects of ideology and consciousness.  
Williams examined the disorienting effect which some of these Marxist cultural theories, 
alongside structural linguistics, post-Althusserian structuralism49 and Russian formalism, 
were having on British literary studies in an NLR piece, ‘Crisis in English Studies’ (1985a). 
This was written in response to the ‘MacCabe affair’, in which marxisant cultural critic Colin 
MacCabe was denied a permanent lectureship at Cambridge by a Faculty Board unprepared 
to institutionalize European innovation. In a late parallel with the New Left Review furore, 
Williams sided with the prevailing theoretical winds and fought in MacCabe’s corner. 
Recounting the recent history of theoretical innovations, Williams distances himself from 
psychoanalysis and structuralism, and affirms the potential of an as-yet unformed ‘fully 
historical semiotics’. ‘Cultural materialism’, he contends, ‘is the analysis of all forms of 
                                                
47 See (1985a), (2007a) & (2007b).  
48 These essays are collected in Politics of Modernism: Against the New Conformists (1989). 
49 Williams notes, for example, the influence of Eagleton’s Criticism and Ideology (1976) of Pierre Macherey 
(1985a, p. 207).	
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signification, including quite centrally writing, within the actual means and conditions of 
their production’ (p. 210). Since much Western Marxist cultural theory has been criticism, 
rather than sociology, Williams argues that ‘most actual Marxist and structuralist tendencies 
have been … compatible or even congruent in a broad sense with the orthodox paradigm’ (p. 
211), that is, the ‘dominant literary paradigm’ (p. 209) which emphasises the uniqueness of 
literature as a distinct symbolic practice. In Williams’s estimation, much of his own work was 
carried out within this broad orthodoxy. His late work, however, is included among the three 
modern positions Williams now takes to be incompatible with ‘Cambridge English’: 
traditional Marxist base and superstructure analysis, among which Williams counts The 
Country and the City (1973),  ‘radical semiotics’ (confusingly, Williams uses this term as a 
synonym for deconstruction50), and cultural materialism. Each of these, argues Williams, 
share an incompatibility with orthodox literary criticism in that they ‘necessarily include the 
[literary] paradigm itself as a matter for analysis, rather than as a governing definition of the 
object of knowledge’ (p. 211). They are, in other words, versions of a total theory of cultural 
production, reserving no special place for literature, or indeed for any other cultural practice. 
For Williams, of course, cultural materialism is the worthiest alternative to Cambridge 
orthodoxy. Traditional Marxism and deconstruction are the polarised extremes (one 
materialist, the other idealist) of total cultural analysis between which Williams will try to 
steer his sociology of culture.  
A key influence on Williams’s mature sociology of culture was Pierre Bourdieu. It appears to 
have been E. P. Thompson, intriguingly, who put Williams on the French sociologist’s trail. 
On an undated postcard to Williams, presumably from the mid-seventies, Thompson writes: 
Just back from a second colloque in Paris: something peculiar is happening there. A 
group of scholars of the left, younger than me but not very young, are trying to make 
 
 
 
 
 
 (E. P. Thompson, 
personal communication, undated) 
Williams would meet Bourdieu in France in 1976, giving a talk that December; later the same 
month, Bourdieu wrote to Williams in English: 
                                                
50 In ‘The Uses of Cultural Theory’ (2007b), Williams describes post-structuralist linguistics more broadly as ‘a 
now increasingly false and misleading’ distortion of Saussure (p. 171). 
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I am most pleased with our meeting and hope that this may be the beginning of a 
 
 
 
 
 
’ [1963]. (P. Bourdieu, personal 
communication, December 22, 1976). 
In the same letter, Bourdieu requests to publish a chapter from William’s Television in his 
journal Actes de la recherché en sciences sociales. As in Ferrara’s account, we find a sense of 
transnational, mutual affinity and influence, in particular here around the concept of the 
sociology of culture, and an aggrieved awareness of national insularity. Bourdieu would later 
express this in praise of Marxism and Literature: ‘I read your book … with interest and agree 
profoundly with you … the fact is, I feel so isolated here that the extent of our agreement 
seems to me somewhat miraculous’ (P. Bourdieu, personal correspondence, December 7, 
1977). Williams’s association with Bourdieu in the seventies proved so fruitful that, as the 
eighties began, Williams wrote (with Nicholas Garnham) ‘Pierre Bourdieu and the Sociology 
of Culture: An Introduction’ (1980), in which the authors argued that Bourdieu’s work 
‘dialectically supercedes [sic]’ (p. 210) three extant and opposing tendencies within cultural 
studies: culturalism, Althusserian structuralism/formalism and more recently, a resurgent 
political-economic Marxism emerging in response to Althusserian/Lacanian theoreticism. 
They viewed Bourdieu as grounding a materialist theory of symbolic power in class relations 
without dismissing either as merely secondary or affording either undue privilege. Such was 
Williams’s goal, the task to which he set, at various points, the terms ‘realism’, ‘totality’, 
‘hegemony’ and ‘cultural materialism’. It is no exaggeration to say that Williams regarded 
Bourdieu’s emphases as something like the future of cultural studies, and certainly the 
direction in which he would be taking his own work. The rather sad coda to Williams’s 
association with Bourdieu is that in 1987, Bourdieu wrote to Williams to request his 
collaboration on a transnational journal of European letters that would try to bridge the 
divisions between Europe’s national intellectual cultures.51 Williams would pass away the 
following year. 
 *     *     * 
                                                
51 Bourdieu’s prospective journal was to have an innovative format: the first half of each issue would contain 
essays from scholars in the country of publication, while the latter half would comprise a common set of essays 
from across Europe in translation. To my knowledge, the journal never appeared. 
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This thesis is structured as a series of detailed discussions of Williams’s writings on the three  
European figures who, in my view, had the greatest overall influence on his thought: Lukacs, 
Sartre and Gramsci. Williams’s engagement with these thinkers was more substantial than 
with any others (with the exception of Brecht – see p. 40), and speaks to the specific 
character of his Europeanism. It is far from coincidental that these three thinkers were also 
those with whom Anderson and Nairn aligned themselves in the mid-sixties. In ‘Lucien 
Goldmann and Marxism’s Alternative Tradition’ (1972), Williams emphasised the 
significance of this same triumvirate: 
Of the two men who died, Georg Lukacs was clearly the more widely significant 
figure. His History and Class-Consciousness, a collection of essays written in the 
early Twenties, is the most important single work of what can be seen – in part 
against the disavowal of its author – as the alternative tradition of Marxism. In the 
scale of its contemporary influence it is joined only by the Prison Notebooks, from the 
late Twenties, of Antonio Gramsci, and by the work of Sartre in the Fifties and 
Sixties. As we look at the range of this work, from fundamental philosophical 
problem to questions of strategy, tactics and political organisation, we can properly 
call it, over a very wide field, a tradition … the most significant feature of this 
alternative Marxist tradition is its account of consciousness: a social analysis which 
seems to me radically different from what most people in Britain understand as 
Marxist. (1972, p. 375) 
Williams does not go as far as Anderson in claiming allegiance to this tradition, but there can 
be little doubt that he regarded this body of work as the central instance of socialist thought 
moving beyond both mechanical materialism and ahistorical, liberal idealism: ‘Consciousness 
is restored as a primary activity: that is the central result of this alternative Marxist tradition. 
But this consciousness is still social, and it is centred in history’ (p. 375). Within the Marxist 
tradition, of course, these were the paradigmatic thinkers of the totality, whose work arose 
out of the confluence of Marxism with late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century forms of 
anti-positivist rationalism and, often enough, idealism. These figures were descendants of that 
older European generation H. Stuart Hughes had identified in his Consciousness and Society: 
The Reorientation of European Social Thought (1958), thinkers who were reacting not just 
against classical Marxism, but also against the positivist reaction to Marxism itself. As 
Marxists, Lukacs, Sartre and Gramsci restored a critical emphasis to European thought, but in 
a way that incorporated the lessons of their idealist forebears and opened out new possible 
futures for historical materialism. Anderson’s theory that Williams was doing something 
similar with the idealist tradition of English literary criticism could only have been 
speculative in the mid-sixties; by the late seventies, it had been confirmed. In the following 
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chapters I track the influence of Marxism’s alternative tradition on Williams’s development. I 
argue that what emerges from these interactions may be regarded, in the context of post-war 
British socialism, as a unique fusion of British and European intellectual traditions. 
Much critical attention has rightly been placed on Williams’s reception of Goldmann, a 
‘second generation’ figure within the alternative tradition whose positions were undoubtedly 
closer to Williams’s mature thought, and with whom he had a brief personal friendship. In 
Chapter One, however, I focus on Lukacs, with whose work Williams was familiar from an 
earlier stage and which he wrote on at greater length. Lukacs is the figure that binds Williams 
and Goldmann, providing the theoretical ground for their interactions. Critical attention has 
been less forthcoming on the influence of Lukacs on Williams, perhaps because much of 
Williams’s engagement takes the form of reviews. I begin by outlining Williams’s reception 
of Lukacs and addressing his early assessments in the sixties reviews. I then measure the 
impact of the long-awaited History and Class Consciousness and track Williams’s 
subsequent development, in critical dialogue with Lukacs and Goldmann, of cultural 
materialism in the seventies. Finally, I interrogate Said’s (1983) account of intellectual 
transmission and establish Williams’s late perspective on Lukacs in the eighties reviews.  
The near-total lack of engagement with Sartre’s influence on Williams is, as I have said, an 
egregious aporia in the critical literature; I attempt to remedy this in Chapter Two, which is 
organised along more thematic lines. After outlining Williams’s engagement with Sartre, I 
connect Williams’s analyses of Sartre’s plays to his broader sense of the structure of feeling 
of modern drama in the sixties and to his assessment of Brechtian theatre. I then assess 
Williams’s relation to political and philosophical liberalism by means of comparison with 
Sartre on the crucial questions of human freedom and the political duty (or lack thereof) of 
the committed artist; Williams’s 1976 review of Sartre’s Critique and his later essays on 
aesthetics are key here. The final sections of the chapter argue for Sartre as a major influence 
on Williams’s turn towards Welsh nationalism in the early seventies, reading side-by-side 
their views on the complex interaction of nation and class within a socialist and anti-
imperialist politics.  
With Gramsci, no doubt due to the Italian Marxist’s early death, Williams’s engagement is 
predominantly with a concept, hegemony, rather than with a series of texts. But the links to 
Gramsci go much deeper, illuminating a shared cultural and political paradigm that bears 
significant investigation. Chapter Three completes a broad transition over the course of this 
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thesis from questions of literary theory to questions of politics. My analysis here is more 
speculative and theoretical than in the previous chapters, and offers an original interpretation 
and development of Williams’s Gramscianism. I read Williams’s quasi-empiricist 
redeployment of hegemony as in essence a theory of reification, that is, of class domination 
buttressed by ‘a sense of absolute because experienced reality’ (Williams, 1983, p. 38). I then 
consider Williams’s views on counter-hegemony and the role of culture in social revolution. I 
affirm Williams as a revolutionary socialist and present a theory of the long revolution as a 
form of what Gramsci called a ‘war of position’, drawing on Gramsci’s ‘interregnum’ 
scenario in The Prison Notebooks for theoretical support.  
Williams wrote as much about Bertolt Brecht as he did about any of the figures of Marxism’s 
alternative tradition. I will have occasion to refer to Brecht at numerous points and a full 
section in Chapter Two is devoted to Williams’s readings of Brecht’s major plays in Modern 
Tragedy and Drama from Ibsen to Brecht. I justify the omission of a comprehensive chapter 
on the German playwright on two grounds: first, that this thesis is primarily an account of the 
influence of European ‘theorists’ and philosophers, in particular those of the ‘alternative 
tradition’, on Williams’s own theoretical and political positions. Brecht did, of course, 
produce theoretical work, but he was primarily a playwright, whereas Sartre can lay claim to 
being a prodigious philosopher in his own right, in addition to being a playwright and 
novelist. Secondly, because while some of Brecht’s notions, in particular that of ‘complex 
seeing’, did influence Williams, Brecht cannot be regarded as a thinker of the totality in the 
same way as Lukacs, Sartre and Gramsci. A full, standalone discussion of Williams’s 
engagement with Brecht’s drama and thought, making full use of Williams’s many reviews of 
Brecht and his critics, deserves to be written. Here I confine myself to the central influence 
on Williams of Marxism’s ‘alternative tradition’. 
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Chapter One 
 
Williams and Lukacs: Realism, Class, Totality  
 
An Outline of Williams’s Engagement with Lukacs 
 
Williams closed his 1984 review of Lukacs’s autobiography, Record of a Life (1984), with a 
note of intellectual exhaustion. Lukacs’s legacy would go on being debated …   
 
… but in another sense that whole phase is ended, or ought to be ended: that 
movement of high intellectuals, with their own curriculum and preoccupations, 
towards the labour and democratic movements. Their memory can be honoured as a 
way of understanding and beginning to reverse the relationship, until the ‘return to 
everyday life’ is not a categorical conclusion but a hard and contested starting-point. 
(1984a, p. 15) 
 
The word ‘ought’ in the above quotation asserts the superiority of something like the 
approach which Williams favoured and had slowly developed over the course of his life: the 
version of Marxist humanism which Williams finally named, in Marxism and Literature 
(1977), ‘cultural materialism’ (p. 5). Opposed to this is the quasi-involvement of sympathetic 
intellectuals who remain nevertheless largely detached from either the political realities of 
socialist struggle, or the lives ‘as lived’ of those they sought to represent in their 
emancipatory social theories. This, of course, was Anderson’s (1976) critique of the Western 
Marxist tradition generally, that the bond between theory and practice had been broken, 
leaving only theory. It should be noted that this formulation, as Anderson conceded, applies 
least of all to Lukacs of all the central figures of Western Marxism. But Williams’s point 
survives contact with Lukacs’s biography, for it is a broader one: that ‘everyday life’52 is the 
only possible site of enquiry, the only possible seed-bed of socialist consciousness and 
struggle, available to even the most engaged intellectual. It was this passionate attachment to 
the fabric of people’s personal experiences which set the meandering course of Williams’s 
                                                
52 Williams abiding concern with ‘everyday life’, which informs every aspect of his work from the ‘culture is 
ordinary’ emphasis to the late work on hegemony, recommends a comparison with Henri Lefevbre, whose 
Critique of Everyday Life (three volumes, Fr. 1948, 1961 and 1981) was a significant influence on French anti-
Stalinism. 
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own engagement with Marxism and formed the background of his theoretical reservations 
about Lukacs. 
 
Williams’s reception of Lukacs’s work was both long and difficult. Unable to read German, 
Williams was forced to read Lukacs as he was published in English. The extraordinary lag 
between the German and English editions of some key works was a constant frustration. The 
seminal History and Class Consciousness (English: 1971 - hereafter HCC), originally 
published in German in 1923, took forty-eight years to appear in English. Williams (1971) 
regarded the intellectual worth of HCC as monumental, describing it in his review as ‘one of 
the indispensable works of the twentieth century’ (The Guardian, 1971, Feb 25, p. 8), and 
finding it ‘remarkable that it has taken half a century to get it in English’ (p. 8). Already in 
1962, while reviewing the English edition of The Historical Novel (English: 1962 - hereafter 
THN), itself twenty-five years overdue, Williams was noting the ‘desperate need’ (The 
Listener, 1962, March 8) for an English edition of HCC. British literary criticism, it seemed, 
was always lagging behind. In 1980, reviewing the English edition of Lukacs’s Essays on 
Realism (English: 1980) nearly fifty years after they appeared in German, Williams is keen to 
point out the prefiguration of contemporary British debates around realism and modernism 
‘in the lively controversies between socialist writers, especially Russian and German, in the 
twenties and thirties’ (New Society, 1980a, Nov 20, p. 381).  
 
In keeping with William’s tendency to equilibrate, the final judgment offered on Lukacs is 
balanced. Lukacs remained for him a thinker of the greatest importance and usefulness for 
contemporary thought, particularly in considering realism and the prospects for articulating 
diverse and heterodox versions of Marxist thought (the irony then being that Lukacs regarded 
himself as quintessentially orthodox, in the sense of ‘true to Marx’). But in 1984, reviewing 
Lukacs’s Record of a Life, there is severe disagreement: cultural materialism, says Williams, 
is a ‘diametrically opposite answer to the questions which Lukacs and other Marxists have 
posed’ (p. 15), particularly when it comes to the social character of art. For Williams, the 
lineage which Said traced in his ‘Travelling Theory’ (1983), from Lukacs through Lucien 
Goldmann to Williams himself, did not, in the end, express a ‘meeting of minds’ (p. 15); the 
differences in fundamental approach to Marxist criticism are simply too stark. And yet one of 
the crucial elements of Williams’s discovery of Lukacs is the extent to which it is felt, 
particularly in its early stages, as symptomatic of discovering, late in the day, an intellectual 
horizon to which British literary and political debate must urgently catch up.  
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The sheer material struggle involved in taking the measure of Lukacs at any point shadowed 
the struggle which Williams faced in coming to terms with the most resonant aspects of the 
intellectual inheritance of the ‘contemporary Marxism’ (1989r, p. 76) he eventually aligned 
himself with. Williams was not good at acknowledging intellectual influences and referenced 
theoretical work by other writers (even British ones) only sparingly; Lukacs, however, was 
one of his more constant references outside of the English-speaking world, the thinker to 
whom he most frequently referred (much more so, tellingly, than Marx himself). Williams’s 
reception of Lukacs spans almost the length of his career, and so his own positions evolve in 
parallel with his encounters with Lukacs. The relationship between the development of 
Williams’s work and his collisions with key Lukacsian texts and categories is the object of 
this chapter’s investigations.  
 
It is possible to group Williams’s reception of Lukacs into three broad periods, the movement 
through which may be compared to the development of Williams’s thought in general. These 
periods are a) the early sixties, in which the first few of Lukacs’s books are made available in 
English, b) the early seventies, with the long-awaited publication of HCC and some 
interesting theoretical engagements by Williams, and c) the late seventies through to the mid-
eighties, when most of what is even now available in English by Lukacs had been published 
and Williams was at the height of his engagement with Marxism and its many internal 
debates. Chapter One of this thesis will describe these dual developments, of Williams’s 
reception of Lukacs and the slow evolution of his own cultural materialist position, in some 
of their mutual interactions. The fact that Williams reviewed many of Lukacs’s works in the 
years they were made available in English provides us with a fortunate scattering of sign-
posts; at the same time, very many more works were made available over the course of 
Williams’s career than he reviewed or commented upon. The result is that we can be very 
specific about when Williams’s encountered certain texts, but must be entirely speculative 
about the rest, unfortunately the greater number.  
 
Between the publication of Williams’s first book, Reading and Criticism (1950) and The 
Long Revolution (1961), he would only have had access to one of Lukacs’s books in English, 
Studies in European Realism (English: 1950, German: various, thirties - hereafter SIER) and 
we cannot be certain that Williams’s read even this text until as late as 1962 (it is mentioned 
for the first time in his review of The Historical Novel). Williams therefore remained almost 
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entirely disconnected from Lukacs’s work until after the publication of The Long Revolution; 
as he says of the period of writing that text in ‘Literature and Sociology’ (1971), ‘it seems to 
me extraordinary, looking back, that I did not then know the work of Lukacs or Goldmann, 
which would have been highly relevant to it, and especially as they were working within a 
more conscious tradition and in less radical an isolation’ (2005f: 20). In 1962 The Historical 
Novel (German: 1937) was published in English, and The Meaning of Contemporary Realism 
(German: 1958) in 1963. Williams reviews both of these in the years of their English 
publication and so, by 1963, we can say with certainty that Williams had read The Historical 
Novel, The Meaning of Contemporary Realism and Studies in European Realism. 
 
By Modern Tragedy (1966), then, Williams had come into contact with one book and one 
essay collection from Lukacs’s literary-critical period in the thirties (THN (Russian: 1937) 
and SER (various essays dating from the late thirties)), and one later text from 1958 (MCR 
(German: 1958)). A number of essays by Lukacs had appeared in English by 1963, primarily 
of a political nature, but we cannot know whether Williams encountered these. From 1963 
until 1971, when History and Class Consciousness (German: 1923 - hereafter HCC) was 
finally published in English, there is no hard evidence that Williams read any further texts 
written by Lukacs, with the exception of Solzhenitsyn (German: 1969), which appeared in 
English in 1970, and which Williams reviewed with HCC in 1971. English editions of Essays 
on Thomas Mann (1964) and Goethe and his Age (1968) appear during this period, as do 
Lenin: A Study in the Unity of his Thought and Writer and Critic and Other Essays in 1970; 
Williams may or may not have read these texts.  
Between 1971 and the publication of Marxism and Literature (1977), which includes the 
period of The Country and the City (1973), a large number of essays and books by Lukacs are 
made available in English. Lukacs’s pre-Marxist The Theory of the Novel appears in 1971 
alongside HCC. Tactics and Ethics (1971), Marxism and Human Liberation (1973), 
Conversations with Lukacs (1974), Soul and Form (1974) and The Young Hegel (1975) all 
appear in the intervening years; given the significance of Lukacs to Williams as a writer, it 
seems likely that he would have read at least some of this output, but we cannot say for sure. 
In the book list to Marxism and Literature, Williams lists The Theory of the Novel (German: 
1920, English: 1971).  
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While Williams does not explicitly reference The Specificity of the Aesthetic (German date; it 
remains unpublished in English as of the time of writing) until Culture (1981), he does 
attribute the phrase ‘the specificity of the aesthetic’ (2009 [1977], p. 151) to Lukacs and 
discusses some of the concepts derived from that work in Marxism and Literature. It remains 
unclear whether Williams encounters the text in its primary form (unlikely, given that 
Williams did not read German) or via secondary material. In Culture, Williams references a 
1969 Frankfurt edition of a text titled Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen. This probably refers to a 
later edition of Lukacs‘s 1963 work Ästhetik. Teil I. Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen (Aesthetic, 
Part 1: The Peculiarity of the Aesthetic), the first part of his planned Aesthetics, but may also 
refer to a 1969 text, Probleme der Ästhetik, the third chapter of which is titled Über die 
Besonderheit als Kategorie der Ästhetik (On Particularity as a Category of the Aesthetic). 
The balance of evidence suggests that Williams encountered the first part of Lukacs’s 
Aesthetics via secondary material in English, probably a PhD thesis by John Fekete (1972) 
included in the Marxism and Literature book list (Williams refers to Fekete’s comments on 
the difficulty of translating the German Eigenart into English while discussing Lukacs’s 
text).  
We can be certain that Williams read the essay ‘Realism in the Balance’ (German: 1938) in 
1978 as part of reviewing NLR’s Aesthetics and Politics collection, and that he read Essays 
on Realism (German: 1971, essays dating from thirties and forties) in 1980, again reviewing 
this in the year of its English publication. In the four years between Marxism and Literature 
and Culture, Williams would have had the opportunity to read all three parts of Lukacs’s 
Ontology, the first two of which were published in English in 1978, the third in 1980, and The 
Destruction of Reason (1980), although, once again, there is no hard evidence to suggest that 
he did. In addition to the texts by Lukacs himself, in 1978 Williams reviews Goldmann’s 
Lukacs and Hiedegger: Towards a New Philosophy (French: 1973, English: 1977) and in 
1980 Michael Lowy’s Georg Lukacs: From Romanticism to Bolshevism (1979). In 1984, 
Williams reviewed Lukacs’s Record of a Life: An Autobiography (1984), also mentioning the 
early essay ‘On Poverty of Spirit’ (German: 1912) for the first time, although he may have 
read the latter in English from 1972 onwards. In the same review Williams comments on two 
further texts about Lukacs by critics: Agnes Heller’s Lukacs Revalued (1983) and Lee 
Congdon’s The Young Lukacs (1983). In summary, we know that Williams read or 
commented on the following texts by or about Lukacs (listed in chronological order of 
mention by Williams, with original and English dates of publication): 
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1962: The Historical Novel (German: 1937, English: 1962) and Studies in European Realism 
(various original chapter publication dates in 1930s, English: 1950) 
1963: The Meaning of Contemporary Realism (German: 1958, English: 1963) 
1971: History and Class Consciousness (German: 1923, English: 1971) and Solzhenitsyn 
(German: 1959, English: 1970) 
1977: The Theory of the Novel (German, 1920, English: 1971) 
1978: ‘Realism in the Balance’ (German: 1938, English: 1978), Goldmann’s Lukacs and 
Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy (French: 1973, English, 1977) 
1980: Essays on Realism (German: 1971 (essays written throughout 1930’s), English: 1980) 
and Lowy’s Georg Lukacs: From Romanticism to Bolshevism (1979) 
1981: Ästhetik. Teil I. Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen (German: 1963) 
1984: Record of a Life: An Autobiography (1984), ‘On Poverty of Spirit’ (German: 1912, 
English: 1972), Heller’s Lukacs Revalued (1983) and Congdon’s The Young Lukacs (1983) 
First, we should note the clear periodization: first the early sixties, then the early seventies 
with the crucial publication of HCC, then the period from Marxism and Literature on. 
Between each period lie gaps of several years. The period of reception, given that Lukacs was 
deceased with a ‘complete’ body of work by 1971, is very large; thirty-two years separate 
Williams’s first and last encounters with Lukacs’s work. Six years is the shortest gap between 
German publication and Williams’s encounter with it (The Meaning of Contemporary 
Realism, first published in 1958), but for the majority of texts the span is much larger. 
Williams and Lukacs were born thirty-six years apart, but for nearly three decades they were 
contemporary writers; Lukacs was writing some of his most important works while Williams 
was mid-career. The villains here are not generational but geographical/cultural: the caprice 
of Lukacs’s general reception in the English-speaking world and the exigencies of his 
translation. Nearly five decades separate the original publication of HCC and the point when 
Williams, and indeed any other non-German-speaking British observers, could encounter it 
‘in the flesh’. HCC is Lukacs most significant and influential text, regarded by Williams, as 
we have said, as indispensable, and so the discovery of this fundamental work must have 
been both disorienting and revelatory.  
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Another point of interest emerges from setting the real chronology of Lukacs’s writing 
against the order in which Williams encounters them. Of the first three books which Williams 
reads, THN and SER are from the late thirties and MCR from 1958. The next major work 
encountered, HCC, dates from 1923, and so by 1971 Williams has read work from three quite 
different phases of Lukacs’s life, in a muddled order, with the earliest read eight years later 
than the rest. This non-linearity continues: in 1977, Williams was encountering (in some 
form) the Aesthetic of 1953, followed shortly thereafter by a series of essays, from ‘Realism 
in the Balance’ to those of Essays in Realism, written throughout the thirties. With the review 
of Lukacs’s autobiography in 1984, there is finally some chronological appropriateness. 
Generally, though, taking only those texts about which we have substantial knowledge of 
Williams’s reception, the order in which the texts were read bears no relation to the order of 
their publication. This is not unusual in itself; when addressing the accumulated output of a 
writer whose work is finished, any order may serve the needs of the reader. But the point here 
is that Williams never had access to everything Lukacs wrote (non-German readers are still 
far from that today) and was not performing any kind of selection. He was forced to read 
Lukacs in a fragmentary and arbitrary order, without the concrete resources to place each text 
into its proper relation to the larger oeuvre. And, of course, Lukacs was writing right up until 
his death, coinciding with the English publication of HCC, in 1971. 
The progression of Williams’s fragmentary reception of Lukacs corresponds to the 
intensification of his theoretical engagement with Marxism, culminating in Marxism and 
Literature, the detailed discussions in Politics and Letters and the more explicitly 
sociological Culture (1981). Some caveats are necessary here. The development of 
Williams’s Marxism was a process that was happening in a variety of ways and through the 
prism of a variety of concerns both cultural and political. It may be argued that Williams’s 
reception of Lukacs occurred too sparsely, and at intervals too great to have had a truly 
significant effect on this development, but there can be no doubt that Lukacs, as Williams’s 
most constant Marxist reference, was a central intellectual influence. The apparently parallel 
lines of Williams’s reception of Lukacs and his own intellectual development were, as I argue 
below, closely intertwined. 
*     *     * 
Let us orient ourselves by briefly establishing Williams’s late view. This can be introduced 
by referring to his own typology, in the Record of a Life review (1984a), of the dominant 
Daniel Robert Gerke  Chapter One: Williams and Lukacs 
 
 
48 
available viewpoints on Lukacs throughout the period of his widest British reception. The 
three dominant characterizations of Lukacs, says Williams, were as ‘a more tolerable and less 
dogmatic than average Marxist literary critic’ (p. 14), ‘an outdated anti-modernist, anti-
Brechtian Stalinist’ (p. 14), or as advocate of ‘a humanist Marxism infected with strains of 
romantic anti-capitalism’ (p. 14). The mutual exclusivity and tendency to polemic of these 
positions is clear. Williams himself cannot accept any of these positions as finally 
sustainable. Indeed, his comments on Lukacs throughout the years express all of the above 
positions in different combinations, refusing to settle on any one as definitive. By 1979 and 
Politics and Letters, which contains some of the deepest and most sustained explorations of 
many of Williams’s major theoretical concerns, Williams has come to a fairly settled view of 
Lukacs; appreciative, but fully aware of some core theoretical differences. 
In 19th century literature and drama, broadly, Williams (2015 [1979]) feels that he and 
Lukacs ‘would have argued in the same terms, but … arrived at different conclusions’ (p. 
349). ‘When, however, we come to the 20th century,’ says Williams, ‘there is a radical 
divergence’ (p. 349). The crux of problem, and what Williams interprets as explaining the 
disjunction between their positions across the two literary periods, is that ‘Lukacs … did have 
– much more strongly than I ever had; for this was the main reason for my distance from 
Marxist literary criticism for so long – the notion of a pre-existent social reality with which 
the literary model can be compared’ (p. 349). This notion of a ‘pre-existent’ social reality, 
which in its broadest sense is common to almost all versions of the Marxist position, is the 
primary point of tension between Williams and Lukacs, and indeed between Williams and 
Marxism itself. It is, for him, ‘where for a generation a certain mainstream of Marxism stuck’ 
(p. 349), and constituted a ‘major barrier when [Lukacs] came to consider the modernists’ (p. 
349). But it is crucial to note that Williams is not, with these comments, subscribing to an 
anti-realist position. He is not critiquing Lukacs’s faith in an objective, material reality, but in 
a known social reality, transparent in its real complexity, to which literature can straight-
forwardly be related or compared. The result of Lukacs’s preoccupation with a ‘pre-existent’ 
social reality, says Williams, is the assumption of a ‘social reality to which that kind of 
[modernist] fiction corresponded … which it described as decadence’ (pp. 349-350). 
Williams maintained this aversion to both the notion of a ‘pre-existent’ social reality and the 
notion of ‘decadence’ throughout his life and work. 
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Elaborating further on the dialectic of his convergence with and divergence from Lukacs, 
Williams (2015 [1979]) states: 
So my accounts and those of Lukacs could be very similar for a type of literature in 
which the question – how does this fiction compare with otherwise observable (a 
phrase one can settle upon rather than pre-existent) social reality? – seems 
unproblematic. The realist novel of the 19th century does not make it essential to 
clarify the differences between the otherwise observable and the pre-existent. They 
can appear virtually identical. But once you move to 20th century fiction, the 
substantial theoretical divergence between them becomes critical. (2015 [1979], p. 
350) 
What is the theoretical divergence here and what work is the phrase ‘otherwise observable’ 
doing? Williams is concerned to refute two notions here; firstly, that we can speak of an 
irrefutable, theoretically known social reality, existing independently of culture and 
consciousness, and secondly that such a reality mechanically determines the shape of the 
fiction produced within it. The distinction between a ‘pre-existent’ and an ‘otherwise 
observable’ social reality, then, is that the former refers to a theoretical construct while the 
latter simply refers to the world external to the text, to which it bears a relation, but not one 
knowable in advance based on the theoretical construction. In fiction, such as the 19th century 
realist novel, which actively attempts to depict ‘otherwise observable’ reality, the question of 
whether the depiction accords with a separate, theoretically determined version of reality is 
secondary; we can be relatively sure that the fiction in question is arising out of social reality 
and reflecting, at the very least, the way social reality appears (empirical realism). In 20th 
century modernism, however, ‘otherwise observable’ social reality i.e. the world outside of 
the text which is available to perception, ceases to impress itself onto the fiction in the same 
way. The rise of modernist art confounds the previously existing relation and, for Lukacs, 
that means we must turn to an underlying or ‘pre-existent’ social reality, the reality 
uncovered by theory, to account for the lost purchase of art on its object. Bourgeois artists, 
argues Lukacs, in their late-19th and early-20th century ‘decadence’, lost ideological purchase 
on the social order over which their class continued to exert domination. 
While Williams can agree that there is a ‘breakdown’ of the most obvious elements of the 
realist correspondence, he cannot take the further, Lukacsian step of claiming that this 
represents a period of ‘decadence’ in the ideological life-cycle of the bourgeoisie. Williams is 
happy to state that there has been a shift in the relation of art to ‘otherwise observable’ (non-
literary) reality and, as his own work on modernism demonstrates, is also concerned to assert 
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a link between this shift and parallel shifts in other spheres of material production; what he 
will not concede is the existence of a theoretically transparent, class-tethered social reality to 
which this shift uniformly refers. It is a matter of some subtlety whether or not Williams’s 
characterization of Lukacs, very loosely sketched above, is accurate; I will discuss this below. 
Williams’s late position nevertheless provides us with a yardstick by which to measure the 
development of his responses over time, and to detect the relative shifts in his own position. 
We may now ‘begin at the beginning’, with Williams’s reviews of the sixties. 
Williams and Lukacs in the Sixties 
In the sixties, Williams publishes two reviews, of The Historical Novel (1962) and The 
Meaning of Contemporary Realism (1963) in The Listener, and briefly discusses Lukacs’s 
treatment of the tragic hero in Modern Tragedy (1966). Williams (1962) prefers THN to SER 
(we are not told exactly why), and declares that ‘Lukacs has probably written one of the 
permanent classics of criticism …’ (p. 437). The tone is one of cautious high praise, the 
caution more pronounced by the close of the review: ‘... but at that level we need the caution 
of discipline. We shall only know, we shall only genuinely understand, after absolute and 
prolonged attention’ (p. 437). There are two ‘unknowns’ here: whether or not THN will 
indeed find its place in the pantheon of modern critical classics, and whether or not what 
currently passes for understanding will stand the test of time. Part of the problem is the 
difficulty of the work, another the confused understandings current in Britain of the Marxist 
tradition: ‘It is the work of a very original mind at a high theoretical level, and to approach it 
in the ready-made English context – through scraps of its author’s life against a background 
of clichés about Marxism – seems inadequate if not insulting’ (p. 436). Williams does not 
elaborate on the clichés, but we can assume them to be both political and philosophical: the 
equivalence of Marxism with Stalinism, and the assumption that Marxism can only reduce 
culture to something else, to non-culture. Notice that Williams is not absolving Lukacs of this 
charge, but rather claiming that it will be leveled in Britain regardless of its justice. 
While considering THN a ‘permanent classic of criticism’, Williams nevertheless finds the 
overall argument ‘not easy to accept as stated’ (1962, p. 437). The idea that there is an 
essential truth buried within Lukacs’s arguments which is not fully registered or expressed, is 
characteristic of Williams’s reception of Lukacs’s work. Stating his views only briefly in this 
review, Williams finds Lukacs weak on ‘the nature of 18th century realism’ (p. 437) and on 
‘the Romantic response to the past’ (p. 437), but strong on drama, to which ‘he devotes his 
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most brilliant chapter, which, if we attend to the preface, is really the core of the book’ (p. 
437). We should read this last statement alongside Williams’s characterization of Lukacs’s 
dramatic criticism in Modern Tragedy four years later. There Williams (1966) argues that, in 
his views on tragedy, ‘Lukacs especially is a post-Hegelian rather than a Marxist critic’ (p.  
35). He reproduces some quotations from THN in support of this: ‘[the tragic hero is] the 
world-historical individual … whose own particular purposes contain the substantial, which 
is the will of the world-spirit’, and ‘[is the figure whose] personal passions centre upon the 
content of the collision’ (p. 35). Lukacs’s position, Williams goes on, ‘is in fact doubtfully 
Marxist’ (p. 35), elaborating: ‘The identification of the ‘world-historical individual’ with the 
‘tragic hero’ … shifts attention from the objective conflict, which is present in the whole 
action, to the single and heroic personality, whom it does not seem necessary to regard as 
tragic if he in fact embodies “the will of the world-spirit” or of history’ (p. 35). 
How just is Williams’s claim here? In THN, Lukacs is concerned with the ability of drama to 
portray the historical totality, rather than with its capacity to generate a tragic charge; in order 
to perform the former function, he argues, protagonists must be those ‘who in the self-
containment of their personalities, can yet bear and reveal the fullness of the world’ (Lukacs, 
1983c, 119). Lukacs concedes the debt owed to Hegel’s ‘world-historical individual’ in this 
formulation, but insists upon a strict Marxist translation and demarcation: ‘One has only to 
translate the whole mysticism of the “spirit” into materialist, historical reality and to conceive 
as directly as possible this coincidence between the personality of the hero and the historical 
essence of the collision’ (p. 119). Williams’s (1966) claim that this is not a Marxist position 
is based upon what at first appears as a paradoxical critique: that Lukacs is annihilating both 
the objective (‘shifts attention from the objective conflict’) and the subjective factors (the 
tragic hero is deprived of his tragic character through his absorption into the world-spirit of 
history) of the tragic situation. It is then interesting to contrast the centrality of Williams’s 
critique of orthodox Marxism (a critique of the strict separation of base and superstructure) 
with what appears here to be a critique of the conflation of the objective and the subjective. 
Clearly, what Williams has in mind as a properly total or realist view will neither separate out 
nor fuse subjective and objective factors, but rather set them into a dialectical relation of 
mutual constitution. 
It is important not to regard Williams’s characterization of Lukacs as a post-Hegelian as a 
criticism; such divergences from what Williams regards as Marxist orthodoxy (Lukacs’s own 
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insistence on orthodoxy notwithstanding) are, for him, essential to reclaiming a post-Stalinist 
tradition. In the 1971 essay ‘Literature and Sociology’, Williams puts the point as follows: 
The fact that I learned simultaneously that [Lukacs and Goldmann’s work] had been 
denounced as heretical, that it was a return to left-Hegelianism, did not, I am afraid, 
detain me. If you’re not in a church you’re not worried about heresies; it is only (but it 
is often) the most routinized Marxism, or the most idealist revolutionism, which 
projects that kind of authoritative, believing formation. The only serious criterion was 
actual theory and practice. (2005f, p. 20) 
About this particular passage Eagleton (1976) remarked, ‘One can almost see the approving 
marginal tick of the relieved liberal reader’ (pp. 3-33). From the point of view of theoretical 
rigour and attention, Eagleton is surely right to suggest that ‘If Williams is not in fact 
interested in the theoretical task of assessing Goldmann’s [and, by association, Lukacs’s] 
place within the Marxist tradition, then he ought to be’ (pp. 3-33). But then, the evidence is 
not uniformly in Eagleton’s favour; as we have seen, Williams described Lukacs as in some 
respects a post-Hegelian as early as 1966. Eagleton’s political criticism, grounded in a firmly 
structuralist understanding of Marxism, has more bite. Isn’t Williams’s refusal to condemn 
the idealist elements in Lukacs the sign of an insufficient Marxism? At this stage, of course, 
Williams’s mature Marxism is still in development, and will in any case be inimical to the 
young Eagleton’s Althusserianism. 
Despite some reservations, positive appreciation of Lukacs is the theme of Williams’s 
engagements in the sixties. The 1963 review of MCR (German: 1958) is particularly 
responsive, both to the text itself and to Lukacs as a thinker. Alongside commentary on the 
literary-critical material of the text, it also contains praise for Lukacs as a political thinker. 
Williams (1963) discusses the 1957 preface to the book, begun before and finished after the 
Hungarian Revolution of 1956: ‘Lukacs, as a Marxist, had diagnosed and analysed this crisis 
before its public eruption, and it is extraordinarily impressive to see the way in which he goes 
on developing his central ideas after the bitterness of those months’ (1963, Feb 28). The issue 
of Soviet authoritarianism found a literary parallel in the enforcement of ‘socialist realism’ 
upon revolutionary Marxist writers; Lukacs mounts a sturdy attack on the Stalinist elements 
in socialist realism, and in particular its tendency towards ‘revolutionary romanticism’, in 
MCR, which Williams praises in his review. 
In terms of the critical substance of MCR, Williams (1963) singles out Lukacs’s first chapter, 
‘The Ideology of Modernism’, as particularly fruitful. ‘I have not seen’, says Williams, ‘a 
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better correlation of the style and the structure of the modern novel with its underlying 
assumptions about man’ (1963, Feb 28), and furthermore suggests that, ‘The analysis of 
“modernism” is the clearest Marxist criticism yet written of the movement we associate with 
Joyce, Eliot and Proust’ (Feb 28). The ‘underlying assumptions’ are of man’s ‘natural 
solitariness’ (Feb 28) and ‘the conviction of an essentially static human condition’ (Feb 28), 
or what Lukacs might have termed alienation and reification respectively. While Williams is 
supportive of Lukacs’s critique of modernist assumptions, he is careful to distinguish this 
from ‘the simple abuse of “decadence”’ (Feb 28) in THN (Russian: 1937). Indeed, Lukacs 
avoids the language of decadence in the fifties; the overriding keyword here becomes the 
‘disintegration’ of man, society, meaning and even time in modernist literature. What 
Williams sees as an improvement in analytical subtlety, however, may be better viewed as a 
change in category to suit a new artistic object; the Lukacs of ‘decadence’ was concerned 
with what he saw as the deterioration of bourgeois critical realism through the 19th century, 
whereas by the fifties he is concerned with the contemporary co-existence of the positive 
(adaptive realists like Mann, Roland and Gorky) with the negative/nihilistic (the anti-realist 
modernism of Joyce and Kafka). 
What Williams detects, in Lukacs’s later critique of modernism, is the shift of focus away 
from rigid class analysis to a critique which encompasses both class-rooted and other forms 
of experience, especially the overriding experience of the Second World War. For the Lukacs 
of MCR, the two great trends in bourgeois literature (modern realist and modernist) are still 
bourgeois, but they embody something of the exceptionality of the times and the 
contradictory class-formations present in phenomena such as the anti-Fascist and Peace 
movements. These new formations brought together radically antagonistic class and 
ideological elements. So heterogeneous were these elements, says Lukacs (1979), that ‘The 
common ideological factor is thus, in Hegel’s phrase, “an identity of identity and non-
identity”’ (p. 15), that is, a common identity forged in and despite an interlocking network of 
similarities and differences. Lukacs states that ‘it is no exaggeration to say that this new 
principle determining human allegiances’ is now the ‘starting-point’ (p. 15) of his 
investigations.53 Already in 1963, Williams is appreciative of this new focus on experiential 
plurality in Lukacs’s work, but also of Lukacs’s normative critique of the modernist 
                                                
53  It is worth noting the compatibility between this conceptualization and two others which will become 
important for Williams: Gramsci’s hegemony (see Chapter Three for discussion) and Sartre’s (1971) notion, 
also a Hegelian borrowing, of ‘a true universalism through the common operation of all particularisms’ (see 
Chapter Two, pp. 70-74 for discussion).   
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‘structure of feeling’. While Williams would not have concurred with Lukacs that modernism 
is ‘the negation of art’ (Lukacs, 1979, p. 46), he is alive to those elements of the Lukacsian 
critique which notice the potentially debilitating experiential focus on angst and nihilism in 
modernist writing. This is the focus of the second part of MCR, where Lukacs claims that 
‘between Franz Kafka and Thomas Mann, the contemporary bourgeois writer will have to 
choose’ (p. 80). There is a passage at the mid-point of this essay with a certain Williams-
esque cadence to it: 
… acceptance or rejection of angst? Ought angst to be taken as an absolute, or ought 
it to be overcome? Should it be considered one reaction among others, or should it 
become the determinant of the condition humaine? These are not primarily, of course, 
literary questions; they relate to a man’s behavior and experience of life. The crucial 
question is whether a man escapes from the life of his time into a realm of abstraction 
– it is then that angst is engendered in human consciousness – or confront modern life 
determined to fight its evils and support what is good in it. (1979, p. 80) 
For Lukacs, the distinction between submission to the social order and its ethical (personal, 
moral and aesthetic) transcendence is, in literary terms, the distinction between historically 
total, realist portrayal, and the fragmented and subjective retreat into abstraction he associates 
with modernism. The artist has a ‘duty’ to observe the realist engagement with ‘modern life’ 
and to eschew the modernist indulgence in experiential angst (to choose Mann over Kafka). 
Williams’s conception of ‘duty’ in art is very different to Lukacs’s, but it still contains the 
crucial element of ‘going beyond’ what is given as social experience. For Williams, as he 
puts it in ‘Art: Freedom and Duty’ (1989b) the moment of ethical decision comes at the point 
at which the artist hesitates to continue mimicking the received speech, the ‘familiar patterns 
which appear to make sense of a kind’ (p. 94) (for example, modernist angst), towards which 
the subject as ‘subject to’ is pressured to gravitate: ‘In much important writing it is the 
hesitation at that point, when the words can come all too easily – when the words are, so to 
say, ready-made – it is that hesitation which is the crucial condition … something new is 
happening in the language itself’ (p. 94). Both Williams and Lukacs, then, share a sense that 
artistic fidelity is about resisting dominant modes of experience and representation; this 
accounts for the Williams-esque character of the above passage. But whereas, for Lukacs, 
modernism errs when it ignores real life i.e. life outside of the dominant angst of ‘inner’ 
experience, for Williams, the failure of some modernist writers is that they ignore subaltern 
sectors of modern experience itself, the emergent experiences which exist below the surface 
of the modernist structure of feeling.   
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Another way of putting the above is that the Lukacsian literary-critical discourse takes the 
most subjectivist modernist art at its word; it believes that the experience proper to modern 
life is angst, and then castigates the art that expresses this for doing so. Politically unhelpful 
art, on this model, is art which expresses politically unhelpful experiences, and if the only 
experiences available are politically unhelpful (angst, despair, nihilism etc.), then all art 
which focusses on experience will tend towards reaction. For the Williams of the sixties, 
however, art is only ever about the communication of experience, and so the Lukacsian 
model of evaluation cannot hold. In The Long Revolution (2013 [1961]), Williams describes 
art as the ‘organization of experience’ (p. 50) and progressive art as that which ‘succeeds in 
describing and communicating new experience’ (p. 51). The progressive nature of art, then, is 
not about its correspondence with progressive affects or representations, but in its facilitation 
of what Williams would eventually call the ‘emergent’ in social experience and culture, new 
and oppositional elements that resist the values and meanings of the dominant social order. 
Progressive art occurs when the artist succeeds in communicating some element, in his own 
experience, of an experience which exists socially but is as yet unrepresented. Thus the 
‘truth’ to which Williams’s positive ethical choice relates is not the truth which Lukacs would 
advocate in the choice of Mann over Kafka, the truth of the historically total portrayal; it is 
rather fidelity to an emergent social experience and commitment to finding the means of 
communication adequate to transmitting it.  
Lukacs’s conception of the ethical duty of the artist is essentially epistemological: the artist 
must understand, not merely express in an immanent way, social reality. Williams’s focus on 
experience is very different from this, and yet in his review of MCR (1963) Williams does 
appear to acknowledge that there is something progressive in Mann’s ‘struggle to 
comprehend’ (1963, Feb 28) the social causes of angst and nihilism that is not present in, say, 
Kafka’s expression of a certain dominant structure of feeling. As I argued in the introduction 
to this thesis and focus on in Chapter Two, Williams becomes less and less able to equate 
access to experience (in which the artist is especially skilled) to access to reality as his career 
progresses; the empiricist emphases of The Long Revolution give increasing ground to the 
need for abstract cognition in the seventies. Thus, while Williams cannot, as of his early 
sixties reviews, accept Lukacs’s assertion that ‘socialist’ art must apprehend the real bases of 
social reality to avoid being reactionary, Lukacs’s firm insistence upon the artist accounting 
for reality stays with Williams and significantly affects the trajectory of his thought. Later, 
Williams will combine the Lukacsian realist emphasis with what is already, in the sixties, a 
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version of the Gramscian emphasis on emergent meanings and values, the necessity of 
discovering and building a socialist hegemony. 
Finally, History and Class Consciousness 
 
By the early seventies, Williams is visibly more comfortable with Marxist categories, and 
more willing to make specific theoretical pronouncements. The deaths of Goldmann and 
Lukacs seem to draw a line under an era of Marxist theory, and to inaugurate a new openness 
of possibility.54 Williams used his review of the long-awaited English edition of History and 
Class Consciousness, as well as the pieces ‘Literature and Sociology’ (1971) and ‘Lucien 
Goldmann and Marxism’s Alternative Tradition’ (1972) as opportunities for retrospective, 
considering both his own work and the Marxist tradition in general from an early vantage on 
the new decade. These texts contain some of William’s first and clearest engagements with 
Lukacs’s conceptions of class consciousness and totality and, continuing the line of 
theoretical descent from The Long Revolution, prepare the ground for the explicit critique of 
base and superstructure outlined in the 1973 essay ‘Base and Superstructure in Marxist 
Cultural Theory’ and developed in Marxism and Literature (1977).  
 
A good part of Williams’s (1971) review is dedicated to the problem of receiving Lukacs in 
English and in the sclerotic context of Anglo-Saxon social theory. ‘It is remarkable that it has 
taken half a century to get History and Class Consciousness into English’ (The Guardian, 
1971, Feb 25, p. 8), says Williams, ‘For, whatever we finally think about its particular 
argument, it is one of the indispensable works of the twentieth century’ (p. 8). The ‘first 
quarter-century of neglect’ (p. 8), as Williams describes it, was due to the fact that HCC was 
described by Marxist orthodoxy as ‘a return to “idealism”; a Hegelian distortion of Marx and 
Lenin’ (p. 8). In concert with this doctrinal suppression, it was at the same time ‘part of a 
continuing Marxist argument which the equally orthodox social theory of the Anglo-Saxon 
world was neglecting’ (p. 8). The double-headed threat which Williams’s analysis depicts 
gives the measure of the challenge towards which Williams’s own work was directed: to 
produce a social and cultural theory which would take the best insights from both the British-
American and European traditions while avoiding both the idealism of either Anglo-
liberalism or orthodox Marxism. The rigid binary between the two positions erected by 
                                                
54 These were personal, as well as intellectual events for Williams, who had maintained a friendship with 
Goldmann. He writes in ‘LGM’ (1972): ‘I cannot easily explain my sense of loss at these two deaths’ (p. 375). 
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combatants on either side had been, for Williams, an absolute impediment. In the review, 
Williams expresses this in relation to his own work: 
 
It is some indication of our slowness in recovering from the limitations then imposed 
that a further quarter-century has gone by without ordinary English access to a work 
which bears very closely on many of the most urgent themes we have been 
considering. I can only speak for myself, but I know that working in a wholly 
different intellectual tradition, I have been preoccupied by just the issues which 
Lukacs had so powerfully considered. (The Guardian, 1971, Feb 25, p. 8) 
 
In this quotation is visible the bald fact that Williams did not, up until this period, consider 
himself as working within the Marxist tradition. Nor does he state explicitly in his review, or 
in the essays, that he is now working in that tradition (it was not until Marxism and Literature 
that the Marxist character of cultural materialism was explicitly affirmed). The reader, 
however, will be forgiven for thinking that these texts are written by a Marxist, since what 
comes through most clearly is Williams’s conviction that the Marxist tradition must be 
recovered, explored, and renewed as a matter of urgency. Whether as a seed from which other 
theoretical contributions have sprung (those of ‘Marcuse and Goldmann among others’ (p. 8)) 
or as a major theoretician in his own right, Williams regards Lukacs as central to this project. 
‘In its movement beyond the abstract opposition of “idealism” and “materialism,”’ says 
Williams of HCC, ‘and in its emphasis on consciousness as an active historical process rather 
than a set of “reflections” or “ideas,” it represents a major position with which everyone who 
thinks about culture and society ought now to be familiar and  concerned’ (p. 8). For 
Williams, Lukacs is the deeply productive foundation upon which a more responsive and less 
abstract Marxism may be built in the seventies. 
 
The false oppositions which Williams praises Lukacs for dismantling in the above quotation 
are, for him, aspects of the more general false opposition of base and superstructure. 
Williams tackles this in greater detail in the essays, but in the review of HCC he proceeds 
with a different emphasis, suggesting that ‘we can learn most about what Lukacs has to say 
about working-class consciousness and about bureaucracy’ (The Guardian, 1971, Feb 25, p. 
8). Williams points to the essays ‘Class Consciousness’ and ‘Reification and the 
Consciousness of the Proletariat’ as insightful texts for the ‘linked issues of bureaucracy and 
working-class consciousness’ (p. 8), which, he argues, ‘ought … to be at the centre of our 
thinking about both capitalist and socialist societies of our own day’ (p. 8). Williams is in full 
agreement with Lukacs’s description of bureaucracy as ‘a form of organized activity – its 
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own and the other human activities it controls – which is in a deep sense passive and static: a 
mode of adjustment to a world which it believes it controls but by which, finally, it is 
controlled’ (p. 8). Lukacs of course, is primarily concerned with capitalist bureaucracy, but 
Williams insists that ‘Communist bureaucracy is in the end the more serious problem, for it is 
more directly linked with the issue of working-class consciousness’ (p. 8).  
 
For Williams, then, what Lukacs has to say about class consciousness contains material 
which may be repurposed for the analysis not just of capitalist bureaucracy, but also of 
Communist authoritarianism. Williams goes on to reproach Lukacs for failing to fully apply 
this analysis, a repetition in another register of his constant complaint that Lukacs does not 
follow his own insights through to the issues most pertinent to socialist struggle. Lukacs’s 
tendency to view the proletariat as an ‘apocalyptic liberator’ (The Guardian, 1971, Feb 25, p. 
8) is an error, says Williams dismissively, which ‘hardly needs emphasis’ (p. 8). And yet, 
Williams concedes, ‘in some of the most impressive pages he hits the real nerve’ (p. 8). The 
crucial insight, Williams argues, is that ‘if the working class is in one sense the product of 
capitalism, it will for a long time be subject to, and will even longer share, the modes of 
existence of its creator’ (p. 9). This is indeed Lukacs’s position, figured in terms of the 
continuing influence of reified forms of consciousness. He expresses the point with 
uncompromising vitriol in ‘Towards a Methodology of the Problem of Organisation’ (2010):  
 
Lenin stubbornly insists on rejecting every utopian view of the human material  with 
which the revolution must be made and with which the victory must be won: it 
consists necessarily of men who have been brought up in and ruined by capitalist 
society … turned into something empty and abstract by the impossibility of finding 
satisfaction and of living out their personalities in their work … which is now 
transformed into a brutal egoism greedy for fame or possessions … The inner life of 
the party is one unceasing struggle against … its capitalist inheritance. (Lukacs, 2010, 
p. 335) 
 
Williams would not have endorsed any view of the working-class which described it as 
‘ruined’, but he is keen, in his review, to distance Lukacs’s perspective from those anti-
socialist critics who ‘often make the easy point that whatever the theory may say, the 
practical consciousness of the working class is otherwise’ (The Guardian, 1971, Feb 25, p. 
8). ‘Lukacs’s account of the problem’, says Williams, ‘is more accurate in practice. He sees 
delay, deference, division, uneasiness as necessary but surmountable elements of the real 
historical development’ (p. 8). Just as he had responded to Lukacs’s awareness of experiential 
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plurality in MCR, here Williams approves of the manner in which Lukacs’s theory of class 
consciousness refuses to insist upon a determinate form of consciousness which follows 
predictably from the economic situation. At the same time, Williams challenges what he sees 
as Lukacs’s unwillingness to connect the indeterminacy of class consciousness to the 
emergence of Communist bureaucracy: ‘while he can then criticize social-democratic 
adjustments he does not go on to connect this precise phenomena to the emergence of 
communist bureaucracy and party dictatorship’ (p. 8). This is a serious omission, says 
Williams, because it connects to the ‘central controversy’ (p. 8), which is that ‘in the 
determinist and ordinary materialist theories of socialism, consciousness need not – ought not 
to – develop in that way: a change in the economic pace must be seen as changing 
consciousness predictably and directly, whether in practice it does so or not’ (p. 8). The 
development which ‘ought not to’ occur here is the development of a consciousness from 
which arises the possibility of bureaucracy and party dictatorship. Williams charges Lukacs 
with seeing through the orthodox veil of mechanical materialism, but then failing to apply the 
resulting insights about the variability of class consciousness to the open possibility of 
adverse developments in revolutionary consciousness.  
 
The justice of Williams’s claims must be viewed as partial. Lukacs was certainly more 
willing to apply the ‘stubborn reification’ thesis to social democracy than to communism, but 
it is clear from the above quotation from ‘Towards a Methodology of the Problem of 
Organisation’ that Lukacs was well aware of the latter issue. The tendencies towards the 
mechanical objectification of man engendered by reification ‘will necessarily persist in the 
Communist Party’ says Lukacs, ‘which after all has never claimed to be able to reform the 
inner nature of its members by means of a miracle’ (Lukacs, 2010, p. 335). The practical 
realities of revolution, moreover, intensify these tendencies: ‘the requirements of purposeful 
action also compel the Party to introduce the division of labour to a considerable degree and 
this inevitably invokes the dangers of ossification, bureaucratization and corruption’ (Lukacs, 
p. 335). As a committed Leninist, Lukacs views both the problem of reification in 
revolutionary times and all possible solutions to it through the lens of the Party; although this 
is not the place to assess Lukacs’s position in full, it can certainly be argued that his 
organizational strategies rely on a utopian faith in the ‘living interaction between the will of 
the whole party and the Central Committee’ (p. 339) and an inevitably hierarchizing recourse 
to ‘iron discipline and …[the] demand for total commitment’ (p. 339) from Party members. 
While Williams (1971) neglects Lukacs’s own formulation of the problem of Party 
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dictatorship, he registers, more strongly than he did in the sixties, the tension in Lukacs’s 
work between deviation from the Party line and unerring commitment to the Leninist model. 
Lukacs’s analyses take us back, says Williams, not just to his ‘originality, but to his no less 
important orthodoxy, as a Marxist intellectual, even more as a traditional intellectual’ (1971, 
Feb 25). 
 
Perhaps due to lack of space in his Guardian column, Williams leaves the question of the 
conceptual crux of Lukacs’s argument, the distinction between ‘actual’ and ‘imputed’ class 
consciousness, to the essay ‘Literature and Sociology’ (2005f), written only a few months 
later as an ode to the deceased Goldmann. The immediate context of this discussion is 
important, since it concerns Williams’s perception of the development of the sociological 
element in literary theory from the thirties up until the time of writing. Williams (2005f) 
notes the fact that young students throughout the sixties began to be drawn to the continental 
tradition and to what is referred to as ‘theory’, a word which ‘suggests laws and methods, 
indeed a methodology’ (p. 14). This turn towards alternative traditions and the ‘rigour’ of 
theory, says Williams, took place due to ‘certain absolute restrictions in English thought, 
restrictions which seemed to link very closely with certain restrictions and deadlocks in the 
larger society’ (p. 12). But there was then a danger of ‘pseudo-theory’ (p. 12), from which, 
Williams notes wryly, ‘English thinkers could easily, too easily, fall back on their older 
habits, professing not to understand abstractions like a power structure though they could 
traditionally understand a microcosm … not to know mediation although they knew 
catharsis’ (p. 13). To complicate matters, thinkers like Goldmann were critiquing elements of 
their own tradition by critically acknowledging that ‘the most available concept of laws, and 
from it the most available organizational methods, come in fact, from studies that are wholly 
different in kind: from the physical sciences, where the matter to be studied can be held to be 
objective, where value free observations can then be held to be possible’ (p. 14). In the study 
of literature in particular, argues Williams, we encounter ‘material so laden with values that if 
we do not deal directly [with them] we have literally nothing to deal with’ (p. 14). Goldmann 
would have concurred, argues Williams, and notes that ‘it is hardly surprising that in England 
it has been literary critics, and above all Leavis, who have led the opposition to what 
Goldmann calls “scientism”’ (p. 14). Williams (2005f) broaches this potential convergence of 
Leavisite practical criticism with the kind of critical continental approach represented by 
Goldmann only to dispel it: 
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In his attack on ‘scientism’ [Goldmann] might for a moment have assumed that there 
were Cambridge allies, who had attacked the same thing in the same word. But this 
wouldn’t have lasted long. Goldmann’s attack of scientism – the uncritical transfer of 
method from the physical to the human sciences – was above all in the name of a 
critical sociology; whereas that word ‘sociology’ has only to be mentioned, in 
practical critical circles, to provoke the last sad look at the voluntarily damned. (p. 17) 
 
Williams’s disdainful attitude towards the inflexible specialism of practical criticism is clear 
here. In forgoing the scientistic attitude towards society and culture, practical criticism sought 
to position human values at the centre of literary production, an aim which Williams shared. 
But who would adjudicate the relation between text and values? The answer of Scrutiny, says 
Williams, ‘was, as we know … the informed critical minority’ (p. 18). From this elitist 
critical perspective stems an interpretation of ‘bad’ literature, aesthetically defined, as a 
symptom of ‘cultural decline’ (p. 18), into which then slips the quasi-sociological ‘wider 
social explanation: in this case the destruction of an organic society by industrialism and by 
mass civilization’ (p. 18).  
 
The notion of an anterior ‘organic society’ would seem to put the Leavisite conception at 
odds with Marxism, as indeed it did. At the same time, Scrutiny was effectively practicing a 
form of cultural criticism, and in this Marxism was a competitor, not an enemy: 
 
In the 1930s [the Scrutiny] diagnosis overlapped, or seemed to overlap, with other 
radical interpretations, and especially perhaps, with the Marxist interpretation of the 
effects of capitalism. Yet almost at once there was a fundamental hostility between 
these two groups: a critical engagement between Scrutiny and the English Marxists, 
which we can have little doubt, looking back, Scrutiny won. But why was this so? 
(Williams, 2005f, p. 18) 
 
Williams’s answer to this forms the backbone of his critique of orthodox Marxism, and 
dictates the trajectory of his theoretical development as an attempt to work through the 
literary-critical contradictions of the thirties. ‘Marxism, as then commonly understood,’ 
Williams contends, ‘was weak in just the decisive area where practical criticism was strong: 
in its capacity to give precise and detailed and reasonably adequate accounts of actual 
consciousness’ (p. 19). Continental innovators like Lukacs and Goldmann came too late for 
the English Marxist of the thirties, the reason for whose defeat at the hands of Scrutiny, 
argues Williams, ‘is not difficult to find: it lay in the received formula of base and 
superstructure’ (p. 19).  
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Williams (2005f) argued that the reductive reflection-theory characteristic of vulgar 
materialism ‘left the field open to anybody who could give an account of art which in its 
closeness and intensity at all corresponded to the real human dimension in which works of art 
are made and valued’ (p. 19). Into the breach stepped practical criticism, the result being a 
‘victory … so crushing that in England, for a generation, even the original questions could 
hardly be raised’ (p. 19). The pervasive language of warfare in Williams’s descriptions (the 
thirties are described as an ‘abandoned battlefield’ to which Lukacs and Goldmann are now 
erroneously referred) underlines Williams’s view of the literary culture of his own period as 
suffering from the effects of intellectual suppression by the victors. The belated English 
discovery of Lukacs and Goldmann points, for the Williams of ‘Literature and Sociology’, 
towards the possibility of renewing the vitality of literary debate, and of disrupting the 
hegemony of a set of positions which, in the name of a humanistic fidelity to experience, was 
neglecting the necessary analysis of society as a totality. But then, if a fresh volley was to be 
loosed against the establishment, it could not be by using the same theoretical arsenal as was 
employed by the losing faction in the thirties. Marxist criticism would have to be radically 
reformed, even if this meant, as it sometimes did, a qualitative disconnection from what had 
been the core insights of the tradition. The project of The Long Revolution, says Williams 
(2005f), had been ‘to replace the formula of base and superstructure with the more active idea 
of a field of mutually if also unevenly determining forces’ (p. 20) i.e. totality. It was in this 
same early sixties context that Williams first encountered Lukacs and Goldmann and, in a 
sense, rediscovered Marxism via the continent: ‘it is easy to imagine my feelings when I 
discovered an active and developed Marxist theory, in the work of Lukacs and Goldmann, 
which was exploring many of the same areas with many of the same concepts, but also with 
others in a quite different range’ (p. 20). The context in which Williams is receiving the ideas 
of Lukacs and Goldmann is thus crucial to the mode in which he receives them, and the 
purposes he wishes to serve in doing so. They point, for him, towards the possibility of a 
Marxist framework which disavows, or at the very least confronts, the disastrous hegemony 
of base/superstructure.  
 
For Williams (2005f), the ‘real advance’ (p. 20) in the work of both Lukacs and Goldmann 
consists in the discussion of reification, this being for him ‘the dominance of economic 
activity over all other forms of human activity, the dominance of its values over all other 
values … so that this reification, this false objectivity, was more thoroughly penetrating every 
other kind of life and consciousness’ (p. 21). Against this phenomenon Williams, with 
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Lukacs and Goldmann, deploys the perspective of totality: ‘The idea of totality was then a 
critical weapon against this precise deformation; indeed, against capitalism itself’ (p. 21).  
But there is a crucial conceptual difference between Williams and the continental tradition he 
is attempting to converse with. The totality, for Williams, is a totality of experience or, as he 
puts it in the same essay, a ‘totality of consciousness’ (p. 22), an interlinked spectrum of 
responses, old and new, to reality. Criticism will intuit the various individual and collective 
responses to elements in a ‘whole way of life’, marking a break from all theories of singular 
determination in culture and aesthetics. For Lukacs, conversely, the totality is objective, a 
statement of absolute ontology, to which consciousness will in one way or another, with or 
without fidelity, relate. Moreover, the Lukacsian totality is specifically determinate along 
orthodox Marxist lines; the ontology of the totality depends first and foremost on the mode of 
production and developments in the class struggle. Williams does not quite seem to intuit, at 
this stage, the magnitude of the difference between his own conceptions and those of the 
continental writers (especially Lukacs) with whom he finds common cause. This becomes 
clearer still in his description of the difference between actual and imputed or possible 
consciousness: 
 
Goldmann, following Lukacs, distinguishes between actual consciousness and  
 possible consciousness: the actual, with its rich but incoherent multiplicity; the  
 possible, with its maximum degree of adequacy and coherence. A social group is  
 ordinarily limited to its actual consciousness, and this will include many kinds of  
 misunderstanding and illusion: elements of false consciousness which are often, of 
 course used and reflected in ordinary literature. But there is also a maximum of  
 possible consciousness: that view of the world raised to its highest and most coherent 
 level, limited only by the fact that to go further would mean that the group would  
 have to surpass itself, to change into or be replaced by a new social group (Williams, 
 2005f, p. 23). 
 
What emerges in the course of the subsequent analysis is a mapping of the actual/possible 
distinction onto something like the dominant and emergent strains (in Williams’s later 
terminology) of a cultural hegemony. The distinction is useful, Williams argues, to the degree 
that it breaks with the received dogma of base and superstructure and permits the division of 
conscious responses to reality between those which conform to the ‘common illusions’ (p. 
24) of a ‘world-view, a particular and organised way of seeing the world’ (p. 24) and those 
which, in their ‘simultaneous realisation of and response to these underlying and formative 
structures’ (p. 24), permits the ‘imaginative act, the imaginative method, the specific and 
genuinely unprecedented imaginative organisation’ (p. 25). Actual consciousness is linked 
Daniel Robert Gerke  Chapter One: Williams and Lukacs 
 
 
64 
here to the idea of a dominant world-view, while possible consciousness plays the part of a 
potentially subversive, or at least progressive, element of emergent response. But then what is 
the reader to make of the claim, in the above quotation, that possible consciousness is also 
‘that [dominant/actual] view of the world raised to its highest and most coherent level’? How 
can the highest and most coherent expression of a dominant world-view be synonymous with 
its transgression? 
 
The problem here, which gives rise to numerous confusions, is that Williams is using the 
terms ‘actual’ and ‘possible’ consciousness as though the latter were an intensification of the 
former; actual consciousness is the consciousness a given social group actually has, while 
possible consciousness is that condition raised to the nth degree, to the point where to surpass 
it would be to pass through the border of what is possible for that particular group at that 
particular stage in its development. From this conception arises Williams’s tendency to see 
‘possible’ consciousness as a kind of ‘going beyond’, a transgressing of dominant responses 
and their organisation. But then this is in some respects the exact opposite of what Lukacs 
meant by these terms, and points towards the vast semantic gulf between Williams’s 
‘possible’ and Lukacs’s (as he is most commonly translated) ‘imputed’ (zugerechnet).  By 
‘actual’ consciousness, Lukacs had meant a relatively indeterminate, perhaps even 
‘inappropriate’, form of consciousness, precisely by its opposition to ‘imputed’ 
consciousness, that being ‘the thoughts and feelings which men would have in a particular 
situation if they were able to assess both it and the interests arising from it in their impact on 
immediate action and on the whole structure of society’ (Lukacs, 2010, p. 50); in short, their 
objective class situation. Williams is right, therefore, to suggest that the distinction points 
towards at least a partial break with base and superstructure, since actual consciousness need 
not necessarily follow the contours of imputed consciousness; real, psychological attitudes 
are not determined straightforwardly by class position. He is wrong, however, to suggest that 
‘possible’ consciousness, in anything like its Lukacsian formulation as ‘imputed’, reaches 
towards the transgressive heights of new experience and the artistic spontaneity of the novel 
response. Possible or imputed consciousness is, in Lukacs, that form of consciousness which 
most closely follows the contours of the economic position. 
 
Again, the crux of the matter is Williams’s principled refusal to acknowledge the determining 
force of a ‘pre-existent social reality’ structured economically around the mode of production 
and its class effects. What he sees as the point of fruitful theoretical development in Lukacs is 
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an analysis of consciousness which refuses to chain consciousness deterministically to an 
economic base; Lukacs does indeed unchain consciousness, but for him this means that there 
now exists a disjunction between consciousness and reality which must be explained and 
ultimately repaired. False consciousness represents the inability of human beings to 
understand their position within an objective historical complex of social relations; the role of 
historical materialism is therefore to restore the link between reality and consciousness 
which, in the orthodox interpretation, will lead to the working-class asserting its interests and 
abolishing class society. Williams simply does not attend to false consciousness as a category 
in this sense. When he speaks of reification, which is the name Lukacs gives to the economic 
process whereby false consciousness is instantiated, Williams  (2005f) refers, as we have 
seen, to ‘the dominance of economic activity over all other forms of human activity, the 
dominance of its values over all other values’ (p.  21). But insofar as these economistic values 
are judged negatively, it is because they are, from Williams’s avowedly socialist perspective, 
perilous to human eudaimonia, not because they are the values of people who have become 
incapable of perceiving adequately the exploitative basis of capitalist social relations.  
 
Williams concludes his discussion of actual and possible/imputed consciousness with the 
following remarks, worth quoting at length, in which he stresses both the utility of the 
distinction (as he has interpreted it), and its limitations:  
 
We must reject those versions of consciousness which relate it directly, or with mere 
lags and complications, to a determining base. The stress on an active consciousness 
made by Lukacs and Goldmann may give us a real way beyond that. And it might be 
possible to say that the relation I have tried to describe – between formal 
consciousness and new creative practice – might be better, more precisely, described 
in their terms: actual consciousness and possible consciousness. Indeed I hope it may 
be so, but I see one major difficulty. This relation, though subtle, is in some ways 
static. Possible consciousness is the objective limit that can be reached by a class 
before it turns into another class, or is replaced. But I think this leads, rather 
evidently, to a kind of macro-history: in many ways adequate but in relation to actual 
literature, with its continuity of change, often too large in its categories to come very 
close, except at certain significant points when there is a radical and fundamental 
moment of replacement of one class by another (2005f, pp. 25-26). 
 
I hope I have shown that what Williams’s distinction between the residual/dominant and 
emergent strains in a culture or a structure of feeling may not, in fact, be described in 
Lukacs’s terms, unless those terms are made to mean something quite different. This does 
not, of course, invalidate either thinker’s formulations, but it does, I think, render them very 
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far even from being commensurable for the purposes of immediate comparison; Williams’s 
conception refers to the conditions for the emergence of novel creative responses in artistic 
production, while Lukacs’s refers to the capacity of particular classes to adequately perceive 
their material interests as part of an existing (and knowable) social totality. The confusions to 
which Williams’s own conflation of these apparatuses give rise are sometimes quite grievous, 
but they are also instructive with regard to his development. Williams’s error nevertheless 
reveals the trajectory he is trying to map out. What he is seeking to establish, in the latter part 
of the quotation, is the degree to which emergent strains are always and everywhere arising as 
part of the normal development of consciousness; their emergence is not limited to those few 
historical junctures (in practice, revolutionary conjunctures) in which classes cease to exist or 
are superseded. Because of the way in which he has interpreted Lukacs, Williams sees the 
actual/possible distinction as the first step in bringing criticism to the point of acknowledging 
the fluid, transformative nature of literary production. Lukacs’s formulation remains 
problematic, however, in its inability to detach artistic creativity from class position, the 
result being a ‘macro-history’, a history viewed at an unhelpfully high level of abstraction 
and generalization which fails to acknowledge the granular mechanisms of cultural 
development. The appreciation of granularity, of course, was precisely what Scrutiny did 
well; the lack of it in the Marxist theory of the thirties was, in Williams’s analysis, the source 
of its defeat at the hands of practical criticism and the ensuing (and enduring) paralysis of 
literary debate. 
 
Again, for the sake of theoretical rigour, it must be pointed out that Williams is incorrect in 
his appropriation of Lukacs here. The class basis of possible/imputed consciousness does not 
render it an inadequate vehicle for emergent acts of creative imagination; it is neither a 
vehicle for such acts nor their negation. For Lukacs, whether or not a literary production is 
‘novel’ (in the sense of reflecting an emergent response to social reality) is irrelevant to 
whether that same production is linked to the imputed class consciousness of its author. 
Novel instantiations of the creative imagination may proceed from both imputed and actual 
consciousness without distinction. What matters for Lukacs is whether or not such novel 
productions follow the contours of reality (which itself will change, offering up new material 
to be responded to) or submit to forms of false consciousness. These are complex issues 
which I will continue to draw out in the final two sections of this chapter. The salient point 
here is that Williams is appropriating Lukacs despite his flawed conception of the theory of 
actual and imputed consciousness. Conceiving of ‘possible’ consciousness as an index of 
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emergent strands in a structure of feeling arguably makes Lukacs into more of an influence 
than he deserves. But Lukacs’s complex model of consciousness does mark a break with 
simple reflection theory, opening the door as it does so to responses beyond the dominant 
ideological nexus. Williams’s is not wrong, then, to appropriate Lukacs for the revival and 
extension of Marxist theory in the literary-critical context of the early seventies.  
 
It should be noted that Williams (2005f) does not hold back in his criticisms of the specific 
failings of Lukacs and Goldmann’s literary criticism, and indeed he links these back to what 
he understands as their Marxism. He complains, justly, that in Lukacs ‘No English novels are 
considered at all’ (p. 26), and accuses him of coming to such sweeping conclusions as that 
‘the novel is the form in which, in a degraded society, an individual tries and fails to surpass 
an objectively limited society and destiny’ (p. 26) from material ‘so extremely selective that 
we are almost at once on our guard’ (p. 26). The idea of an inattention to granularity on 
Lukacs’s part comes through here again, and Williams develops this into a critique of Lukacs 
and Goldmann’s conception of literary form: ‘form, in Lukacs and Goldmann,  translates too 
often as genre or kind … we stay, too often, within a received and ultimately idealist tradition 
in which ‘epic’ and ‘drama’, ‘novel’ and ‘tragedy’, have inherent and permanent properties, 
from which the analysis begins and to which selective examples are related’ (p. 27). Of 
course, one of Lukacs’s central concerns had been to distinguish the novels of high realism 
from the ‘decadent’ novels of the modernists; while Williams is cognizant of such 
appreciations of formal development and change (‘Lukacs makes … distinctions, from 
Balzac through Mann and Kakfa to Solzhenitsyn’ (p. 27)), he insists that the issue of form is 
still confused by an ‘undiscarded ballast of form in a more abstract, more supra-historical 
sense’ (p. 27). Whether this ‘undiscarded ballast’ is indeed supra-historical is a larger issue 
that cannot be properly addressed here; what is at least clear is that Lukacs’s distinctions are 
based firmly in class. For Williams, who could not accept what he saw as the ‘macro-
historical’ implications of the class theory of consciousness, the repetition of such a macro-
history in the analysis of literary form is equally unacceptable.  
 
For Williams in the early seventies, then, Lukacs (with Goldmann), repurposed for a less 
orthodox Marxism, itself aware of the theoretical and strategic failings of base/superstructure, 
represent an opportunity to provide literary theory with a sociological dimension sorely 
lacking in practical criticism. Despite his misappropriation of some key categories, 
Williams’s commentary is keener and more detailed than was possible during his first 
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encounters with Lukacs in the early sixties. The reservations Williams has at this stage fail to 
mar his enthusiasm for the potential enlargement of literary debate which the increasing 
availability of Lukacs’s work in English is making possible. In the remaining sections of this 
chapter, I want to bridge the gap between the Williams of 1971, who still regards Lukacs as a 
necessary addition to the arsenal of a materialist criticism, and the Williams of 1984, for 
whom the developed theory of cultural materialism is not a different, not a partial, but a 
‘diametrically opposite answer to the questions which Lukacs and other Marxists have posed’ 
(1984a, p. 15 – my emphasis). 
 
Cultural Materialism and the Break with Lukacs 
 
The period 1977 to 1984 marks the phase of William’s most robust engagement with 
Lukacs’s work. 1977 sees the publication of Marxism and Literature, Williams’s first 
systematic articulation of the theory of cultural materialism, in which he develops his position 
on the nature of class consciousness and addresses Lukacs’s notions of ‘typicality’ and the 
‘specificity of the aesthetic’. In the Introduction to ML, Williams develops the contextual 
themes touched on in ‘Literature and Sociology’ with a more explicit statement of affinity to 
the European intellectual ferment that had inspired him in the sixties and early seventies. The 
‘model of fixed and known Marxist positions’, says Williams, ‘which in general had only to 
be applied, and the corresponding dismissal of all other kinds of thinking as non-Marxist, 
revisionist, neo-Hegelian, or bourgeois’ (p. 2) was, mercifully, over. The deadlock of the 
thirties which Williams had described in ‘Literature and Sociology’ was, in this period of 
significant cultural and intellectual transmission, ‘being vigorously and significantly 
reopened’ (p.  4), and Williams positions his own work as embedded in this vital new 
conjuncture. How does Lukacs, who is after all one of oldest of the new European references, 
fit into this vibrant, emergent scene? For Williams, it is as the progenitor of certain categories 
and approaches which, while crucial in the early development of the new Marxism, must now 
be decisively superseded. Even in 1972, it had been Goldmann (having developed and 
nuanced Lukacs’s categories) who represented the greatest advance; in the broad period of 
ML, PL and Culture, Williams’s critique of Lukacsian categories is extended and the distance 
between his own and Lukacs’s positions is made more explicit. While the mid-to-late 
seventies was the period of Williams’s most explicit affirmation of his work as Marxist, it 
was also the period of his most concerted critique of, as he put it in 1972, ‘what [had] come 
down to us as Marxism’ (The Listener, 1972, March 23). Alongside the seminal critique of 
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base and superstructure, the term ‘cultural materialism’ drew its meaning from opposition to 
the closely related ‘epochal’ construction of historical materialism which had, in Williams’s 
view, divided the ‘whole and indissoluble material and social process’ (2009 [1977], p. 68) 
beyond recognition. 
 
One of the unifying themes of Williams’s commentary in this period is his resolute 
opposition to any ‘epochal’ analysis of history and its ‘corresponding’ forms of 
consciousness and literary production. This position had already found expression in the early 
seventies in Williams’s critique of the ‘macro-historical’ implications of Lukacs’s class-
theory of literature. In Marxism and Literature Williams (1977) turns his attention to the 
notion of ideology, in particular its usage as ‘an abstraction … a category of illusions and 
false consciousness … given a categorical rigidity, an epochal rather than a genuinely 
historical consciousness of ideas, which could then be separated into … successive and 
unified stages’ (2009, p.  67). Here Williams opposes an epochal conceptualization of 
ideology, in which particular (false) ideas and forms of consciousness mechanically 
correspond to particular historical periods, to a ‘genuinely historical’ conception, centred in 
‘Marx’s emphasis on a necessary conflict of real interests’ (p. 67). An authentically Marxist 
(materialist and historical) definition of ideology would, Williams argues, be one in which 
the term ‘reverts to a specific and practical dimension: the complicated process within which 
men “become” (are) conscious of their interests and their conflicts.55 The categorical short-
cut to an (abstract) distinction between “true” and “false” consciousness is then effectively 
abandoned, as in all practice it should be’ (p. 68).  
 
Does the rejection of the abstract and categorical simplification of consciousness as an 
‘epochal’ phenomenon demand the rejection of the distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ 
consciousness? The manner in which Williams brings Lukacs into the discussion clarifies his 
intention. The conflation of ideology with ‘false consciousness’, says Williams, ‘has always 
prevented the more specific analysis of operative distinctions of ‘true’ and ‘false’ 
consciousness at the practical level, which is always that of social relationships’ (2009 
[1977], p. 68). The epochal or macro-historical approach, then, with its rigid taxonomies of 
true and false forms of consciousness and their iron-clad historical determinants, fails to 
                                                
55 Williams’s analysis here is clearly indebted to Thompson’s analysis of class (or class formation) in TMEWC 
(1963), where he states that ‘class happens when some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or 
shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose 
interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs’ (2013 [1963], pp. 8-9). 
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account for consciousness at the level of the complex and particular social relationships in 
which men and women find themselves and locate their experiences. Lukacs, Williams 
suggests, had attempted to ‘clarify this analysis by a distinction between “actual 
consciousnesses” and “imputed” or “possible” consciousness (a full and “true” understanding 
of a real social position)’ (p. 68). The clarification, Williams implies, lies in the fact that 
imputed consciousness (Williams now includes the more common term), being a ‘full and 
true understanding of a real social position’ (p. 68), points towards a more complete, complex 
or nuanced (‘granular’) apprehension of real social relationships; ‘This has the merit’, he 
argues, ‘of avoiding the reduction of all “actual consciousness” to ideology’ (p. 68).  
 
In what sense does distinguishing ‘imputed’ from ‘actual’ consciousness avoid the stated 
reduction of actual consciousness to ‘ideology’ (false consciousness)? Only in the sense that 
actual consciousness, on this reading, is an ‘incomplete’ form of consciousness, in which case 
it must contain elements that do not follow mechanically from the particular ideological 
formation associated with the corresponding imputed consciousness. But here Williams is 
repeating the mistake he made in ‘Literature and Sociology’, namely, that imputed 
consciousness is a more ‘complete’ or ‘full’ version of actual consciousness. Lukacs is clear 
on this: imputed consciousness is awareness of interests, nothing more or less. On Williams’s 
reading, actual consciousness isn’t so much ‘false’ as contingent, and therefore potentially 
subversive; it cannot be reduced to mere ‘bourgeois ideology’ and may therefore, in being 
made more coherent, be raised to the level of totality. For Lukacs, however, what determines 
whether or not consciousness is true or false isn’t ‘coherence’ but class, and the relation of a 
class to reality as described by historical materialism. To clarify Lukacs’s position: actual 
consciousness is the consciousness of a class (or individuals within a class) which does not 
properly understand its class position and the interests proceeding from it. Whether or not 
such a consciousness is true depends on the relation between it and reality; in practice, this 
means whether or not it examines the social totality from the ‘correct’ perspective of 
historical materialism. By definition, the bourgeoisie cannot do this; its imputed 
consciousness is false, since it is not historical materialist (this is because a historical 
materialist view would insist upon the overthrow of class society, which the bourgeoisie 
cannot condone). Proletarian ‘actual’ consciousness will usually be false, as when proletarian 
individuals fail to understand their class position, but imputed proletarian class consciousness 
is true; it views reality ‘correctly’ via historical materialist theory and, by understanding its 
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own interests in the overthrow of class society, which it can and must condone, is capable of 
realizing, in both thought and action, the ‘truth’ of history. 
 
Now, Williams is aware of the thrust of this view of the ‘truth’ of proletarian class 
consciousness, and indeed this awareness forms the backbone of what is, in ML, a stronger 
condemnation of Lukacs’s theory than is mounted in the early seventies. While the 
distinguishing notion of ‘imputed’ consciousness rescues actual consciousness from mere 
falsehood, Williams argues, ‘the category is speculative, and indeed as a category cannot 
easily be sustained’ (2009 [1977], p. 68). The reason is that, ‘In History and Class 
Consciousness it depended on a last abstract attempt to identify truth with the proletariat, but 
in this Hegelian form it is no more convincing than [positivist, bourgeois abstraction]’ (p. 
68). Lukacs criticizes himself in similar terms in the 1967 Preface to HCC, in which he says 
that by imputed class consciousness he had meant ‘the same thing as Lenin in What is to be 
done? when he maintained that socialist class consciousness would differ from the 
spontaneously emerging trade-union consciousness in that it would be implanted in workers 
“from outside”’ (Lukacs, 2010, xviii), i.e. by professional Marxist revolutionaries. This, 
Lukacs goes on, ‘was transformed in [HCC] into a purely intellectual result and thus into 
something contemplative. In my presentation it would indeed be a miracle if this ‘imputed’ 
consciousness could turn into revolutionary praxis’ (xix). What is then interesting is that 
Williams, while cognizant of the class-basis of Lukacs’s account, and while substantially 
agreeing with Lukacs’s later self-criticism, nevertheless retains a conception of the 
actual/imputed distinction which strips it of its grounding in the dialectic ‘class/reality’ and 
makes of it a measure of the solidity or coherence of the world-view of a ‘social group’. The 
attribution of ‘true’ or ‘false’ consciousness to such a group falls outside of the purview of 
class analysis. He firmly rejects Lukacs’s distinction, then, but only after presenting it as a 
necessary step forward (now to be superseded) in the development of Marxist theory, a 
characterization which is only tenable for Williams on the basis of a misunderstanding of its 
real import. 
 
If I labour the point about Williams’s misreading of Lukacs, it is in no way to declare 
Williams’s analysis, or indeed his general position, inadmissible by virtue of it; I insist on 
acknowledging his error only to bring into sharper focus the gulf that separates his late work 
from that of Lukacs. This is so much so, I have been arguing, that Williams primarily finds 
himself in agreement with Lukacs where he misunderstands him, and yet that very 
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misunderstanding marks a sequence of points in Williams’s development in which he feels 
able to trace the contours of a new theoretical conjuncture. As the strength of Williams’s 
critique intensifies in the late seventies, the erroneous appropriation of Lukacs becomes less 
important, and the criticisms, which are often relatively autonomous (the errors having 
functioned mainly to increase Williams’s esteem for Lukacs), come to the fore. I turn now to 
Williams’s critique of Lukacs’s late aesthetic theory in ML and in Culture, before, in the final 
section, addressing PL and Williams’s later reviews.  
 
I have argued that Williams is drawn to Lukacs, throughout his career but particularly in its 
middle phase, by the promise held in Lukacs’s work of a resolution of the deadlock of the 
thirties: a ‘third way’ between the over-specialized and elitist practical criticism of the 
Scrutiny tradition, and the dogmatic reflection theory of a certain kind of orthodox Marxism 
(Caudwell). Another way of stating this same distinction is as that between a Platonic 
aesthetics, which made of art and literature a repository of pure human values floating above 
and beyond a ‘fallen’ industrialised society (Leavis), and a vulgar materialist aesthetics which 
subsumed art into an abstractly categorised totality of economic forces which art could only 
‘reflect’, ‘mimic’ or otherwise ape. Williams shared with this orthodox Marxist position a 
positive conception of totality, the ‘whole social and material process’, but then the central 
issue was to avoid importing into the totality concepts which deviated from what was always, 
in Williams, a granular stress on the real material bases of social life. Theories, among which 
we may include both practical criticism and Marxist reflection theory, which separated art 
and artistic expression out from the whole social and material process as something 
secondary, perhaps even immaterial, could not be accepted; as Williams put it in ‘Literature 
and Sociology’, ‘the whole point in thinking in terms of a totality is the realization that we are 
part of it; that our own consciousness, our work, our methods, are then critically at stake’ 
(2005f, p. 21). Both practical criticism and orthodox Marxism failed to include artistic 
creativity within the totality at all, leading either to a denial of the real totality (‘art is 
transcendent and separate from the world’), or the impoverishment of both the totality and art 
(‘art, being “merely” superstructural, is not a part of the real foundation of society’). 
 
This conceptual dialectic, which Williams sought to sublate, reappears in his treatment of 
Lukacs’s late aesthetic theory. In ML, Williams argues that the history of the word ‘aesthetic’ 
‘is in large part a protest against the forcing of all experience into instrumentality (‘utility’) 
and of all things into commodities’ (2009, p. 151). This ‘humane response’ (p. 151), which 
Daniel Robert Gerke  Chapter One: Williams and Lukacs 
 
 
73 
recalls the emphasis of Scrutiny, used the idea of the aesthetic to communicate ‘an 
affirmation, directly comparable with the definition and affirmation of “creative 
imagination”, of certain human meanings and values which a dominant social system 
[industrial society] reduced and even tried to exclude’ (p. 151). If this was an attempt to 
guard art against the ravages of capitalist instrumentality, then so too, says Williams, has 
been a Marxist ‘tendency, centred on Lukacs, to distinguish and defend “the specificity of the 
aesthetic”’ (p. 151) in internal opposition to the unhelpful ‘reduction of art to social 
engineering (“ideology”) or superstructural reflection’ (p. 151). If the ‘humane response’, in 
its transcendentalism, positions art above the social world, and the traditional Marxist 
response reduces art to either ideology or reflection, where does the Lukacsian effort, here 
explicitly formulated as an attempt to bypass this false dichotomy, go wrong in assigning to 
art a specific location? ‘Lukacs sought to define art’, says Williams, ‘in ways which would 
distinguish it, categorically, from both the “practical” and the “magical”’ (p. 151). By 
practical, says Williams, is meant ‘containment within specific historical forms: for example 
the reduced practice of capitalist society’ (p. 151) whereas the ‘magical’ or ‘religious’ ‘offer 
their images as objectively real, transcendent, and demanding belief’ (p. 151). Williams then 
offers the following summary of Lukacs’s view of the ‘aesthetic’ category, which stands in 
opposition to the other two: 
 
Art offers its images as images, closed and real in themselves (following a familiar 
isolation of the ‘aesthetic’), but at the same time represents a human generality: a real 
mediation between (isolated) subjectivity and (abstract) universality; a specific 
process of the “identical subject/object”’. (2009 [1977], p. 151) 
 
Williams’s response is balanced, but reaches a verdict: 
 
This definition is the strongest contemporary form of the affirmation of genuine 
‘aesthetic’ practice as against a reduced ‘practicality’ or a displaced ‘myth-making’. 
But it raises fundamental problems. It is, intrinsically, a categorical proposition, 
defensible at that level but immediately subject to major difficulties when it is taken 
into the multiple world of social and cultural process … The problem is to sustain 
such a  distinction through the inevitable extension to an indissoluble social and 
material process: not only indissoluble in the social conditions of the making and 
reception of art, within a general social process from which these cannot be excised; 
but also indissoluble in the actual making and reception, which are connecting 
material processes within a social system of the use and transformation of material 
(including language) by material means. (2009 [1977], p. 152) 
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In ‘reduced practicality’ we hear echoed the ‘ideology’ and ‘reflection’ of the Marxism to 
which Williams is opposed; in the ‘displaced myth-making’ we can intuit the transcendental 
elitism of Scrutiny and practical criticism. The specific failing of Lukacs’s alternative is that 
it is ‘categorical’, a word symbolizing the same kind of analytic taxonomy that Williams 
opposed in Lukacs’s ‘epochal’ analysis of literary form. The categorical nature of the 
specificity of Lukacs’s aesthetic cannot survive what Williams suggests would be a more 
probing and complex analysis of human activities as they really, that is, indissolubly, exist. 
The totality is a more severe one, for Williams, than it is even for Lukacs (long considered 
the foremost thinker of totality), a ‘general social process’ within which all forms of human 
creative activity (‘practical’ labour, ‘magical’ idealisation, ‘aesthetic’ creation), are so closely 
interwoven that categorical pronouncements are always insufficient, even as the complexity 
of the totality demands their most probing examination and description.  
 
Williams’s point is well made, and indeed a certain degree of categorical unraveling is 
unavoidable as soon as the critical gaze turns towards such liminal objects/practices as 
‘religious art’ or ‘artisanal manufacture’. But then, Lukacs’s distinctions do not refer to the 
specific ‘empirical’ differences between activities but to the relation between subject and 
object, and to the possibility of the dissolution of that opposition (that opposition being the 
essence of alienation) in certain, quite contingent, creative situations; there is no necessary 
reason why certain kinds of manual labour or religious worship may not, indeed, be regarded 
as ‘aesthetic’ in Lukacs’s terms. The explicit categorization of such human practices 
nevertheless comprises, for Williams, another example of Lukacs’s inattention to the 
complexity of, as it stood in ‘Literature and Sociology’, the ‘field of mutually if also 
unevenly determining forces’ (2005f, p. 20). Williams expresses the same point with greater 
clarity in Culture (1981), and touches once again on the distinction between the historical and 
the categorical (or ‘epochal’): 
 
Too many processes and objects from the ‘practical’ and ‘magico-religious’ phases 
come to demand inclusion in the ‘aesthetic’ phase. Too many ‘aesthetic’ processes 
and objects overlap, in practice, with the ‘practical’ and ‘magico-religious’. It is 
indeed the relative integrity of these phases, in certain periods of human practice, 
which allows us to see certain subsequent specializations, in periods of altered general 
practice, as historical rather than categorical facts (and the theory of Lukacs, in terms, 
as idealist rather than historical materialist). (1983a, p. 128)  
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This is an important passage because it contains, in microcosm, the full kernel of Williams’s 
disagreement with Lukacs’s general perspective. ‘Specializations’, here of different kinds of 
(ultimately indivisible) human practice, are revealed, in the occasional integrity of their 
manifestations, to be responding to fluid, historical circumstances. An ‘epochal’ focus, on the 
other hand, is only capable of analyses in which the character of the phenomena in question is 
para- or extra-historical i.e. grouped according to non-historical criteria. From this opposition 
of the categorical and the historical (the categorical becomes ‘epochal’ in analyses aiming at 
historicity), Williams moves to the opposition between idealist and historical materialist 
thought, and maps the first opposition onto the second. The categorical analysis (Lukacs’s), 
being based upon speculative, extra-historical criteria, is ‘idealist’; it is de-linked from the 
‘whole material and social process’ which, for Williams, is the totality. A properly historical 
materialist analysis, by contrast, would attend to the precise historical character of the 
creative response and account for it in terms of a general structure of responses (a structure of 
feeling with residual, dominant and emergent aspects) to the broader conjuncture. 
 
If I were to argue, citing as evidence Marx’s famous statement that ‘the history of all hitherto 
existing society is the history of class struggles’ (2008, p. 3), that Marxism is above all a 
class theory of history, then it is true that there is nothing particularly Marxist about Lukacs’s 
distinction of the aesthetic from other forms of human creative practice. It is certainly 
‘dialectical’, in positing the possibility of the synthesis of subject and object in aesthetic 
sublation, but it does not in itself go beyond dialectical idealism of a Hegelian kind. Williams 
is therefore quite right, from a Marxist perspective, to insist on placing aesthetic production 
back into the complex of specific material social processes as they unfold historically, and in 
criticizing Lukacs for failing to apply the insights of historical materialism in his account. But 
if Marxism is indeed a ‘class theory of history’, then the charge must also be leveled at 
Williams that his own account, while more ‘materialist’ in a basic sense, omits the category 
of class (replaced by the ‘social group’) almost entirely, a charge which could not be leveled 
at Lukacs’s literary criticism of the thirties. What Lukacs’s earlier criticism, and indeed HCC, 
shares with the founding doxa of Marxism is a) a materialist and class-based theory which is 
‘epochal’ and ‘categorical’ because based on categorical distinctions between classes and an 
epochal-class theory of history and b) an insistence on ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ as operative 
categories upon which social and economic analyses may be based and by reference to which 
criteria it should be possible, at least in theory, to assess the consciousness of individuals and 
classes. Even if Lukacs firmly continues only b) into his later aesthetic work, the lack of a 
Daniel Robert Gerke  Chapter One: Williams and Lukacs 
 
 
76 
commitment to class analysis in Williams, and of the ‘categorical-epochal’ analyses which 
Marxism thereby tends to erect, which remains the most fundamental difference between the 
two thinkers. 
 
Remaining on the terrain of the aesthetic, consider in this light Williams’s assessment, in 
Marxism and Literature, of the ideological content of the separation of the aesthetic from 
other forms of human practice: 
 
We can then see more clearly the ideological function of the specializing abstractions 
of ‘art’ and ‘the aesthetic’. What they represent, in an abstract way, is a particular 
stage of the division of labour. ‘Art’ is a kind of production which has to be seen as 
separate from the dominant bourgeois productive norm: the making of commodities. 
It has then, in fantasy, to be separated from ‘production’ altogether; described by the 
new term ‘creation’; distinguished from its own material processes; distinguished, 
finally, from other products of its own kind or closely related kinds – ‘art’ from ‘non-
art’; ‘literature’ from ‘para-literature’ or ‘popular literature’; ‘culture’ from ‘mass 
culture’. The narrowing abstraction is then so powerful that, in its name, we find ways 
of neglecting (or of dismissing as peripheral) that relentless transformation of art 
works into commodities, within the dominant forms of capitalist society. (2009, pp. 
153-154) 
 
Williams implicates both the Scrutiny tradition and the new Marxist aesthetic emphasis of 
Lukacs in what is ultimately theorized as a malign ideological current: the separation of art 
from other kinds of productive activity. This, argues Williams, perpetuates an elite division of 
labour, divorces the making of art from its constituent material processes and obscures the 
ongoing commodification of art behind a veil of romantic transcendentalism. From the 
explicit signaling of the ‘productive norm’ as having its basis in class (‘bourgeois’), to the 
emphasis on a form of ideological manipulation which obscures the real processes at work, 
this is a suggestive analysis with all the hallmarks of a Marxist criticism. At the same time, 
however, the ‘abstraction’ (the specificity of the aesthetic) is sociologically indifferent; ‘we’, 
not members of any particular class, or for reasons pertaining to the kinds of consciousness 
available to particular classes, neglect the commodification of art. Williams’s analysis takes 
reification, interpreted as ‘the dominance of economic values over all other values’, to be a 
driving force behind the aesthetic abstraction. For Lukacs, however, reification is not a set of 
‘economic values’ to which ‘we’, as an undifferentiated social subject, pay tribute by our 
collective consciousness; it is an illusion thrown up by the capitalist mode of production, 
which is absolutely false from an epistemological standpoint, and which persists as the 
ideological form of the interests of the bourgeois class and the ideological antithesis of the 
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interests of the working class, who alone are capable, in their revolutionary activity, of 
‘practically’ apprehending the underlying totality. 
 
I have been arguing that Williams appropriates Lukacs for the purposes of resolving the 
contradictions of the thirties and rejuvenating Marxist criticism, and that this proceeds 
alongside some severe misunderstandings and a gradual intensification of Williams’s own 
awareness of the distance between his own position and Lukacs’s. All of this occurs in 
parallel with the development of Williams’s own materialist theory, which aims at historicity 
by cleaving to an indissoluble and indivisible totality designated variously as a ‘whole way of 
life’, a ‘structure of feeling’, the ‘totality of consciousness’, the ‘field of mutually if also 
unevenly determining forces’, and ultimately ‘culture’ itself. ‘Cultural materialism’ 
formulates culture not as an abstraction or an idealization opposed to ‘industrial society’, nor 
as a rarefied metaphysical property of the identical subject-object, but as a material process 
like any other, wholly integrated and as fluid as the conception of history to which Williams 
subscribes. It seems perverse to argue that Williams’s model ought not to be described as a 
‘historical’ materialism, since it is evidently sensitive to history, to change and 
transformation, to the evolving character of the totality. But if historical materialism is to 
mean Marxism, then Williams is indeed propounding a cultural, and not a ‘Marxist’ 
materialism, since Marxism at its best has not been about ontology, but about causation, and 
it is in this precise sense that Marx’s is a ‘historical’, as opposed to a ‘philosophical’, 
materialism. Eagleton (2007a) expresses this point clearly in his ‘Base and Superstructure in 
Raymond Williams’: 
 
There is a strong implication throughout much of Williams’s later work that to label a 
phenomenon ‘superstructural’ is somehow to assign it a lesser degree of effective 
reality than an element of material production … The specificity of the 
base/superstructure thesis lies not here, but in the question of determinations. It is not 
a thesis which is out to distinguish the more from the less material, perhaps 
categorizing some phenomena as ‘material’ and some as ‘spiritual’ or ‘ideal’. It is a 
conceptual instrument for the analysis of forms of material determination in particular 
historical societies, for the ends of political practice. Williams’s concept of ‘cultural 
materialism’, by contrast, threatens to return to an essentially philosophical emphasis. 
(Eagleton, 2007a, p. 168) 
 
Of course, even were Williams to accept that historical materialism does not aim at dividing 
material from ideal, real from ‘less real’ (and in a variety of places he does acknowledge this) 
he would still be disinclined to assent to any ‘global’ or ‘total’ theory of determination in the 
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sense which Marxism can purport to be. There are undoubtedly versions of the base and 
superstructure thesis which, when sufficiently sensitive to historical specificity and when 
theoretically buttressed by the less controversial claim that ‘social being determines 
consciousness’, offer, for the committed historical materialist, ways out of the difficulties 
which Williams identifies.56 But there is then the question of whether Marxist cultural theory 
can survive Williams’s pivot away from the idea of an ‘articulated’ totality,57 or whether the 
fully specific, fully granular model Williams advocates requires instead a broader discipline: 
a ‘sociology of culture’. 
 
For now, let us turn to Edward Said, whose essay ‘Travelling Theory’ (1983) offers a model 
of intellectual transmission, reception and even transformation, across time and space, and 
illustrates this via what he sees as a kind of lineage from Lukacs, through Goldmann, to 
Williams. This was a lineage which, as I have said, Williams was ultimately to renounce; 
Said’s analysis nevertheless remains useful as a tool for orienting Williams’s engagement 
with Lukacs in time and space, and to explain more concretely the process of partial 
appropriation of Lukacs’s ideas in which Williams was engaged.  
 
Travelling Theory 
 
Said’s (1983) analysis is guided by the idea that, when addressing cross-cultural and cross-
geographic appropriations of theoretical constructions, it is proper to ask ‘whether by virtue 
of having moved from one place and time to another a theory gains or loses in strength, and 
whether a theory in one historical period and national culture becomes altogether different for 
another period or situation’ (p. 226). For all the contingent complexity of such movements, 
Said argues, there persists across a multitude of examples ‘a discernable and recurrent 
pattern’ (p. 226) comprising four rough stages: 
 
First, there is a point of origin, or what seems like one, a set of initial circumstances in 
which the idea came to birth or entered discourse. Second, there is a distance 
traversed, a passage through the pressure of various contexts as the idea moves from 
an earlier point to another time and place where it will come into a new prominence. 
Third, there is a set of conditions – call them conditions of acceptance or, as an 
inevitable part of acceptance, resistances – which then confronts the transplanted 
                                                
56 Indeed, as I argue in Chapter Three, pp. 196-206, Williams’s own work on hegemony in the seventies offers 
precisely such a model. 
57 A conception of the social totality as being ‘articulated’ in determinate ways was, for Hall in ‘Cultural 
Studies: Two Paradigms’ (1980), one of the strengths of structuralist over culturalist analysis.	
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theory or idea, making possible its introduction or toleration, however alien it might 
appear to be. Fourth, the now full (or partly) accommodated (or incorporated) idea is 
to some extent transformed by its new uses, its new position in a new time and place. 
(1983, pp. 226-227) 
 
The most striking thing about this passage is its debt to Williams’s triad of the residual, 
dominant and emergent, here mapped onto cross-cultural processes of translation and 
reception of theory. Said’s analysis is not only sympathetic to the destination at which 
Williams arrives but is itself, I would argue, an example of cultural materialist analysis. 
Said’s focus is what he sees as the homologous relation, in Lukacs, between class 
consciousness and ‘theory’. Subject and object become an identity with the self-
understanding of consciousness, inaugurating the perspective of totality beyond the 
perspective of reification: ‘Consciousness goes beyond empirical givens and comprehends, 
without actually experiencing, history, totality, and society as a whole – precisely those 
unities that reification had both concealed and denied. At bottom, class consciousness is 
thought thinking its way through fragmentation to unity’ (pp. 232-233). At this point, when 
classes become aware of themselves as historical potentialities (in other words, when they 
‘impute’ themselves), ‘Consciousness had moved from the world of objects into the world of 
theory’ (p. 234), theory here being figured as projective, so that ‘consciousness looks ahead 
to complete self-realization, which is of course the revolutionary process stretching forward 
in time, perceivable now only as theory or projection’ (p. 234). Theory and Lukacsian class 
consciousness, in this formulation, are the same; classes, using information from their real 
experiences, theoretically impute themselves and move from this imputation to revolutionary 
activity, a process which Lukacs (in the preface to the 1967 edition of HCC) was later to 
criticize as anti-Leninist and utopian.  
 
Said then moves on to Goldmann, arguing that the French Marxist’s appropriation of 
Lukacs’s thought depletes its insurrectionary potential and renders the ‘totality’, itself 
reduced to a signifier of the coherence of a particular ‘world-view’, a function of the 
hermeneutic activities of academics in the study of great writers. For Goldmann, ‘the 
theoretical enterprise, an interpretative circle, is a demonstration of coherence: between part 
and whole, between world vision and texts in their smallest detail, between a determinate 
Daniel Robert Gerke  Chapter One: Williams and Lukacs 
 
 
80 
social reality and the writing of particularly gifted members of a social group’58 (Said, 1983, 
p. 235). Said delivers the following judgment: 
 
Goldmann’s adaptation of Lukacs removes from theory its insurrectionary role. The 
sheer existence of class, or theoretical, consciousness for Lukacs is enough to suggest 
to him the projected overthrow of objective forms. For Goldmann an awareness of 
class or group consciousness is first of all a scholarly imperative, and then – in the 
works of highly privileged writers – the expression of a tragically limited social 
situation … to put it another way, for Lukacs theory originates as a kind of irreducible 
dissonance between mind and object, whereas for Goldmann theory is the 
homological relationship that can be seen to exist between individual part and 
coherent whole. (1983, pp. 235-236) 
 
The first thing to be said about this otherwise acute analysis is that it fails to distinguish 
between the consciousnesses of different classes, so that Said takes ‘consciousness’ in 
general to be, for Lukacs, a sufficient condition for revolution. For Lukacs, of course, only 
proletarian class consciousness is sufficient for proper awareness of the totality and thus 
revolution; the non-proletarian class consciousness of, say, the great bourgeois novelists, 
which is tragic insofar as the fate of their class is tragic (against the grain of history), would 
be no more the guarantor of revolution for Lukacs than it is for Goldmann. The more 
important point made by Said, in my view, is that Goldmann makes class consciousness 
(including proletarian class consciousness), by an intensification of its connection to ‘theory’ 
more broadly conceived, into something which is initiated (imputed) by the ‘scientific 
researcher’ (p. 234) in his/her dialectical analysis of great works of literature. This may then 
be profitably distinguished both from the Lukacs of 1923, for whom imputed proletarian class 
consciousness is a spontaneous outgrowth of the working-class itself, and from the Lukacs of 
1967, for whom it is the ‘imputed’ product of professional revolutionaries on the Leninist 
model. 
 
Said claims that the considerable difference between the two thinker’s use of the same 
categories may be at least partially explained by the fact that ‘Lukacs writes as a participant 
in a struggle (The Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919), Goldmann as an expatriate historian 
at the Sorbonne’ (1983, p. 236). While he can accept that ‘Goldmann’s adaptation of Lukacs 
degrades theory … domesticates it somewhat to the exigencies of a doctoral dissertation in 
Paris’ (p. 236), Said is also keen to emphasize that not all ‘borrowings inevitably involve 
                                                
58 The debt to Goldmann owed by Williams’s (2009 [1977]) reading of imputed class consciousness as a more 
‘coherent’ version of actual consciousness should be clear.	
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misreadings’ (p. 236), and even where misreadings occur they ought often to be judged ‘as 
part of a historical transfer of ideas from one setting to another’ (p. 236). He therefore 
concludes: 
 
The Hungary of 1919 and post-World War II Paris are two quite different 
environments. To the degree that Lukacs and Goldmann are read carefully, then to 
that precise degree we can understand the critical change – in time and in place – that 
occurs between one writer and another, both of whom depend on theory to accomplish 
a particular job of intellectual work … In measuring Lukacs and Goldmann against 
each other, then, we are also recognizing the extent to which theory is a response to a 
specific social and historical situation of which an intellectual occasion is a part. Thus 
what is insurrectionary consciousness in one instance becomes tragic vision in 
another, for reasons that are elucidated when the situations in Budapest and Paris 
determined the kinds of theories produced by Lukacs and Goldmann. (1983, p. 237) 
 
In Said’s elaboration of theory as a ‘response’ to a social situation we can hear echoes of 
Williams’s analysis of art, and indeed of consciousness. One of the consequences of applying 
a ‘response-theory’ to intellectual output is that it implies, but does not necessitate, a certain 
relativism with regard to the capacity of theory to apprehend reality. One can imagine a 
‘theory of theory’ based upon response to a specific situation which is not relativistic 
(arguably, Lukacs’s own), but Said’s argument, which emphasizes the cultural dimension of 
theory, moves tendentially in a relativistic direction. Moreover, Said’s reluctance to fully 
distinguish between the consciousness of different classes leads him to a flawed conception 
of Lukacs’s and Goldmann’s incompatibility. Thus, when he states that ‘what is 
insurrectionary consciousness in one instance becomes tragic vision in another, for reasons 
that are elucidated when the situations in Budapest and Paris are seriously compared’ (p. 
237), I think it is necessary to both criticize the initial conflation (‘insurrectionary 
consciousness’ is, in Lukacs, proletarian class consciousness; the ‘tragic vision’ is that of the 
dying noblesse de robe) while retaining the useful  emphasis on the element of politico-
geographic transmission. Said is undoubtedly correct to argue that Budapest and Paris, with 
all their historical and political import, ‘provide limits and apply pressures59 to which each 
writer, given his own gifts, predilections and interests, responds’ (p. 237). 
 
So too, then, with Williams, in his own time and place.  I suggested earlier that Williams’s conception 
of totality was as a potential form of critical practice aimed at resolving the abstractions and false 
                                                
59 This language is directly lifted from Williams’s work on base and superstructure in the seventies, in particular 
‘Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory’ (2005c). 
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dualities of the debates of the thirties (base vs superstructure, aesthetic values vs fallen industrial 
society etc) and replacing them with a holistic analysis of the ‘whole social and material process’. 
Said pursues a different line of argument, suggesting that, in Williams’s hands, ‘Lukacs’s thought – in 
this instance the avowedly revolutionary idea of totality – has been tamed somewhat. Without wishing 
in any way to belittle the importance of what Lukacs’s ideas (via Goldmann) did for the moribund 
state of English studies in late twentieth-century Cambridge, I think it needs to be said that those ideas 
were originally formulated in order to do more than shake up a few professors of literature’ (1983, p. 
238). In some ways, this overstates the case, since in HCC the totality is above all a statement of 
ontology, not strategy. At the same time, Lukacs’s formulation of class consciousness in HCC does 
tend towards rendering the attainment of knowledge of the totality immanently revolutionary, since 
such knowledge is only achievable by the revolutionary proletariat (the tautological character of such 
a formulation is precisely what Lukacs was, in 1967, to disavow).  
  
What starts to become visible here is the tension between the influence on Williams of Lukacs on the 
one hand and of Goldmann on the other. Williams responds positively, I think, to the implication of 
the early Lukacs (which Lukacs later disavowed and for which he drew harsh criticism from his 
fellow Marxists) that the perspective of totality may be in some way the spontaneous outgrowth of the 
working-class, of their coming to be aware of a truth which, in traditional Marxist theory, could only 
be ‘imputed’ onto them by others. Such a reading is broadly attuned to Williams’s own conception of 
the essential validity of the consciousness of ordinary people and the fidelity of their responses to 
experience; it is when the notion of ‘imputed’ consciousness is taken not as a hypothetical point of 
departure, but as a real-world process of ‘imputing’ thoughts and feelings into the working-class for 
the purposes of ideological motivation (which was, Lukacs later claimed, how he had always intended 
it), that Williams cannot hold to totality in its Lukacsian sense. However, at the same time as he can 
affirm the spontaneity and experiential responsiveness of immanent consciousness, Williams is also 
drawn to Goldmann’s conception, described by Said, of the ‘perspective of totality’ as a form of 
critical intellectual activity geared to towards the theoretical revelation of the homology between part 
and whole, a practice which may well, in the final analysis, be reserved for an intellectual class. The 
combination of these influences produces an uneasy tension between the steadfast advocacy of 
‘actual’ consciousness, the real, categorically indeterminate responses of ordinary people to their 
lives, and the role of what may always be an elite critical activity: rigorous (intellectual) analysis of 
the whole social and material process. 
 
Despite flagging up the disjunction between insurrection and critical reflection, Said’s 
sympathies appear to lie with the latter: ‘because Williams is not the militant Lukacs, because 
Williams is a reflective critic – this is crucial – rather than a committed revolutionary, he can 
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see the limits of a theory that begins as a liberating idea but can become a trap of its own’ 
(1983, p. 238). Said approvingly quotes Williams from ‘Literature and Sociology’ to the 
effect that Lukacs does not always carry the insights of HCC through to the most penetrating 
conclusions (a common refrain), and that Goldmann too is susceptible to ‘certain cruder 
operations – essentially still those of base and superstructure’ (Williams, 2005f, p. 21).  
‘What looked like the methodological breakthrough’, says Williams, ‘might become, quite 
quickly, the methodological trap’ (p. 21). Said’s (1983) interpretation of these and other 
comments is as follows: 
 
What he means, I think, is that once an idea gains currency because it is clearly 
effective and powerful, there is every likelihood that during its peregrinations it will 
be reduced, codified, and institutionalized. Lukacs’s remarkably complex exposition 
of the phenomenon of reification indeed did turn into a simple reflection theory; to a 
degree of course, and Williams is too decently elegiac to say it about a recently dead 
old friend, it did become this sort of idea in Goldmann’s hands. (1983, p. 239) 
 
For Said, Lukacs follows the logic of his own categories too closely, verging on dogmatic 
repetition and self-parody: ‘[Lukacs’s theory] risks becoming a theoretical overstatement, a 
theoretical parody of the situation it was formulated to remedy or overcome’ (p. 239). 
Reification is too absolute a domination by capitalism over social life, totality too absolute a 
theoretico-revolutionary solution, the result being a categorical polarity which is blind to the 
uneven porosity of power and discourse: ‘For all the brilliance of his account of reification, 
for all the care he takes with it, Lukacs is unable to see how even under capitalism reification 
itself cannot be totally dominant’ (p. 240). This in particular is very much in keeping with 
Williams’s conception of an ever-changing mixture of residual, dominant and emergent 
factors (as opposed to the utter hegemony of the dominant factor which one version of 
reification implies). ‘If you want to be told that our whole existence is governed by the 
economy’ Williams notes wryly in Politics and Letters, ‘go to the city pages of the bourgeois 
press – that is really how they see life’ (2015, p. 141); just as the notion of art as 
superstructure engendered, for Williams, a malign (because divisive of the totality) 
ideological effect, so too is the notion of an omnipotent reification tantamount to political 
reaction. 
 
Ultimately, then, Said conceives of Williams’s appropriation of Lukacs as one of useful 
transformation rather than evolution or improvement. ‘There is an extraordinary virtue to the 
distance,’ says Said, ‘even the coldness of his critical reflections of Lukacs and Goldmann, to 
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both of whom he is otherwise so intellectually cordial’ (1983, p. 240). Said argues that 
Williams’s late work, and in particular the essay ‘Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural 
Theory’ (1973), acknowledges that ‘the terminology provided by Marxist aesthetic theory for 
mapping the peculiarly uneven and complicated field lying between base and superstructure 
is generally inadequate, and then Williams goes on to do work that embodies his critical 
version of the original theory’ (p. 240). A ‘critical version of the original theory’ is, I think, a 
good way to describe what Williams produced as a result of his exposure to Goldmann and 
Lukacs, provided that we conceive of the ‘original theory’ somewhat narrowly, as the conflict 
between reification and totality. In his concluding remarks on Williams, Said emphasizes the 
constitutive role played in Williams’s work by ‘travelling theory’ and elucidates a general 
meta-position on theory which owes a lot to Williams, and which reflects the growing 
influence, in the eighties, of post-structuralist and post-Marxist perspectives:  
 
There is no minimising the fact that Williams is an important critic because of his 
gifts and his insights. But I am convinced it would be wrong to underestimate the role 
in his mature writings played by what I have been alluding to as borrowed, or 
travelling, theory. For borrow we certainly must if we are to elude the constraints of 
our immediate intellectual environment. Theory we certainly need, for all sorts of 
reasons that would be too tedious to rehearse here. What we also need over and above 
theory, however, is the critical recognition that there is no theory capable of covering, 
closing off, predicting all the situations in which it might be useful. This is another 
way of  saying, as Williams does, that no social or intellectual system can be so 
dominant as to be unlimited in its strength. Williams therefore has the critical 
recognition, and uses it consciously to qualify, shape and refine his borrowings from 
Lukacs and Goldmann, although we should hasten to add that it does not make him 
infallible or any less liable to exaggeration or error for having it. (1983, p. 241) 
 
While I do not think Said is correct to apportion to Williams a greater degree of critical 
‘recognition’ or ‘reflection’ than Lukacs or Goldmann simply by virtue of his status as an 
academic, in a non-revolutionary situation, introducing a stronger note of caution into their 
theories (politics, after all, need not be less critical than criticism, nor criticism less political 
than politics), he is absolutely right to position Williams on the side which refuses to see 
reification as all-pervasive (a viewpoint which has considerable and immediate implications 
for socialist strategy). Said is also correct to characterize Williams’s thought as being 
profoundly affected by travelling theory, and the two dimensions which Said’s essays brings 
out (the dissatisfaction with any totalizing definition of capitalism/reification and the 
influence of European theoretical impulses), are dialectically bound. The discussions 
contained in Politics and Letters (1979) and the sentiments expressed in Williams’s later 
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reviews make the interaction between the ‘travelling’ influences and Williams’s own theory 
especially clear. Williams is using the work of Lukacs and Goldmann to remedy what 
Anderson described as ‘the lack of either a classical sociology or a national Marxism’ in 
Britain; at the same time, what those very lacking elements mean is being tested and 
transformed by contact with Williams and his own very different intellectual inheritance. 
 
At a crucial point in PL, Williams’s New Left Review interlocutors raise the question of the 
primacy of economic production in historical processes, generally taken to be a hallmark of 
historical materialism, and ask Williams for his viewpoint. There follows a discussion in 
which Williams charts the development of his thinking on this issue between The Long 
Revolution and Marxism and Literature. In The Long Revolution, he had described the social 
totality as comprising four essential systems interacting on the basis of ‘parity of structure’ 
(2015 [1979], p. 138); these were the system of ‘maintenance’ (economic), the system of 
‘decision’ (political), the system of ‘communication’ (cultural), and the system of ‘generation 
and nurture’ (familial). The intervening period taught Williams two things which forced him 
to make significant alterations to the idea of structural parity between systems: first, that ‘the 
relative importance of different kinds of production and social processes can be very uneven’ 
2015, p. 138) and secondly that there is always ‘a temporal unevenness in the formation and 
evolution of these structures’ (p. 138). In light of these lessons, says Williams, ‘My present 
vocabulary of dominant, residual and emergent patterns within any given culture is intended 
to indicate precisely the phenomenon of this historical discrepancy. So in these respects there 
has been a quite decisive change in my thinking’ (p. 138). Acceptance of the notion of 
structural unevenness permits the conceptualization of the relative dominance of a single 
system, and it is in precisely this developmental context that Williams encounters Lukacs and 
is energized, if not entirely convinced, by the idea of reification (in Williams's use, the 
dominance of the economic order): 
 
Today, however, I am interested in the increasing influence of the idea, which derives 
 originally from Lukacs, that the domination of the economic order of society is  
 peculiar to the capitalist epoch. I find that difficult to accept in its simplest sense, but 
 it would explain one’s sense of a qualitative alteration of the meaning of production 
 precisely as the capitalist mode of production itself matured. It is at any rate  
 noticeable that in the 20th century the exponents of capitalism have been the most 
 insistent theorists of the causal primacy of economic production. (2015 [1979], p.  
 141)  
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Williams’s charge against the apologists of capitalism, that they regard economic production 
as determining the rest of social life (and approve of this), raises the question of whether this 
charge should also be leveled against Lukacs, to whom Williams attributes a similar 
perspective. It is necessary here, I think, to distinguish sharply between ‘domination’ and 
structural primacy. Reification, as formulated by Lukacs or by Williams (they each formulate 
it somewhat differently), is undoubtedly a vehicle for domination, whether of the ideological 
interests of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat (Lukacs) or of economic (commercial) values 
over values of community and solidarity (Williams); whether or not a particular element in 
the totality of social life is dominant over another is, however, a different question, since in 
theory an element may be afforded structural primacy without exerting ‘domination’ in the 
normative and moral senses relevant to Williams’s political argument. Williams’s suggestion 
that the dominance of the economic order is in principle politically regressive therefore charts 
a theoretical trajectory at odds both with the organs of business and financial propaganda, for 
whom the domination of social life by market imperatives is both true and felicitous, and with 
the mainstream of Marxist theory, for whom the same domination is true, but undesirable 
because of its specific character under capitalism (namely, the reduction of human beings to 
chattel for the production of surplus-value). 
 
The above theoretical distinctions have direct and serious implications for the relationship 
between socialist strategy and literary and cultural criticism, since they unavoidably broach 
the question of how ‘domination’ under capitalism is, can or should be represented. Recall 
that, for Lukacs, reification produces false consciousness because, by fragmenting social life 
and ossifying available appearances, it prevents human experience from perceiving that social 
life is determined by economic activity, specifically the reality of generalised commodity 
production (and thereby exploitation) under capitalism. For Williams, on the other hand, 
reification indicates a ‘false objectivity’, by which he means that it produces an erroneous 
sense of the domination of capitalist economic activity (however defined) when, in reality, 
the totality of social life is heterogeneous and contested. In both formulations, capitalism 
itself produces reification (on this Lukacs and Williams are agreed), but then the question of 
whether or not to portray social life as being primarily structured by capitalist imperatives 
(and how do so) must be answered very differently depending on which position is affirmed. 
From the Lukacsian perspective, economic activity should be portrayed as having a 
determining effect, and reification revealed as deeply pervasive, precisely in order to portray 
the totality (the question then is how to achieve this at the technical and formal level). From 
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Williams’s perspective, to portray social life as being overwhelmingly determined by 
capitalist imperatives would, conversely, be to deny the totality as it really exists (as a 
shifting lattice of dominant, residual and emergent strands). Such a viewpoint does not deny 
the necessity of demonstrating the power and influence of reification conceived of as the 
domination of commercial values, or indeed of demonstrating the extreme prevalence of 
economic exploitation under capitalism, but it is nevertheless a conception of the role of 
literary realism which diverges sharply from Lukacs’s. 
 
The divergence described above is significant given that Williams’s early views on realism, 
particularly as expressed in The Long Revolution,60 have been at the centre of comparisons of 
him with Lukacs. There Williams praised what he calls the ‘realist tradition’ (Williams, 2013, 
p. 321) in the novel, defined as that …  
 
… which creates and judges the quality of a whole way of life in terms of the qualities 
of persons … Neither element, neither the society nor the individual, is there as a 
priority. The society is not a background against which the personal relationships are 
studied, nor are the individuals merely illustrations of the way of life. Every aspect of 
personal life is radically affected by the quality of the general life, yet the general life 
is seen as its most important in completely personal terms. We attend with our whole 
senses to every aspect of the general life, yet the centre of value is always in the 
individual human person. (2013 [1961], p. 322) 
 
In effect, Williams endorses a dialectical view of the relation between the individual and 
society (each is mutually constitutive of the other), and determines that realist fiction is 
preferable to those modes in which the portrayal either over-subjectifies or over-objectifies 
reality. Realist fiction, formulated as bearing a relative proximity to reality, is precisely that 
fiction which avoids the ‘polarisation of styles, object-realist [documentary] and subject-
impressionist’ (p. 323), in terms of the vacillation between which ‘it may indeed be possible 
to write the history of the modern novel’ (p. 323). Williams criticizes recent developments in 
the novel for failing to perceive the deep interrelation of all individuals and the societies of 
which they are a part. The ‘personal novel’, for example, ‘as it is now developing … ends by 
denying the majority of persons. The reality of society is excluded, and this leads, inevitably, 
in the end, to the exclusion of all but a very few individual people’ (p. 329). The ‘social 
                                                
60 It should be noted that Williams’s position on literary realism, while retaining some underlying assumptions, 
develops new emphases over time. In The Long Revolution (1961), realism is the portrayal of a dialectical 
relation between the individual and society; in later writings realism is attached to the politics of place and the 
‘knowable community’ (ENDL, 1970a), and later still to a kind of intentional critique mixed with other features 
(‘A Lecture on Realism/A Defence of Realism’ (1977)). 
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novel’, all too often, does the opposite. The shared negative property, as so often for 
Williams, is the fragmentation of what is here described as realist ‘balance’ (p. 326), later as 
the literary-critical component of the perspective of totality. 
  
Williams’s analysis clearly makes the assertion that there are more and less accurate ways of 
perceiving and portraying social reality. ‘There are perhaps a thousand cases’, Williams 
suggests, ‘where the restriction [of the polarizing new styles] is simply a failure of 
consciousness, a failure to realize the extent to which the substance of a general way of life 
actively affects the closest personal experience’ (2013, p. 326). This comes very close, of 
course, to a traditional Marxist analysis along the lines of ‘false consciousness’, and indeed 
the implication throughout is that non-realist fiction is guilty of a failure of perception. But 
then what accounts for this failure and what, if anything, is its remedy? To the question of the 
origins of the ‘crisis’ (p. 330), Williams offers the following preamble to an answer: 
 
The realist novel needs, obviously, a genuine community: a community of persons 
linked not merely by one kind of relationship – work or friendship or family – but 
many, interlocking kinds. It is obviously difficult, in the twentieth century, to find a 
community of this sort. (2013 [1961], p. 330) 
 
A ‘genuine community’ of persons, then, is necessary for the health of the realist novel, at 
least as we have known it. Williams notes the passage from the typical Victorian narrative, 
which ends with ‘a series of settlements, of new engagements and formal relationships’ (p. 
33), to the modern, which ‘ends with a man going away on his own, having extricated 
himself from a dominating situation, and found himself in so doing’ (p. 331). The modern 
novel, then, reflects the real breakup of established communities and human relationships in 
the modern period; the movement towards personal assertion (and the concomitant distancing 
the individual from society) is a necessary process, says Williams, even if it appears to derail 
the realist project: ‘while old establishments linger, and new establishments of a dominating 
kind are continually instituted, the breakaway has continually to be made, the personal 
assertion given form and substance, even to the point where it threatens to become the whole 
content of our literature’ (p.  331). In this sentence are included all the elements of Williams’s 
later formulation of residual (‘old establishments’), dominant (‘new establishments of a 
dominating kind’) and emergent (‘the breakaway’) elements. Williams’s analysis, for all its 
critical edge, suggests that the social conditions which have given rise to the modernist 
narrative, with its significant fragmentation of the realist dialectic, are not symptoms of 
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Lukacsian decadence but rather an appropriate response, as individuals grapple, fallibly and 
partially, with the impact of accelerated historical change on the social totality. Relative to 
Lukacs, of course, what is missing from Williams’s early critique of modernism is any 
mention whatsoever of class. 
 
The gulf between Williams and Lukacs on the question of how non-realist fiction relates to 
totality and the ‘phases of a class’ (Williams, 2015, p. 221) is a recurring theme of the literary 
discussions in Politics and Letters. During a broader conversation centered on drama, 
Williams’s NLR interlocutors challenge him to react to Lukacs’s critique of naturalism. 
Referring back to Williams’s formulations in TLR, NLR sets out the Lukacsian stall as 
follows: 
 
Realism, which Lukacs defined in very similar terms to your own as a kind of 
synthesis of the personal and the social, is in effect the great aesthetic achievement of 
the bourgeoisie, when it is still in its historical ascent. Naturalism is the decadent 
successor to it, which has ruptured the dynamic linkage between men and women and 
their society, indeed projects society into a kind of second nature … Characters in 
naturalist fiction become essentially passive … Lukacs argues that naturalism sets in 
as the bourgeoisie ceases to play a progressive historical role in 19th century Europe 
… Here the opposition between naturalism and realism is founded historically and 
corresponds to the variant social destiny of a class. (2015 [1979], p. 220) 
 
Anchoring the discussion in Williams’s critique of dramatic naturalism in Drama from Ibsen 
to Brecht, the questioners note the similarity between Lukacs’s position and Williams’s 
complaint that naturalist fiction undialectically portrays ‘the external determination of the 
characters in the drama by forces that remain permanently beyond them’ (p. 220). They note 
that in Williams’s analysis even ‘Brecht retained the central knot of the naturalist structure of 
feeling, for the two terms of his drama remained the unmodified pair of the isolated 
individual and the overwhelming society ranged against the individual’ (p.214). What is 
lacking is the element of mediation between the individual and society (in Marxist terms, 
class), the inclusion of which in the narrative or action would render the relation between the 
two poles explicable and ‘realist’, freeing the characters from simple passivity in the face of 
an alien objectivity. Lukacs’s account, NLR suggests, ‘appears compatible with your own 
account in that you lay great stress on the fact that naturalist theatre, even at its height, is 
unable to re-create or embody a dynamic interrelationship of persons and societies: the 
greatest masters of naturalism do not achieve that, whereas the masters of the realist novel 
did’ (p. 220).  
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Williams is asked whether he concurs with NLR’s reading, and whether drama is capable of 
reaching beyond the constraints of naturalism towards a more realist portrayal of the relation 
between the individual and society. His response highlights the difficult absorption by 
Williams of two quite different conceptions of realism derived from either side of Lukacs’s 
conversion to Marxism: a) realism as social critique via the portrayal of a thwarted subject 
beset by hostile objective conditions (The Theory of the Novel) and b) realism as the accurate 
(historical materialist) portrayal of the dialectical interrelation of subject and object in the 
totality. ‘Naturalist drama’, argues Williams, ‘in spite of the limitations we have discussed, 
still seems to me to be committed to what Lukacs elsewhere describes as the classical realist 
project: showing a man or woman making an effort to live a much fuller life and 
encountering the objective limits of a particular social order … the structural constraints of a 
society’ (2015, p. 221). This progressive naturalism, which Williams associates with Ibsen 
and Strindberg, ‘proclaimed that social life was stifling, and affirmed the validity of 
suppressed desires and impulses to a point where it questioned the whole order, though by 
definition the work did not get through to breaking with it’ (p. 222). Thus Williams argues 
that naturalism of this sort, while falling well short of revolutionary aspirations, was still, like 
the work of the classical realists, capable of playing a progressive social role. Williams’s 
opposition to Lukacs’s specific critique of naturalism as the product of a decadent 
bourgeoisie thus proceeds on two fronts: firstly, he disputes Lukacs’s claim that bourgeois art 
in general is, after a certain historical juncture, incapable of progressivity; secondly, as we 
have seen, he disputes the notion that developments in art may be explained solely by the 
phases of the class producing them. Naturalist writers were ‘all bourgeois in their social 
composition’ (p. 222), but the progressivity of their texts belies the notion that their class had 
entered a stage of accelerated historical degradation. ‘Perhaps it would be simpler’, Williams 
suggests, ‘if we called it realist drama’ (p. 222). 
 
NLR correctly point out that ‘The action of a man or woman who seeks a freer life with a 
greater attainment of value in it and finds the society an insuperable barrier … is not what 
Lukacs called the realist project. It is rather the leit-motif of Theory of the Novel, before he 
was a Marxist critic at all’ (2015 [1979], p. 222). Williams does not explicitly answer the 
charge; both interpretations of the realist project, it seems, continue to inform Williams’s 
reception of Lukacs and, in complex ways, his own practice. It would be unfair, however, to 
imply that Williams is ignorant of the contradiction between reifying portrayals which paint 
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society as the dominant agent in the pair individual/society, and those in which the pair are 
represented as mutually constitutive. When Williams states, for example, that ‘Lukacs’s 
characterisation of … the realist novel in the 19th century as the discovery by the dramatic 
hero of the limits of an unjust society … is based much more largely on French and some 
Russian fiction than on the European novel as a whole’ (p. 349), he is attempting to distance 
the European novel from the former conception. Williams broadly rejects Lukacs’s pre-
Marxist formulation of the realist project, but then cannot fully endorse the later Lukacs’s 
more dialectical view either, since it relies on the notion of a ‘pre-existent’ social reality 
constructed upon, and rigorously determined by, inter- and infra-class structures. ‘My 
argument for realism has always been’, Williams insists, rounding out the discussion in PL, 
‘that it is a certain perception of reality and a certain awareness of interrelationships, not that 
it carries a certain mode of composition within it, nor that it has a second-order relation to a 
pre-existing reality’ (p. 350). 
 
A Man without Frustration 
 
I began this chapter with a quotation from Williams’s 1984 review of the autobiographical 
Georg Lukacs: Record of a Life, in which Williams restated his distance from Lukacs on 
questions of art, and called for an end to the era of ‘high intellectuals, with their own 
curriculum and preoccupations’ (1984a, p. 15), bringing their theories to bear on the ‘real 
life’ of culture and politics. Williams advocated the reversal of this process, a return to 
everyday life as ‘a hard and contested starting point’ (p. 15). In concluding the present 
chapter I now briefly return to this review and others that Williams wrote towards the end of 
his career. All are reviews of texts published in English after Lukacs’s death; in them, we see 
Williams pursuing the difficult object of finally assessing Lukacs’s effect on himself and, 
more generally, on socialist discourse and literary criticism. 
 
In 1977, Goldmann’s ambitious philosophical work Lukacs and Heidegger: Towards a New 
Philosophy (French: 1973) was made available in English; Williams reviewed it in New 
Society the following January. The review ranges widely, touching on many of the themes we 
have already discussed, including the tension between actual and imputed consciousness and 
the relation between class and literary form. Williams introduces readers of New Society to 
Goldmann’s ‘genetic structuralism’, a non-positivist approach to sociology based on ‘the 
analysis of forms, which disclose the true general situation of the group in its relations with 
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other groups’ (1978a, p. 26). In this view, classes are culturally manifested as ‘collective 
subjects’ who ‘originate all cultural creation, through characteristic forms’ (p. 26). It is in the 
raw objective data obtainable from these forms, rather than in the information ‘ordinarily 
available to empirical enquiry’ (p. 26) that, for Goldmann, genuine social knowledge may be 
found. From this stems the literary-critical goal of seeking out ‘those major works in which a 
“potential consciousness” is most coherently and completely articulated’ (p.  26). While such 
an approach tends in the synthetic direction Williams advocated for realism, he reproaches it 
for risking an ‘implicit classicism’ (p. 26) and for neglecting those elements of discontinuity 
and ideological tension in works as canonical as King Lear. Here we find a stronger critique 
of the ‘coherence’ model of consciousness which Williams had earlier found useful in Lukacs 
(as Williams understood him). He reserves his critical ire, however, for what he sees as the 
necessary political outcomes of such a viewpoint. 
 
An interesting aspect of Goldmann’s text is its discussion of Lukacsian actual and imputed 
consciousness alongside the existentialist binary ‘authentic’/‘inauthentic’ as expressed by 
Heidegger (and, of course, Sartre). Williams is deeply suspicious of the implications of 
equating the two binaries, wherein actual consciousness, the product of ideological distortion, 
is equated with the ‘inauthentic’ and imputed consciousness with the ‘authentic’. Whether or 
not actual consciousness is inauthentic is, for Williams, a matter for precise historical 
investigation, particularly when it comes to the analysis of the class character of literary 
works, and is a question ill-suited to the pursuit of totalizing theories: ‘The distinction 
between “ascribed” and “inauthentic” works is, however, the outcome of the difficulties of 
specific groups in specific historical periods. It is easy to see the attraction of a concept of 
“ascribed consciousness” to intellectuals already seized by a global (Hegelian or Marxist) 
view of history and of classes’ (1978a, p. 26). The implication of ‘already seized’ here is that 
literary intellectuals are bringing their pre-conceived social and political theories to the work 
of analyzing specific texts. The two ‘magisteria’, literature and politics, are inextricably 
linked, but the critical procedures which best acknowledge this seem wed to a familiar 
elitism. In expressing this point, Williams makes a brief but suggestive foray into the 
language of psychoanalysis: 
  
…the relation of intellectuals (critical and revolutionary intellectuals) to “the masses” 
is implicit in the theoretical starting-point. A class generates only “actual 
consciousness”; “ascribed” or “potential” consciousness has to be theoretically, 
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culturally or politically created. Thus within the “collective subjects” there is an 
effective split, between “conscious” and “unconscious” creators. (1978, p. 27) 
 
Here the ascription of ‘unconsciousness’, meant not as ‘false consciousness’ but as ‘acting 
without consciousness’, is employed by Williams to critique the elitist assumptions both of 
Leninist/Lukacsian politics, and the literary-critical practice of both Lukacs and Goldmann. 
In assessing Said’s ‘Travelling Theory’, I noted that, for the Williams of ‘Literature and 
Sociology’, there was a tension between his rejection of Lukacs’s neo-Leninist elitism and his 
appreciation for Goldmann’s conception of the ‘perspective of the totality’ as a form of 
critical intellectual practice. Though the distinction is retained in the later Goldmann review, 
the tension is somewhat elided as both positions now receive robust critique: the ‘division 
between “actual consciousness” (that of the majority) and “ascribed” or “potential” 
consciousness (possessed, articulated or initiated by minorities) led in one period to 
Stalinism; leads now to the ratified privilege of “revolutionary” intellectuals’ (p. 27).  
 
Williams closes the 1978 review in an impatient tone which increasingly shows itself in his 
later writing about Lukacs: ‘The problems of “ascribed” consciousness are little more than a 
phase in the history of ideas; beyond that they can be forgotten’ (1978a, p. 27). Nowhere is 
this harsher critical edge employed to more biting effect than in Williams’s 1980 review of 
Essays on Realism, a long-delayed English publication of some of Lukacs’s seminal literary-
critical essays of the thirties. It is in these essays, some of them republications of polemical 
articles in newspapers and journals in which Lukacs is interacting directly with other 
commentators and writers on the issue of realism, that Williams finds Lukacs most arrogant 
and abrasive. The key examples of this, for Williams, are Lukacs’s responses to the 
proletarian fiction of Ernst Ottwalt and Willi Bredel, in which Lukacs castigates both writers 
for insufficiently portraying the fundamental class-based character of the social totality: 
 
It has to be said, first, that Lukacs’s tone in these essays is appalling. It is as if he 
cannot avoid being patronizing, and in one way he deserved what he got when 
Bredel’s novel and Lukacs’s article were shown to (we don’t know how many and 
how selected) German workers and got the response: “the book is good, the other 
stuff is shit.” I have felt the same way reading the British working class novelists of 
the thirties and some of the academic and critical writing about them: a contrast 
between the struggling and imperfect producer and the high-class-consumer 
theoretician and critic. (New Society, 1980, Nov 20, p. 381)  
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If, during the sixties, Williams had held out some hope that Lukacs’s ideas might represent a 
solution to the literary-critical contradictions of the thirties, the above quotation provides 
perhaps Williams’s clearest acknowledgment that by the late seventies and early eighties he 
regarded such hopes as having been very seriously misplaced. Lukacs’s tendential elitism, his 
inability to accept the fundamental validity of diverse, even imperfect forms of consciousness 
remains, for Williams, in insuperable barrier to his efforts to establish a normative theory of 
literary realism. And yet it remains impossible to discard the questions which Lukacs’s work 
raises. Still to be overcome, and in this Williams deviates little from his position in The Long 
Revolution, is the problem of ‘representing working class life and at the same time 
introducing the necessarily different consciousness of the objective conditions and wider 
historical movement within which the men and women live and act’ (p. 382). Williams sees 
Lukacs as having manifestly failed to solve this problem, but nevertheless ‘the insistence that 
the problem exists is valuable’ (p. 382). He concludes that ‘the problem of finding ways of 
interlocking substance and system remains central and challenging, and it is not helpful to 
collapse in towards either of its poles’, and that ‘it is in just this effort to interlock, in 
convincing composition, that the whole realist project is defined, and Lukacs, who more than 
anyone showed us this, in fact damaged the project by tying it so closely to “traditional 
methods”’ (p. 382). 
 
The desire to assess and pin down Lukacs’s legacy was a common goal of several Marxist 
writers in the early eighties. Williams reviews three such efforts during the period: Georg 
Lukacs: From Romanticism to Bolshevism by Michael Lowy (1979), Lukacs Revalued, a 
collection of essays edited by Agnes Heller (1983) and The Young Lukacs by Lee Congdon 
(1983). The latter two are mentioned only fleetingly in the body of the larger review of 
Lukacs’s autobiography in 1984, but Lowy’s text, reviewed by Williams in 1980, receives a 
longer treatment. Perhaps the most interesting thing about the review is how little Lukacs 
features in it. Williams focuses for the most part on what he sees as Lowy’s great 
achievement: mapping out the pre-1914 central European intellectual milieu out of which 
Lukacs’s Bolshevism is said to have developed (breaking with that tradition in the process). 
Williams identifies with the situation of ‘that brilliant, mainly German, generation, between 
the 1880s and 1914’61 (New Society, 1980b) whose ‘diffuse anti-capitalism’ (1980b) enjoined 
them to engage in a series of difficult problematics which Williams sees as strikingly relevant 
                                                
61 There is some overlap between this group and the tradition H. Stuart Hughes discusses in Consciousness and 
Society (1958), whom Anderson (1966) suggested were the idealist precursors of the Western Marxists. 
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to his own period: ‘The hard intellectual and political choices, including quite radical 
divergences, which under pressure emerged from what had seemed a reasonably common 
position, have a very close, moving and challenging, relevance to our own strictly 
contemporary situation’ (1980b). Lowy sees the substance of those ‘hard choices’ as being 
dramatized in Lukacs’s transition, which he endorses, from romanticism (here used 
synonymously with ‘diffuse anti-capitalism’) to Bolshevism. Williams cannot accept this 
characterisation of the difficult situation in which the pre-1914 anti-capitalists found 
themselves, nor the interpretation of Lukacs’s development which it argues for; his nuanced 
critique of Lowy’s argument is worth citing here in full: 
 
Of course one major way out of that substantial but diffuse anti-capitalism was the 
theory and practice of Bolshevism. But today, at a certain imposed distance, the 
problems of that road, and some of its major points of arrival, are too evident to allow 
us to dismiss the preceding positions as, where they are useful at all, merely 
preparatory. If the diffuse anti-capitalism of those days spent so much time analyzing 
the problems of state bureaucracy, of the relations between a modern industrial 
system and quantitative kinds of thinking and administration, of the difference 
between actual communities and a centralized monetary social order, we can hardly, 
from the late seventies, suppose that they were wasting their time or missing some 
simple central truth. Bolshevism, in this perspective, looks less like a solution than a 
short-cut to both new possibilities and some of the same old problems. (New Society, 
1980b) 
 
What is crucial in this analysis is the attention Williams pays to Lowy’s pseudo-Hegelian 
sense of temporality. For Lowy, Bolshevism represents the ‘sublation’ of the contradictions 
inherent in the problematics faced by the pre 1914 European anti-capitalists. From this 
perspective, their diffuse anti-capitalism appears as preparatory, a necessary stage in the 
development of consciousness towards its appropriate historical form; Lukacs, for all the 
imperfections and inconsistencies in his development, becomes a kind of metaphor for this 
necessary movement. For Williams, on the other hand, the contradictions faced by the pre-
1914 group, much like those expressed in the debates between Marxists and Leavisites in the 
thirties, have stubbornly refused to resolve. These were, and remain, real problems to be 
faced down by socialists, not avoided or their emphasis by critical intellectuals disparaged on 
the grounds of ‘romantic anti-capitalism’. Williams sees Lowy’s tendency to describe non-
Marxist-Leninist anti-capitalist positions as romantic as ‘a muddle and at times a deliberate 
confusion between the historical reference – “Romantic” – and the deprecatory sense of 
“unrealistic”, “cloudy”, “impractical”. And this is at every level intolerable, especially since 
its main intellectual result is to exclude those questions which were being put to the idea of 
Daniel Robert Gerke  Chapter One: Williams and Lukacs 
 
 
96 
socialism, from a number of positions within that complex earlier tradition’ (1980b). The cost 
of this exclusion could hardly be higher; it ‘has now to be diagnosed’, argues Williams, ‘as 
one major cause of damage to the theory and practice of socialism itself’ (1980b).  
 
One thing which made Lukacs an attractive figure to Williams was the way in which he 
appeared to straddle the divide between incorporation and outright rejection of the pre- and 
proto-socialist tradition out of which he had emerged. On the one hand, says Williams, 
Lukacs had to ‘push away these earlier positions, in his relatively rapid transition to 
communism and above all in his later accommodation with Stalinism, during which most of 
the dismissive formulations were developed’62 (New Society, 1980b). On the other hand, 
argues Williams, summarizing Lukacs’s development: 
 
The irony is that in History and Class Consciousness he recovered for Marxism, in 
part by returning to neglected elements in Marx, in part from the strongest elements in 
the anti-capitalist problematic, a dimension of social thought which in combination 
with a new revolutionary politics was indeed a major advance. In particular in his 
analysis of ‘reification’ he found ways of restating the critique of quantitative and 
instrumental consciousness and social relations in terms which genuinely connected 
with the struggle for socialism. But it is then a further irony, not only that he had to 
appear to withdraw from these new positions, under the pressure of actual 
developments which as a matter of fact were making them even more relevant, but 
also that when they came through again, in the crisis after Stalin, they were soon 
being attacked in the terms he had forged: as romantic idealism, and in the new 
rhetoric of abuse, as humanist and moralist. (New Society, 1980b) 
 
When Williams writes in praise of ‘a dimension of social thought in combination with a new 
revolutionary politics’, he is referring, I think, to something like cultural revolution: an 
awareness of and a critique of reification, itself born of the breakdown of traditional 
communities, combined with the revolutionary determination to transform society by 
reclaiming the holistic and communitarian values Williams associates with the ‘perspective 
of totality’. Lukacs was the first Marxist writer to engage seriously with the breakdown of 
popular holistic modes of thought and to analyze them in terms of a ‘failure of 
consciousnesses’ (as Williams put it in TLR) brought about by concrete changes in the way 
people were experiencing their reality. The fact that Lukacs was forced to rescind some of the 
useful emphases of his earlier work, coupled with the backlash against that work in later 
years, is regarded by Williams as something quite tragic. Lukacs was wrong, finally, about 
class consciousness and realism, but he is nevertheless ‘abused’ by those later strands of 
                                                
62 Williams is probably thinking of the recently translated Essays on Realism (1983) here. 
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Marxist thought which regard his early work as an aberration (partly for its connection to the 
work of the pre-1914 European anti-capitalists) and his more orthodox phase as the resolution 
of contradictions which have not, in fact, been resolved.  
 
After having written very little about Lukacs’s personal life and character, Williams’s 1984 
review of Record of a Life attempts to bring the real, historical Lukacs into focus as an 
alternative way of getting at the crux of his work. In part, this is a necessity owing to the 
material of the review: Lukacs’s autobiography, an edited transcription of death-bed 
conversations with his friend Istvan Eorsi, and the two synoptic critical works from Heller 
and Congdon. But the two men had much in common, and it seems impossible, reading 
Williams’s account of Lukacs ‘the man’, to avoid the conclusion that, even if equivalences 
were finally rejected, a comparison was being made. In concluding this chapter, I wish to 
briefly explore the resonances of that always implicit personal comparison. 
 
The question of whether or not there is something of intellectual value to be gleaned from the 
transcribed utterances of Record of a Life, Williams (1984a) argues, is to a great extent 
determined by ‘the kind of mind that is being questioned or interrogated’ (1984a, p. 14). 
Williams is concerned first of all to deny the validity of two possible portraits of that mind, 
one from Lukacs himself, the other a speculative construction which Williams quickly 
disregards. From Lukacs himself, on this occasion originating in a separate NLR interview 
(1971), comes the image of a ‘man without frustration’: 
 
I can say that I have never felt frustration or any kind of complex in my life. I know 
what these mean, of course, from the literature of the twentieth century, and from 
having read Freud. But I have not experienced them myself.  When I have seen 
mistakes or false directions in my life, I have always been willing to admit them – it 
has cost me nothing to do so – and then turn to something else. (1971, p. 58) 
  
Williams elaborates on Lukacs’s self-description as the image of a man ‘wholly dedicated to 
pure thought, who can indeed abandon and move on from positions and affiliations, without 
significant disturbance, and who moreover from that practice moves without difficulty into 
the kind of hard confidence, which can be interpreted as arrogance’ (1984a, p. 14). Such a 
man, says Williams, were he to really exist, would be ‘one kind of high intellectual, who 
knows and accepts and keeps his distance from what others see as substantial everyday life, 
and who can in fact rely on being judged, eventually, solely by the quality of his work’ (p. 
14). To be judged solely by the quality of one’s work; this is not an aspiration which 
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Williams feels it is possible to ascribe to Lukacs, the committed revolutionary socialist, to 
whom political action and effect must have been just as much the measure of success. But at 
the same time, and here enters the straw-man speculation, it is no more possible to put 
everything down to psychology, to explain the twists and turns of Lukacs’s allegiances and 
positions to mere changes of heart: ‘there is simply not enough evidence to move in one now 
familiar Western way, towards a form of psychological reconstruction and explanation’ (p. 
14). Williams is thus caught between two impossible portraits, of Lukacs as an arrogant and 
aloof pragmatist, constantly true to his own ‘removed’ thinking but able to move through 
disparate and incompatible commitments without psychological harm, and a totally 
speculative Lukacs, bearing no resemblance to reality, ruled, in one clichéd model, by his 
desires and passions, allowing his thinking to flow freely along affective channels. 
 
To be ‘a man without frustration’, Williams seems to be suggesting, would above all mean 
possessing immense intellectual confidence, keeping one’s work rigorously 
compartmentalized by ‘delineating a sphere of public intellectual life from which merely 
personal matters are excluded’ (1984a, p. 14). Before addressing the Lukacs which Williams 
arrives at in the course of dispelling the myth of the ‘man without frustration’, we might note 
that the issue of intellectual confidence and its relation to affect touches directly upon a 
recent episode in Williams’s own life. As Fred Inglis (1995) recounts in his early biography 
of Williams, the interviews conducted in 1977-78 for what would become Politics and 
Letters took a heavy psychological toll on Williams. While Inglis is perhaps exaggerating 
when he describes Williams’s subsequent state of mind as having ‘approached a psychosis’ 
(1995, p. 260), Williams’s moving letter to Perry Anderson in 1979 indicates a profound 
anxiety and quite crippling depression: 
 
The usual words don’t help, but for what they’re worth it’s a condition of almost 
overwhelming anxiety, perpetually preoccupied – not only as a working habit but now 
as an almost paralyzing state – with qualification and revision and redefinition and 
exactness and so on, and the relations between that and the actualities and modes of 
past and present have come through as profound distress … you’ll remember Manod 
and my (prophetic) reply about that inexplicable kind of sadness, which I was then 
talking about mainly in others … I’ve even known, for the first time, some of the 
states out of which defeatist and reactionary ideologies have been so often built … 
But I’m fighting, and every handhold – what may seem to anyone else a marginal 
detail – has become crucial. (Williams quoted in Inglis, 1995, p. 261) 
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In parts of Politics and Letters, Williams had indeed been very strongly and insistently 
challenged on the core assumptions of his thought. His Marxism, which had by now been 
named as ‘cultural materialism’, was rigorously critiqued, as were his long-held positions on 
literary realism. It is extremely difficult, reading through Politics and Letters, to speculate on 
which particular exchanges, upon later introspection, pushed Williams onto unstable ground. 
It seems likely, however, that NLR’s sustained critique of formulations upon which it is no 
exaggeration to say that his life’s work depended, played a central role. The primary 
symptom was an intense obsession with ‘qualification and revision and redefinition and 
exactness’. Williams’s writings had always been precise and tentative, even punctilious, but 
now the desire for authorial control, and to avoid misinterpretation, became paramount. It is 
notable that this painful episode in Williams’s career occurred the year before the review of 
Lowy’s book and only a few years before Williams was considering Lukacs, in one guise, as 
the ‘man without frustration’; such a construction could hardly have been further from 
Williams’s own recent intellectual and emotional trajectory. Williams engages in robust self-
criticism in Politics and Letters, and is generally open to the criticisms leveled at him by his 
interlocutors, but if he was at all convinced, internally, that he had gone in some wrong 
directions, he was not immediately able to crystallize those lessons into a detached ‘hard 
confidence’. Williams wrote that the ‘man without frustration’, the aloof and confident 
intellectual, would feel satisfied that he would ultimately be judged ‘by the quality of his 
work’; in 1979, this seemed to be precisely what Williams feared the most, developing an 
acute obsession with ensuring that posterity understood what he had been trying to say. 
 
It is perhaps no surprise, then, that in 1984 Williams was not prepared to allow Lukacs his 
self-construction. Williams recounts some of Lukacs’s utterances on his romantic 
entanglements, first with Irma Seidler, who committed suicide in 1911, then with Gertrud 
Bortsteiber, who was more politically and intellectually influential. The crucial point, for 
Williams, is that Lukacs regarded his personal development, including basic life decisions 
and romantic entanglements, as the mutually constitutive obverse of his political 
commitments and endeavors. As Lukacs puts it in Record of a Life: 
 
What was at stake was my need to fuse my intellectual and practical aspirations with 
the contemporary world situation in such a way as to make my efforts bear fruit (not 
just objectively and practically right, but also favourable to my personal development) 
… No one – with the exception of Lenin (in quite a definite sense) – has understood 
that the two processes are ultimately identical: that is, the social development of the 
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new man is in effect a synthesis of the individual aspirations to come to terms with the 
novel reality in an honest revolutionary way. (1983b, p. 158) 
 
Williams argues that this is ‘quite central to Lukacs’s thought’ (1984a: p. 15). Indeed, the 
passage is redolent with the kinds of intuitive emphases that Williams had always thought 
proper to literary and social analysis. In Lukacs’s desire to fuse his public and private 
aspirations we can hear echoes, displaced into the context of an intellectual’s life and work, 
of Williams’s long-standing aspiration for a realism which would authentically attend to the 
dialectical interrelation of subject and object. In the notion of coming ‘to terms with the novel 
reality’ a clear emphasis emerges on the subjective response to social experience which 
Williams found so central a consideration in pinning down the nature of class consciousness. 
There can be no dividing, in this model, the personal aspirations of the individual from his or 
her class’s collective aspiration for emancipation; these are ‘not any aspirations, but those 
learned from and centred in a changing reality’ (p. 15) In Lukacs’s fusion of his personal life 
with his political and intellectual commitments, if not in his simplifying self-portrait, 
Williams finds a trace of the Lukacs whose work had first inspired him in the sixties: a 
Lukacs alive to the absolute necessity of attending to the personal responses of those who 
labour under capitalism; a Lukacs from whom the notion of a consciousness imputed from on 
high seems quite distant. For a moment, in this, Williams’s final engagement with Lukacs, 
the ‘man without frustration’, the intellectual who simply has his view and his commitments 
and divorces them from his affective life, is not present, and a recovered Williams can feel 
somewhat at home. And yet, for all that, Lukacs remains insistent: only Lenin fully 
understood these problematics.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Williams and Sartre: Tragedy, Freedom, Nation 
 
An Outline of Williams’s Engagement with Sartre 
 
Lukacs’s Record of a Life was not the only auto/biographical work by a European thinker 
Williams reviewed in 1984; he also reviewed Simone de Beauvoir’s Adieux: A Farewell to 
Sartre, in which details of the last ten years of Sartre’s life introduce, much as in Lukacs’s 
Record, wide-ranging transcribed interviews. Sartre had died in 1980, but perhaps what is 
most interesting about the review is the manner in which Williams suggests he had already 
‘bid adieu’ to Sartre some time before: ‘The move from history to biography, and then to a 
kind of exposed biographical living … is the point at which, many years ago, one said adieu 
to Sartre, though still respecting the fierce energy and the rigour, and the different adieux of 
those who loved him within his singular and intransigent circle’ (1984b, p. 470). When did 
this move ‘from history to biography’, with which Williams broke with Sartre, occur? This is 
difficult to judge; it seems likely that Williams is referring to Sartre’s unfinished, three-
volume existential-psychoanalytic biography of Flaubert, The Family Idiot (1971-72), a work 
which more than any other of Sartre’s sought to comprehend the ‘meaning’ of one man and 
his work. Williams is really dealing with two turning points in Sartre’s career in this review: 
a) the movement from the early, necessarily subjectivist existentialist works to the 
publication of the more Marxist and historically engaged Critique of Dialectical Reason 
(1960), and b) a period of, as it were, ‘re-subjectification’ in the later biographical output. In 
a sense, then, the full movement Williams is describing is from biography to history and back 
to biography again. Williams (1984b) expresses this trajectory in both a psychological and a 
literary register: 
 
There was a time, in the sixties, when the engaging paradoxes of the earlier work 
seemed to have been taken to a new objectivity of inquiry: a movement, one might 
say, from a subjective sense of historical situation to exploration of a common and 
general history. It is now clear, from the whole trajectory, that this was not a 
culmination; it was a heroic phase, ending in failure and then in relapse. But even his 
failure is of great intellectual and symptomatic importance. (1984, p. 470) 
 
Daniel Robert Gerke  Chapter Two: Williams and Sartre 
 
 
102 
The period of the Critique was ‘heroic’; it is a sign of Williams’s esteem for Sartre that he 
does not say ‘tragic’, perhaps the more apt description given what Williams sees as Sartre’s 
‘failure’ and ‘relapse’, and a word which would have conjured his critical analyses of Sartre’s 
plays in Modern Tragedy. Williams will argue that one of the greatest barriers to Sartre’s 
further progress was his over-engagement with psychoanalysis or ‘Freudianism’. And yet, it 
is only from a psychoanalytic perspective that we might ask whether there was something in 
Sartre’s original formulations that dictated there should be a ‘return of the repressed’ post-
Critique, a return of the voluntaristic atmosphere which pervaded existentialism, and 
rendered it a difficult fellow traveller with Marxism. 
 
At the core of Williams’s definition of the failure of Sartre’s heroic phase is the sense that 
Sartre was both the product of his time (influenced by the residual and dominant strains in his 
society) and the purveyor of original or emergent ideas which, from the beginning, were not 
sufficiently distinguishable from certain bourgeois philosophic and moral orthodoxies: 
 
[Sartre] went into this inquiry with certain profound orientations which at the end – 
and over and above what can be seen as an inevitable, because in its time very 
general, failure – stand out as barriers to the project. It is not only the persistent 
bourgeois position that one’s freedom is constrained by the freedoms of others. It is 
also the voluntarism: [quoting Sartre] ‘One is concerned with men who would be 
equal if they would make a slight change in their attitude, but who in their present 
state are countermen’.63 (1984b, p. 470)  
 
We can infer what Williams means by a ‘very general’ failure by referring to two related 
statements in his 1974 review of Sartre’s Between Existentialism and Marxism, in which he 
a) describes what he sees as a general weakness among the French Left-intelligentsia and b) 
asserts the inflexible and dogmatic nature of a certain kind of orthodox Marxism: 
 
[Sartre’s difficulties] remain, for me, centred in the problem of the relation with 
psychoanalysis. Sartre maintains a stubborn reservation about what he calls, 
accurately, the mythology of Freudianism, but it is clear that he is hard pressed by the 
prevailing structures of French neo-Marxism in just this area which is its confident 
and insistent weakness. (The Guardian, 1974, April 25)  
 
What Sartre is trying to do, as a Marxist, is to restore individual and collective 
response and responsibility to a system which had become, internally, abstract and 
falsely determinist. (The Guardian, 1974, April 25) 
 
                                                
63 I have not been able to locate the source for this quotation. 
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There is much to unpack in these three statements. What is crucial to note for now is the 
critical thread Williams is drawing between orthodox Marxism, psychoanalysis and 
existentialism, as discourses and as (political/clinical/philosophic) practices. In Modern 
Tragedy, which I will discuss extensively in the section on Sartre’s drama, Williams argues 
that ‘the three characteristically new forms of thinking, in our own time – Marxism, 
Freudianism, Existentialism – are all, in their most common forms, tragic’ (1966, p. 189). 
The phrase ‘in their most common forms’ is important because, as we know, Williams’s own 
work will eventually attempt to assert an alternative and affirmative position within the 
Marxist tradition. Nevertheless, Williams is emphatic in drawing together these three 
twentieth-century traditions under the umbrella of a tragic discourse which, whether in the 
mechanistic and deterministic manner of orthodox Marxism, the pseudo-bourgeois 
voluntarism of Sartrean existentialism or the psychoanalytic vision of individuals in 
permanent conflict with society, evinces a view of human nature and freedom which fails to 
acknowledge the considerable emancipatory resources human beings hold in common.  
 
It should not be taken, from the above, that Williams’s judgement on Sartre was damning. 
Sartre never receives anything resembling the upbraiding that Lukacs received on the basis of 
his Essays on Realism, and indeed Williams overwhelmingly appears to esteem Sartre as a 
man of character and compassion. In the review of de Beauvoir’s text Williams notes Sartre’s 
‘characteristically brave identification with the most extreme and exposed individuals and 
movements’ (1984b, p. 470) in a period, from the mid-fifties onwards, in which the 
atmosphere of cold war and the regressive foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet Union 
had led to ‘the simple contrast between communism and liberty which, in so many cases, and 
to a shameful extent in France, ends with an accommodation to capitalism’64 (p. 470). Sartre, 
says Williams, even though ‘despairing of the [communist] project, after the suppression of 
the Prague Spring, was incapable of that kind of accommodation’ (p. 470), his constant 
mission being ‘the attempt to recover communism for liberty – still the central project of our 
time’ (p. 470). Such a project, in the sixties and seventies, was required to intersect at 
innumerable points with struggles that could not be fitted cleanly into the class struggle, 
engaging Sartre in a myriad of progressive causes, perhaps most significantly the national 
liberation struggles of the period. Williams writes, glowingly: ‘His intense recognition of the 
                                                
64 Williams may be thinking here of the French ‘New Philosophers’ around Bernard-Henry Levi and Andre 
Glucksmann, former leftists who, from the mid-seventies, denounced both Marxism and communism and 
declared for liberal-democratic capitalism (and later neo-conservatism). 
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victims of every kind of oppression, and both his courage and his conscious use of his 
celebrity to protect others, led him again and again to denounce tyranny and exploitation 
wherever they occurred: a rare and invaluable position within the polarisation and 
opportunism of a continuing cold war. From a distance, and now also when we see its close 
details, this stand should engage our immense respect’ (p. 470). As we shall see, the issue of 
commitment, both in in politics and literature, is one of the most significant components of 
Williams’s reception of Sartre.   
 
Sartre’s intellectual and political commitment to the causes he championed is a quality which 
signals, for Williams (1968b), a difference in consciousness between ‘England’ and the 
continent: ‘Sartre is not a writer and thinker who takes time off for politics and journalism: 
that familiar English account in which thinking is a professional activity, a job, and politics is 
another professional activity, on which amateurs may sometimes intrude’ (The Guardian, 
1968b, Nov 29, p. 11). From his reception of Lukacs and Goldmann we know that Williams 
was highly critical of the English literary establishment, and that he was conscious of 
England lagging behind the continent in its engagement with what Williams saw as the 
crucial questions facing the politically aware critic of literature and culture. In his review of 
Iris Murdoch’s Sartre, Romantic Rationalist in 1967, Williams is equally disparaging of what 
he sees as the elitism and lack of imagination of the British philosophical establishment, at 
that time almost entirely analytic in orientation: 
 
Since an icy upper-middle-class voice took over rational discourse in England, people 
have been frightened of what they think of as philosophy, and have developed a kind 
of bored awe. Yet “philosopher” still sounds forbidding, and “Oxford philosophy”, 
vaguely imagined as a prodigious intellectual exercise about returning a book to a 
friend, especially so. (The Guardian, 1967b, May 12, p. 8) 
 
Sartre had strongly criticised the classical formulations of dialectical materialism (Marxist 
philosophy since Engels) in the Critique. Williams appreciated the way Sartre was seeking to 
reformulate the postulates of classical/orthodox Marxism without assimilating the analytic-
empiricist assumptions of the Anglo-American philosophical establishment, traditionally the 
hardest opponents of Marxism as a metaphysical or epistemological position (though this 
does not stop Williams from criticising what he does see as a bourgeois strain within Sartrean 
existentialism). Time and again in his engagement with European thinkers, and even where 
he finally and decisively parts ways with them, Williams is finding productive seams of 
thought which seem to hold the promise of resolving deadlocks within the intellectual 
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Anglosphere. Rarely, if ever, are these deadlocks resolved to Williams’s satisfaction, but each 
attempt is a step towards a new and productive emergence, so that even the failures of 
thinkers like Sartre (and Lukacs) are ‘of great intellectual and symptomatic importance’. 
 
																																																																*						*						*	
A key difference between Williams’s receptions of Sartre and Lukacs is the issue of access 
and translation. Inglis (1995) implies a less than perfect aptitude when he says that Williams 
‘didn’t read French for fun’ (1995, p. 145), but the fact remains that Williams read French, 
and could therefore have read Sartre at any point following the French publications. In stark 
contrast to Lukacs’s major works, the bulk of Sartre’s output, for reasons of celebrity and 
commercial impact in the immediate post-war era, was very rapidly translated. All but one of 
the plays Williams discusses in Modern Tragedy were published in English within three years 
of the French; Nausea (1943) and the Roads to Freedom (1945-1949) trilogy found 
translation just as rapidly. Sartre’s major philosophical works, Being and Nothingness (1943) 
and the Critique (1960), took longer, at thirteen and sixteen years respectively; while it seems 
unlikely that Williams would have read either of these highly complex texts to completion in 
French, he could nonetheless have read passages or fragments, as well as reviews and 
analysis in French, close to their French publication. In the case of Lukacs, we were aware 
that Williams could have read a number of English translations which he did not directly 
comment upon in print. With Sartre these unknown but potential engagements extend to his 
entire corpus in French. Nevertheless, we must proceed on the basis of what we know 
Williams to have read, or can reasonably infer from his commentaries; fortunately, as with 
Lukacs, Williams’s published pronouncements on Sartre are considerable, spanning almost 
the full length of his career. Here I provide an outline of that engagement, followed by a brief 
commentary.  
 
In 1947, one of the pieces on literature and political commitment that Sartre was gradually 
publishing in the journal Les Temps Modernes and in Situations I (1947) and II (1948) was 
published in English translation in Politics and Letters, the literary-political journal Williams 
co-founded and edited following the completion of his studies at Cambridge. This piece, 
entitled ‘What is Writing?’, would comprise the opening chapter of Sartre’s What is 
Literature? (French 1948), published in English in its entirety in 1950. While ‘What is 
Writing?’ was published on its own in English in 1948 by the Paris-based literary journal 
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Transition, the 1947 translation in Politics and Letters is, to my knowledge, the earliest 
English version of the text. The interesting question then, of course, is whether Williams 
himself was the translator; the edition of Politics and Letters does not inform us, so we 
cannot be sure. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the piece in so early a publication of Williams’s 
signals a very early familiarity with Sartre’s work (I have mentioned the rapidity with which 
Sartre’s fiction was being translated), and is an early acknowledgment by Williams that 
Sartre would be a significant figure for thinking through the relationship between literature 
and politics. The first time Williams refers to Sartre in his own words is in Drama from Ibsen 
to Eliot (1953); the brief material on Sartre here would be considerably expanded in the …to 
Brecht version. In both versions, a single play is treated: Sartre’s The Flies (F. 1943, E. 
1946). Following this we find a gap of eight years (1953-1961) in which Williams does not 
explicitly engage with Sartre in his published writings (he may well have read some of 
Sartre’s on-going output in French and English). 
 
Williams’s first serious engagement with existentialist themes comes in The Long Revolution 
(1961), in which Williams assesses the contribution of existentialism to debates around the 
individual and society. While Williams does not refer to any specific texts here, his 
engagement with the concepts of ‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity’, terms which, in English 
translation, originate in Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927) (Sartre generally prefers ‘good 
faith’ and ‘bad faith’), indicates familiarity with existentialist arguments. Sartre is mentioned 
by name, and that Williams refers to Sartre’s use of the terms ‘function’ and ‘duty’ (2011b 
[1961], p. 110) suggests that he has at least read the chapter on ‘Bad Faith’ in Being and 
Nothingness (F. 1943, E. 1956), in which these terms appear. The next engagement, and 
perhaps the most significant for Williams’s views on the function of literature/art, comes in 
1966 with Williams’s critical analysis of Sartrean drama in Modern Tragedy. Here Williams 
provides readings of six of Sartre’s plays: The Flies (F. 1943, E. 1946), No Exit (F. 1945, E. 
1946), Men Without Shadows (F. 1946, E. 1949), Dirty Hands (F. 1948, E. 1949), The Devil 
and the Good Lord (F. 1951, E. 1960) and Altona (F. 1959, E. 1960) alongside works by 
Camus and Brecht. In 1967 Williams reviews Iris Murdoch’s earlier work Sartre, Romantic 
Rationalist (1953 – this text deals primarily with Sartre’s novels, suggesting that Williams 
was broadly familiar with them), and in 1968 (alongside the material on The Flies in DFIB), 
he reviews the essay collection The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre (1968), edited by Robert 
Denoon Cumming. In the latter review, Williams actually quotes from Sartre’s Critique, 
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which was not yet available in English, indicating that he had at least read parts of it in 
French as of 1968.  
 
In 1972, Sartre (with his Critique), appears alongside Lukacs and Gramsci as part of 
Marxism’s ‘alternative tradition’. In 1974 Williams reviews Sartre’s Between Existentialism 
and Marxism (F. 1972, E. 1974) alongside two critical texts, Sartre (1973) by Hazel E. 
Barnes and Camus and Sartre (1974) by Germaine Brie. Two years later, in 1976, Williams 
includes ‘existential’ as an entry in his Keywords, elaborating on the development to 
‘existentialism’ after 1945, due in large part to Sartre’s influence. In 1977, the year in which 
he publishes his own ‘reckoning’ with Marxism, Williams reviews Sartre’s major theoretical 
engagement with the Marxist tradition, the Critique of Dialectical Reason (F. 1960, E. 1976). 
Williams also discusses the theme of commitment in literature and Sartre’s poetry/prose 
distinction in Marxism and Literature (1977) and, in the same year, refers favourably to 
Sartre’s position on the national liberation movement of the Basques in Spain in the essay 
‘Marxism, Poetry, Wales’ in Poetry Wales. Williams’s mention of Sartre’s position in the 
latter text strongly suggests that he had read Sartre’s essay ‘The Burgos Trials’ (1971), which 
had quickly appeared in English in the journal Planet: The Welsh Internationalist (1971-
1972). Williams rounded off the seventies with some significant discussion of Sartre in the 
Politics and Letters interviews, including ruminations on Sartre’s materialism, his concepts 
of ‘seriality’ and ‘scarcity’ in the Critique, and the relation of his pessimism to other strains 
of thought within contemporary Marxism. Williams also mentions Sartre in the context of the 
crucial question of hope in politics in his afterword to the 1979 edition of Modern Tragedy. 
In 1980, Williams returns to the issue of commitment in literature with the significant essay 
‘The Writer: Commitment and Alignment’ in Marxism Today; Sartre’s position is mentioned 
as in many ways the linchpin of debates around the subject. In 1984 we have the above-
mentioned review of de Beauvoir’s Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre, and in 1985 Williams 
briefly mentions Sartre in the context of non-economic interpersonal relations in his lecture 
‘Cinema and Socialism’, appearing in print for the first time in The Politics of Modernism 
(1989). 
In summary, then, we know that Williams reads or comments on the following texts by or 
about Sartre. Texts are by Sartre unless otherwise indicated and are listed in chronological 
order of mention by Williams, with French and English dates of publication: 
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1947: ‘What is Writing’ (French: 1947, English: 1947) 
1953: The Flies (French: 1943, English: 1946) 
1961: Being and Nothingness [at least the ‘Bad Faith’ chapter] (French: 1943, English: 1956) 
1966: No Exit (French: 1945, English: 1946), Men Without Shadows (French: 1946, English: 
1949), Dirty Hands (French: 1948, English: 1949), The Devil and the Good Lord (French: 
1951, English: 1960) and Altona (French: 1959, English: 1960) 
1967: Sartre, Romantic Rationalist by Iris Murdoch (1953) 
1968: The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre edited by Robert Denoon Cumming (1968), 
Critique of Dialectical Reason (French: 1960, English: 1976) 
1974: Between Marxism and Existentialism (French: 1972, English: 1974), Sartre by Hazel 
E. Barnes (1973), Camus and Sartre by Germaine Brie (1974) 
1977: ‘The Burgos Trials’ (French: 1971, English: 1971) 
1984: Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre by Simone de Beauvoir (French: 1981, English: 1984) 
The first thing to note about the above chronology is that, in comparison with Lukacs, 
Williams is ‘dealing with’ Sartre roughly a decade earlier. The translation of ‘What is 
Writing?’ in Politics and Letters comes fifteen years before Williams’s first writings on 
Lukacs (1962). Williams’s engagement with Lukacs in the sixties is confined to two reviews, 
whereas his engagement with Sartre in that decade comprises six plays, parts of Being and 
Nothingness and two reviews of critical texts. By the mid-seventies Williams had probably 
read everything on Sartre that he would comment on (with the exception of de Beauvoir’s 
book) in his lifetime, whereas he was still discovering newly translated texts of Lukacs into 
the eighties. This is so despite the fact that Lukacs began his career and died roughly a decade 
earlier than Sartre; the over-riding reasons are, of course, Williams’s language ability and 
relative speeds of translation. Broadly speaking, then, the key decades for Williams’s 
engagement with Lukacs are the seventies and eighties, for Sartre the sixties and seventies. 
That the overlapping decade is the seventies is in keeping with the general acceleration in 
translation of the fundamental texts of European or Western Marxism in the immediate post-
1968 era.  
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A second observation relates directly to the first. One of my contentions in chapter one was 
that Williams’s opinion of Lukacs declines over time, roughly in keeping with the 
intensification of Williams’s own engagement with Marxism up to Marxism and Literature, a 
text which evinces a Marxist perspective significantly at odds with Lukacs’s. Williams’s 
position on Sartre, beginning critically, peaking with the Critique and declining again in the 
early seventies, is relatively settled prior to the period of Marxism and Literature and the 
explicit affirmation of the Marxist character of cultural materialism. While it is still the case 
that Williams is reading or commenting on some of Sartre’s works during the period of his 
own theoretical transition, his encounters with Sartre’s output occur earlier and in a more 
concentrated form than with Lukacs, and there is a lack of the sense of sudden discovery and 
re-orientation that obtains, for example, in Williams’s commentaries on History and Class 
Consciousness or Essays on Realism. Williams’s engagement with Sartre is steadier, earlier 
and more linear, following the contours of Sartre’s career more or less in real time, and 
permitting Williams a more accurate and complete image of Sartre’s development. As noted 
above, this chapter will be structured along more thematic than strictly chronological lines.  
The key cultural issue in Williams’s writing on Lukacs was that of literary realism; the key 
political issue was that of class consciousness. With Sartre, I think, the predominant cultural 
issue is that of commitment in art, the predominant political issue the relation of the 
individual to society. At stake in both is the question of freedom, and so the theoretical spine 
of the following discussion will be the relation of both Williams and Sartre’s thought to the 
notion of human freedom and its intellectual corollary under capitalist social relations: 
political liberalism. Williams’s criticisms of existentialism in the 1960’s and beyond, both as 
a philosophical doctrine and as a structure of feeling within literature, stem from his rejection 
of the stance, which he sees as absorbed from a certain kind of bourgeois ideology, that the 
freedom of the individual is antithetical to inclusion within, or partial determination by, a 
social structure. We will find an inherited strain of liberalism in Williams’s thought, 
alongside its socialist obverse: frustration with the liberal (or libertarian) equation of freedom 
with radical individualism. In his After Theory (2004), Eagleton puts the distinction between 
liberal and socialist conceptions of freedom into relief: 
If human beings naturally live in political society, we can either try to arrange 
political life so that they all realize their unique capacities without getting in each 
other’s way, a doctrine known as liberalism; or we can try to organize political 
institutions so that their self-realization is as far as possible reciprocal, a theory known 
as socialism. One reason for judging socialism to be superior to liberalism is the belief 
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that human beings are political animals not only in the sense that they have to take 
account of each other’s need for fulfillment, but that in fact they achieve their deepest 
fulfillment only in terms of each other. (2004, p. 122) 
 
Eagleton is simplifying and is not, of course, saying that liberalism, in the Thatcherite 
manner, does not ‘believe’ in society; the point is that liberalism regards the formation of 
political institutions as a means to establish negative liberty for individuals, traditionally 
conceived of as freedom from others. Socialism, in contrast, regards political institutions as 
enablers of a common and reciprocal prosperity, in which individual freedom is theorized as 
achievable only through others, by means of common resources employed in solidarity. 
Sartre, of course, was not a liberal politically, and indeed the relationship between Sartrean 
existentialism and liberalism would itself require the devotion of a thesis. The question of 
whether a philosophical position and an ethics based on a radicalism of individual freedom 
can contribute to the socialist project is a key one for Williams in assessing Sartre. His is a 
mixed response, acknowledging the validity and power of the goal of ‘restoring communism 
for liberty’ while criticizing the vulnerability of Sartre’s work both to lapses in the rigour of 
its author’s anti-bourgeois assumptions, and to misinterpretation by the libertarian zeitgeist of 
the late sixties. Clearly, Williams’s reception of Sartre also provides an opportunity to 
interrogate Williams’s own liberal inheritance, the tension therein, and his own conception of 
human freedom, individual and social. Let us begin with a topic which presages in interesting 
ways these more philosophical and political concerns: the social and aesthetic nature of 
tragedy. 
The modern tragedy is the Sartrean tragedy 
Williams’s book-length discussions of drama in Drama from Ibsen to Eliot (1952 – hereafter 
DFIE), Drama in Performance (1954), Modern Tragedy (1966) and Drama from Ibsen to 
Brecht (1968 – hereafter DFIB) form the backbone of his literary criticism before a turn 
towards the novel with The English Novel from Dickens to Lawrence in 1970. The European 
dimension of this body of work is largely absent in the early DFIE, which Williams 
acknowledges is a weakness: ‘There are omissions I regret, where the opportunity to see and 
read important recent work in the European theatre was not available’ (1967a, p. 43);65 the 
engagement develops apace in the later texts. It was precisely during the period between 
                                                
65 In addition to the European dramatists mentioned in the following quotation, Williams also became familiar 
with Scandinavian drama during this period. In a 1965 review of Evert Sprinchorn’s collection, The Genius of 
Scandinavian Theatre (1964), Williams bemoans the absence of Bjornson, Grieg, Munk and Hjalmar Bergman, 
along with the screenplays of Ingmar Bergman, from Sprinchorn’s account. 
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DFIE and DFIB (the latter a wholesale revision and extension of the former) that Williams 
noticed the increasing influence of contemporary European drama on ‘English’ practice, as 
he recounts in a new conclusion for the 1963 edition of the DFIE: 
A very important recovery of European and American drama was widening the sense 
of possibility in English drama … The first influence was undoubtedly the reopening 
of the English theatre to the full range of European practice. The work of Anouilh, 
Sartre, Brecht, Beckett, Giradoux, Ionesco came as a revelation, especially since 
people were feeling that elsewhere only mannerism and the commercial theatre was 
left. Much of the work, especially that of Brecht and Beckett, realized, in practice, 
what the revival of verse drama [Eliot] had originally been about: the expansion of 
dramatic action and speech to a more vital and more extended human range. (1983b, 
p. 303) 
The process of ‘widening’, ‘reopening’ and ‘expansion’ is never a finished process, and what 
begins as a critique of the limitations of naturalism in DFIE becomes, by DFIB, equally a 
critique of expressionism, with Brecht pushing at the outer edges of what has been achieved 
as far as social critique. Modern Tragedy is the clearest expression of what is really at stake 
in Williams’s critique of modern drama, not a formal critique but a critique at the level of a 
structure of feeling common to both major forms and realized fully in neither. It is a structure 
of feeling which aims at a fully human truth, shorn of external designs or elite interference 
(Lukacs’s ‘imputed class consciousness’, for example), but which is nevertheless embedded 
within a class society and cannot but express the resulting tensions and contradictions. In 
Modern Tragedy this is given a politico-aesthetic formulation as the interaction between 
revolution and tragedy, with the dramatists Williams selects to examine presented as ‘stages’ 
in this interaction. Brecht is the last stage, as of Williams’s writing, and Sartre the 
penultimate one (literally, in the progression of chapters; theoretically, in the argument). 
Preparatory to interrogating Williams’s reading of Sartre’s plays, then, it will be worth 
examining Williams’s account of the tragic structure of feeling he sees as constitutive of 
modern drama. 
I will bluntly state the case at the outset: Williams is for revolution as a total process and 
against the pessimism of a certain modern conception of tragedy based on an indifferent 
universe and isolated human nature. ‘Hope’ is not a theoretical category for Williams, but it 
persists as an affective through-line throughout his work. Williams’s opposition to the 
Leninist/Lukacsian model is a rejoinder to the cynicism implicit in the notion that ordinary 
people are incapable of coming to emancipatory conclusions under their own experiential and 
cognitive power. This is at the root of his humanism, and we saw it in his rejection of 
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Lukacs’s view of realism: the model of truth and resistance to which realism aspires cannot 
be that of an abstract, objective (in the sense of beyond human experience) and thus alienated 
system of mechanical laws. We noted that in Politics and Letters (2015 [1979]), Williams’s 
interlocutors pull him up on using a definition of realism which is really that of the pre-
Marxist Lukacs of The Theory of the Novel (1916), as ‘the action of a man or woman who 
seeks a freer life with a greater attainment of value in it and finds the society an insuperable 
barrier, the ratification of the quest, yet at the same time the representation of the society’ 
(2015, p. 222). Now, while this is not the version of realism in the novel which Williams puts 
forward in his own work nor, as a rule, what he criticizes Lukacs for advocating, the old (pre-
Marxist) Lukacsian model is reminiscent of Williams’s analysis and critique of dramatic 
naturalism, an analysis which bleeds into the critique of expressionism in DFIB. 
DFIE is a critique of naturalism on the grounds that its formal conventions, namely, the 
reproduction of ‘everyday’ or ‘lifelike’ speech, settings and scenarios, in fact effect only a 
shallow simulation of reality: ‘The naturalist dramatists wanted to produce “the illusion of 
reality”. (The unconscious irony of the phrase is perhaps the final critical judgment of 
naturalism)’ (1967a, pp. 25-26). What is lacking in naturalism is what Williams calls, 
following Eliot, a ‘deeper consistency … the “reduction” to essentials … of living 
experience; the refusal to be distracted by the “natural surface experience”. It is the 
consistency of art rather than the consistency of representation’ (p. 24). In DFIE, Williams 
sees this consistency as only practicable under the strict authorial control of the dramatist and 
with strict proximity to what he calls the ‘community of sensibility’: 
The moral activity of the artist [i.e. ‘intentional’ expression of experience/sensibility] 
can also be an individual perception of pattern, or structure, in experience; a process 
which involves the most intense and conscious response to new elements of 
substantial living, so that by this very consciousness new patterns of evaluation are 
created or former patterns reaffirmed. In an age of widespread community of 
individual belief, the conventions of this process are clearly easier to establish, and 
full communication is more likely. But at all times, the community between artist and 
audience which seems to matter is the community of sensibility. (1967a, p. 31) 
This is clearly an early formulation of what would become one of Williams’s lasting theoretical 
legacies, the ‘structure of feeling’, but also the later ‘knowable community’ of The English Novel. 
Here the idea is general but, in DFIB, Williams develops the ‘structure of feeling’ as it relates to 
drama specifically (it was developed as a general cultural category in TLR) and especially to dramatic 
conventions. ‘Conventions’ are formal qualities which carry collectively understood and tacitly 
agreed upon meanings: ‘the convention, in any particular case, is simply the terms upon which author, 
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performers and audience agree to meet’ (Williams, 1983b, p. 4). In a naturalist play, then, ‘the 
convention is that the speech and action should as closely as possible appear to be those of everyday 
life’ (p. 4). As the common ground between dramatist and audience, conventions reflect a collective 
and intuitive experience of the totality of social life (i.e. a structure of feeling) in a given community 
in a given period. While we are accustomed to dividing social reality into empirically manageable 
chunks, Williams argues, ‘in the living experience of the time every element was in solution, an 
inseparable part of a complex whole … it is from such a totality that the artist draws’ (p. 9). 
The artist will undoubtedly name parts of social reality, but what is being drawn on as the 
structure of feeling is an intangible set of whole relations: ‘there yet remains some element 
for which there is no external counterpart. It is this, in the first instance, that I mean by the 
structure of feeling’ (p. 10). The non-empirical nature of the structure of feeling (as precisely 
that which eludes separation and definition) means that Williams’s position is both anti-
formalist and, to a limited degree, anti-representational. What matters is not what conventions 
express ‘in themselves’, or whether they express ‘reality’ (the goal to which naturalism 
aspired), but how they relate to the structure of feeling; a given set of conventions may help 
or hinder the artist’s communication of experience of the totality which his/her creative act 
hopes to express and participate in. Already, Williams’s commitment to totality is rendering 
his critical methodology incompatible with any simple empiricism. 
Given these positions, Williams cannot regard the relationship between naturalism and 
expressionism as merely formal. Instead, Williams reads these forms as sharing an 
underlying structure of feeling that we can summarize as secular, humanist and tragic 
(Brecht, at his best, transcends this last quality). At its most basic level, ‘naturalism’ names a 
dramatic form evincing ‘an absorbed interest in the contemporary everyday world, and a 
corresponding rejection or exclusion of any supposed external design or system of values’ 
(Williams, 1983b, p. 382). But then the rejection of naturalism, and the rise of other forms 
such as expressionism, was not the rejection of ‘too lifelike’ a set of conventions, but the 
judgment of those conventions as ‘no longer true enough, by essentially similar criteria’ (p. 
383). Williams elaborates: ‘It can then seem a rejection of naturalism to use conventions of 
speech, action and scene which are not, in immediate terms, probable, or superficially 
lifelike. But these new conventions, normally, have the same central purpose: a true 
representation of life’ (p. 383). That ‘true representation’, however, is really a representation 
of a modern structure of feeling, in which the dominant sense is of a man-made world or 
context (as opposed to a theologically oriented one) within which, paradoxically, the 
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individual person is thoroughly, even tragically, limited by that very man-made environment; 
it is the drama of ‘a uniquely representative figure (representative of “humanity” or “Man”) 
who is in revolt against the representative environment other men have made’ (p. 390). For 
Williams, this contradictory structure of feeling is inextricable from the development of 
bourgeois society:  
The inner history of naturalism is really this: that it developed as a style – a 
characteristic way of handling the world – in bourgeois society, but that it developed 
as a form, capable of major dramatic importance, in a period in which bourgeois 
society was being fundamentally criticized and rejected, mainly by people who 
nevertheless belonged in its world. There is then a contradiction in naturalism, but 
also a tension out of which the great drama of Ibsen directly came. The style assumed 
an understandable, recognizable, manageable everyday world; the form, while linked 
to this, discovered a humanity which this same world was frustrating or destroying. 
(1983b, p. 389) 
Both of the major modern dramatic forms, then, express the tension between a secular liberal 
humanism, which seeks to liberate man by freeing him from transcendental determination, 
and the socialist recognition of the reality of class in capitalist society. In other words, there 
exists in these forms a contradictory recognition, even if only unconsciously for the bourgeois 
practitioners of these forms, that humanism is not in itself a sufficient guarantor of freedom. 
Williams argued that a dissident, critical tension existed in naturalist plays between the 
realistically portrayed rooms, the everyday speech and scenarios, and the sense that the 
humanity which humanism had discovered was being stymied by the liberal capitalist order 
(or, in more philosophical terms, empiricism as an escape from transcendentalism was being 
problematized by a materialist recognition of the injustice inherent in the deep structures of a 
man-made social order). ‘This real contradiction between style and form’, argues Williams in 
DFIB, ‘could not last forever, in serious drama’ (p. 390). The result was a complex of 
adaptations in formal expression (conventions) that became known as expressionism: 
The suppressed tension, of those many trapped rooms, now breaks to a redefinition of 
what any environment is. A dramatic world is made (and we are still mainly in this 
phase) in which it is human isolation that has become representative: another unique 
history, offered, even more paradoxically, as a general truth. What was still, in the 
patient reproduction of naturalism, a self-evidently man-made world, is now a 
phantasmagoria, a hostile projection, a parody of order. Out of this structure of feeling 
– in historical terms, out of the failure of bourgeois revolt against bourgeois society – 
comes a new confidence: a confidence of despair … the techniques were available, 
from traditional romantic literature, from the fragments of a supernatural order: 
visions, transformations, superhuman powers, a malignant nature … It was not now in 
an order beyond man that these manifestations occurred; it was inside him, deep 
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inside him, in dreams and in visions, in his own irreducible and most personal and 
significant life. (1983b, p. 391) 
The dramatic action of the major expressionists, then, ‘succeeds to, rather than contradicts, 
the great tensions of the major naturalist play’ (p. 391). While expressionism uses a very 
different set of conventions, it communicates many of the same critical or dissident liberal 
intuitions as naturalism in ‘what is really only a development of the structure of feeling’ (p. 
391). Expressionism is the more pessimistic because the more inward-facing form, tending to 
wallow in ‘despair, contempt and rejection’ (p. 395); Sartre, while his work contains both 
naturalist and expressionist formal elements, falls primarily into the more severe affective 
space of expressionism. But it is clear that, for Williams, neither of the major forms go nearly 
far enough in their critique. This is because both forms proceed from an essentially tragic 
structure of feeling, ‘a “rejection” of bourgeois society which was also, factually, a resigned 
or angry acceptance of it as inevitable’ (p. 393). This, in effect, was the importation of an 
older, metaphysical notion of tragedy (as Fate), into a modern context in which it functions as 
the unrecognized projection of social and individual breakdown.  
Modern Tragedy (1966), which is where the bulk of the material on Sartre’s plays appears, is 
Williams’s attempt to render revolution in a manner which neither rejects nor succumbs to 
tragedy, but rather incorporates it into the conceptual apparatus of modernity. But this will 
require a wholesale reassessment of the concept of tragedy as it has been applied in dramatic 
criticism. Williams argues that the conventional academic account of tragedy has tended to 
divorce it from people’s everyday experiences. This critical tradition asserts that ‘there has 
been tragedy’, defined as dramatic actions embodying a certain metaphysical relation to Fate 
or a divine plan/will, ‘but that lacking this belief, that rule, we are now incapable of it’ 
(Williams, 1966, p. 45). A specifically modern tragedy, by this logic, is impossible because 
of the loss of a metaphysical order. Both ordinary tragic events, such as accidental deaths, 
and larger historical and political events, such as wars and revolutions, are by this cynical 
humanist logic excluded from the definition of tragic experience and action: ‘The events 
which are not seen as tragic are deep in the pattern of our own culture: war, famine, work, 
traffic, politics. To see no ethical content or human agency in such events, or to say that we 
cannot connect them with general meanings, and especially with permanent and universal 
meanings, is to admit a strange and particular bankruptcy, which no rhetoric of tragedy can 
finally hide’ (p. 49) A multitude of events, clearly imbued with a great deal of suffering and 
negativity and comprising a large part of what happens to people in modern society, are 
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barred from participation in the potentially cathartic affective structures of tragedy and are 
reduced to the status of indifferent accidents. Both ‘ethical content’ and ‘human agency’ are, 
by a kind of humanist masochism, purged from the humanist experience of society in the 
period of industrialization, impairing our ability to take the full measure of periods of 
suffering and crisis by accepting our own active role in their development and resolution.  
Williams argues that individualist liberalism, which played such a crucial role in the initial, 
emancipatory step of separating human values from abstract metaphysics (and, in doing so, 
sowing the seeds of revolutionary optimism), is ‘especially responsible for the sharp 
opposition between the idea of tragedy and the idea of revolution which we find so clearly in 
our own time’ (1966, p. 68). The deadlock of liberalism expresses itself as the naturalist 
paradox also discussed in DFIB, of a non-metaphysical world over which, because it is 
abstracted into a set of mechanical, law-like processes (as in both natural science and 
orthodox Marxism), human beings can have no control: 
The tragedy of naturalism is the tragedy of passive suffering, and the suffering is 
passive because man can never really change his world … the impulse to describe and 
so change a human condition has narrowed to the simple impulse to describe a 
condition in which there can be no intervention by God or man, the human act of will 
being tiny and insignificant within the vast material process, universal or social, 
which at once determines and is indifferent to human destiny. (1966, p. 69) 
Recall that in DFIB Williams would characterize naturalism as the product of a period of 
bourgeois revolt, and expressionism as the product of the failure of that project, ‘the failure of 
bourgeois revolt against bourgeois society’. Naturalism made society into a kind of machine, 
beyond all human contact, while expressionism, being the product of the failure of a liberal 
rebellion against that notion, made society per se, society as a concept, into the enemy of the 
individual, the source of his subjective anguish and isolation. Irrationalism emerges as a 
counter to the mechanical rationality of the previous phase, as does the rejection of all 
collective or social acts, including social revolution, as allied to an ineradicably hostile and 
oppressive external world. Both conceptions, argues Williams, are inevitably tragic; the first 
makes man impotent, the second either renders him or actively encourages him to be 
irrational, isolated and nomadic. In naive opposition to these tragic conceptions, argues 
Williams, stands ‘utopianism, or revolutionary romanticism’ (p. 77), the ‘suppression or 
dilution’ of the inescapable fact that revolution is tragic, that it is ‘born in pity and terror: in 
the perception of a radical disorder … in an experience of evil made the more intolerable by 
the conviction that it is not inevitable, but is the result of particular actions and choices’ (p. 
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77). We thus remain stuck between an idea of tragedy that cannot incorporate the idea of 
revolution, and an idea of revolution which, obsessed with ‘the total redemption of 
humanity’, cannot incorporate the idea of tragedy. 
Williams’s solution is dialectical and totalizing. Revolution and tragedy share a genus in 
historical experience, namely, the living through by human beings in society of periods of 
acute social disorder, the crises which ensue and their often very painful resolution in the 
construction of a new order. The temptation to view the pain and suffering as ‘merely’ tragic, 
and thus as inimical to the emancipatory spirit of revolution, must be overcome. How is this 
to be done? First, an affirmation of socialism: ‘Socialism, I believe, is the true and active 
inheritor of the impulse to human liberation’ (1966, p. 74). Next, the humanist 
acknowledgment of our own involvement in revolution (and indeed tragedy) and the rejection 
of any purely objective/mechanical viewpoint: ‘Elevating ourselves to spectators and judges, 
we suppress our own real role in any such action, or conclude, in a kind of indifference, that 
was has happened was inevitable and that there is even a law of inevitability’ (p. 83). 
Following this recognition of the tragic nature of revolution, wherein we ‘see actual liberation 
as part of the same process which appalls us’ (p. 82), comes the acceptance of the 
unbreakable dialectical bond between the two concepts and experiences: ‘The tragic action, 
in its deepest sense, is not the confirmation of disorder, but its experience, its comprehension 
and its resolution. In our own time, this action is general, and its common name is revolution’ 
(p. 83). Finally, Williams enjoins us to fully identify with the tragic experience of revolution 
as a means of furthering the emancipatory project initiated by humanism but stalled by the 
contradictions of liberalism, and by our own limited responses to the experience of tragedy: 
we must ‘make the connections, because that is the action of tragedy, and what we learn in 
suffering is again revolution, because we acknowledge others as men and any such 
acknowledgement is the beginning of a struggle, as the continuing reality of our lives. Then 
to see revolution in this tragic perspective is the only way to maintain it’ (pp. 83-84). 
*     *     * 
So, where does Sartre fit within Williams’s complex dialectic of tragedy and revolution? It is 
instructive that the heading Williams gives to the Sartre (and Camus) chapter in Modern 
Tragedy is ‘Tragic Despair and Revolt: Camus, Sartre’. The difference between the two 
tragedians is smaller, argues Williams, than Sartre believed it was. Sartre had contended that 
‘while Camus was ostensibly in revolt against historical suffering, he was less concerned to 
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end this than to find a personally satisfying position: a metaphysical revolt against an eternal 
injustice’ (1966, p. 184); Williams is quick to point out, however, that Sartre ‘shares with 
Camus those perceptions of the absurd which are the starting point of the metaphysical rebel’ 
(p. 185). Camus’s attempt at an emancipatory humanism, argues Williams, which would deny 
the inevitability of despair, was hampered by the consistent location of revolt in the isolated 
individual, collectivity being reserved for the negative pole of suffering: 
Thus while the suffering is genuinely collective, the revolt is inevitably individual. 
The last rhythm of liberal tragedy is again heard. The capacity of history to change the 
common condition, is any essential way, is implicitly denied. Thus revolt is sharply 
distinguished from revolution. (1966, p. 183) 
Revolution, then, as collective revolt. It is worth recalling in this context Williams’s 
discussion of the different positions an individual may take towards society in TLR. There 
Williams defined, as conservative positions, the ‘member’ as the person who whole-heartedly 
endorses and identifies with the purposes of their society, the ‘subject’ as the person who 
makes no such identification but is forced by material necessity to conform, and the ‘servant’ 
as the person who is only partly, to use an Althusserian term, interpellated; the servant 
becomes aware, through deep personal suffering, of the gulf between the purposes of (class) 
society and the possibility of living a full life, but nevertheless ‘plays the role as if it were 
really his’ (Williams, 2011b [1961], p. 112), denying the necessity of rebellion as well as his 
own capacity to rebel. Williams terms this the ‘servant complex’ (p. 113), and places it in 
direct opposition to existentialist doctrine.  The existentialist, concerned to adopt an authentic 
and responsible position with regards to his/her choices, ‘refuses this complex, and asserts the 
centrality of personal choice. From this position, with the reality of membership virtually 
excluded as a possibility, the whole repertory of modern individualism proceeds’ (p. 113). As 
in Camus, then, the refusal of identification with a social edifice that produces ‘despair’ 
issues forth in a merely individual revolt, a revolt perennially limited by its association of 
society tout court (in short, other people) with the alienating pressures that are felt and 
theorized as absurdity (this is very close to Williams’s general critique of expressionism). 
Sartrean drama will follow a similar, if more militant, existentialist trajectory. 
Williams’s analysis of Sartre’s plays in Modern Tragedy nuances what were quite dismissive 
comments in DFIE, in which he suggested that Sartre’s dramatic output was less that of a 
dramatist, and more that of a philosopher, contrasting him unfavourably with his fellow 
Frenchman, the playwright Anouilh: ‘Sartre … is fundamentally a melodramatist, and [his] 
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opinions are more interesting than the plays which express them … Anouilh’s achievement 
is, like that of Ibsen, the achievement of a dramatist, and not of a philosopher’ (Williams, 
1967a, pp. 221-222). This was based on the following critique of Sartre’s The Flies (1943), in 
which the Orestes and Electra myth is reformulated as a kind of existentialist parable: ‘it is 
Orestes’s refusal of guilt, Sartre’s modification of the legend, which is the main interest. But 
in Sartre’s play one’s attention is directed to the philosophical change, and the legend is not 
so much a form as a case. The philosophical interest in indeed considerable, but the play is an 
example of a gain in interest at the expense of intensity’ (p. 221). Such broad-brush value-
judgements are indicative of Williams’s pre-cultural materialist or ‘practical critical’ period 
(DFIE is an explicit attempt to apply practical criticism to drama); the argument is 
considerably advanced in Modern Tragedy but retains the, I think correct, view that the 
engine of Sartre’s drama is his philosophy.  
In Modern Tragedy Williams tackles six of Sartre’s plays (including The Flies) from across 
the latter’s career, producing an overview of Sartre’s development as a dramatist from his 
existentialist roots to the Marxism of his mid-to-late period. Williams works chronologically, 
beginning with The Flies. Here, he argues, Sartre produces a paradigmatic metaphysical rebel 
in the personage of Orestes, whose refusal of any metaphysical order beyond man liberates 
Argos from the tyrannical Aegisthus, backed by Zeus. In the cosmos of Sartre’s play, gods 
exist (Zeus is a major character), but influence human affairs only under cover of the lie that 
they are all-powerful; in reality, the gods have no power and men are fully free. The 
realisation of this fact by the hero and its communication to others is then the focus of the 
dramatic action, effectively elevating the revelation of an existentialist metaphysical doctrine 
to the level both of moral imperative and dramatic catharsis. The adaptation of the form of 
Greek tragedy is a technical tool towards philosophical revelation, and that revelation is the 
form taken by the revolt. As Williams puts it: ‘By the form of the Greek story, [Orestes] is 
the man destined to the decisive action; thus the metaphysical rebel can be seen also as the 
liberating hero’ (1966, p. 185). The play itself corroborates Williams’s sense that, in Sartrean 
drama, collective revolt is off the table. It is Orestes, not the people of Argos themselves, who 
performs the reversal of false consciousness. Furthermore, Orestes only frees the people via a 
strange act of self-sacrifice, drawing to himself the pestilence of flies, representative of the 
false unfreedom of Argos, and leaving the kingdom forever. All responsibility now lies with 
Orestes, and by a kind of messianic ‘positive alienation’, the people are delivered into 
freedom. We are firmly in the realm of imputed class consciousness, of Leninist elitism, 
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when Orestes benevolently accepts the position of king but vows to be a king ‘without 
subjects’: 
Now I am of your kind, my subjects; there is a bond of blood between us, and I have 
earned my kingship over you. As for your sins and your remorse, your night-fears, 
and the crime Aegisthus committed – all are mine, I take them all upon me. Fear your 
dead no longer; they are my dead. And, see, your faithful flies have left you and come 
to me. But have no fear, people of Argos. I shall not sit on my victim’s throne or take 
the scepter in my blood-stained hands. A God offered it to me, and I said no. I wish to 
be a king without a kingdom, without subjects. (Sartre, 1989c, p. 123) 
A king without subjects, of course, is still a king. The metaphysical rebel refuses to rule but 
leaves intact the distinction between those who rule and those who do not. The implication 
that it is possible to speak and act in the interest of all men without ruling them is progressive 
in a limited, liberal sense, but falls far short of what Williams defines as revolution: collective 
revolt enacted with an acknowledged and responsible involvement in suffering. The people of 
Argos do neither.  
The Flies is fully consistent with the philosophical ideas of the early Sartre. In Existentialism 
is a Humanism (1946), Sartre presented the following view on the relationship between 
individual and collective ethics/freedom: 
When we say that man chooses himself, we do mean that every one of us must choose 
himself; but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself he chooses for all men. 
For in effect, of all the actions a man may take in order to create himself as he wills to 
be, there is not one which is not creative, at the same time, of an image of man such as 
he believes he ought to be … When a man commits himself to anything, fully 
realising that he is not only choosing what he will be, but is thereby at the same time a 
legislator deciding for the whole of mankind – in such a moment a man cannot escape 
from the sense of complete and profound responsibility. (Sartre, 2007, pp. 31-33) 
The formulation fits Orestes perfectly; not a King in the traditional sense, but nevertheless a 
‘legislator deciding for the whole of mankind’, burdened by that responsibility (the flies are 
transformed from a symbol of bad faith into Sartrean ‘anguish’, the trans-personal, but not 
properly collective, burden of ethical choice). As Williams puts it during a third discussion of 
the play in DFIB, ‘It is not the revolt of the citizens, as in Alfieri or Voltaire, which liberates 
the city. Their freedom is brought to them, by the desperate outsider, who in acting for 
himself is acting for them’ (1983, p. 256). This is the action of the metaphysical rebel, the 
figure who goes beyond the simple, fully individualized metaphysical angst of Antoine 
Roquentin in Sartre’s Nausea (1938), pushes through to social critique (revolt) but falls short 
of historical solutions. In this sense, The Flies bears the archetypal political weakness that 
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Williams attributes to expressionism more generally: the manifestations of social disorder, 
their experience and their working through occurring entirely within the critical 
consciousness of the far-seeing individual. 
In Modern Tragedy (1966), Williams argues that a welcome shift onto the terrain of history 
begins with Sartre’s Les Mains Sales (Dirty Hands) (1948), the story of Hugo Barine, a 
communist and reluctant assassin who goes through with the hit only when he sees his victim 
in a romantic liaison with his wife. The target, Hoederer, is a fellow party member whom 
Hugo’s superiors believe was about to make a damaging strategic blunder. The action post-
assassination focuses on the question of Hugo’s real motives: political duty or passionate 
jealousy in the moment? The meaning of this complex interplay between motive and outcome 
is further obfuscated by the fact that Hugo’s superiors belatedly come to believe that 
Hoederer’s strategy was in fact the right one. Williams is scathing of the political 
implications of such multi-layered uncertainties:  
It is possible to read it as in part the familiar Freudian gloss on historical actions: 
Hugo could not kill Hoederer for public reasons, but he can kill him in personal 
jealousy. The public reasons are themselves made ambiguous by the shift in the party 
line which makes Hoederer first a traitor and then a hero. Of such ironic reveals and 
ambiguities of motive, history, the play seems to assert, is in fact composed. 
Authenticity is then a matter of personal intention, of the meaning given to the act by 
the man who commits it. Other kinds of meaning are inevitably secondary and 
confused. This is then still the morality of revolt, and not of revolution. A personal 
meaning can be asserted, but there are no effective meanings beyond this. (1966, p. 
185) 
In the absence of an authoritative account of history, then, authenticity is what the person 
involves makes of it, their ‘version of events’. Williams’s analysis is in many ways adequate, 
but his account of authenticity is lacking, and an important sexual dimension of the play is 
left untouched. After the assassination, Hugo’s life is at risk from the party, since because 
Hoederer’s strategy turned out to be right, it is now Hugo who is ‘objectively’ the traitor. 
Hugo refuses to please guilty to a ‘crime of passion’, insisting that he really did believe, and 
still does, that Hoederer was wrong. At this level, the play implies, Hugo is being inauthentic, 
attributing false motives to his actions. However, a homoerotic subtext in the play strongly 
suggests that Hugo in fact loved Hoederer, not his wife, and that the murder was one of erotic 
rage directed at the male object of his desire. At this level, Hugo is right to say that the 
murder was not the crime of passion his friends hope it was; it was, in fact, a quite different 
crime of passion. But by holding onto the face-saving and, in this case, heteronormative 
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narrative of dispassionate political service, his action remains ‘inauthentic’. Williams is right 
to assert that the play offers no metric by which to judge the adequacy of different political 
strategies or ethical commitments. But as a reading of authenticity in the early Sartre, 
Williams’s analysis is flawed. Authenticity is never a matter of ‘personal intention’ for 
Sartre; it is about taking responsibility for one’s choices, and accepting that a man’s actions 
define him, not the reverse (‘existence precedes essence’). ‘Personal meanings’ are not 
authentic by definition for Sartre. They are just as often post-factum rationalizations of 
behavior on the basis of an idealized self-image, as with Hugo (‘I am politically 
committed/heterosexual’) and paradigmatically, as we shall see, with Garcin in No Exit 
(1945). 
While his analysis is flawed as an account of Sartrean authenticity, Williams’s focus on the 
gap between individual and collective meanings is pertinent. He is noticing a development, in 
Sartre’s work, from the individual experience of freedom to the acknowledgment of common 
projects and a corresponding tension. Williams (1966) turns briefly to Men without Shadows 
(1946), written before Dirty Hands, to illustrate the presence of the individual/collective 
meaning problematic even in the earlier plays: ‘Already in Men without Shadows, the 
essential argument has begun’ (1966, pp. 185-186). In the play, a politically committed group 
of Resistance fighters are captured and tortured; they kill a younger member of their group 
who was likely to talk under duress, raising questions about who is qualified to judge others. 
In the end, supposedly in exchange for their freedom, they agree to confess a jointly 
fabricated version of events. Their jailors believe the lie (the activists’ actions were useful to 
the cause), but they are killed anyway by their cruel and dishonest captor. Williams writes: 
In the extremes of exile and despair, the decision has to be taken between a self-
justifying death [i.e. refusing to talk] and the limited actions by which they can still be 
useful to the cause. They make the decision to be useful, by a common morality, but 
are killed anyway, by a cruel lie which has all the effect of the wholly arbitrary. 
(1966, p. 186) 
One of Williams’s irritations throughout Modern Tragedy is the tendency of the tragic 
tradition to emphasize the arbitrary nature of suffering, the cause of death or isolation being 
either blind Fate or malicious caprice, irrelevant to common meanings. In Men without 
Shadows, a common meaning or ethic is asserted by the characters, but their suffering has no 
connection to their endeavor or to the movement of history. Williams is perturbed by the way 
the play’s denouement invites a wholly bleak interpretation of events, wherein even tentative 
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movements towards collective revolt are coded in terms of an arbitrary and callous universe 
of empty contingency. 
Williams’s analysis tracks the development of Sartre’s ethical characters from the pure 
metaphysical rebel (Orestes) through the political assertions of collective meaning in Men 
without Shadows and Dirty Hands to the active revolutionary (Goetz) in The Devil and the 
Good Lord (1951 – hereafter TDGL)). In TDGL, Goetz, a military commander and willful 
mass murderer, loses a bet with a priest and commits to being ‘good’. He erects a city of 
pacifist love, the ‘City of the Sun’ within a war-torn country (his military genius, meanwhile, 
is sorely missed at the front) and the city is predictably razed. He eventually abandons his 
quest for goodness and chooses war. Williams summarizes Goetz’s development: ‘Goetz 
comes to see that in a world without God, and in a time of violent social conflict, the 
important commitment is not to goodness, which is impossible, but to the cause of liberation 
… this is the final point of development, from revolt to revolution’ (1966, p. 186). In the 
play, Goetz discovers that in the context of social upheaval, his commitment to abstract 
goodness was in fact a way of being isolated, a refusal to engage with the common 
materiality of history. He chooses revolutionary war as a way of ‘being with everybody’ 
(Sartre, 1960, p. 149). So yes, there is a movement towards revolution, towards collective 
action and meaning, a political advance on The Flies, but Williams intends neither a ringing 
endorsement of Goetz, nor of Sartre’s dramatic trajectory. On the contrary, Williams is highly 
critical of the overwhelming emphasis on revolutionary violence at the expense of what he 
regards, throughout Modern Tragedy, as the appropriate synthesis of revolution and tragedy, 
the experiential working through of social disorder. He suspects that, for Sartre, violence 
means something else: 
For Sartre, revolution must be accepted, if any final personal authenticity is to be 
attained. And if revolution, then political realism and if necessary violence … Sartre, 
defending revolution, puts his whole stress on its violence, which at times seems to be 
not merely necessary but actively purifying. For or against, [both Sartre and Camus] 
identify historical revolution with a kind of willed violence. (Williams, 1966, p. 187) 
Again, Williams is using ‘authenticity’ oddly; it is perfectly possible, in the Sartrean schema, 
to be an authentic counter-revolutionary. But he is right to point out, particularly in the case 
of TDGL, that what amounts to ‘self-realisation’ for many of Sartre’s characters is a kind of 
violent will to power, an existential ‘leaning in’ to concrete, at their best collective, actions to 
which it remains intractably difficult to attach firm historical meanings. In part, I think, this is 
Daniel Robert Gerke  Chapter Two: Williams and Sartre 
 
 
124 
because Sartre, at this stage, is deeply suspicious of the social actor who assigns ‘respectable’ 
meanings to his actions, like Hugo in Dirty Hands. It is safer to simply act, free from all self-
imposed meanings, to refuse to ‘code’ existence with essence, and to let what objective 
historical meanings may be established in the fullness of time apply retroactively. In keeping 
with Williams’s critique of liberalism’s contradictory metaphysic, we should read this as a 
secular version of the Christian injunction to forego moral arrogance and await the judgment 
of God at the end of life. 
The commitment to violence, or rather the inability to think through violence to a more 
meaningful and collective experience of revolution, appears to persist in Sartre’s drama, at 
least, through the conversion to Marxism. Williams completes his survey of Sartre’s plays by 
claiming a basic philosophical similarity between an early and a later work, Huis Clos (No 
Exit) (1945) and Altona (1960) respectively, drawing a starkly negative conclusion: 
If we compare Sartre’s early Huis Clos with his most recent Altona, we discover that 
in the later play a political dimension has been added to the identical (Pirandellian) 
version of human beings as inevitably mutually destructive and frustrating. It is true 
that in Altona the destructive and frustrating elements are related to capitalist and to 
imperialist war, but whether this is a primary or secondary relation we cannot say. If 
people are as they are in Huis Clos – and nearly all of Sartre’s work confirms that this 
is his view – it is indeed difficult to believe that revolution could be anything more 
than nihilism. (1966, p. 187) 
On the one hand, then, Williams had been tracing a development in Sartre’s dramatic 
characterizations from the pure metaphysical rebel to the active and willful revolutionary. On 
the other, he detects a countervailing tendency to the progressive development in a basically 
pessimistic view of human beings in their social relations. Moreover, Sartre’s pessimism is 
not an occasional but a core impulse confirmed by ‘nearly all of Sartre’s work’. The texts 
which Williams goes to for evidence are well chosen. Huis Clos (No Exit) contains the 
famous line ‘hell is other people’, spoken by the paradigmatically inauthentic Garcin upon 
realizing that hell is not a place of fire and brimstone, but of eternal proximity to other human 
beings. The action of the play revolves around the futile attempts of three damned 
individuals, stuck together in a single room, to evade recrimination by resorting to self-
deceptive ideal-egos, ameliorative fictions which are continually punctured by the barbs of 
the other detainees. Garcin’s starkly pessimistic declaration is an aggrieved railing against 
authenticity, and a despairing acknowledgment that it is because man is a social animal that 
he cannot remain protected by his own self-image. ‘Other people’, the play implies, do not 
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have the same interest in rendering your actions respectable, and will often force you to 
confront the reality that your actions/choices (existence), as opposed to your interpretation of 
those actions/choices, define your being (essence). In the language of Being and Nothingness 
(1943), other people are what prevent the human individual from alchemizing itself as pour-
soi (for-itself: one’s conscious self-description) into the more substantive en-soi (in-itself: 
being). 
Williams had noted that in the later Altona, the historical context of capitalist-imperialist war 
bears only a tangential relation to the mutual frustration of human beings by one another. 
Again, this is an accurate reading. In the play, set post-WW2, Franz, the eldest son of the 
Gerlach dynasty of German industrialists, spends his days voluntarily locked in his room, 
imagining that outside his bricked-up window Germany, having lost the war, lies in ruins. 
The mystery is why he does so; he appears mad, begging for a future race of ‘crabs’, the 
successors to human beings, to judge him. We receive snippets of Franz’s troubled backstory, 
some of which, including sheltering an escaped Jewish concentration camp detainee, imply a 
deep moral antipathy to Germany’s conduct in the war. We eventually learn that Franz is the 
latest in a long line of inauthentic characters, pretending that his inability to face a ‘ruined’ 
Germany was because he had betrayed it. It fact, Franz is incapable of looking upon the real, 
resurgent Germany out of disgust at its crimes, and guilt at his own complicity in them during 
his time as a soldier: ‘The ruins gave me my justification. I loved our looted houses and our 
mutilated children.  I pretended that I was locking myself up so that I shouldn’t witness 
Germany’s agony. It’s a lie. I wanted my country to die, and I shut myself up so that I 
shouldn’t be a witness to its resurrection’ (Sartre, 1981a, p. 154). Franz’s father, whose 
company provided ships, ports and land for the concentration camps, to the Nazis, apologizes 
for his role in producing Franz’s guilt. The two men achieve a personal détente but, unable to 
deal with their mutual guilt, they perform a double suicide. Once again, a revelation of 
authenticity precipitates a bleak, violent dénouement.  
Authenticity never ‘saves’ any of Sartre’s characters; it resolves a certain personal deadlock 
which, regardless, culminates in death or violence of a kind that eschews any sense of trans-
personal meaning or historical agency. The rebellion of the metaphysical rebel, even where 
imagined into a historical context, is never revolutionary in Williams’s sense of active, 
collective involvement.  Williams (1966) notes that the kinds of human experience Sartre 
chooses for his dramatic actions ‘are of an overwhelmingly negative kind’ (1966, p. 187). 
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Sartre’s real support for freedom and revolution does not excuse the direction of his dramatic 
art: ‘That he has the courage to believe in freedom, and to support revolution, despite such 
evidence, is important but again secondary’ (p. 187). Williams cannot forgive Sartre the 
pessimism of his plays because they are predicated on a philosophy the inherent 
individualism of which not only isolates human experience but, like expressionism, reduces 
the external (social or natural) world to a system of mechanical laws in contradiction with 
human needs and interests: 
Whether in the bourgeois and bourgeois-Marxist versions of nature as matter to be 
dominated, or in the existentialist version of nature as indifferent or resistant, there is 
no sense of common process or common life, and this, itself an analogue of 
individualism, leads inevitably to despair. In these ways, I see the work of Camus and 
Sartre as the latest and most notable struggle within the deadlock which has, 
historically, taken over our consciousness. The conclusions they draw, whether of 
revolt or revolution, are convincing only to the extent that one’s own mind remains 
within the deadlock itself. (1966, p. 189) 
Recalling Williams’s general discussion of modern drama, this is the deadlock brought about 
by the failure of progressive liberalism i.e. the bourgeois revolt against bourgeois society. 
Liberalism, finding the world which it had made replete with alienation and injustice, 
attempted to harness its own founding emancipatory gestures to the critique of liberal society. 
The discursive and political strategies of liberal humanism were sufficiently forceful to 
emancipate modern society from the pre-existing alienations of a theological/monarchical 
social order. But that emancipatory promise falls short when confronted by the fresh 
alienation of an industrialised class society which it can only critique from within a logic of 
inevitability, since it is the society to which it (liberalism) corresponds. The contemporary 
enemies of freedom (for Williams, as a socialist humanist, these include both philosophical 
individualism and real structures of property and power) evade the targeting systems of 
liberal critique, which turn instead to society in general, to an ahistorical human sociality 
which ‘inexplicably’, ‘inevitably’ reverts to barbarism despite casting off the chains of 
absolutism. 
As stated earlier, tragedy, in the eyes of its conventional theorists, was supposed to have been 
rendered impossible in modernity because the metaphysical doctrines which undergirded it 
(Fate, divine caprice etc) had been replaced with the secular doctrines of liberal humanism.66 
But Williams, having surveyed the existentialist tragedies of Camus and Sartre, cannot 
                                                
66 Modern Tragedy was in part written in response to a thesis along these lines by George Steiner in his The 
Death of Tragedy (1961).  
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concur. His concluding statement on these French dramatists, in which Williams draws a 
crucial link between Marxism, psychoanalysis and existentialism as quintessential modern 
doctrines, is worth quoting in full: 
It has often been said that tragedy is impossible, in the twentieth century, because our 
philosophical assumptions are non-tragic. What is then adduced, as evidence, is the 
humanism of the Enlightenment or perhaps the Renaissance. I have already argued 
that this is useless; the humanism that matters is not now of those kinds. What is more 
important to notice is that the three characteristically new systems of thinking, in our 
own time – Marxism, Freudianism, Existentialism – are all, in their most common 
forms, tragic. Man can achieve his full life only after violent conflict; man is 
essentially frustrated, and divided against himself, while he lives in society; man is 
torn by intolerable contradictions, in a condition of essential absurdity. From these 
ordinary propositions, and from their combination in so many minds, it is not 
surprising that so much tragedy has in fact emerged. The tragic humanism of Camus, 
the tragic commitment of Sartre, are as far as any of us have reached, and each 
experience, evidently, is of our own time … But the question remains, inevitably, 
whether this is really as far as we can go, whether under the weight of a common 
suffering this is our own last word. (1966, p. 189) 
I think this is one of the most crucial passages in all of Williams’s theoretical work. Brecht, 
in the following chapter of Modern Tragedy, will go further than the existentialists. His 
chapter is called ‘A Rejection of Tragedy’, and indeed the passage above appears to vacillate 
between a defence and an assault on the modern tragic impulse. On the one hand, Williams is 
keen to defend modernity against the charge that its secular humanism renders it non-tragic; 
as the whole of Modern Tragedy has demonstrated, the tragic impulse is alive and well in 
new forms. But what these new forms share with the old, and what Williams would like to 
critique in them, is an essential pessimism about human nature and society, anathema to his 
own conception of tragedy as the experiential working through of social disorder. For 
Williams, the modern tragic impulse has been focused through the combined prism of three 
doctrines, (orthodox) Marxism, psychoanalysis and existentialism. Each of these, argues 
Williams, postulates an intractable negativity immanent to either human nature or to various 
intractable structural properties of history/society tout court. In each case, both the problems 
of social life and their solutions are suspended above human experience and, to a significant 
degree, human agency. Williams resists these multiple alienations in the name of a new 
humanism, socialist and materialist, which outperforms the liberal critique of the existing 
social order by refusing to alienate either problem or solution to a sphere beyond human 
beings, their common agency and experience. Sartrean drama, even in those moments where 
it courted history, and even, with Altona, during Sartre’s Marxist period, could not achieve 
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this, pinned down as it was by the dissident bourgeois structure of feeling which Williams 
associates with expressionism. For Williams, it was Brecht alone among modern dramatists 
who occasionally pointed the way forward to a humanist re-historicisation of social 
transformation, an insistence on the possibility of revolutionary change on human terms. 
Beyond Tragedy: Brecht 
In the epilogue to his recent book on the Russian Revolution, China Miéville (2018) offers 
the following reading of the world’s first socialist revolution and its legacy: 
The standard of October declares that things changed once, and they might do so 
again … Fleetingly, there is a shift towards workers’ control of production and the 
rights of peasants to the land … And though those moments are snuffed out, reversed, 
become bleak jokes and memories all too soon, it might have been otherwise. It might 
have been different, for these were only the first, most faltering steps. The 
revolutionaries want a new country in a new world, one they cannot see but believe 
they can build. And they believe that in so doing, the builders will also build 
themselves anew. (2018, p. 317) 
Miéville’s is a Brechtian reading of history. The idea that things ‘might have been otherwise’, 
that even the past is infused with contingency, is vital to Brecht’s project, as is a conception 
of history as an act of self-making by human beings. Such an anti-mechanical, anti-
teleological perspective is what Williams is attracted to in Brecht’s plays, in which specific 
historical, or indeed fictional, events are presented as ‘case studies’ in the contingency of 
human choice and actions. In this section, we will consider Williams’s responses, in Modern 
Tragedy and Drama from Ibsen to Brecht, to the major plays of the period 1937-1945. 
As of the late sixties, Williams regarded Brecht as without parallel among modern dramatists. 
He is not only a formally original artist, but a pioneer of a new and progressive manifestation 
of what Williams called a structure of feeling, that historically specific complex of 
perceptual, affective and creative responses to social life that functioned as the central 
epistemological category of Williams’s early theory. Williams (1966) emphasizes Brecht’s 
achievement in Modern Tragedy, his last sentence below prefiguring Miéville’s Brechtian 
evocation of the essential contingency of history: 
In most modern drama, the best conclusion is: yes, this is how it was. Only an 
occasional play goes further, with the specific excitement of recognition: yes, this is 
how it is. Brecht, at his best, reaches out to and touches the necessary next stage: yes, 
this is how it is, for these reasons, but the action is continually being replayed, and it 
could be otherwise. (1966, p. 202) 
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In the lineage of modern dramatists which Modern Tragedy traces, Brecht comes closest, for 
Williams, to a perspective approximating a dramatic Marxist humanism. He is not without his 
limitations, however, and for Williams these are symptomatic of his emerging out of an 
expressionist tradition inherently predisposed to taking the measure of the individual against 
society; Brecht falls short, in other words, except in his greatest moments, of a drama of the 
totality. Nevertheless, via the application of an original theoretical apparatus and dramatic 
conventions, Williams views Brecht as having achieved a level of social critique which 
eclipses the metaphysical revolt of the early Sartre and invites further progress. 
Contextually, we should acknowledge that Williams’s dramatic criticism was in many ways a 
belated intervention into the Marxist debates around realism and modernism of the thirties, 
within which Brecht and Lukacs were perhaps the main antagonists.67 ‘It is remarkable,’ 
Williams (1980) noted in his review of Lukacs’s Essays on Realism, ‘that so many current 
arguments, among left writers and commentators, about such fundamental problems as 
realism, reportage, partisanship and experimental form were prefigured in the lively 
controversies between socialist writers, especially Russian and German, in the twenties and 
thirties’ (New Society, 1980, Nov 20). Williams’s writings on Brecht in the sixties were 
fundamentally an attempt to enrich the anti-Stalinist humanism of the British New Left, 
indeed British political and literary criticism more generally, with what Williams saw as a 
vital strand of European socialist humanist thought. 
Before addressing Williams’s reading of Brecht’s plays in Modern Tragedy and Drama from 
Ibsen to Brecht, it will be worth briefly recalling the different politico-aesthetic positions, and 
their attendant formal conventions, which Williams was identifying in his dramatic criticism. 
Naturalism, Williams argued, was a product of the liberal critique of bourgeois society, an 
attempt to solidify an object of critique via realistic representations, instead producing an 
alienated objectivity antithetical to its own humanist aspirations. Expressionism, a product of 
the failure of the original liberal revolt, escaped inwards, emphasizing the subjective anguish 
of the bourgeois subject, rejecting conventions aiming at verisimilitude and instead positing 
an irrevocable gulf between an abstract ‘society’ or ‘external world’ and an equally 
abstracted individual consciousness. Neither was revolutionary; the structures of feeling to 
which the conventions of both relate are limited to a non-dialectical experience of tragedy. 
The early Sartre remained at the level of expressionist-subjective revolt, a metaphysical 
                                                
67 For an overview of these debates see Theodor Adorno et al, Aesthetics and Politics (2007). 
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rebellion which, even when it does rise to meet the real contradictions of revolutionary action 
(The Devil and the Good Lord), is held at the point of ‘willed violence’. Opposed to both the 
naturalist and expressionist accommodations with the prevailing social order, ‘revolutionary 
romanticism’ asserted the necessity of revolution without the negotiation with tragedy (i.e. 
awareness of contradiction and suffering) which Williams regarded as necessary for 
revolution to proceed as a ‘total process’, an authentic experiential working through of social 
disorder. Sartre had perpetuated the old expressionist structure of feeling; Brecht, for 
Williams, signaled the emergence of a new experiential paradigm. His dramatic theory and 
practice offered what Williams saw as the essence of a vital artistic creativity: the 
communication of new experience to a receptive audience via new conventions developing a 
common, existing tradition (as expressed in Williams’s elaboration of the creative act in 
TLR). Williams therefore pays considerable attention to the relation between Brecht’s 
theoretical concepts and his theatrical conventions, seeing in them the emergence as dramatic 
form of a new, proto-revolutionary structure of feeling exemplified in the notion that ‘things 
could be different’. As we shall see, however, Williams still regards Brecht as having fallen 
short of a ‘total’ drama or dramatic realism. 
In DFIB, Williams argues that by ‘Aristotelian’ theatre, Brecht meant dramatic naturalism, 
‘the dominant naturalism of the period after Ibsen’ (1983b, p. 317). What Brecht is attacking, 
Williams contends, ‘is the central thesis of the “illusion of reality”, in which an action is 
created that is so like life that the verisimilitude absorbs the whole attention of both dramatist 
and audience’ (p. 317). Williams gives some examples of Brecht’s opposition between 
naturalism/Aristotelian drama and epic theatre: 
The drama he opposes involves the spectator in a stage-action and consumes his 
capacity to act; the drama he recommends makes the spectator an observer but 
awakens his capacity to act … the drama he opposes presents experience, drawing the 
spectator inside this until he is experiencing the action with the characters; the drama 
he recommends presents a view of the world, in which the spectator confronts 
something and is made to study what he sees … the drama he opposes takes man, in 
the run of its action, as known, given, inevitable; the drama he recommends shows 
man producing himself in the course of the action, and therefore subject to criticism 
and to change. (1983b, p. 317) 
Audience passivity vs. audience activity, immersion vs. critique, man as reified and given vs. 
man as self-producing contingency. The latter terms of each opposition approximate the 
axioms of a broad humanism, but Williams is also happy to ascribe to Brecht’s practice a 
Marxist foundation: 
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Essentially, what Brecht created, after long experiment, was a dramatic form in which 
men were shown in the process of producing themselves and their situations. This is, 
at root, a dialectical form, drawing directly on a Marxist theory of history in which, 
within given limits, man makes himself. (1983b, p. 318) 
Williams deepens the reading of Brecht as Marxist by contrasting his approach to ‘naturalist 
materialism’: ‘Correspondingly, the pure naturalist form … depends on a simpler materialist 
view, in which man discovers the truth about himself by discovering his real environment: 
the literal presentation of this environment is then a means to human truth’ (p. 318). Brecht, 
argues Williams, manages to avoid the naturalist temptation to explain man entirely in terms 
of his environment; he refuses the ahistorical abstraction of human nature and the liberal-
humanist variant of mechanical materialism (in which the determining role of God is 
displaced onto Nature). In other words, Brecht aims at, and occasionally produces, a non-
alienated objectivity, an objectivity suited to the goals of a ‘Marxist humanism’. Recall that it 
was precisely on the grounds of its elaboration of an alienated objectivity that Williams 
rejected orthodox Marxism (mechanical materialism), including Lukacs’s subtler 
formulation. 
Both DFIB and Modern Tragedy assert the superiority of Brecht’s output between 1937 and 
1945 to earlier efforts. In The Threepenny Opera (1928), The Measures Taken (1930), St 
Joan of the Stockyards (1931) and the slightly later Fear and Misery in the Third Reich 
(1938), Williams views Brecht as groping towards, but ultimately failing to achieve, the 
dramatic realization of his central theoretical categories, in particular the notions of ‘making 
strange’ (Verfremdung/Entfremdung – also ‘alienation/distancing effects’)68 and ‘complex 
seeing’. It was only, Williams argues in DFIB, ‘in the major plays, from 1937 to 1945, that 
Brecht broke through to a complex seeing which was the dramatic action itself’ (1983, p. 
323). The four major plays which Williams discusses in this context are The Life of Galileo 
(1938), Mother Courage and her Children (1939), The Good Person of Szechuan (1941) and 
The Caucasian Chalk Circle (1945). 
Williams’s account of The Threepenny Opera will suffice in elaborating his critique of the 
earlier plays. The broad point is that an ‘objective-critical’ position, which Williams saw as 
being at the heart of Brecht’s mature drama, is incompletely realized when the advance in 
consciousness which declares ‘this is how it is’ is not followed with the assertion that ‘things 
                                                
68 For Brecht’s own formulations of these concepts, see Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on Theatre: The Development of 
an Aesthetic (1997). 
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could be otherwise’, i.e. when the critical charge remains at the level of naturalist or 
expressionist critique and resignation. Williams reads The Threepenny Opera, an ironic farce 
in which the amorality of criminals, whores and corrupt officials acts as a metaphor for the 
endemic immorality of bourgeois society, as aiming at the defamiliarization of bourgeois 
society for the audience by inserting its own ideology of respectability into a down-and-out, 
criminal milieu: ‘The Threepenny Opera, for example, is offered or rationalized as a portrait 
of respectable bourgeois society. If all property is theft, and the institutions of property cold 
and false, then thieves and whores are the true if shocking portraits of a society trying to pass 
itself off as respectable’ (1966, p. 192). The inevitable result of this attempt, argues Williams, 
is failure. ‘Nothing is more predictable’, says Williams, ‘in a falsely respectable society, than 
the conscious enjoyment of a controlled and distanced low life … There is no real shock, 
when respectable playgoers confront it, because [it is] seen, precisely, as a special class, a 
district’ (p. 192). Brecht’s early attempt at a drama of ‘complex seeing’, in which the 
audience should be invited to critique ‘what is’ in the name of ‘what could be’, ends up 
ratifying the existing order; endemic immorality is relegated to a district which is in any case 
disavowed by bourgeois morality. The result is an incomplete synthesis between theory, 
formal convention and the structure of feeling Brecht latterly expressed. Williams expresses 
this as follows: 
Brecht had found his theory, in the idea of complex seeing, but its practice was not 
there, in the actual play … He had used distancing effects to push the spectator into 
‘what the spectator wishes to see’: crime and coldness not structural in the society, but 
lived out in a romantic and theatrical district … Brecht thought he was detaching 
himself … by a calling it bourgeois morality, but in The Threepenny Opera this is so 
external, so really casual, that it is in effect an indulgence. The displacement of 
feelings about modern capitalism on to a group of pseudo-eighteenth century thieves 
and whores is no more than an escape clause. (1966, pp. 193-195) 
Williams (1983b) acknowledges that Brecht recognised his error, and that in his later plays 
complex seeing was integrated into the dramatic action, rather than appearing as an ‘imputed’ 
attitude of a newly ‘enlightened’ audience: ‘The spectator (as Brecht learned, bitterly, when 
his Threepenny Opera succeeded for what to him were the wrong reasons) is the one element 
the dramatist cannot control, in any form. It is in the action, the dramatic design, that the 
choices Brecht insists upon must be made’ (1983b, p. 318). This, of course, was precisely 
Williams’s critique of Lukacs’s notion that good realist fiction should transparently 
demonstrate the totality of an unjust social order, and that provided this was achieved the 
reader would necessarily become possessed of her imputed class consciousness. Williams’s 
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critique of Brecht places the full burden of stimulating the audience to critical thought on the 
skill of the dramatist. The ‘epic’ dramatist, for the later Brecht and for Williams, should 
provoke the critical faculties of the audience by defamiliarizing the dominant ideology and 
presenting the staged action as radically contingent and dependent upon human action within 
a given context.  
Williams views Brecht’s later plays as the synthesis of his dramatic theory with his dramatic 
form. ‘The extraordinary thing about Brecht’, says Williams, ‘is that he was able to grow 
through this position … into the genuine complexity: the connections and contradictions 
between individual goodness and social action’ (1966, p. 196).  Naturalism and 
expressionism were, of course, concerned with the relation between the individual and 
society, and here Williams praises Brecht for approaching this in an unusually subtle manner. 
The later plays do not, like the earlier, rely on a direct transfer of ‘true’ consciousness from 
dramatist to audience via a univocal unmasking of bourgeois ideology. Rather, the dramatic 
action itself expresses the possibility of multiple interpretations, and the audience is invited to 
interact with the material critically on this basis. ‘It was in the major plays, from 1937 to 
1945’, Williams (1983b) argues, ‘that Brecht broke through to a complex seeing which was 
the dramatic action itself’ (1983b, p. 323 – my emphasis).  
The most explicit example of Brecht’s later method is, for Williams, The Good Person of 
Szechuan. In the play, the destitute prostitute Shen Te is granted a sum of money by gods 
who wish to find a good person on Earth. She sets up a tobacco shop but is immediately beset 
by problems stemming from the needs of others in a brutal, commercial society. Unable to 
resolve the contradiction between personal morality and social immorality in herself, she 
devises an alter-ego, Shui Ta, a male ‘cousin’ who occasionally appears and, by practicing a 
tough, utilitarian self-interest, protects Shen Te’s personal prosperity by immoral means. The 
epilogue, the play having refused to pass verdict on the contradictory life of Shen Te/Shui Ta, 
challenges the audience to make up their own mind: ‘There’s only one solution that we know 
/ That you should now consider as you go / What sort of measures you would recommend / 
To help good people to a happy end / Ladies and gentlemen, in you we trust: / There must be 
happy endings, must, must, must!’ (Brecht, 1998, p. 111). At the most basic level, the play 
evokes the usual naturalist-expressionist incompatibility between the aspirations of the 
individual and the frustrations of the prevailing social order. But Williams sees Brecht’s 
version as avoiding the temptation to submit to commonplace versions of this liberal-critical 
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doxa, whether in ‘the romantic figure of the isolated heroine destroyed by the greed of others’ 
(1983b, p. 323) or ‘the anti-romantic version, in which the woman, realizing that her society 
was like this, [would adopt] a cheerful, tough amoralism – “eats first, morals after” – and 
[keep] alive’ (p. 323). Both of these would be examples of ‘simple seeing’ (p. 323), argues 
Williams, monologic exercises in accepting, or critiquing and then accepting, the hegemonic 
order. Brecht, says Williams, incorporates both archetypes into a single consciousness and a 
single objective action, achieving complex seeing: 
But what Brecht now does is in effect to embody both versions: Shen Te, the good 
woman, invents her tough cousin, Shui Ta – first as an alternative, relieving role, but 
then, in effect, as an independent person who coexists with her. It is not fixed 
goodness against fixed badness – a cops-and-robbers morality – but goodness and 
badness in the act of being produced in the turns of an action, as coexistent 
possibilities. This is genuinely complex seeing, and it is deeply integrated with the 
dramatic form. (1983b, p. 323) 
In opposition to the traditional expressionist method of showing contradictions in their 
subjective aspect, occurring within a single mind, the contradictions which The Good Person 
emphasises are shown ‘through an objective action in which Shen Te and Shui Ta are at once 
created characters and yet, by this fact of creation, reveal the processes by which they have 
produced themselves’ (p. 323). This is only possible, Williams argues in Modern Tragedy, 
because ‘No resolution is imposed. The tension is there to the end, and we are formally 
invited to consider it’ (1966, p. 197). The lack of explicit ideological positioning permits, in 
epic style, ‘impersonal judgement’ (p. 198) on the part of the audience, negating both the 
tendency to audience passivity of earlier forms and the pseudo-Lukacsian aspiration to 
‘imputation’ that marred The Threepenny Opera. 
It is demonstrative of Williams’s conception of art as the expression of a structure of feeling 
rather than as formal conventions in abstraction that he regards The Good Person as both the 
clearest expression of epic convention (complex seeing) and as less than ‘a full dramatic 
discovery’ (1983b, p. 324). In DFIB, Williams groups the four major plays under discussion 
into two pairs, the ‘fable plays’ and the ‘history plays’; The Good Person and The Caucasian 
Chalk Circle fall into the first pairing, Mother Courage and Galileo into the second. In the 
fable plays, says Williams, ‘the issues are characteristically simpler’ (p. 324). Scenarios are 
created as cases for direct debate and judgement by the audience, which Williams regards as 
‘the simplest, most discursive version of complex seeing’ (p. 324). The fable-plays, 
Williams’s analysis suggests, are in an important sense ahistorical; they are set in given 
Daniel Robert Gerke  Chapter Two: Williams and Sartre 
 
 
135 
historical periods and regions, but do not engage history as a motive force in constructing the 
social context within which characters make their choices. Fables, of course, are meant to be 
universally applicable, and by this choice of form, Williams argues, Brecht simplifies the full 
complexity of these scenarios. Williams notes that, in The Caucasian Chalk Circle, a play in 
which the clownish, vitalist figure of Azdak becomes the real arbiter of justice in a case of 
disputed maternity between a cruel aristocrat (the biological mother) and a criminalised 
peasant (who raised and loves the child), the fable form facilitates complex seeing at the same 
time as it displaces history: 
The main dramatic conclusion, through the figure of Azdak, is arrived at almost by 
impulse: an essentially unpredictable vitality, concerned, really, with neither formal 
law nor human morality, gives the child to the woman who loves her, in ‘a brief 
Golden Age that was almost just’. That is indeed how it could happen, in the fable 
plays: life would find the right way, as in all fable conventions. The intellectual 
backing, that life finds the right way through the struggles of history, can be produced 
on demand, but, in creative terms, is only marginally present. Thus, though formally 
the seeing is complex, the chosen action is a simplification. (1983b, p. 325) 
Even the mature Brecht, it seems, at least in the fable plays, slips into something like 
abstraction or formalism. The distinction which Williams is drawing between the fable and 
the history plays is more than a formal comparison. It relates, crucially, to his assertion that 
Brecht is dealing with a new structure of feeling, and that his conventions are only fully 
successful when they relate directly to this. Recall that a structure of feeling is really a social 
experience; the communication involved in successful art is not of objective knowledge, but 
of this experience. It is in their disconnect from this experiential epistemology that Williams 
sees the partial failure of the fable plays: they do not communicate experience so much as 
dramatize the objective-critical mode of thinking itself. Another way of putting this would be 
to say that it is impossible to engage the audience in a structure of feeling, in the 
communication of real experience, via what is ultimately the portrayal in art of a critical 
methodology. Experience has to be conveyed in a different way, and it is this feat that 
Williams sees Brecht’s history plays as better accomplishing.  
The key virtue of the history plays is their insertion of a sense of historical process into the 
conventional Brechtian ‘case study’. This combination of history and contingency is, for 
Williams, the true locus of Brecht’s achievement (it is also, of course, the locus of totality). 
Williams (1966) is particularly effusive in his praise of Mother Courage:  
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To call this action Shakespearean is not to put the praise too high. History and people 
come alive on the stage, leaping past the isolated and virtually static action that we 
have got used to in most modern theatre. The drama simultaneously occurs and is 
seen. It is not ‘take the case of this woman’ but ‘see and consider what happens to 
these people’. (1966, p. 198) 
The difference is between ‘taking the case’ and ‘seeing what happens to these people’ may 
not be immediately apparent. The crucial phrase is these people; specific people, in a specific 
historical moment, faced with specific contradictions embedded in a concrete social structure. 
The point is not, as was partly the case with The Good Person, to establish whether or not 
characters are making the ‘right’ moral choices: ‘That separable moral judgement is precisely 
what the play confounds. For not an attitude but an experience drives through the action: 
what else can be done, here, in this war across Europe?’ (Williams, 1983b, p. 327). Mother 
Courage, like the other three major plays, eschews a contemporary setting, but unlike the 
others its action (the travails of a destitute family in the war-torn Europe of the Thirty Years 
War) is immediately translatable into Brecht’s and his audience’s common experience of war. 
A link is thus forged between the dramatic action, the convention of complex seeing 
(encouraging an objective-critical attitude) and a resonant historical experience capable of 
engaging the audience with the Brechtian structure of feeling. What exactly that structure of 
feeling amounts to is then the crucial question.  
The action of Mother Courage revolves around the absolute contradiction, in a violent class 
society, between the imperative to acquire money as the means of subsistence, and the 
imperative to directly preserve life. Both are matters of life and death and are, in concrete 
historical circumstances, mutually exclusive; the preservation of life in one moment can lead 
to death in the next. Mother Courage herself is repeatedly required to make such decisions 
and, by the close of the play, her children have all been killed. It is worth quoting Williams’s 
(1983) commentary at length: 
Past the justifications, the excuses, the ‘bad luck’, the inevitabilities, it takes this 
action – of a mother destroying her family with the aim of preserving life – to see 
what is happening; to be able to bear to see it. If she were not so strong and persistent, 
there would be no life at all; and at the same time, because she is strong and 
persistent, in a destructive society, she destroys the life that she has herself has 
created. This deep and complex image, in a character and in an action, is Brecht’s 
central structure of feeling, directly dramatized. It is by looking at this action, this 
character, in the face, that we see what we are doing: the essential contradiction; the 
destructive acquiescence in the name of life; the persistent vitality in a continuing 
destruction … The conflict is pushed through, seen from every side, until it connects 
with our own conflict. (1983b, p. 328)  
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How does this differ from the traditional naturalist-expressionist structure of feeling, in which 
an individual lives an impossible life at the hands of an irrecoverably unjust society? The 
difference is that Mother Courage tries, consistently, with ‘courage’, to preserve life; she does 
not revert to ironic acceptance of corruption like the characters of the Threepenny Opera, 
engage in duplicity or self-deception like Shen Te, or in any way pretend that her choices are 
not her own. She is aware of social injustice, but also that her decisions carry weight, and are 
her own even when enacted under the overwhelming pressure of a violent social order. What 
Williams does not say, but which his analysis strongly implies, is that Mother Courage is 
acting authentically in the Sartrean sense, refusing to attribute her actions to external energies 
which force her hand despite an ‘inner’ goodness. Unlike in Sartre’s plays, however, the 
assumption of responsibility by characters is not followed by an act of arbitrary violence; 
Mother Courage carries on, as a living character in a violent society, making painful 
decisions in an overall historical context she cannot personally control. Moreover, her actions 
are not causally superfluous. At least two of her children die as direct consequences of her 
decisions; she alters the social world she is living in. The point is not that an inert society 
and/or human nature presents us with impossible decisions or an unliveable life, but that 
human beings can produce suffering and destruction through their very attempts to supersede 
it or to mitigate the effects of social disorder. The suicides and arbitrary deaths of Sartre’s 
plays fail to speak to this constitutive, painful human involvement in history. For Williams 
(1966), the image of Mother Courage struggling on with her cart through a concrete historical 
world, making decisions and living with them, is ‘a way of looking at a continual action’ 
(1966, p. 199), the real, frequently sad, continuous action of history as both ‘lived in’ and 
‘made’. Tragedy is not inevitable, in this model, but history is often tragic. 
Where Mother Courage was about a particular kind of degraded but active life embedded in 
history, Galileo concerns human decisions of larger historical significance. The action 
revolves around Galileo, who has discovered the true movement of the spheres, and his 
tortured decision to renounce his discoveries under theocratic persecution. At the end we 
discover that Galileo, while under ‘house arrest’ by the Church for many years, has secretly 
been completing his radical Discorsi; the play closes with the text being smuggled over the 
border into freedom. In the penultimate scene Andrea, a friend of Galileo’s, interprets his 
actions as an honourable rebellion against the Church in the name of science. Galileo 
disagrees, claiming that he recanted to avoid torture and insisting that he has done a great 
disservice to the scientific community. In his final speech of the play, Galileo makes clear his 
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view that he has betrayed not only science, but also his fellow man, since his actions have 
ensured that the social function of science will be to bolster the power of an elite at the 
expense of a superstitious and exploited population: 
If the scientists, brought to heel by self-interested rulers, limit themselves to piling up 
knowledge for knowledge’s sake, then science can be crippled and your new 
machines will lead to nothing but new impositions. You may in due course discover 
all that there is to discover, and your progress will nonetheless be nothing but a 
progress away from mankind. The gap between you and it may one day become so 
wide that your cry of triumph at some new achievement will be echoed by a universal 
cry of horror. (Brecht, 2006, pp. 108-109) 
Galileo loses his public connection to the truth, and with it disconnects the public from that 
truth, and from the social goods that stem from the democratization of knowledge; as 
Williams puts it, Galileo ‘loses the connection of his truth, his science, with the needs – the 
physical continuities and satisfaction – of the majority of men’ (1983, p. 328). In the final 
scene, as the text crosses the border, some small boys speak credulously of witches; they 
remain in the world of superstition which Galileo’s decision has helped perpetuate. In this 
composite image, Williams’s argues, contradiction is retained and left unresolved as a 
constitutive force in history: 
When the manuscript crosses the border, it is hidden in a coach, and the boys playing 
at the frontier – the boys who would have been Galileo’s audience – are talking of 
devils and witches. Both things happen: a way of continuing science, and a way of 
detaching it from ordinary life. And the solution is in the service of Galileo’s ordinary 
life: the goose and the opportunity to work, both of which he had every right to. A 
complex consciousness, in which not only this but also that must be said, is then 
brilliantly created. (1983b, p. 329) 
The creation of a ‘complex consciousness’, replete with contradictory impulses neither 
entirely honest nor entirely self-justifying, responding to and altering an objective context; 
this, for Williams, is the method of properly historical characterisation. It is also a way of 
inoculating a piece of narrative art from pseudo-idealism of the Lukacsian-Sartrean variety, 
the temptation to think that if only the right things were known or admitted, a positive 
outcome would be reached. Simple awareness of class interests or individual freedom is not a 
sufficient guarantor of radicalisation. Williams felt that Brecht’s mature drama offered a 
superior conceptualisation of the radical impulse to change things, as well as the experience 
of suffering associated both with life as presently lived and with the conflictual process of 
social revolution. 
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At the core of Williams’s generally positive appraisal of Brecht in Modern Tragedy is the 
idea that the playwright is breaking with the tragic tradition by incorporating history and 
contingent human decision-making into his dramatic actions, rejecting tragedy as an 
inevitable, reified fact: ‘The major achievement of Brecht’s mature work is this recovery of 
history as a dimension for tragedy’ (1966, p. 202). The Brechtian structure of feeling is 
precisely this refusal of tragedy as synonymous with the human condition, an affective 
complex which actively and self-consciously rejects the notion that things cannot be 
otherwise.  The tragic feeling in Brecht is the feeling that the suffering borne by his 
characters is a contingent fact, and therefore avoidable, but also that, for concrete reasons, it 
is not avoided in numerous cases. From this mode of consciousness, Williams argues, 
commitment to a different future may follow.		
This feeling extends into a general position: the new tragic consciousness of all those 
who, appalled by the present, are for this reason firmly committed to a different 
future: to the struggle against suffering learned in suffering: a total exposure which is 
also a total investment. Under the weight of failure, in tragedy that could have been 
avoided but was not avoided, this structure of feeling is now struggling to be formed. 
(1966, p. 203) 
Tragedy, here, is not an affliction, but an aspect of history. History, for its part, is not an 
alienating process but that which human beings produce in their activity, and could produce 
differently; this is the achievement of Brecht as a historical materialist. But if Williams 
regards Brecht as at least in part unravelling the knot of historical alienation, establishing the 
negative liberty of history (freedom from alienation), it is equally clear that Williams sees 
Brecht as failing to provide a positive emancipatory project; the freedom to produce history, 
the means to do so, is lacking. I turn now, in concluding, to Williams’s discussion of the 
limitations of Brecht’s approach, and his insistence on the necessity of moving beyond it. 
Williams touches on the possible pitfalls of the Brechtian structure of feeling in Modern 
Tragedy; these are fleshed out with a different emphasis in DFIB. In the former text, 
Williams’s partial critique of Brecht is centered on the idea of historical fixity through 
resignation. Danger arises when ‘not the recognition but the acceptance of contradiction’ 
(1966, p. 203) is the predominant attitude towards the basic Brechtian acknowledgement that 
humans beings often produce suffering in their attempts to go beyond it; recognition is the 
goal, resignation and acceptance the pitfalls. The final paragraph of Modern Tragedy (also 
the very end of the Brecht chapter) expounds on this risk in broad strokes, relating it at all 
times to the difference between fixation and abstraction on the one hand, and the real, 
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experiential working through of social disorder on the other; it is also linked to the concrete 
historical example of the Soviet Union. This is worth quoting at length: 
The recognition is a matter of history, the known harshness of the revolutionary 
struggle. But while this is seen as a process it can be lived through, resolved, changed. 
Whereas if it is seen, even briefly, as a fixed position – an abstract condition of man 
or revolution – it becomes a new alienation, an exposure stopped short of 
involvement, a tragedy halted and generalized at the shock of catastrophe. In our own 
day, in a known complexity, it is the fixed harshness of a revolutionary regime which 
has turned to arrest the revolution itself. (1966, p. 203-204) 
Resignation, then, breeds abstraction, and is the antithesis of humanist ‘involvement’. Where 
suffering in the process of cleaving to something better is viewed as a perennial feature of the 
human condition, the critique of capitalism becomes ‘a new alienation’, the alienation of man 
from history, the revolutionary process ‘stopped short of involvement’. Moreover, this is not 
the overwriting of revolution by tragedy, but ‘a tragedy halted’, tragedy itself, as a dialectical 
counterpart to the real process of revolution, abstracted into an external force which suffuses 
man. That Williams brings his discussion round to the Soviet Union should not distract us 
from the fact that this is the conclusion Modern Tragedy brings to bear on Brecht; the danger 
of fixity, of acceptance, are dangers shared by real revolutionary movements (which, by 
‘halting tragedy’, breed counter-revolution), and by Brecht himself and us as readers 
encountering his work. In this absolute opposition to fixity, Williams prefigures his later 
formulation of the residual, dominant and emergent strains in a structure of feeling; indeed, 
we may venture to read this tripartite process not just as a factual description of the way 
cultures develop, but also as a normative statement of how cultures should develop, 
continually, if they are to resist the counter-revolutionary pressures of fixity and abstraction. 
The critical historical analogy in Modern Tragedy is, it must be said, a little cryptic. We can 
better discern the connections Williams is making by turning to the more precise account of 
Brecht’s limitations in DFIB. In his concluding remarks in that text, Williams argues that 
while Brecht does more to develop the expressionist mode than any other dramatist, he is still 
ultimately of that tradition and, crucially, still cleaves to the binary individual/society: 
Put one way, Brecht’s drama is that of isolated and separated individuals, and of their 
connections, in that capacity, with a total historical process. He is hardly interested at 
all in intermediate relationships, in that whole complex of experience, at once 
personal and social, between the poles of the separated individual and the totally 
realized society. His dramatic form, isolating and dialectic, serves this structure of 
feeling exactly. (1983b, p. 331) 
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Another way of putting Williams’s claim that Brecht neglects ‘intermediate relationships’, of 
course, would be that Brecht neglects class; we might then argue that this condemns Brecht’s 
drama to a limited apprehension of the movement of social forces so vital to a perspective 
capable of overcoming fixity (Brecht’s characters, it should be acknowledged, are distinctly 
classed). Williams, however, in a move which signals his proximity to Lukacs on the issue of 
reification and totality, declines a straight class analysis and focuses, as in his treatment of 
realism, on the opposition between a conception of the totality and the reified polarization of 
the individual and society. The lack, in Brecht, of a sense of how to move through suffering 
to a new state of affairs is then formulated in terms of his continuation of this binary; 
collective action, social revolution as the whole movement of the totality, is foreclosed or left 
unexplored. We might say that Williams views Brecht’s drama as dialectical but isolating; it 
insists on the possibility of change while retaining the isolation of individuals who, precisely 
because of this, are not aligned with a trajectory of transformation.  
What in MT had been the risk of abstraction and fixity has become, by DFIB, Brecht’s actual 
fate. Williams describes Brecht’s ultimate inability to overcome fixity as follows: 
Because the polar relationship is still there and decisive, the drama is retrospective, in 
a deep sense: the intolerable isolation is a fact, and when we see men producing 
themselves and their situation it is this, essentially, that they produce; that it is seen as 
inevitable and yet is rejected. The dramatic form is not oriented to growth: the 
experiences of transforming relationship and of social change are not included, and 
the tone and the conventions follow from this: men are shown why they are isolated, 
why they defeat themselves, why they smell of defeat and its few isolated, complicit 
virtues. (1983b, p. 331) 
Men are shown why they suffer in a humanist manner which refuses the cynical arbitration of 
external abstractions, but they are not shown how to proceed, or even given an indication of 
the processes involved in social transformation. This, for Williams, is a fatal limitation, but it 
does not take away from Brecht’s ‘major originality’ (p. 331), which is that his drama 
thoroughly rejects the world of defeat, frustration and absurdity accepted by the naturalists 
and earlier expressionists, ‘a world purged now, by Brecht, of pity and acceptance – held at 
arm’s length, criticized, explained’ (p. 332). Brecht’s critique is not only a moral one, that 
things ought to be different, but also metaphysical one, that things can be different, because 
social causality is the remit of human beings in society. Brecht’s achievement is to fully 
illuminate the dramatic world of naturalism and expressionism, which is a reified world, to be 
fully aware of all the implications of a world based on the opposition between the individual 
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and society. At the same time, Brecht is still ‘of’ that world; he does not achieve a drama of 
the totality, but rather a kind of self-conscious reification, the furthest point that a reified 
drama can develop before changing into something else.  
Brecht’s work, in Williams’s (1983b) view, is a kind of postscript to the modern dramatic 
tradition, its hard limit, which must now be the ground of a new structure of feeling, and a 
new dramatic world: 
The power of this different master is conclusive. With this last shift, a particular 
dramatic world – that of the individual against society – is now wholly seen. Without 
the substance created by others, Brecht’s critical epilogue – his dramatic negative – 
could not have been written. But now that it has been written, in two or three great 
plays and in a wider achievement of a powerful and unforgettable dramatic 
consciousness, we have to struggle to enter, as Brecht himself insisted, a new kind of 
world. (1983b, p. 332) 
Brecht, in short, has opened up the possibility of change. How to bring about that change is 
then the salient question, as is how to do so in such a way that tragedy and revolution are 
viewed dialectically, as the experiential and cultural ‘working though’ of social disorder. It is 
clear that Williams regarded Brecht’s inability to envision that kind of progress as a function 
of his isolating retention of the individual/society binary and unwillingness to investigate 
‘intermediate’ social groupings. In the extract from China Miéville with which I opened this 
section, we are met with a Brechtian endorsement of possibility but in a social action 
populated by specific people: the workers or, later, the ‘builders’. Brecht’s drama was by no 
means classless, but neither did it portray the proletariat as the exclusive agent of historical 
change. Williams also eschews the traditional Marxist model, preferring the more expansive 
and inclusive emphasis on culture itself, the totality of a way of life (with subject and object 
mutually determining one another), as that which powers and undergoes social 
transformation. What Williams is doing then, as his own way of attempting to ‘go beyond’ 
Brecht, is recapitulating his central stance that the project of overcoming fixity, the 
wallowing in tragic social disorder, will not be realized by the emancipation of an isolated 
individual who in any case does not exist.  
We might characterize the challenge of a Marxist humanism as being to overcome the 
condition which Fromm, to whom Williams’s analysis of the individual and society in TLR 
was indebted, attributed to modern man in his The Fear of Freedom (1942): a feeling of 
insignificance and powerlessness resulting from the tension between a liberal, positive 
freedom from social bonds and the insecurity and uncertainty which this very freedom 
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engenders. ‘Society’ comes to appear not as a constitutive force in one’s development, but as 
an alien force or collection of ‘others’ to which one must somehow relate through ‘social 
contracts’ and other means. Liberal or bourgeois ideology, of course, erects itself upon this 
conception of the human being. Williams’s theory of tragedy, as well as his critical 
assessment of various ‘tragic’ traditions and conceptions, is both an acknowledgement of this 
‘liberal condition’ and a call for its theoretical and political negation. The means of doing so, 
of course, was the perspective of totality, the production of an altered understanding of man’s 
position in the world that relates him inseparably to a social and material world while 
retaining the individual human being as the centre of political and moral concern.	Let us now, 
in tracing Williams’s response to Sartre’s transition to Marxism and the Critique, enquire of 
both: is individuality still a meaningful concept in a world defined by totality?	Over the next 
two sections, I read Williams’s writings on individual freedom by the light of his responses to 
Sartre’s, both in his existentialist and his Marxist phases. We will find that Williams’s 
estimation of Sartre on these issues increases as we move from the tendentially liberal and 
voluntarist existentialist writings, from which the ‘metaphysical rebel’ of the plays proceeds, 
to the properly dialectical analysis of the Critique, which both influenced and confirmed the 
totalising methodology of Williams’s social and aesthetic theory. 
 
Williams, Sartre and Liberal Ideology 
 
Williams begins his discussion of the individual and society in TLR with an etymological 
analysis, prefiguring the methodology of Keywords. He draws our attention to the medieval 
roots of the word ‘individual’ as closer to ‘inseparable’, being involved in theological debates 
over the status of the separate aspects of the Holy Trinity, ‘how a being could be thought of 
as existing in its own nature yet existing by this nature as part of an indivisible whole’ (2011b 
[1961], p. 96). The notion then moves through Reformation conceptualizations of the 
‘individual soul’ and ‘a man’s individual relationship with God’ (p. 97) towards application 
to a person’s social position; men become capable of seeing themselves as ‘having’ rather 
than ‘being’ their social position, to choose or move between positions and to develop 
affective links to ‘being an individual in a sense separable from one’s social role’ (p. 98). 
Williams’s analysis here is ideological-linguistic, but patently non-idealist; he is at pains to 
stress the formative role of material historical and social change to the development of the 
ideas concerned. In particular, he emphasizes the historical roots of what would become 
bourgeois ideology: 
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The growth of capitalism, and the great social changes associated with it, encouraged 
certain men to see ‘the individual’ as a source of economic activity, by his ‘free 
enterprise’. It was less a matter of performing a certain function within a fixed order 
than of initiating certain kinds of activity, choosing particular directions. The social 
and geographical mobility to which in some cases then changes gave rise led to a 
redefinition of the individual – “what I am” – by extension to “what I want to be” and 
“what by my own efforts I have become.” (2011b [1961], p. 98) 
 
What Williams does not do is explicitly link the emergence of liberal ideology to the rise of 
the capitalist class. The historical analysis evokes the passage to modernity rather than the 
transition to bourgeois rule: ‘Thus we can trace our concept of ‘the individual’ to that 
complex of change which we analyse in its separable aspects as the Renaissance, the 
Reformation, the beginnings of the capitalist economy’ (p. 99). Williams views the 
development of the modern ‘abstraction of the individual from the complex of relationships’ 
(p. 99) as a general pattern of response to changing real conditions; the emergence of 
ideological and philosophical liberalism is an intellectual intensification of that pattern, rather 
than a reflection of ideological dominance on the newly dominant class.  
 
In English thought, Williams argues, a pattern develops through Hobbes, utilitarianism and 
Locke, within which, in contrast to the foundational organicism of former systems, 
‘individual man is the axiom, and society the derivative’ (2011b [1961], p. 100). This 
abstraction of the individual, the conception of it as something which pre-dates society and 
which society is codified around and in the service of, is a severe limitation in producing 
convincing social analyses. The major success of liberalism, however, is in something not 
dissimilar to the Brechtian emphasis: that things can be different and that a person can be to 
some degree self-making. Building on social-psychological theories of ‘individuation’, 
Williams’s formulates a tentative (and rather imprecise) definition of ‘individuality’ that 
combines an acknowledgment of the unique potentialities and histories of each person with 
the strong effects of social influence and partial determination and capacities for self-
direction attendant on self-consciousness: ‘This “autonomous” self grows within a social 
process which radically influences it, but the degree of gained autonomy makes possible the 
observed next stage, in which the individual can help to change or modify the social process 
that has influenced and is influencing him’ (p. 107). Here Williams is groping towards what 
he will, in the later essays on artistic freedom, call ‘alignment and formation’, a basic 
embeddedness in social relations and the lasting formative influence of one’s personal and 
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social history, in negotiation with art, however ‘unconstrained’ by other factors, is necessarily 
produced. In the ‘Individual’ entry in Keywords, Williams would make a clarifying 
distinction between ‘individualism’, the liberal inscription of the rights of a ‘given’ or pre-
existing abstract individual, and this version of ‘individuality’, which ‘comes out of the 
complex of meanings in which “individual” developed, stressing both a unique person and his 
(indivisible) membership of a group’ (2014, p. 161), in effect restoring to the word a measure 
of its organicist origins.  
 
In the ‘Images of Society’ section of TLR, Williams more explicitly connects individualism 
(the abstract cousin of individuality) to bourgeois liberalism or ‘economic individualism’ 
(2011b, p. 131). ‘Here’, says Williams, ‘instead of thinking of society as an established order, 
you think of it, essentially, as a market … You do not now start from the King or the 
established social order: you start from the activities of production and trading, and 
increasingly these are seen as the essential purposes of the society, in terms of which other 
activities must submit to be judged’ (p. 131). This ideological saturation accelerates as does 
the development of capitalist social relations: ‘With the further development of capitalism, to 
its corporate stage, society was no longer thought of as merely providing a market: the 
organisation of society itself was essentially a market organisation … Obligation and service 
had been challenged by freedom and responsibility, but then, in the final image, buying and 
selling became terms in which all human activity could be assessed’ (pp. 131-132). Again, 
the direct Marxist attribution of these changes to shifts in class power is absent; the new 
individualist ideology militates in favour of markets and market relations, but these are seen 
as an overarching condition, a material generality producing a set of changing ideological 
responses.  This harnessing of the abstract conception of the individual to the maintenance 
and justification of a market society was, recalling the discussion of Lukacs, what Williams 
had understood by reification: the pattern of material developments produces a pattern of 
response which is inadequately totalising, distorting the real dialectical indivisibility of 
individual and society. Williams’s critique of classical liberal ideology in TLR is clearly a 
measured one. In the general assessment of liberalism above, Williams views the positive 
element as the liberation of human beings from ‘arbitrary and oppressive systems’; the 
negative element is not intrinsically linked to the market, nor to the interests of that rising 
class whose interests liberalism in fact announced and legitimised, but is tied instead to the 
inability of liberalism to adapt to changing circumstances, in particular the development of its 
own intensifying contradictions, including the prevalence of market relations. As elsewhere 
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in TLR, class is present but implicit, perceptible beneath the surface of a trenchantly 
universalizing argument that stresses the development of general ideological tendencies in a 
shifting and contradictory, but fundamentally shared cultural formation. The breakdown of 
that formation and its ideology is then the salient issue.  
 
The title of Modern Tragedy finally refers, I think, to precisely that breakdown of liberal 
consciousness which issues in the irrationalism of expressionism and the total disassociation 
of the individual from society. It is important to always bear in mind that, for Williams, this is 
the breakdown of an emancipatory impulse, its fixation (as we saw in the discussion of 
Brecht) in counter-revolutionary forms. At the core of Williams’s analysis across TLR and 
MT is an account of two interrelated necessary conditions for a sustainable emancipatory 
movement: a) the commitment to openness and change (inoculation against fixation) and b) 
an awareness of the totality as the dialectical interrelation of individual and society. One way 
of framing Williams’s argument in these two sixties texts is that liberalism achieves a) but 
not b); it asserts, as did Brecht, the necessity of change and the irreducibility of human beings 
to roles within a fixed order, but it builds this critique of absolute order from a reified 
foundation, the autonomy of the pre-existing atomised individual. It is this, essentially, that 
renders liberalism a failed project for Williams. In Modern Tragedy that failure is theorized 
as an inability to make the decisive choice to embrace socialism and the socialist idea of 
revolution, which is fundamentally the choice between a reified and a total conception of 
human freedom:  
 
The liberal idea of revolution and the feudal idea of tragedy are no longer the only 
alternatives, and to go on offering to choose between them is to be merely stranded in 
time … It is at first sight surprising that so open and positive a movement as 
liberalism should ever have produced tragedy at all. Yet each of the literary 
movements which took their origins from liberalism came to a point where the most 
decisive choices were necessary, and where, while some chose, others merely divided. 
(1966, p. 68) 
 
The ‘feudal idea of tragedy’ was the inescapability of the absolute order, given agency in the 
figure of Fate; liberalism diffuses this with its emphasis on contingency and the malleability 
of rank, but in cleaving to this option we remain mired in the reification of the individual, 
from which perspective social revolution, as opposed to the desperate, violent individual 
rebellions we found in Sartrean drama appears impossible. ‘Socialism, I believe,’ says 
Williams at the end of the section on liberalism, ‘is the true and active inheritor of the 
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impulse to human liberation which has previously taken so many forms’ (p. 74). For 
Williams in Modern Tragedy, the acceptance of totality is the acceptance of a socialist form 
of revolution, one which views tragedy not through the prism of the abstract individual 
oppressed by an abstract society, but as the dialectical synthesis of suffering and liberation 
through which means alone social disorder may be overcome. But this means discarding a 
particular, received notion of liberty, and making the active decision to embrace a new 
consciousness of what freedom and unfreedom might mean in a modern, capitalist society. 
This conception of revolutionary consciousness recurs in Williams’s claim in ‘Art: Freedom 
as Duty’, that the only duty of the writer is to move through the temptation to replicate the 
emancipatory slogans and rhetorical flourishes of an available tradition: to ‘hold yourself at 
that point as a writer … with some hope of moving beyond it’ (1978, p. 94). Here freedom is 
the combination of the negative liberty of artistic freedom itself (the absence of an absolute 
aesthetic code to which one must adhere), plus self-consciousness of one’s formation within 
and through the totality of social relations. Contingency plus consciousness of totality, then, 
are the necessary conditions of both progressive art and social revolution. Having established 
Williams’s basic position, let us now turn to his responses to Sartre’s writings on human 
freedom in both his existentialist and Marxist periods. 
 
*     *     * 
 
In TLR, Williams had stressed the tension between a particular version of existentialist 
‘authenticity’, interpreted as ‘autonomy from social determination’, and reified ideas of 
individual freedom: ‘Sartre emphasizes the danger of such social concepts as “function” or 
“duty”, which can only be valid to the “unauthentic” man … but the tendency to equate 
“social man” with “unauthentic man” is highly misleading. For what is being described as a 
social process is not the experience of a member, but of the subject or the servant’ (2011b, p. 
110). That Williams, a thinker of the totality, is keen to stress the possibility of forms of 
social inclusion (what will later be called alignment and formation) which are not ‘unfree’ or 
‘unauthentic’, should not be surprising. In TLR this finds expression in the idea of the 
‘member’, the self-consciously socially integrated person, in contrast to the relationships of 
oppression and determination implied by the positions ‘subject’ and ‘servant’. For the 
member, who in Williams’s view evades inauthenticity, is involved in a central process of 
decision-making; choice appears as the central category of freedom: 
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The valuable element in the existentialist emphasis is the insistence on choice and 
commitment. It is true that unless an individual, in the process of his growth, achieves 
a real personal identity, he is incomplete and can be dismissed as ‘unauthentic’. He 
must become deeply conscious of the validity of his ways of thinking and acting, so 
that he is not merely ‘a creature’ of the society, but also an individual, a man in his 
own right. (2011b, p. 111)  
 
The process of self-conscious individuation which Williams is describing here is that which 
produces, as in the distinction outlined in Keywords, ‘individuality’ as opposed to a reified 
‘individualism’. While this is clearly a rejection of the idea of the mechanistic, fully 
determining abstraction of society, it is also a rejection of the fully self-determining 
individual in abstraction from the processes of alignment and formation inherent to the 
development of true individuality.  
 
Williams finds another affinity with Sartre in the latter’s insistence, in Being and Nothingness 
(1943), that ‘existence precedes essence’, i.e. that individuals do not possess a pre-existing 
hard core of attributes that determines their ideology or behaviour. In his 1968 review of The 
Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre (1968b), a collection of essays edited by Robert Denoon 
Cumming, Williams elaborates on this crucial notion and its contribution, but also its 
vulgarisation: 
 
The major contribution of Sartre’s early work, within a phenomenological tradition 
only recently much known in Britain, is his attack on the idea of a self, a character, 
which precedes action and consciousness and which can be used as a causal 
explanation of them. The implications of this successful attack are as crucial in 
literature, especially in the novel, as in any other field. But it is then an irony that the 
alternative idea, of the self as a project, should, both in his own work and, more 
grossly, in its popularisation, have confirmed social experience as a process of self-
making. (The Guardian, 1968b, Nov 29, p. 11) 
 
The paradox of Sartre’s early work, for Williams, is the fact that Sartre’s demythologization 
of the abstract, pre-existing individual has nevertheless provided fertile ground for extreme 
voluntarism in ideas of selfhood expressed both in ‘romantic versions of existentialism’ and 
in ‘a kind of post-liberal individualism which is now our dominant ethos, in most kinds of 
social assent and dissent’ (p. 11). But here we should recall that Sartre’s individual, while not 
‘pre-existing’ in the sense of having a determinate ‘essence’ which precedes experience and 
action, is nevertheless abstract in that its freedom is abstract; freedom as conceptualised by 
the early Sartre is indeterminate but absolute, inherent in the nature of man but possessed of 
no specific content. Since this is not so far from the negative liberty of the classical liberal 
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tradition (also being indeterminate, absolute and inherent in the nature of man), it is not 
surprising that a version of Sartrean freedom should have been harnessed to new forms of 
abstract individualism in a period, towards the end of post-war social democracy, in which 
the market was indeed coming closer to becoming that incarnation of ‘absolute order’ which 
Williams had hypothesized in TLR. But Williams is also aware of Sartre’s gradual theoretical 
turn towards Marxism (the political turn came earlier). In the 1968 review, Williams suggests 
that Sartre’s interpretation of Marxism is an ‘inversion of method’, that is, of Marxist 
method; rather than proceeding ‘downwards’ from macro level structural determinants to 
individual behaviour and consciousness, as in the traditional Marxist model, Sartre moves 
‘upwards’ from the individual to the deeper connection and practical links from which 
emerge larger social structures. This is ‘a necessary antithesis’ (p. 11), Williams concedes, 
but it falls short of synthesis, so that, beginning from ‘the quite different starting point of 
lived relationships through which the abstractions of “individual” and “society” are both 
made and known’ (p. 11), Williams must finally reject both orthodox Marxism and its 
Sartrean ‘inversion’. 
 
Now, Williams’s rejection of Sartrean Marxism in 1968 is challenged, it seems, by the 
publication in English of Sartre’s avowedly Marxist Critique of Dialectical Reason in 1976 
(French: 1960). Williams was aware of the Critique in the French and appears to have read at 
least parts of it as of the 1968 review just discussed, in which he notes that ‘the essential 
“Critique de la raison dialectique” (1960) is not available, as a whole, in English, and there 
has been less popularisation of the later positions than of the earlier, for reasons closely 
connected with what those positions are’ (The Guardian, 1968b, Nov 29, p. 11) i.e. precisely 
because of the more explicitly Marxist argumentation. In a 1974 composite review of Sartre’s 
Between Existentialism and Marxism (French: 1972) and two critical texts, Williams insists 
that ‘someone has to say that the Sartre who emerged from the conflicts of the fifties is very 
much the more significant figure. This is certainly my own view’ (The Guardian, 1974, May 
25, p. 17); the fifties is broadly the period after Sartre’s major existentialist productions but 
before the Critique, when Sartre was working out his relation to Marxism, most concertedly 
in Search for a Method (1957). In the 1974 review, Williams gives the following assessment 
of the late Sartre’s Marxism, more comprehensible now with the English edition of the 
Critique: 
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What Sartre is trying to do, as a Marxist, is to restore individual and collective 
response and responsibility to a system which had become, internally, abstract and 
falsely determinist. It is a mark of the backwardness of the state of the argument that 
the old response to perception of this difficulty – the adhesion of another system, 
abstract and falsely determinist, but dealing with individuals – should go on being 
attempted: trying to bind one shell to the other. But though Sartre takes the colour of 
this confused and difficult period, it remains true that in the “Critique of Dialectical 
Reason” (1960) Sartre himself took one of the very few original steps beyond it. (The 
Guardian, 1974, May 25, p. 17) 
 
The ‘other system’, abstract but individualist, is psychoanalysis, while the binding of two 
deterministic shells gestures towards the various attempts, by the Frankfurt School and 
others, to install the subject into orthodox or vulgar Marxism by the psychoanalytic route. 
Such attempts, for Williams, produce not a conception of the totality, a true synthesis, but 
rather a dual determinism, a twice-alienating analysis within which human beings both 
making and situated in history remain as absent as in systems, like Althusserianism, which 
reject the subject entirely. The Critique, for Williams, moves tentatively beyond this. 
 
In his 1977 review of the Critique, Williams argues that Sartre’s late opus has been neglected 
or outright rejected both by English thinkers guilty of romanticising ‘Sartre the post-war 
existentialist’ (The Guardian, 1977b, Jan 20, p. 14) and by ‘one important kind of orthodox 
Marxist: men who sustained their work by adherence to what they believed were the 
“scientific laws” of history and society, and among these laws “the dialectic”’ (p. 14). 
Williams argues, in agreement with Sartre, that ‘the basic error of what has been known as 
“dialectical materialism” is its external character: its projection of predicated laws not only to 
Nature but on to Man and History’ (p. 14). Indeed, Sartre’s argument in the Critique is not 
merely against Engels’s notion of the ‘dialectic of Nature’, but also the ascription of such 
exteriorising, abstract laws to the movement of human history and society. Sartre’s most 
sustained encounter with Marxism asserts the need for something called ‘dialectical 
materialism’, but insists that it must be of a kind that fully incorporates both major clauses of 
Marx’s claim (in The Eighteenth Brumaire) that ‘Men make their own History … but under 
circumstances … given and transmitted from the past’. Thus the dialectic must be an account 
of praxis, the process whereby human beings, in a determinate situation, pursue aims and 
engage in actions, the synthetic outcome of which Sartre calls a ‘totalisation’ (Sartre, 2004, p. 
830). As the observable movement of history, the dialectic must appear as both the product 
and as the motive force of the individuals through whose actions history both operates and is 
operated; ‘in a sense’, says Sartre, ‘man submits to the dialectic as to an enemy power; in 
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another sense, he creates it … we must show how it is possible for it to be both a resultant, 
though not a passive average, and a totalising force, though not a transcendent fate’ (pp. 35-
36). The dialectic is thus the ‘unity of freedom and necessity’ (p. 35) and this is a human, not 
a transcendent, operation: 
 
The dialectical movement is not some powerful unitary force revealing itself behind 
History like the will of God. It is first and foremost a resultant; it is not the dialectic 
which forces historical men to live their history in terrible contradictions; it is men, as 
they are, dominated by scarcity and necessity, and confronting one another in 
circumstances which History or economics can inventory, but which only dialectical 
reason can explain … on the level of ontology, the dialectic appears as the only type 
of relation which individuals, situated and constituted in a certain way, and on 
account of their very constitution, can establish amongst themselves. (2004, p. 37) 
 
This is a clear advance on what Williams had described in 1968 as Sartre’s Marxism, namely, 
an ‘inversion of method’, a working up from the ground of the individual to social structure. 
Here, Sartre is explicit in opposing the erasure of the world by the individual, or indeed vice-
versa: ‘the universe becomes a dream if the dialectic controls man from outside, as his 
unconditioned law. But if we imagine that everyone simply follows his inclinations and that 
these molecular collisions produce large-scale effects, we will discover averages of statistical 
results, but not a historical development’ (2004, p. 35). At the same time, Sartre is explicit in 
stating, in terms which come a little closer to the ‘inversion’ model, that the only way to 
avoid transcendentalism is, in fact, to appeal to a conception of the individual (as opposed to 
classes) as the agent of history: ‘if we do not wish the dialectic to become a divine law again, 
a metaphysical fate, it must proceed from individuals and not from some kind of supra-
individual ensemble’ (p.  36). Now, Sartre privileges the individual here not because he 
believes in the individual as a non-historical, contingent atom, but because he wishes to re-
found dialectics as ‘a reason rather than a blind law’ (p. 37), which is to say as a procedure 
for acquiring knowledge rather than an impersonal process on the model of natural science. 
Since knowledge must be knowledge of something by something, Sartre argues, it requires a 
thinking subject, which can only be the organic individual. What makes dialectical reason 
distinct from ‘analytical’ reason (the impersonal, categorical reason Sartre associates with 
liberalism and the bourgeois social sciences), then, is that it names the epistemological 
operation wherein human individuals come to know a process which is both an object for 
them (the process of history) and of which they are the subjects (history being made by 
human beings). 
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The epistemological process I have just described is what Sartre means when he uses the 
word ‘interiority’ in the quotation below, the italicised part of which (my emphasis) Williams 
reproduces in his review of the Critique: 
 
The stance of the de-situated experimenter … tends to perpetuate analytical Reason as 
the model of intelligibility; the scientist’s passivity in relation to the system will tend 
to reveal to him a passivity of the system in relation to himself. The dialectic reveals 
itself only to an observer situated in interiority, that is to say, to an investigator who 
lives his investigation both as a possible contribution to the ideology of the entire 
epoch and as the particular praxis of an individual defined by his historical and 
personal career within the wider history which conditions it. (2004, p. 38) 
 
Williams is in deep agreement with Sartre’s analysis here, commenting that this ‘kind of 
inquiry, taking the weight of every clause, is now so rare, whatever name may be given to it, 
that even its definition is a landmark’ (The Guardian, 1977b, Jan 20, p. 14). The idea of 
interiority is vital to Williams not because it recuperates the individual for Marxism, which 
would violate the principle of totality, but because it foregrounds the dimension of experience 
in the production of history. Sartre’s analysis makes experience into a form of reason, an 
epistemological procedure, rather than one by which an isolated observer passively absorbs 
and is acted upon by information coming from ‘somewhere else’. Lukacs and Goldmann’s 
epistemological strategies (as they have appeared in Williams’s engagements, at least), 
imputed class consciousness and homology respectively, seem to fall markedly on the side of 
analytical reason in comparison to the late Sartre’s formulation, which is to say that they fall 
on the side of the observer in exteriority. The Lukacsian observer, in effect the professional 
revolutionary, observes the proletariat from a distance, imputing to it what he/she regards as 
an appropriate consciousness. Goldmann’s critical-intellectual observer, establishing the 
coherence of literary text and historical development, is more detached, more ‘exterior’ still. 
The achievement of what Williams regards as the necessary experiential involvement of 
authentic revolutionary activity will, from either of these positions, on the evidence of 
Sartre’s analysis, be problematic. 
 
In Sartre’s Critique, dialectical reason is not the ‘reason of nature’, which is the domain of 
the natural sciences and is carried out by scientists from a position of exteriority, but the 
‘Reason of History’ (2004, p. 36), the becoming-known-to-itself of a process which has its 
origin and essential substance in human beings. Williams’s humanist model of cultural 
extension, experience and response which, in its relation to the individual, is analogous to the 
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late Sartrean conception, bears striking epistemological resemblances to the procedure of 
dialectical reason as Sartre elaborates it in the Critique. Indeed, contra Eagleton’s claim that 
Williams’s advocacy of an extending participatory democracy is non-revolutionary by virtue 
of its being idealist, that is, of placing a fallacious faith in the power of human reason, we 
must answer that the kind of reason to which Williams gestures is really a dialectical reason 
of the Sartrean type, and ought to be defended against attacks such as Eagleton’s which are 
better levelled at non-Marxist articulations of analytic reason. Eagleton believes Williams to 
be propagating an idealism in which the observer, somehow standing apart from the material 
determinants of her own consciousness, effects both those determinants and future social 
change merely by learning/responding in new ways i.e. by thinking differently. In fact, 
Williams’s model, like Sartre’s, is one which aspires towards an epistemology in which 
thought apprehends its own material conditions, and in doing so produces a new material 
condition in which history has been made intelligible by dialectical reason. This is the sense 
in which Sartre says that ‘Marxism is History becoming conscious of itself’ (2004, p. 40): 
dialectical reason as the process whereby the subject becomes conscious of itself as both 
subject and object. Analytic reason, by contrast, holds the object at bay, outside of the 
subject, and attempts to discover its laws, including the production of what can then only 
appear as the ‘fiction’ of a subject (Althusser). Eagleton views Williams as projecting a 
‘circular totality’ onto history, rendering causal analysis of how material processes impact 
consciousness impossible. What Williams is in fact doing, with Sartre, is denying that a 
subject constituted by material processes is in fact a pure object or resultant. He instead posits 
the double-life of a subject which is irreducibly both subject of and to history. 
 
Marxism and Literature appears in 1977, a year after Sartre’s Critique appears in English and 
the same year in which Williams publishes his review. It seems to me that the Critique was a 
significant influence on that text, and its basic logic definitively informs the cluster of related 
politico-aesthetic essays which Williams writes in the late seventies and early eighties, of 
which the ‘Alignment and Commitment’ chapter of M&L is effectively a part. I turn now to 
those texts, and to a comparative analysis of Williams and Sartre on the question of artistic 
freedom and political commitment. We shall find that while Williams finds something of 
value in the aesthetic positions of the early Sartre, he arrives at a view of artistic freedom 
which is heavily indebted to the philosophical arguments of the Critique, with its dialectical 
synthesis of freedom and necessity.  
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Williams and Sartre on Freedom and Commitment in Literature 
 
In both ‘Commitment’ (1978) and ‘The Writer: Commitment and Alignment’ (1980 – 
hereafter ‘The Writer’), Williams casts Sartre as a key source of debates about politics and art 
around the term ‘commitment’. Sartre’s is ‘the original argument for “commitment”’ (1990b, 
p. 256) and ‘commitment became the normal term, in our own time, because of the famous 
intervention by Jean-Paul Sartre at the end of the war when he wrote…’ (1989n, p. 77); the 
intervention to which Williams then refers is the following, from Sartre’s ‘The Purposes of 
Writing’ (1960): 
 
If literature is not everything it is worth nothing. This is what I mean by 
‘commitment’. It wilts if it is reduced to innocence or to songs. If a written sentence 
does not reverberate at every level of man and society then it makes no sense. What is 
the literature of an epoch, but the epoch appropriated by its literature? (Sartre, 2008, 
pp. 13-14) 
 
Williams states that Sartre wrote this ‘at the end of the war’; this is incorrect (the quote is 
from 1960). Whether this was parapraxis on Williams’s part or an acknowledgment that the 
idea of commitment being referred to is that established in What is Literature? (1948), is 
unclear. It should also be pointed out that this passage, which hails from the period of the 
Critique, contains elements of both periods. The noble universality of the first few sentences 
evokes Sartre’s presentation of prose writing as the apotheosis of freedom in What is 
Literature?; the final sentence prefigures the procedure of apprehending one’s own material 
conditions or ‘objectness’ in the Critique. Distinguishing between the early and late positions 
will help us to establish the relation between the idea of commitment in the early Sartre, to 
which Williams refers and which grounds his discussions, and ideas found in the Critique 
which are crucial to understanding the position which Williams in fact comes to. 
 
The question to which Sartre’s comment, above, refers us is whether literature must or should 
have, a broad social application, ‘commitment’ to something which ranges far beyond the 
individual writer. Williams points out, both in ML and in ‘Commitment’, that such a position 
is open to Adorno’s critique that commitment as such is ‘politically polyvalent’: ‘Adorno’s 
critique of this position is convincing … [Sartre’s view] leaves all questions of commitment 
in writing unanswered. (It is of course an aspect of Sartre’s commitment to freedom that they 
are left unanswered)’ (2009 [1977], p. 202). Now, commitment in the very broad sense 
sketched in ‘The Purposes of Writing’ is indeed politically polyvalent (Sartre’s larger 
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argument, as we shall see, is not), and Williams’s account, in ‘The Writer’, of the backlash 
against politically committed prose is grounded in this slipperiness of the political signifier. 
There Williams identifies three forms of resistance to the notion of commitment. First, the 
backlash against the cause to which left writing was supposed to be committed (authoritarian 
Communism), from which ‘it was no distance at all to saying that writers should keep out of 
that kind of political and especially left-political thing’ (Williams, 1989n: 78). Secondly, the 
accusation, given historical support by Stalinist literary repression, that commitment was in 
fact ‘the practice of an authority above the writer which was telling him what to write and 
how to write’ (1989n, p. 78). Here Williams turns to Brecht, writing against Lukacs: 
 
They69 are, to put it bluntly, enemies of production. Production makes them 
uncomfortable. You never know where you are with production; production is 
unforeseeable. You never know what is going to come out. And they themselves don’t 
want to produce. They want to play the apparatchik and exercise control over other 
people. Every one of their criticisms contains a threat (Brecht quoted in Benjamin, 
1973, p. 3)  
 
Williams is entirely in support of this endorsement of artistic freedom from Brecht, and sees 
it as the expression of a healthy, socialist distinction between ‘a commitment to production 
linked to a cause, and on the other hand subservience to some version of desirable production 
arbitrarily decided by a party and its ideologists’ (1989n, p. 79).  This socialist counter-
interpretation of commitment, Williams notes, was not enough to prevent a general fatigue: 
‘it was very difficult to sustain it in the period of the cold war and that mood of confession of 
errors … the two very different ideas – of commitment and subservience – were pushed 
together and seemed to support each other’ (p. 79). The third backlash against commitment 
that Williams identifies was the critique of ‘the false commitment of the inserted political 
reference’ (p. 80), what we might think of in Sartrean terms as commitment in bad faith, as 
opportunism or pure propaganda, that ‘superficial kind of writing which took care to include 
the political references that went with the cry of the moment’ (p. 79). Williams concurs with 
this opposition to the uncritical attachment to certain habitual kinds of content, and refers 
more or less approvingly to Marx and Engels’s opposition to ‘tendency’ literature within the 
socialist movement (Lukacs, in the name of a robust realism, had opposed the same 
phenomenon).  
 
                                                
69 Brecht means advocates of, in one form or another, socialist realism. 
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Now, against these negative characterizations of commitment, Williams reminds us that 
‘commitment still meant, at its best, taking social reality, historical reality, the development 
of social and historical reality, as the centres of attention, and then finding some of the 
hundreds of ways in which all those processes can be written’ (1989, p. 79). Commitment, 
then, as the commitment to something like a realism (echoing Lukacs), but one which, devoid 
of any specific political content, does not obviously escape Adorno’s political polyvalence; 
all political positions, after all, stem from, legitimate and pursue their aims via a set of 
historical and ontological assumptions. Here we may return to Sartre, for Williams’s 
characterisation of the arguments of What is Literature? as essentially formal or ‘conceptual’ 
(2009 [1977], p. 202), that is, on the side of freedom but abstracted from concrete political 
goals, is not entirely accurate. This is important to clarify since Williams appears to agree 
with Sartre only when his argument can be interpreted in this way. 
 
Sartre’s argument in What is Literature? accords with his basic existentialist position in the 
forties. Man is free, a pure contingency. He can either be aware of this (authentic) or unaware 
or in denial of it (unauthentic). It is in this sense that ‘existence precedes essence’ i.e. that 
what person does determines what he/she is (their ‘existence’), as opposed to that being 
determined in advance by an ‘essence’ which pre-dates the subject in its real interactions with 
other people and with objective reality. Man aims at being objective, at having ‘being’ 
independently of his actions and intentions (man as en-soi or ‘in-itself’), but man is 
‘condemned to be free’, having full responsibility for what he is (man as pour-soi or ‘for-
itself’). Literature, in this context, is both process and product of an interaction between two 
freely acting and producing agents, author and reader, who collaboratively produce the 
literary object as an expression of the freedom of both, recognising in so doing the freedom 
of all men. For Sartre, literature takes the form of an appeal from author to reader, ‘the writer 
appeals to the reader’s freedom to collaborate in the production of his work’ (2001, p. 34) and 
this, being an appeal primarily to the reader’s unconditioned freedom, it is also an end in 
itself or ‘unconditioned end’. At this early stage in the argument, it could well be claimed that 
literature as an appeal from the unconditioned freedom of the author to the unconditioned 
freedom of the reader, is indeed politically polyvalent; one may after all ‘freely’ chose to 
write in defence of fascism. But here Sartre’s argument takes an overtly political turn; he 
moves from literature as the implicit contract between two unidentified free agents (author 
and reader in abstraction) and considers the conditions within which a truly free writing can 
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occur at all, emphasising the reality of the situated writer making a specific and concrete 
appeal to a real audience: 
 
The freedom of writing implies the freedom of the citizen. One does not write for 
slaves. The art of prose is bound up with the only regime in which prose has meaning, 
democracy. When one is threatened, the other is too. And it is not enough to defend 
them with the pen. A day comes when the pen is forced to stop, and the writer must 
then take up arms. Thus, however you might have come to it, whatever the opinion 
you might have professed, literature throws you into battle. Writing is a certain way of 
wanting freedom; once you have begun, you are committed, willy-nilly. (2001, p. 49) 
 
Taking the notion that man is ‘really’ free, an unconditioned end, at face value, the very 
possibility of an unfree (undemocratic) society, in which one must take up arms to defend 
freedom, may seem paradoxical. There are real contradictions here which it is not the purpose 
of What is Literature? to resolve. Suffice it to say that Sartre in his existentialist phase is at 
least as concerned with the capacity of man to perceive his freedom (to be authentic), as with 
the question of his literal or political freedom. In the sphere of literature, this implies the 
distinction between an alienated and a non-alienated literature, a literature which appeals to 
man’s essential freedom and a literature that does not. Thus, Sartre argues, ‘if it is true that 
the essence of the literary work is freedom totally disclosing and willing itself as an appeal to 
the freedom of other men, it is also true that the different forms of oppression, by hiding from 
men the fact that they were free, have screened all or part of this essence from authors’ (p.  
116). This false consciousness on the part of authors is compounded by the fact that while 
literature, by its nature, is an appeal to the freedom of all men (freedom of the totality) 
specific, historically situated authors necessarily are only read by a small fraction of 
humanity. Sartre erects upon this fact a crucial distinction between ‘abstract universality’, 
wherein a writer ‘postulates the constant repetition in an indefinite future of the handful of 
readers which he has at present’ (p. 118), in effect taking a limited, bourgeois audience for all 
of humanity, and ‘concrete universality’, or ‘the sum total of men living in given society’ (p. 
119). At various points, Sartre refers to this distinction as that between one’s ‘virtual public’ 
and one’s ‘real public’. It is to concrete universality, to one’s ‘real public’, that the writer’s 
work must be addressed and to the freedom of which it must appeal, if it is to be ‘a concrete 
and liberated literature’ (p. 119).  
 
The lack of immediate existence (availability as an audience) of a ‘real public’ for whom one 
may write is an obstacle and a contradiction which Sartre resolves in favour of a concretely 
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Marxist politics, so that ‘actual literature can only realise its full essence in a classless 
society’ (2001, p. 120). Class, argues Sartre, is the fundamental social co-ordinate of the split 
between abstract universality and concrete universality, the virtual and the real public. Class 
is the gulf between literature as an appeal to the freedom of all men, and literature as 
bourgeois ideology, partial and oppressive: 
 
Only in [a classless] society could the writer be aware that there is no difference of 
any kind between his subject and his public. For the subject of literature has always 
been man in the world. However, as long as the virtual public remained like a dark sea 
round the sunny little beach of the real public, the writer risked confusing the interests 
and cares of man with those of a small and favoured group. But, if the public were 
identified with the concrete universal, the writer would really have to write about the 
human totality. (2001, p. 120) 
 
It is the advent of a classless society, then, which allows literature to realise its essence as the 
expression of and appeal to the freedom of all men, so that the writer can finally write for all 
men, as his real public, and about all men, as the social totality. The important thing to note 
here is that a ‘concrete’ (i.e. historical) literature does not only require the freedom of the 
author, but also of the reader: ‘It is not enough to accord the writer freedom to say 
everything; he must write for a public which has the freedom of changing everything’ (p. 
122). Formal discursive freedom is here insufficient. Freedom, argues Sartre, is only 
meaningful in the classless society of the socialist democracy, entailing ‘suppression of 
classes, abolition of all dictatorship, constant renewal of frameworks, and the continuous 
overthrowing of order once it tends to congeal’ (p. 122). Liberal or negative freedoms from 
the kinds of coerced commitments which Williams discusses in ‘The Writer’ are necessary 
but not sufficient; the freedom to which a concrete literature appeals must also be a positive 
project, so that ‘concrete literature will be a synthesis of Negativity, as a power of uprooting 
from the given, and Project, as an outline of a future order’ (p. 122).  
 
For Sartre, then, literature must demonstrate the power/freedom of man to change himself 
and his situation, to constantly overturn all embedded and sclerotic hierarchies, but it must 
also posit a constructive social project.70 And this is not an abstract proposal; it entails a 
                                                
70 Sartre, of course, did not do this in his plays. From Williams’s analysis of Brecht, moreover, we may 
conclude that the German playwright, while injecting a welcome contingency and humanism into expressionism 
(bringing it almost to the point of dissolution), also did not posit a constructive project. As we shall see in 
Chapter Three, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony provides Williams with the theoretical ground for a concrete 
cultural positivity.   
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definite commitment to a particular politics and a particular project which, while framed as 
the product of the freedom of the author and reader is far from politically polyvalent: 
 
We must historicize the reader’s goodwill, that is, by the formal agency of our work, 
we must, if possible, provoke his intention of treating men, in every case, as an 
absolute end and, by the subject of our writing, direct his intention upon his 
neighbours, that is, upon the oppressed of the world … [but also] show him … that it 
is quite impossible to treat concrete men as ends in contemporary society … In other 
words, we must transform his formal goodwill into a concrete and material will to 
change this world by specific means in order to help the coming of the concrete 
society of ends. For goodwill is not possible in this age, or rather, it is and can only be 
the intention of making goodwill possible …  In short, we must militate, in our 
writings, in favour of the freedom of the person and the socialist revolution. It has 
often been claimed that they are not reconcilable. It is our job to show tirelessly that 
they imply each other. (2001, pp. 211-213) 
 
There is a lot to unpack here. Firstly, the prevalence of the word ‘must’ indicates that Sartre 
is not making a set of recommendations, but is setting out a moral programme, a normative 
theory of committed literary practice. Secondly, Sartre is very clear that writers must not 
simply ‘be’ socialists, or advocate socialism as public figures; ‘we must militate, in our 
writings’ (my emphasis) says Sartre, insisting that the content of one’s writing must itself be 
‘for’ both ‘the freedom of the person’ (liberal rights) and ‘the socialist revolution’. Thirdly, 
we are given some indication, not of specific content, but of what the content of a committed 
writing must ‘show’ about the world, namely that it is ‘impossible to treat concrete men as 
ends in contemporary society’ and that the freedom of the person and the socialist revolution 
are not antitheses but rather mutually constitutive aspects of the same emancipatory 
formation. This passage, at least, calls into serious question Williams’s claim that Sartrean 
commitment is ‘politically polyvalent’; it seems clear that Sartre is advocating not 
commitment in abstraction, but concrete commitment to the cause of freedom and of socialist 
revolution, to be militated for in writing, and which is implied in the nature of literature as the 
collaborative creative activity of free individuals.  
 
The question we must now ask is: why does Williams choose to interpret Sartre as though he 
is in favour of the polyvalence of political content? The simplest explanation is that Williams 
did not regard the latter parts of What is Literature? as carrying the core message of that text. 
It is only late in the text, after all, that Sartre makes the explicit recommendations of political 
content given above; the bulk of the argument does indeed treat the issue of artistic freedom 
in a relatively conceptual/abstract manner. The more salient explanation, however, is that 
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Williams is trying to recuperate the idea of commitment away from its older, problematic 
connections to particular kinds of ‘imputed’ political content and towards something implied 
in the totalising analysis of the Critique: commitment not to a specific politics but to the 
comprehension of one’s material conditions, an understanding only achievable on the basis of 
the thorough routing of ideas founded on the reifying binary of the individual and society. 
Consider Williams’s comments on Sartre in the 1984 review of de Beauvoir’s Adieux, where 
he simultaneously applauds Sartre’s attempt to ‘recover communism for liberty – still the 
central project of our time … an attempt wholly distinct from the simple contrast between 
communism and liberty which … ends with an accommodation to capitalism’ (New Society, 
1984b, June 21, p. 470) and criticizes ‘the persistent bourgeois position that one’s freedom is 
constrained by the freedoms of others’ (pp. 470-471), as well as Sartre’s ‘voluntarism’ (p. 
471). In other words, Williams is entirely in favour of pursuing a materialist theory and 
practice of freedom (libertarian communism); what he will not abide is any conception of 
freedom which abstracts the individual from others and from the social structure (historically, 
the bourgeois liberal view). 
 
Let us be clear in noting that, for Williams, ‘commitment’ in literature does not/should not 
mean exclusively commitment to socialism. But neither does Williams believe that this 
reductive meaning of commitment has been the dominant one in the period inaugurated by 
Sartre’s popularization of the term: ‘What we have come to understand, I think, is that 
commitment was not, for the most part, a positive proposition. It was mainly a response to … 
the position that the artist, by definition, must be a free individual; that to be an artist is to be 
a free individual’ (1989n, p. 81). Commitment, here, appears as a negative political reaction 
to the liberal-Romantic conception of the artist as an entirely free creative agent. While the 
latter is not really so far from Sartre’s position in the bulk of What is Literature?, Williams 
acknowledges that ‘there is a version of commitment which can include that, because if you 
are a free individual you can choose to commit yourself’ (p. 81). But then the ‘libertarian’ 
conception of freedom, while an improvement on the false and coerced commitments, is also 
insufficient. The problem is precisely the element of ‘voluntarism’ which Williams ascribes 
to Sartre’s work generally. Voluntaristic ideas, in Williams’s schema, are invariably 
symptomatic of reification, the artificial isolation of the individual from society. Thus 
commitment in the sense which Williams attributes to Sartre (freely chosen commitment), is 
tendentially liberal and limiting in conception. As Williams describes it in 1978: 
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‘Commitment’ implies conscious choice, and thus voluntary choice. This makes it 
sound almost liberal, and it is indeed, in one sense, a profoundly liberal idea. It 
presupposes writers who, as it were, survey the spectrum and decide to which part of 
it they will move. It also presupposes a natural state of innocence, free of ideology, 
from which a writer may or may not choose to move, committing himself, if he moves 
that way, to a set of acquired positions and values. Historically this is the bourgeois 
concept of the individual, who exists, as it were, free and formed, before he decides to 
enter into relationships, associations or contracts, or , in the extreme case, to refrain 
from doing so or to enter into as few as he can. (1990b, pp. 257-258) 
 
In contrast to this atomizing view, Williams, in ‘Art: Freedom as Duty’, emphasises that ‘We 
are born into the specific relationships of a family, of a society, of a historical phase, well 
before any questions of conscious choice and any realisation of the possibility of freedom can 
arise’ (1989b, p. 91). Here Williams is writing in strict opposition to the early Sartrean notion 
of a freedom of the individual which pre-exists one’s situation in society. Williams was 
sympathetic to Sartre’s ‘existence precedes essence’ schema on the basis of its anti-
essentialism and the possibility of it being linked to a historical and totalising theory of 
individualization through material practice in relation to others. It had to be rejected, 
however, insofar as it practiced a kind of libertarian extremism, an apparently limitless 
endorsement and theorisation of contingency. For Williams, freedom is unthinkable ‘except 
in terms of its specific social production’ (p.  91); social influence, moreover, is not 
something which must escape the critically-minded artist’s consciousness: ‘in an important 
sense, a writer is not free, and knows in the course of his practice that he is not free’ (p. 92). 
In place of the early Sartre’s libertarianism of human freedom, Williams enjoins us to think 
‘in terms of formation and alignment … every artist who reflects on his experience and 
development becomes deeply aware of the extent to which these factors of formation and 
alignment in his own very specific history have been decisive to a sense of what he is and 
what he is then free to do’ (p. 91). 
 
One of the most important pressures upon the freedom of the situated writer is of course the 
language-system into which he is born and embedded. Language, ‘the medium from which he 
must try to make his particular art’ (Williams, 1989b, p. 92), is both a factor in the freedom of 
the writer and in his being restrained, his ‘indispensable resource’, a ‘constant stimulus’, and 
at the same time ‘a set of limits, of constraints … directions this way and that’ (p. 92). 
Between mental conceptions (themselves strongly influenced by elements of personal 
formation and socio-cultural alignment) and the material-productive practice of writing lies a 
highly pressurised field of influence stemming from the material and historical structure of 
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the language itself: ‘between the conception as it moves in the mind … and [its] quite 
material realization in the words, there is a very complex process which most writers spend 
their lives trying to understand, and perhaps never fully understand. It is a material process’ 
(p. 92). Williams is keen to emphasise this surprising, unplanned aspect of the confrontation 
of the writer with language, the fact that ‘many writers have correctly observed a moment of 
surprise when the creation seems to be going in a way which they had not fully intended’ (p. 
93). The outcome of this merely contingent contact with language, while it can, ‘in some 
instances, be diagnosed as failure’, it is just as often the case that ‘what happens at that stage 
comes to be seen as more important, as having more substance to it’ (p. 93).  
 
Williams’s analysis of the confrontation of artistic creation with the materiality of language 
returns us to the question of choice, but a choice which now appears not as the expression of 
an abstract but of an emergent contingency, a literary fecundity which, while ‘appearing’ 
only to the individual, has in fact been co-parented by the material and social forces of 
formation, alignment and language. This process, moreover, which in 1978 Williams 
describes as culminating in ‘moments’ or ‘points’ of significant artistic praxis, in no way 
negates the freely choosing individual in the positive sense implied by ‘individuality’: ‘Now 
of course we all become, or hope to become, fully-formed individuals, and we do have real 
choices – to allow ourselves to be pushed this way or that or to resist that kind of push. 
Nothing I’m saying diminishes the importance of that kind of mature choice … I wish it was 
more widely exercised’ (1989b, p. 91). The individual writer does and should make choices, 
then, but the crucial thing for Williams is that these choices take place within a process which 
in important ways surpass the writer, and which are indelibly marked by formative and 
aligning forces which the writer did not choose. ‘And what, then, is freedom?’, Williams 
wonders, ‘Or what is duty?’ (p. 93). Freedom, firstly, must indeed include the liberal freedom 
from ‘arbitrary interferences’ (p. 95) which Sartre had also recognised as necessary. But 
beyond that, freedom comes to be attached to an emergent project which arises from 
consciousness of formation and alignment, that is, of the material, social and linguistic 
conditions which ground one’s exercise of resistance or passivity in the face of established 
conventions. As I have already noted, Williams’s position is that the only ‘duty’ which a 
writer can have is to follow through on the hesitation to conform, the potential for originality 
announced by ‘the hesitation at that point, when the words can come all too easily … to hold 
yourself at that point with some hope of moving beyond it’ (p. 95). But that act of hesitation 
and emergence is predicated upon recognition of the determining pressures against which 
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original practice arrays itself. Freedom, Williams argues in ‘The Writer’, is not freedom from 
formation and alignment, as it so often appears in the early Sartre, but the freedom to act in 
conscious defiance of formative pressures: 
 
It is one of the most surprising things about [critics of commitment] that they say, ‘I 
only write as a free individual, I only write what I want to write’, but in fact what they 
write is, in majority, already written and what everybody else knows. That of course 
is an illusion of freedom. This is when you are free to choose, or to choose to try to 
alter, that which is really pressuring you, in your whole social formation, in your 
understanding of the possibilities of writing. (1989n, p. 87)  
 
Or, as he puts it in ‘Art: Freedom as Duty’: 
 
We have to think that the most significant freedoms may therefore be discovered in 
the consciousness of our true conditions, including conditions which necessarily set 
certain limits on us. Not the arbitrary limits, which we must always refuse, but that 
placing in a people, in a language, and in a time, which is not a denial of freedom but, 
properly used, the means of its realization. (1989b, p. 95) 
 
So, our ‘understanding of the possibilities of writing’ is linked to ‘consciousness of our true 
conditions’; what considerable freedom there is in artistic practice is symbiotically linked to a 
materialist practice of combined self-reflection and social critique. We are now in a position 
to address the striking similarity between Williams’s development of a holistic, totalising 
aesthetic epistemology out of the discredited binary of ‘pure’ artistic freedom and 
commitment, and the epistemological divide between the early and the late Sartre (and with 
this the influence of the Critique on Williams’s late aesthetic essays).  
 
For Sartre in What is Literature?, the enemy of consciousness was inauthenticity, the 
inability to perceive or acknowledge absolute freedom. Authenticity, by contrast, was the 
perception or acceptance of freedom, of man as an ‘unconditioned end’. This, in Williams’s 
analysis, is close to the ideology of the ‘pure artist’ of individualist contingency, writing 
‘from the heart’ and ‘unconditioned’ by social forces. ‘Commitment’ or ‘duty’, within this 
reifying and tendentially liberal framework, can only appear as arbitrary restraint (although, 
as we have seen, the early Sartre was not above making concrete demands of the committed 
writer). In the Critique, by contrast, the idea of man as an ‘unconditioned end’ has been 
replaced by the Marxist notion of freedom within pre-existing parameters, history as made by 
man but in conditions transmitted from the past.  Indeed, the Critique defines praxis as ‘the 
activity of an individual or group in organizing conditions in the light of some end’ (Sartre, 
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2004, p. 829). Revolutionary praxis, of course, takes as its end socialist revolution; replace 
‘organising conditions’ with ‘formation and alignment’ and we are not far from Williams’s 
analysis, in which the committed writer has as his ‘end’ the transmission of new aesthetic 
experience via the commitment to emergence. In the Critique, the enemy of consciousness is 
no longer inauthenticity but analytic reason, precisely the reified and exteriorizing logic that 
would oppose coerced or false commitment to the isolated ‘pure artist’. Dialectical reason, 
by contrast, the core epistemological procedure of the Critique, is precisely ‘the intelligibility 
of praxis at all levels’ (p. 828) i.e. self-consciousness of thought and action wherein the 
individual becomes aware of itself as materially conditioned and conditioning. This is 
precisely the logic of Williams’s politico-aesthetic essays; the artist is enjoined, via a process 
of intellection which is remarkably similar to Sartrean dialectical reason, to a) become aware 
of the constitution of both his subjectivity and his art in the material processes of formation 
and alignment and b) direct, through self-conscious aesthetic praxis, ‘emergent contingency’ 
in the direction of new artistic creation. 
 
What of revolution, given this line of aesthetic argument? Eagleton (1976) had criticised 
Williams for his ‘idealist’ belief in the power of deliberative reason, but it is better to say that 
Williams ‘believes in’ the power of interiority (self-conscious praxis). Art, in Williams’s 
view, is not only a process of expression but also of discovery; emergent art is only possible 
under conditions of self-understanding, which entails, since the isolated individual is a myth, 
an understanding of social relations. Thus, as Williams argues in Marxism and Literature, ‘In 
any specific society, in a specific phase, writers can discover in their writing the realities of 
their social relations, and in this sense their alignment. If they determine to change these, the 
reality of the whole social process is at once in question’ (2009 [1977], p. 204). The artist, 
then, can be a revolutionary if he goes through with that hesitation to conform to, or merely 
reflect, his material conditioning; this is not the ‘metaphysical rebellion’ which Williams had 
criticised in the early Sartre, but the discovery of real social conditions, which are always 
extra-individual, and the commitment to changing them. This, for Williams, can only be 
realised in an educated, participatory democracy (the end-point of Williams’s ‘long 
revolution’) in which, we may now argue, dialectical reason is the normative epistemological 
horizon and the production of freedom entails the perception of material and social 
formations: 
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This is why the claim for the freedom of the artist is necessarily a claim for quite new 
kinds of freedom, an acknowledgment of the need for freedom for everyone in 
society. This sense connects with the deepest notions of an educated and self-
managing democracy as the best cultural and political model, distinct from the 
received models with which other ideas of art have been so commonly associated. 
(Williams, 1989b, p. 95) 
 
Let us now, in establishing precisely what is meant by ‘everyone in society’, pass to a more 
practical set of considerations. Since revolutions are not carried out by man in the abstract, it 
follows that the material and social formations which dialectical reasons enjoins us to 
‘interiorize’ will not be uniform over the surface of the globe. The freedom of everyone in 
society may be acknowledged as a need, but it may also have to be acknowledged as a series 
of different needs, or of different freedoms. In the passage from abstraction to concreteness, 
we face the reality of groups differently constituted as cultures, nations and peoples or, in 
other words, as distinct particularities. In the early seventies, partly, I argue, due to his 
exposure to Sartre’s work on the Basque separatist movement, Williams became increasingly 
concerned with questions of particularism, cultural plurality and self-determination. The 
interaction of these considerations with the foregoing philosophical questions, that is, of the 
epistemological project of totality or dialectical reason with the concrete realities of placed 
and classed struggles, will be the subject of the remaining sections in this chapter. 
 
From the ‘common culture’ to the Burgos Trials 
 
In his introduction to the edited collection Who Speaks for Wales? Nation, Culture, Identity: 
Raymond Williams (2003), Daniel Williams is surely right to foreground the dissonant 
combination, in Williams’s work, of experience in a place and the abstract, objective insights 
gleaned from a prestigious formal education: 
  
Williams’s writings on Wales are consistently informed by that backward gaze from a 
formal education to the ‘intense association’ of family and childhood in the Welsh 
Border village of Pandy. In both his theoretical writings and his fiction Williams 
shares Hardy’s ‘special gift’ of relating his own early history to the ‘insights of a 
consciously learned history and of the educated understanding of nature and 
behaviour’, of seeing ‘the native place and experience but also the education.’ (D. 
Williams, 2003, xv) 
 
This dichotomy, I would argue, is central to Williams’s work in general, but it achieves its 
highest pitch in Williams’s writings on Wales, where he speaks dialogically from what D. 
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Williams describes as the ‘ambivalent location that lies at the heart of his fictional and 
theoretical engagement with Wales and Welshness’ (xxiv). The ambivalence of this position 
can be related to the concept, liberally applied by Williams scholars, of the border, the liminal 
space within and across which the subject is forced to apply both experience and reason, lived 
and abstract knowledge, to make sense of his surroundings and identity. This also implies a 
kind of combined presence and absence: the presence of the native, with his lived experience, 
and the partial or total absence of a) the subject who relies only or mainly on abstract or 
objective knowledge (lacking the lived experience) and, as I argue here, b) a certain quantum 
of knowledge which may be read as being inaccessible to experience, at least in the sense 
implied by ‘lived’. Objective knowledge, in particular that related to structural class relations, 
haunts Williams’s work in a way that I believe Williams himself found difficult to 
interrogate; nevertheless, such knowledge becomes increasingly important for Williams in 
the seventies and eighties with his analyses of nationalism and the politics of place. Sartre’s 
writing on Basque nationalism influenced Williams’s ‘nationalist turn’ in the early seventies; 
in this section I will draw on this work, alongside the conceptions of knowledge outlined in 
the previous section, to examine the relation between class and nation in the socialist politics 
of both thinkers.  
 
The title of D. Williams’s introductory essay is ‘The Return of the Native’, a reference to 
Hardy’s novel which neatly encapsulates the temporal trajectory of Williams’s writing on 
Wales and the politics of place: an increasing engagement with a place of origin and the 
implications of that emphasis, properly beginning with ‘Culture is Ordinary’ (1958) and 
Border Country (1960) but increasing significantly in volume and depth in the early seventies 
with the publication of ‘Who Speaks for Wales?’ (1971), a review of Ned Thomas’s The 
Welsh Extremist (1971). What the return permits, under propitious circumstances, is the 
enrichment of experiential knowledge with information gleaned from external sources of 
knowledge, the ‘outside’ component of what Williams describes as ‘seeing the matter in my 
own living conditions from both inside and outside’ (2003b, p. 28). Here I would like to layer 
on top of this directionality a rough tri-partite structure, corresponding with a) the period of 
the late fifties and sixties, b) the early to mid-seventies and c) the late seventies through the 
eighties. In the first period, Williams advocates cultural equality and anti-elitism (opposition 
to anything resembling an ‘imputed’ culture), focussing on the importance of self-made 
meanings derived from experience and the idea of universal solidarity rooted in an 
amorphous ‘equality of being’ (2013 [1958], p. 337); this is best encapsulated in the 
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conclusion to Culture and Society, in which Williams calls for ‘diversity without separation’ 
(2013 [1958], p. 334). In the second period, under the influence of Welsh nationalist currents 
and a broader and deeper understanding of his own Welsh cultural inheritance, the ‘without 
separation’ element weakens, though under the same presumption that the goal of a cultural 
politics is a self-defining, ‘free’ people or community, which may or may not take the form of 
the traditional nation-state. Towards the end of the seventies and throughout the eighties, 
Williams increasingly advocates an approach incorporating both experience and ‘the politics 
of abstract analysis’ (2009 [1977], p. 182) i.e. the application of objective knowledge. 
Engaging with left critiques of nationalism and encountering conceptual difficulties within 
the politics of Welsh nationalism, this third period is characterised by a holistic view of the 
role of class and nation in a socialist politics, in keeping with his long-standing commitment 
to totality. Williams’s position increasingly mirrors the Sartre of the early seventies, both in 
terms of a general epistemology (dialectical reason) and the role of minority nationalism as a 
necessary component of the socialist project. 
 
It is the conspicuous absence of geographically delineated place in Williams’s theoretical 
works of the fifties and sixties71 that is probably responsible for what D. Williams (2003) 
rightly criticises as a serious aporia in the critical treatment of Williams’s later engagement 
with these issues. Nevertheless, in the notion of a common culture and its enemies, we can 
establish the links between the early and late work, and detect the nascent impulses behind 
the mature shifts. In 1958, Williams publishes the essay ‘Culture is Ordinary’ and includes a 
meditation on the idea of a common culture in the Conclusion to Culture and Society (‘The 
Development of a Common Culture’). These texts, along with the 1968 essay ‘The Idea of a 
Common Culture’ which summarises and builds upon them, confirm the narrative that sees 
the early Williams as rejecting the traditional nationalist emphasis on political and cultural 
separation, but belie the assumption that this implies cultural or experiential homogeneity; 
precursors to what D. Williams describes as Williams’s mature advocacy of ‘a culturally 
diverse society based on the acceptance of a necessary ambiguity in cultural and political 
identity’ (2003, xlv) are present, in muted forms, from at least these early works.  
 
In CS, Williams begins from the position that society must not be viewed as a ‘ladder’, with 
its definition the purview of an elite and a population defined as a ‘mass’ or ‘the masses’ 
                                                
71 It is firmly present, of course, in the novels Border Country (1961) and Second Generation (1964). 
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locked out of the processes of definition by artificial scarcities of elite education and political 
power. ‘For in the end, on any reckoning’, argues Williams, ‘the ladder will never do; it is the 
product of a divided society, and will fall with it’ (2013 [1958], p. 332). The ladder model, 
which expresses ‘the inherent dominative mode’ (p. 336) of class societies, must be opposed 
by ‘democracy’ and ‘solidarity’, which ‘is potentially the real basis of a society’ (p. 332). The 
problem of building a ‘fully democratic society’ (p. 332), argues Williams, ‘can be defined as 
one in which diversity has to be substantiated within an effective community which disposes 
of majority power’ (p. 332). What is being imagined here is a single community run on 
democratic principles, but free from the yoke of elite power and minority definition. At this 
point, the rationale for adopting the aim of ‘achieving diversity without creating separation’ is 
attributable to a kind of Millian rationalism;72 the point is to acknowledge the limits of dogma 
and intellectual over-confidence in uncertain times and, whatever one’s own starting point, 
‘to listen to others who started from a very different position’ (p. 334). Thus, argues Williams 
‘It is necessary to make room for, not only variation, but even dissidence, within the common 
loyalty’ (p. 334). That there should be a ‘common loyalty’, a sacrosanct solidarity, is not 
questioned at this stage and the idea of a common culture is expressed as the democratic 
circumvention of the elite and artificial hijacking of common cultural processes. The 
acknowledgement of difference and variation is primarily a means to the end of ‘common 
government’ (p. 337). 
 
The title phrase of ‘Culture is Ordinary’ (1989d) carries the same emphasis as Williams’s 
analysis in CS, that culture is, in effect, classless, or ought to be, and that it is the province of 
everyone who lives in a given society, not only a ‘cultured’ elite. Everyone ‘has’ culture 
because culture is not merely ‘high culture’ but, famously, a ‘whole way of life’. Common, in 
this sense, means something akin to ‘public’, a common stake held in something in which 
there is universal involvement and shared responsibility. A Welsh dimension to the 
discussion emerges in the initial descriptions, but primarily as a ‘proof’ that culture is 
everywhere, and that every community produces its own culture via experience, conservation 
and emergence (culture as tending and growing). The political thrust of the Welsh 
descriptions is an emphasis on working-class culture in general, which could be a model for 
England, itself being artificially defined by a minoritarian cultural hegemony, as much as 
Wales: ‘I think this way of life, with is emphases of neighbourhood, mutual obligation, and 
                                                
72 Indeed, Mill had been a key figure in Culture and Society. 
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common betterment, as expressed in the great working-class political and industrial 
institutions, is in fact the best basis for any future English society’ (1989d, p. 8). The 
prerequisites of what Williams describes as ‘a good common culture’ (10) are that it is a) 
grounded in solidarity, b) produced and agreed upon in common, by deliberation, c) opposed 
to the Leavisite disavowal of the cultural legacy of the industrial revolution and popular 
education and d) opposed to the distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture. 
 
With ‘The Idea of a Common Culture’ in 1968, Williams reaffirms the goals of his previous 
writings while emphasizing in a stronger way than before the value and necessity of cultural 
heterogeneity. The language of totality, organicism and ‘wholeness’ is, as ever, pervasive; 
complexity, discrepancy and dissent are conceived of as elements within a whole process, so 
that the idea of a community of interest or process follows almost as a logical necessity. Thus 
Williams’s account of his previous work is as follows: ‘In talking of a common culture, then, 
one was saying first that culture was the way of life of a people, as well as the vital and 
indispensable contributions of specially gifted and identifiable persons, and one was using the 
idea of the common element of the culture – its community - as a way of criticizing that 
divided and fragmented culture we actually have’ (1989l, p. 35). The goal here is full, rather 
than minority involvement in making cultural meanings and the political vehicle is ‘an 
educated and participating democracy’ (p. 37); education is the key to challenging the elite 
monopoly of the means of communication, on which material basis cultural hegemony is 
reinforced. Williams is keen, by this point, to emphasize that he does not regard the common 
culture, which he is still advocating, as a culture freely chosen only by a minority and made 
artificially universal or ‘common’. A concluding passage to that text is worth quoting at 
length: 
  
There is some danger in conceiving of a common culture as a situation in which all 
people mean the same thing, value the same thing, or, in that usual abstraction of 
culture, have an equal possession of so much cultural property … people, inevitably, 
will have different aspects of the culture … When this is an act of choice, it is 
completely desirable; when it is an act of someone else’s choice as to what is made 
available and what is neglected, then of course one objects. But it is not only that the 
society will be complex … It is also that the idea of a common culture is in no sense 
the idea of simply consenting, and certainly not of a merely conforming, society. One 
returns, once more, to the original emphasis of a common determination of meanings 
by all the people, acting sometimes as individuals, sometimes as groups, in a process 
which has no particular end. (1989l, p. 37) 
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Williams, acknowledges, then, the diversity of individuals and groups within a culture, but 
not at any point different cultures. Part of Williams’s shift towards a more openly nationalist 
emphasis in the seventies comes from recognizing the difficulty of combating the ‘flattening’ 
effect of minoritarian cultural hegemony without fragmenting one culture into several. And 
then, of course, if one accepts the necessity of division, the problem is how to retain the sense 
of solidarity that Williams’s found so central to the project of an educated and participating 
socialist democracy.  
 
*      *      * 
 
Let us turn now to Sartre’s essay ‘The Burgos Trials’ (1971), a work of Marxist post-
colonialism which helped precipitate Williams’s reorientation towards Welsh nationalism and 
cultural pluralism in the early-to-mid seventies. ‘The Burgos Trials’73 was Sartre’s 
interrogation of the relation between class and minority nationalist elements in a socialist 
praxis through the then ongoing historical example of Basque nationalism under Franco’s 
fascist regime. In the 1977 essay ‘Marxism, Poetry, Wales’, Williams looked back on Sartre’s 
piece as a sensible endorsement, against the grain of orthodox Marxism, of left-wing minority 
nationalism as a force for good (and for socialism): 
 
Originally the Marxist challenge was precisely that the proletariat has no country. 
Whereas any good Marxist who has to preserve practice in history, even if he 
proposes to transcend it, has had to notice ever since that one of the most tenacious 
holds of the proletariat is to a country … When it comes back to Europe, there’s been 
such a lot of impatience among traditional Marxists that I found that Sartre writing 
about the Basques had for me a lot of the right sense of this, that people should 
determine, since it is the crucial thing for them, the conditions of their own social 
being. And this is the Marxist project. It is extraordinarily difficult to rule out on 
abstract grounds some particular project which describes itself as nationalist. I often 
think that is not what it is, but it is the obvious thing to call it, when it comes up in 
Wales or Ireland, or Scotland or Brittany. (2003d, p. 86) 
 
We can connect elements of this account to both the early and middle periods of Williams’s 
development. In the consciousness of place and nation we find the increasing engagement 
with Wales and minority nationalism, but in the more abstract phrase, ‘people should 
determine … the conditions of their own social being’, which Williams sees as central to 
                                                
73 Sartre’s essay appeared first appeared in Zutik, the organ of the Basque armed separatist movement Euskadi 
Ta Askatasuna (ETA), before appearing in the 1971/72 edition of the journal Planet: The Welsh Internationalist, 
translated into English from the French by the Welsh nationalist poet Harri Webb – this is almost certainly 
where Williams encountered it. 
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Marxism, we find an echo of CS, where Williams had said: ‘The struggle of democracy is a 
struggle for the recognition of equality of being, or it is nothing’ (2013 [1958], p. 337 – my 
emphasis). There is a difference, though, between the abstract ‘equality of being’, which is 
more redolent of liberal universalism than any recognizably Marxist analysis, and 
‘determining the conditions of one’s own social being’, which suggests a more variegated and 
historical process better capable of incorporating class and geographical differences into 
political praxis. To simplify, it is the difference between universalism and particularism as 
valences of an emancipatory politics; indeed, Sartre’s analysis in ‘The Burgos Trials’ 
illuminates some of the complexities inherent in this distinction. 
 
In What is Literature?, Sartre had made the distinction between a writer’s ‘virtual public’ and 
his ‘real public’, between the ‘constant repetition in an indefinite future of the handful of 
[bourgeois] readers which he has at present’ (2001, p. 118) and ‘the sum total of men living 
in a given society’ (p. 119). Sartre overlays a Hegelian theoretical couplet onto this 
formulation: to write for one’s ‘virtual public’ is to be on the side of ‘abstract universality’; to 
write for one’s real public is to side with ‘concrete universality’. Abstract universality means 
taking the experiences and perspectives of a minority for those of everyone in the society; the 
abstract is oppressive and ‘unreal’, the concrete real, expansive and tendentially democratic.   
In ‘The Burgos Trials’, many years later, Sartre applies these conceptual categories to the 
question of Basque nationalism, but now with the crucial addition of ‘concrete particularism’. 
Sartre argues that what the militant Basque nationalists (ETA), with whom he sides 
unreservedly, must oppose, is ‘the present unity’ (1971, p. 24), the bourgeois nationalist 
(internal) unity of the modern roll-call of nation-states, which are the product of imperialism 
and class war: ‘It has become clear that the present frontiers correspond to the interests of the 
dominant classes and not to popular aspirations, that the unity of which the great powers are 
so proud is a cloak for the oppression of peoples and for the overt or covert use of repressive 
violence’ (pp. 24-25). The unity on which such state structures are erected is false and 
abstract, so that in each imperialist country there is the forced ideological construction of ‘the 
same type of abstract man defined by the same formal rights – democracy – and the same real 
obligations, without taking any account of his concrete necessities’ (p. 24). This false liberal 
or bourgeois unity is an abstract universality which must be opposed by the ‘concrete 
particularism’ of Basque resistance both to class oppression (by Basque and Spanish 
capitalists) and to Spanish cultural and political repression, both of which are arrayed on the 
side of abstract universality. Note that Sartre’s advocacy of concrete particularism, here, as 
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opposed to concrete universality, indicates a shift of emphasis in his later work, consonant 
with his increasing involvement in anti-colonial struggles. The universalist element is not 
lost, however, and returns at the close of Sartre’s argument. 
 
Sartre regards the Basque struggle, and many others like it in the post-war period, as cases of 
‘really existing’ experiential and historical communities legitimately demanding that they not 
be annihilated by liberal universality: anti-colonial struggles, argues Sartre, ‘could not have 
taken place if the so-called provinces had not had a national existence which for centuries the 
conquerors have tried to suppress and obstruct and conceal, but had remained in being, a 
fundamental tie between the people’ (1971, p. 26). This is in keeping with basic existentialist 
ontology; Spanish abstract universality is ‘essence’, preceded by the concrete particularism of 
Basque ‘existence’: the real, lived, historical and practical existence of the Basque people 
with their own unique customs and language. A really existing and distinct cultural and 
linguistic heritage, however, is only one of Sartre’s preconditions for minority nationalist 
struggle. The other is a properly Marxist one, namely colonial super-exploitation, here of the 
Basque country by imperialist, centralist Spain. The following selection gives Sartre’s basic 
political-economic analysis, and his prescription for Basque emancipation: 
 
Can we say, with ETA, that Euskadi (Spanish Basque country) is a colony of Spain? 
The question is important. For it is in colonies that the class struggle and the national 
struggle merge … history offers no example of a conquered country which does not 
pay tribute to the conqueror … Spain is committed to a veritable campaign of fiscal 
pillage against the Basque country. The workers are crushed by taxes … despite 
appearance, the situation of the Basque worker is in all respects that of a colonised 
worker. He is not merely exploited, as the Castilian worker is exploited, who wages a 
‘chemically pure’ class struggle, but deliberately super-exploited, in that he does the 
same work as the Spanish worker and receives a lower wage for it … [Basque 
workers] have to be made to understand that in the case of Euskadi, the economic and 
social problems are expressed in national terms. (1971, pp. 28-31) 
 
Note, first, that Sartre does not concede that national and class struggles can merge elsewhere 
than in the colonial situation; national independence is a worthy goal for the Basques because 
of the fact of Spanish super-exploitation, not despite or alongside it. The ‘chemically pure’ 
class struggle, argues Sartre, is waged by workers in imperialist countries, so that Basque 
workers are naïve to think that they can achieve socialism by means of traditional class 
struggle only.  
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It is unclear, on the basis of ‘The Burgos Trials’, whether Sartre regards national self-
determination as an end in itself, or only as the proper means to socialist ends for workers in 
a colonised situation. Casting doubt on Sartre’s commitment to self-determination as an end-
in-itself is his analysis of the two main rivals to the ETA on the anti-Spanish side: the Basque 
Communist Party (PC) and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). Sartre chastises both for 
failing equally to recognize the necessity of both socialist and nationalist agitation in the 
Basque context. Of the communists, Sartre says: 
 
PC [Basque Communist Party] regards Euskadi as merely a geographical expression. 
It takes its orders from the Spanish Communist Party in Madrid and takes no account 
of local realities. Clinging to centralism, it is socially progressive and politically 
conservative. It attempts to lead the Basque workers into a “chemically pure” class 
struggle. They forget they are dealing with a colonised, superexploited country. 
(1971, pp. 34) 
Of the nationalists: 
 
The PNV is also mistaken. It considers independence as an end in itself. First, they 
say, let us set up the Basque Republic, then we can change our society any way we 
like. But if this means setting up a bourgeois Basque state then, although Spanish 
superexploitation would be brought to an end, it would not be long before the new 
state fell into the clutches of American Imperialism. (1971, pp. 35) 
The ‘chemically pure’ class struggle, then, is insufficient because it fails to grapple with the 
reality of colonial super-exploitation, and is too optimistic about the capacity of the centralist 
Spanish state to realize the essential solidarity proper to both the Basque and the Spanish 
workers. National sovereignty as an end-in-itself will fall through the fingers of a liberal 
nationalism which, ignoring the centrality of class to economic power relations, will sacrifice 
working-class Basque particularism to the abstract universality of U.S. economic hegemony: 
‘If the [prospective Basque] state retained the structure of capitalism the compradors would 
sell the country, the USA would rule through the local bourgeoisie, colonialism would be 
succeeded by neo-colonialism’ (p. 35). On this account, the concept of ‘nationalism for all’, 
even when pursued by minorities, would seem to fall outside of the purview of a 
thoroughgoing socialist praxis.  
 
At the end of ‘The Burgos Trials’, in ambiguous relation to the thrust of the larger argument, 
Sartre expresses a muted optimism for the idea of a universal and particularist socialist 
politics. He openly inquires of history whether there might be a universalist emancipation 
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which operates by and through the assertion of particular interests, and whether this could in 
fact be the proper grounding for socialism: 
  
A heroic people, led by a revolutionary party, has given us a glimpse of the ‘other’ 
socialism, decentralist and concrete, the singular universality that ETA rightly sets up 
in opposition to the abstract centralism of its oppressors. Is this socialism viable for 
all? Isn’t it only a provisional solution for colonized countries? In other terms, can we 
foresee that this is the end of a stage towards the time when universal exploitations 
will come to an end and all men will enjoy equally a true universalism by the common 
operation of all particularisms? (1971, pp. 40-41) 
 
If particularism is expressed primarily at the level of the bourgeois nation-state, it seems clear 
from Sartre’s indictment of the PNV that the answer to this question is ‘no’. But then, Sartre 
is emphatic in claiming that particularism in general must be pursued as part of any properly 
humanist political project: ‘What ETA has shown us is the need of all men to affirm 
(including the centralists) their particularisms against abstract universalism’ (p. 41). That ‘the 
centralists’ (i.e. imperialist populations) also stand to gain is a crucial feature of Sartre’s 
account; ‘to affirm [the Basque’s and others’] concrete singularity’, argues Sartre, ‘is, as a 
direct consequence, to fight for ourselves as French people, for the true independence of 
France, which is the first victim of its own centralism’ (p. 41). The French people, then, 
despite being nominally non-colonised, are gripped by an abstract universality of their own 
projection turned inwards, ‘massifying’ them by proxy (‘today there are only French masses’ 
(p. 41)). The French working-class, in other words, should not think that they embody 
universality simply by virtue of having national self-determination. What Sartre calls ‘true 
universalism’, or ‘concrete universality’ in What is Literature?, is the realm of all people, and 
since the French are not all people, they are not it. Concrete particularism for all is, on 
Sartre’s account, the precondition of concrete universality ‘for all’.   
 
*     *     * 
 
Let us now, armed with the spirit and the letter of Sartre’s influential text, consider the 
transition from the first to the second stages of Williams’s developing engagement with the 
politics of place. From at least Modern Tragedy (1966), Williams had been emphasising the 
ubiquity of colonial domination and national liberation struggles but, in keeping with the 
‘common culture’ emphasis of his first phase, these were conceived in terms of a tragic 
disorder occurring within an essential totality. While Williams is cognisant of Western 
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imperial domination, in this period, he is not yet conceiving of national independence 
struggles as autonomous struggles for regionally and culturally specific forms of 
emancipation. In Sartrean terms, we are still in the realm of a kind of weak abstract 
universality, anti-elitist but non-concrete, majoritarian but lacking consciousness of particular 
interests.  
 
It is with the review of Ned Thomas’s The Welsh Extremist in 1971 (the same year as ‘The 
Burgos Trials’ appeared in English),74 that new emphases on what Sartre would call concrete 
particularism come to the fore. The knee-jerk equation of nationalism with fascism is 
emphatically rejected, and thus the simple association of nationalism with anti-socialism on 
the traditional left. Williams foregrounds Wales as a historically oppressed, post-colonial 
nation, itself internally divided and experientially diverse. He makes the necessary distinction 
between industrial South Wales, with its ‘centres of socialist consciousness’ (2003k, p. 3) and 
‘the more enclosed, mainly rural, more Welsh-speaking west and north’ (p. 3), where ‘a 
radical emphasis on identity and community’ comes through in ‘the campaigns of Plaid 
Cymru and the Welsh Language Society’ (pp. 3-4). Williams refuses, however, to see the two 
as incompatible and castigates the tendency of ‘Many English Socialists, and many Welsh 
Labour Party people’, to see the nationalist emphasis of the rural areas as ‘a marginal or 
romantic irrelevance’ (p. 4) praising by contrast ‘the new thinking about culture which in 
many parts of the world has been called the New Left’ (p. 4). Here Williams is cognisant of 
the kinds of abstract universality which can issue from socialist as well as liberal formations. 
Williams’s opposition to the mechanical universalisms of orthodox Marxism now 
accompanies an acknowledgement, more pronounced in later essays, of the danger of 
universalising or writing one experience within a minority nation over others within that same 
nation i.e. the experience of the industrial South over the rural west and north. While there is 
still the danger of a ‘falsely inward-looking, regressive, and complacent localism’ (p. 3) to be 
avoided, Williams is now appreciative of the fact that ‘some of the most powerful campaigns 
begin from specific unabsorbed (and therefore necessarily marginal) experiences and 
situations’ (p. 3). Specificity ‘in common’ replaces, at this stage, the common culture, so that 
an equation can be made between diverse particularisms: ‘Black Power in the United States, 
civil rights in Ulster, the language in Wales are experiences comparable in this respect to the 
                                                
74 Thomas, in fact, was the founder of Planet, where Sartre’s essay appeared; an analogy was clearly being 
drawn between Welsh civic nationalism and the Basque case as elaborated by Sartre. 
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student movement and to women’s liberation’ (p. 3); this is not so far away from Sartre’s 
‘common operation of all particularisms’. 
 
What began as the necessity of a participatory common culture becomes, as of the early 
seventies, the necessity of defining a distinct culture and a distinct cultural identity. Now, 
while the achievement of a common culture had not seemed inherently difficult to Williams, 
since what was preventing it was mainly the ‘external’ imposition of abstract universality, the 
achievement of a distinct culture appears to face greater internal challenges. In the essay 
‘Welsh Culture’ (1975), Williams rakes over the coals of Welsh national self-definition, 
focussing on the difficulty of arriving at a settled conception of Welsh culture within a 
modern commercial society, and with a past and present of colonial domination and hard 
economic pressure to incorporate, unevenly, into that image; the difficulties, in short, of a 
culture which is not common. ‘Where is it now, this Wales?’ asks Williams, ‘Where is the 
real identity, the real culture?’ (2003j, p. 5). The goal, as for Sartre, is to foreground that 
which is concrete against that which is abstract, but this is a prodigious feat in the face of a 
history of colonial exploitation and cultural repression. Williams notes the temptation to 
‘reach for our fancy dress’ (p. 5), to ‘indulge’ culture only on ‘high days and holidays: not an 
ordinary gear but an overdrive’ (p. 5), or to see culture as a commercially-oriented exercise in 
selective preservation, ‘a resort and a festival, both meticulously and distinctively Welsh’ (p. 
7). Wales, argues Williams, is expressing a post-colonial cultural pattern in which 
distinctiveness is cultivated negatively and with an oppositional fixation on painful historical 
processes of formation, lacking the expansiveness and confidence in the future necessary to 
achieve effective cultural self-definition: 
 
There is a very skilful kind of accommodation, finding new ways to be recognised as 
different, which we then actively cultivate, while not noticing, beyond them, the 
profound resignation. These are some of the signs of a post-colonial culture, 
conscious all the time of its own real strengths and potentials, longing only to be 
itself, to become its own world but with so much, too much, on its back to be able, 
consistently, to face its real future. It has happened in many places. Real 
independence is a time of new and active creation: people sure enough of themselves 
to discard their baggage; knowing the past as past, as a shaping history, but with a 
new confident sense of the present and the future, where the decisive meanings and 
values will be made. (2003j, p. 9) 
 
Williams’s analysis of the problematics of Welsh cultural experience bears a close 
resemblance to Sartre’s formula for dialectical reason, to which coin there was two sides: a) 
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the acknowledgement of objective historical processes and their determining influence, and 
b) the awareness of human action itself as the fundamental shaping force of history; 
intentional human action proceeding on the basis of both was what Sartre called praxis. 
Welsh culture, in Williams’s analysis, refuses to ‘discard the baggage’ of its own history, to 
take practical responsibility for the historical past and future. It is as though Welsh culture 
has achieved a passive version of the objective component of dialectical reason, recognising 
the past ‘as a shaping history’, but has failed to achieve the subjective, creative element, the 
art of ‘knowing the past as past’ so that it can be in the present and future that ‘the decisive 
meanings and values will be made’. In ‘Welsh Culture’ something similar to what Williams 
called, in the review of The Welsh Extremist, a ‘falsely inward-looking, regressive, and 
complacent localism’ appears in the form of the tourist version of historical memory, a 
sublimation of post-colonial anxieties substituted for the production of new meanings in the 
present. We might here draw a fourth pairing from Sartre’s four-term combinatory (concrete, 
abstract, particularism, universalism) and say that Williams’s analysis points to the 
production of abstract particularism, the mistaking of a historically fixated simulacra of a 
culture for the real, lived culture of an existing community.  
 
The goal of cultural self-production, as I am framing it here using Sartrean terminology, may 
be theorised as the avoidance of both abstract universality (false unity) and abstract 
particularism. The first barrier, abstract universality, is also the most politically urgent, and it 
is against such false unity that Williams rails in ‘Are We Becoming More Divided?’ (1975-
78). There Williams provides a basic sense of what minority nationalism is for him, as an 
antidote to the received view that such projects create only spurious and harmful divisions: 
 
In Scotland and Wales we are beginning to find ways of expressing two kinds of 
impulse that are in fact very widely experienced throughout British society. First, we 
are trying to declare an identity, to discover in fact what we really have in common, in 
a world which is full of false identities … second, but related to this, we are trying to 
discover political processes by which people really can govern themselves – that is, to 
determine the use of their own energies and resources – as distinct from being 
governed by an increasingly centralised, increasingly remote and also increasingly 
penetrating system: the system that those who run, for their own interests, have 
decided to call ‘Unity.’ (2003a, p. 188) 
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The search for concreteness announces itself in phrases like ‘what we really have in 
common’, that is, an underlying cultural experience75 and ‘by which people can really govern 
themselves’; what is ‘real’ is opposed to what is abstract, and what is abstract is falsely called 
‘Unity’ by those who stand to gain from traditional and habitual configurations of unity and 
division. But other false unities, albeit smaller ones, are close at hand, whether in the form of 
‘a weak kind of romanticism’ making ‘the Scots and the Welsh more different from the 
English than they really are’ (p. 188) or the elision of, as Williams reiterates, ‘the deep 
differences between industrial South Wales, rural North and West Wales, and the very 
specific border country from which I myself come’ (p. 188). For Williams, the solution to the 
problem of cultural self-definition cannot lie in ‘inventing a pseudo-historical or romantic 
Welshness’ (p. 189) i.e. the replacement of abstract universality with abstract particularism. 
The solution, Williams argues, is a new unity: ‘We get past it by looking and working for 
unity in the definition and development of a modern Wales, in which the really powerful 
impulses – to discover an effective modern community and to take control of our own 
energies and resources – can be practically worked through. That is what I mean by saying 
that the nationalist movements, while they can be seen from one position, as working to 
divide, must be seen from another position as working to unite’ (p. 189). Again, the 
comparison with Sartre is instructive; if Wales is to be the site of a new unity, it will be a 
unity of acknowledged differences, a universality composed of free particularisms.76 The 
crucial thing is self-determination, but the focus on an inclusive form of unity returns us to 
the emphasis of the ‘common culture’; solidarity doesn’t depart the argument, and the ‘work’ 
of cultural definition remains a common work or nothing at all. The difference by this point is 
that Williams no longer sees it as necessary to corral conflicting viewpoints into a single 
cultural matrix, however tolerant and democratic the process of doing so may be; social 
systems falling beneath particular locational signifiers may be comprised of many different, 
distinct cultures which either agree or refuse to co-operate in common projects and 
formations.  
 
Williams’s trajectory up to the early-seventies is thus defined by the move from the common 
culture to the (hopefully) co-operating plurality of concrete particularisms (concrete or 
‘effective’ communities): 
                                                
75 Recall that Sartre, similarly, had claimed the existence of a concrete Basque cultural experience. 
76 Specifically, the industrial South, rural West and North and the border country. The same would be true, says 
Williams (2003a), of the English regions, if they had the definitions to hand, so that ‘a nationalist movement 
isn’t the only way, often isn’t the way at all, to work for these things’ (189).	
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Once you are not controlled, in advance and systematically, by others, you soon 
discover the kinds of co-operation, between nations, between regions, between 
communities, on which any full life depends. But it is then your willing and not your 
enforced co-operation. That is why I, with many others, now want and work to divide, 
as a way of declaring our own interests, certainly, but also as a way of finding new 
and willing forms of co-operation: the only kind of co-operation that any free people 
can call unity. (2003a, p. 190) 
  
Cultural co-operation, here, is an act of ‘willing’, carried on by a ‘free people’. A prerequisite 
of such ‘sovereignty-pooling’ is that a given community ‘is not controlled, in advance and 
systematically, by others’. Politically, Williams gives us little to object to; there is a 
nonetheless a conceptual tension between this broadly liberal, ‘contractual’ analysis and 
Williams’s insistence, in his aesthetic essays and elsewhere, that freedom is unthinkable 
‘except in terms of its specific social production’ (1989b, p. 91). Is Williams indulging in 
what he will later call ‘the bourgeois concept of the individual, who exists, as it were, free 
and formed, before he decides to enter into relationships, associations or contracts, or, in the 
extreme case, to refrain from doing so or to enter into as few as he can’ (1990b, pp. 257-
258)? Here, of course, Williams is speaking of communities rather than individuals, but it 
was clear from his analysis of Welsh culture that communities are no less formed and aligned 
by social-historical forces than the human beings who comprise them. The way in which 
Williams parses the tension between material-historical formation and cultural self-
determination cannot be considered apart from the issue of class and socialist practice within 
minority nationalism. Let us now, in approaching the third period of Williams’s engagement 
with the politics of place, consider his increasing concern with objective (especially 
economic) forces in the constitution of ‘free’ or concrete cultures, as well as the question of 
cultural elements which remain intractably obscure to experience. In doing so we shall also 
fully reckon with Sartre’s insistence that minority nationalism must incorporate the class 
struggle to achieve concreteness. 
 
Dialectical materialism and the politics of place 
 
Williams’s search for cultural self-determination, focussed through the prism of Welsh 
minority nationalism, leads him to the view, as of the mid-seventies, that true unity is 
achieved through the mutual operation of distinct particularisms, so that D. Williams (2003) 
is correct in arguing that, for Williams, ‘plurality forms the basis for a new sense of Welsh 
Daniel Robert Gerke  Chapter Two: Williams and Sartre 
 
 
180 
communality’ (xxxv). Recalling that, for Williams, cultural identity is based on the practice 
of self-defining communities establishing the meaning of their own experiences, free from 
imposed abstractions, we can say that the plurality and diversity which Williams advocates 
has experience as its primary site and grounding; the cultures which will emerge from a 
system of self-determining politico-cultural units will be ‘concrete’ precisely because the full 
complexity of diverse, ‘placed’ experiences elude unitary, ‘abstract’ definitions. Diverse 
cultural interpretations and ‘whole ways of life’ co-exist in the combinatory of a wider 
cultural signifier (say, ‘Wales’), entering into various and shifting configurations without 
being overwritten or obscured by other terms (in this case, the impositions of abstract 
universality/particularism). By the mid-to-late seventies, Williams has resolved the problem 
faced by the ‘common culture’ argument, of how to incorporate heterogeneity without 
sacrificing solidarity, by incorporating plurality into a ‘single-system’ approach, in keeping, 
at least at the level of rhetoric, with the notion of totality; we can achieve unity through the 
free configuration and reconfiguration of distinct cultural units on the basis of what we might 
call ‘syntagmatic’ cultural relations, which is to say the simultaneous presence of different 
cultural forms within a wider social experience. 
 
But how do we incorporate those elements of culture which either do not announce 
themselves to experience, or do so unreliably? While it is right to attribute to experience a 
privileged position in Williams’s cultural schema, based as it is on self-definition, he was 
nevertheless acutely aware of the importance of incorporating knowledge of processes which 
are less available to experience. This, after all, was the central kernel of the realist 
problematic, which Williams regarded as having been correctly posed but unresolved by 
Lukacs: how to portray the full complexity of life under capitalism in such a way as to 
capture the power relations and structural causalities immanent to modern industrialised 
society? The problem is one that Williams described as being between ‘substance and 
system’ i.e. between concrete lived experience and objective structures. As of his 1980 
review of Lukacs’s Essays on Realism, Williams did not believe that a reliable literary 
method had been found for ‘representing working class life and at the same time introducing 
the necessarily different consciousness of the objective conditions and wider historical 
movement within which the men and women live and act’ (New Society, 1980, Nov 20, 
p.382). Williams thought that a ‘different consciousness’ would be required for untangling 
objective reality from lived experience, and that this would be central to apprehending or 
representing the real lives of working-class people. At the level of epistemology, Williams 
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found something akin to this ‘dual consciousness’ in Sartre’s late elaboration of dialectical 
reason, which aimed at precisely such a synthesis of objective historical analysis and 
‘interiority’ or lived experience. If working-class life is also, and fundamentally, the life of a 
people in a place, it remains for socialists to bolster the free self-definition of effective 
communities with objective analysis of those material structures which are difficult to explore 
from within a stance of pure ‘interiority’. 
 
Early precedents for Williams’s thinking about the synthesis of substance and system express 
an acute anxiety about its very possibility. Matthew Price in Border Country (1961), a 
university lecturer born in Wales but working in London, is the archetypal case of a 
psychological ‘wedge’ between the dual consciousnesses required for real social 
representation. Struggling to resolve the tension between the cold detachment of formal 
analysis and the lived and placed experience of a community to which he feels a deep but 
time-frayed attachment, Price, on returning to Wales to visit his dying father, reflects on his 
epistemological dilemma: 
 
He was working on population movements into the Welsh mining valleys in the 
middle decades of the nineteenth century. But I have moved myself, he objected, and 
what is it really that I must measure? The techniques I have learned have the solidity 
and precision of ice-cubes, while a given temperature is maintained. But it is a 
temperature I can’t really maintain; the door of the box keeps flying open. It’s hardly 
a population movement from Glynmawr to London, but it’s a change of substance, as 
it must also have been for them, when they left their villages. And the ways of 
measuring this are not only outside my discipline. They are somewhere else 
altogether, that I can feel but not handle, touch but not grasp. (Williams, 2010, pp. 5-
6) 
 
The word ‘substance’, which actually appears in this passage, is used in a similar way to 
‘concrete’ in Williams’s (and Sartre’s) writing, to mean lived, particular, or experienced. 
Moving to London isn’t just a ‘population movement’, an objective fact, but a ‘change of 
substance’, an experiential shift. The precision measurements of his research fail to capture 
this; the tools required to measure the experience are ‘somewhere else’, that is, in a specific 
place where he is not, so that he can somewhat ephemerally ‘feel’ them (having grown up 
there) but no longer ‘handle’, ‘grasp’ or know them as matters of continuing practical 
relevance. Price is the paradigmatic ‘returning native’ in Williams’s oeuvre, but he does not 
return with the ‘concrete’ experience of a different, English culture. While Price speaks 
disparagingly of a more atomized, distant set of social relations in England (p. 5), his anxiety 
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is provoked not by the contact of Welsh culture with English culture, but of lived experience 
with abstract analysis. England, in fact, operates largely as a metaphorical analogy with 
abstraction itself, the antithesis to the role that Wales plays, in the ‘common culture’ essays, 
as the site of a relatively autonomous, self-defining cultural productivity based in experience. 
D. Williams (2003) argues that, in Border Country, this tension manifests itself most 
immediately as a ‘crisis of language’ (xix), of communication, as Matthew struggles to ‘re-
adapt’ to the speech patterns and received meanings operative in his place of origin. ‘The 
relationship between the language of intellectuals and the inherited language of one’s “native 
country” is a recurrent theme in Williams’s theoretical and fictional writings’ (xxiii), he 
suggests; we have consistently observed Williams’s impatience with intellectuals who impose 
abstract theories onto more ‘concrete’  interpretative procedures. Such linguistic difficulties 
can provoke stark political tensions, as in another example D. Williams draws from 
Williams’s later fiction: ‘In a significant and revealing moment in the novel The Volunteers, 
Evan castigates a technocratic intellectual for having “nothing to say for us. You have plenty 
to say to us. You beam in from another world”’ (xxiii). Again, we are returned to Lukacs and 
the perennial problem of condescending to people lacking adequate consciousness of 
exploitation. And yet, like Lukacs, Williams considers it a genuine problem of literary 
representation that the wider structures determining so much of working-class life elude the 
eye of the realist narrator. 
 
A passage from the start of ‘Welsh Culture’ evocatively announces the problem of what we 
might call ‘cultural objectivity’: 
 
So if you say Welsh ‘culture’ what do you think of? Of bara brith and the Eisteddfod? 
Of choirs and Cardiff Arms Park? Of love spoons and englynion? Of the national 
costume and the rampant red dragon? All these things are here, if at different levels 
and in different ways. But over and above them is another culture. Not the alien 
Saxon, who belongs, in truth, with the fancy dress … Taking culture in its full sense 
you would be speaking of something quite different: of a way of life determined by 
the National Coal Board, the British Steel Corporation, the Milk Marketing Board, the 
Co-op and Marks and Spencers, the BBC, the Labour Party, the EEC, NATO. But 
that’s not Welsh culture. Maybe, maybe not. It’s how and where most people in 
Wales are living, and in relation to which most meanings and values are in practice 
found. Depopulation, unemployment, exploitation, poverty: if these are not part of 
Welsh culture we are denying large parts of our social experience. (2003j, p. 5) 
 
What makes the narrow ‘customs and costume’ definition of culture seem painfully narrow is 
the totality in all of its expansiveness, the full range of interconnected material, political, 
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economic and institutional forces which contribute to a ‘way of life’. Williams’s case, that we 
should broaden our definition of Welsh culture, appears unarguable, but when he refers to 
‘denying large parts of our social experience’, he is begging the question. For unless the 
modifier ‘social’ is supposed to detach ‘experience’ from the issue of consciousness entirely, 
one would be hard pressed to argue that ‘NATO’, for example, announces itself to 
experience, still less the experience of a place, in anything but the most distant and abstract 
manner. What makes Williams’s argument sound faintly idealistic is the fact that the larger 
material structures governing much of what signifiers like ‘EEC’ and ‘National Coal Board’ 
refer to are deeply resistant to ‘social experience’ of the lived or ‘concrete’ kind. Like 
Lukacs’s unanswered challenge, it alerts us to the necessity of abstraction in grasping the 
totality, which appears in Sartre’s work as the objective, historicizing side of the coin of 
dialectical reason, and in Williams’s as the ‘different consciousness’ required to achieve full 
social representation. It is primarily from the late seventies into the eighties that Williams’s 
writings on the politics of place begin to seriously incorporate this acknowledgement, 
although from at least the ‘common culture’ pieces it was present in the need for an ‘educated 
and participating democracy’, which means among other things a democracy capable of 
abstract or formal analysis. 
 
The central problem which ‘The Importance of Community’ (1977) addresses is why it has 
been so difficult to make the ‘common culture’ argument for socialism, namely that the 
values of close-knit, working class communities ought to be ‘extended towards a political 
movement which should be the establishment of higher relations of this kind and which 
would be the total relations of a society’ (2003h, p. 179). Such efforts, argues Williams, 
underestimated ‘systemic obstacles’ (p. 181) centered around the inscrutability of structures 
of power and property, and the concomitant necessity of ‘the politics of abstract analysis’ (p. 
182). What the general shift towards abstract analysis on the left betokened, Williams argues, 
is ‘the perception that there were now fundamental and systematic historical changes, above 
all in the mode of production but carrying with them virtually every other kind of institutional 
change … which put the basic elements of our social life beyond the reach both of direct 
experience and of simple affirmation, affirmation followed by extension’ (p. 182). What 
Williams regrets in the necessary movement towards abstract analysis is the manner in which 
community was made to seem, and sometimes actually was, the antithesis of both a 
globalizing world and the paradigms now required to understand it: 
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Certain things which are now profoundly systematic, which happen in complex ways 
over very large areas, and which we have had to understand in ways that, in 
comparison with the simple affirmatives extended from experience through 
community to the making of new societies, seem and indeed often are distant and 
dehumanized: the apparent opposite of community. The system of ownership, for 
example, in the modern economy, which cannot be observed, which has to be 
consciously discovered. (2003h, p. 182) 
 
We are a long way, in the foregrounding of that which ‘cannot be observed’, from the 
skepticism of TLR (1961), where Williams approached a semi-Kantian, anti-realist 
epistemology.77 Williams does not cede too much ground to abstract analysis in ‘The 
Importance of Community’, however, insisting that a left politics which negates experience 
cannot simply replace one which affirms it. It is ‘of course’ (2003h, p. 183) right that ‘a 
modern community simply could not be built in the model of these simpler and earlier ways 
of life’ (p. 183) and that ‘the objections being made in the phase of this revival of community 
and nationalist thinking … have to be taken at their full and proper weight’ (p. 183). 
However, Williams argues, ‘if that negative politics is the only politics then it is the final 
victory of a mode of thought which seems to me the ultimate product of capitalist society … 
a mode of thought which really has made relations between men into relations between things 
or relations between concepts’ (p. 184). This, of course, recalling Williams’s discussions of 
Lukacs, would be reification, the dehumanizing and naturalizing logic of the market and of 
abstract universality. Minority nationalist movements, argues Williams, are restoring to the 
necessary but ‘negative’ procedure of abstract analysis ‘the sense of what any of this 
liberation is for, the sense of what the struggle would be able to attain, the sense of what 
human life would be’ (p. 185). They point, in other words, towards a positive project to 
identify a non-reified, non-alienated way of life in service to human needs and aspirations, 
discoverable in experience; ‘a reconnection inside the struggle, including the negations, but 
also the sense of an objective which has the possibility of affirmation’ (p. 185). 
 
It is important to note that Williams, following Sartre’s ‘interiority’, does not see objective 
knowledge as an addition to self-knowledge, but as internal to it. Self-knowledge of a culture 
or a community cannot be achieved without incorporating those elements of culture, which 
can be absent from the ‘text’ (and indeed the territory) of experience. Thus in ‘Remaking 
                                                
77 For example: ‘The new facts about perception make it impossible for us to assume that there is any reality 
experienced by man into which man’s own observations and interpretations do not enter’ (2011b [1961], p. 38). 
Even here, however, Williams provides a realist caveat: perception acts not upon objective reality, but on reality 
as ‘experienced by man’. 
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Welsh History’ (1980d), commenting on the work of the Welsh historian David (Dai) Smith, 
Williams approvingly cites ‘the crucial description of the nineteenth-century “Imperial” and 
“Atlantic” economy, in iron and then coal, which is the true historical matrix. That wealth 
and power, that scale of world-economic significance, is as much to be remembered as the 
subsequent depression, for it is from the political interactions and effects, in each period, that 
the complexity of culture derives’ (2003e, p. 71). Again, Sartre-esque phrases such as ‘the 
true historical matrix’ would have felt utterly out of place in TLR. Culture as it really is, 
Williams suggests, in its full historicity, cannot be understood without this information. The 
combination of subjective experience in a place, including memory, with objective, ‘learned’ 
information creates a new kind of knowledge and new affective and personal resonances. As 
an example, Williams recalls his father growing potatoes: ‘But I just did not know the 
complex history of potato-setting, and its formal and informal labour obligations as traced by 
David Jenkins’ (p. 71). The result, far from overwriting experience with cold abstraction, is 
an unlocking of cultural identification: 
 
The personal memory, local and specific, is then suddenly connected with the history 
of thousands of people, through several generations. As the particular and the general, 
the personal and the social, are at last brought together, each kind of memory and 
sense of identity is clarified and strengthened. The relation between people and ‘a 
people’ begin to move in the mind. (2003e, p. 71) 
 
This, of course, was precisely the object of the perspective of totality, as elaborated for realist 
literature in TLR, and the reference point of the affective complex known as a ‘structure of 
feeling’. Where the general overwrites the particular, on the left, it polarizes ‘an idea of the 
proletariat against the idea of community’ (2003e, p. 72), an anachronistic Marxist temptation 
(‘the proletariat has no country’) against which Williams had endorsed Sartre on the Basques. 
It is, of course, tautologically true to say that ‘the proletariat has no country’, since ‘the 
proletariat’ is a term originating in abstract analysis, at the level of absolute generality; it is 
true, in that it refers to the universal, borderless reality of exploitation, but not to reality as 
experienced, day-to-day, by the majority of working people.78 Qua Sartre, we would have to 
say that the true sentence ‘the proletariat has no country’ does not, at the level of its simple 
elaboration, satisfy the requirements of dialectical reason. But neither does the simple 
(bourgeois) assertion that nation or community are what is ‘real’ in people’s lives, while class 
is a mere abstraction or overlaid theory. What both Sartre and Williams’s positions imply is 
                                                
78 In the structurally identical sentence ‘homo sapiens has no country’, the tautology is evident. 
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that praxis is not achievable except for that social actor who experiences her interiority 
objectively; as historically and materially conditioned and conditioning (thus Sartre’s 
assertion that the national and the class struggle are inextricable). 
 
Ellen Meiksins Wood (2003) describes capitalism as a mode of production in which the 
economic and the political are separated out, both literally and ideologically, because the 
extraction of a surplus is carried out through economic means, in contrast to the direct 
coercive force used in, for example, the feudal system. The appropriating class thus 
establishes a certain distance, in reality and in appearance, between its own activities and the 
civic and cultural lives of the working majority, so that while continuing to exert social 
hegemony, it becomes spectral, its character as a class opaque. This raises severe problems 
for the socialist novelist who wishes to set his action in a well-observed locale, as Williams 
acknowledges of his own fiction in Politics and Letters (1979): 
The class relations in Border Country come through literally at the end of the line, in 
the way the railway company tries to treat the workers after the General Strike 
through its remote telegrams and notices. The capitalist world is not a presence, it is 
never directly introduced in the novel. If it had been, I would have felt in a quandary. 
(2015, p. 284) 
Williams doesn’t explain the nature of the quandary; we can assume, on the basis of later 
essays such as ‘Region and Class in the Novel’ (1985c), that it consists in the extreme 
difficulty of representing ‘the capitalist world’ i.e. large-scale systems of economic 
oppression within the narrative parameters of a local experience. In that essay, Williams 
foregrounds the problem of distance and opacity: ‘The local class enemy is usually the 
manager, or more broadly the local petty bourgeoisie. The dominant bourgeoisie is less 
visible and indeed is often, at this stage of capitalist development, physically absent’ (1985c, 
p. 237). We are returned to the Lukacsian problematic, with Williams even noting the irony 
‘that the best historical fiction about the Welsh working class has been written by a 
sympathetic outside observer, who could read as well as experience the history: Alexander 
Cordell  (see The Rape of the Fair Country (1959)’ (p. 237). This is ironic, but only from the 
received nationalist perspective that close personal experience is equal to ‘better 
understanding’; from the dialectical perspective, it follows that someone with a grasp of the 
material history of a place might write better historical fiction than someone with intimate 
knowledge only of the local present. That Williams endorses the quality of being someone 
‘who could read as well as experience’ is redolent of that life-long commitment to popular 
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education, what was called ‘cultural revolution’ in the sixties, as the enabler of the 
perspective of totality (or of dialectical reason). Historical literacy, then, as one way of 
evading abstract particularism.  
D. Williams (2003) correctly notes that Williams’s advocacy of cultural pluralism does not 
ally him with postmodern theorists of cultural ‘hybridity’: ‘Williams’s pluralism always 
involves a simultaneous gesture towards a community of belief and action which is hardly 
compatible with the cultural and political relativism of postmodernism’ (xliv-xlv). Against 
the temptation to read Williams’s firm rejection, in Sartrean fashion, of cultural ‘essences’ as 
a ‘postmodern’ impulse, we must recall that postmodernism has no monopoly on anti-
essentialism; it is also a hallmark of historicizing but non-relative forms of thought, among 
which Williams’s must be counted. The key distinguishing feature between Williams and 
postmodernism, I would argue, is his commitment to philosophical (as well as literary) 
realism, the maintenance in theory of objects beyond consciousness, to which our access may 
be indirect and mediated. The purpose of education, then, of becoming historically and 
economically literate, can be neither the discovery of combative essences with which to fight 
the essences wielded by imperialism, nor the overwriting of experience and interiority with 
determining systems articulated in the language of science and Enlightenment. Such non-
dialectical logics, as Williams’s analysis in ‘Wales and England’ (1983) suggests, have as 
their end-point failed political strategies: 
At its most negative, this has led, on the one hand, to archaic or residual types of 
nationalism, in which a received, traditional and unproblematic identity has been 
asserted as overriding all those modern economic and political relations which are in 
fact inevitable and determining. It has led, on the other hand, to pseudo-modernist 
rejections of the specificities of Welshness and the Welsh situation, in which the 
confident imperatives of the incorporation – a transforming Liberalism, a redeeming 
and transforming Labourism – are repeated long after they have practically failed, 
both at the centre and in Wales itself. (2003, p. 23-24) 
Liberalism and Labourism, in this schema, are the abstract universalities of Welsh anti-
nationalism, while essentialising forms of Welsh nationalism play the role of abstract 
particularism. Nationalist false consciousness figures in the ‘ideological notion … that Wales 
is classless, because we do indeed have easier immediate ways of speaking to each other’ (p. 
25), so that a cultural history of solidarity, misinterpreted by essentialism, could now be ‘a 
powerful barrier to that practical communalism which requires difficult transformations of 
political and economic institutions and relations, rather than friendly and informal 
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accommodations to them’ (p. 25). And yet Wales, argues Williams, with its complex 
experience of both socialist and nationalist politics within a context of historical oppression, 
may yet be closer than England to that concrete particularism (and thus concrete universality) 
which Sartre identified and advocated for the Basques: ‘The Welsh of course, have been 
inside these cross-pressures for much longer than the English. And as a result we have had to 
learn that we need to solve the real contradictions between nationality and class, and between 
local well-being and the imperatives of a large-scale system. Consequently, we may be 
further along the road to a relevant if inevitably painful contemporary social consciousness’ 
(p. 25). Wales, then, as a potential locus for the synthesis of substance and system. 
*     *     * 
I have argued that the shift from the first to the second phases of Williams’s development was 
the movement from a kind of democratic monoculturalism (the common culture) to an 
advocacy of cultural pluralism which, at least in theory, evades ephemerality79 by better 
reflecting the diversity of real experiences; the stability of the plural system is to be found in 
its correspondence with really existing differences between nationally ‘co-habiting’ ways of 
life. This is cultural diversity at the level of the syntagm, the co-presence of cultural units 
within the national text/territory. But the development from the second to the third phases of 
Williams’s development expresses a problem which is not captured by the monoculturalism-
pluralism antagonism, but which instead refers us to presence/absence relations within the 
cultural totality i.e. between those which are routinely experienced and those which are not. 
The elements which are not experienced are most often those which relate to the larger, extra-
territorial and structural properties of class relations in developed capitalism. Moreover, the 
experienced and the non-experienced elements of a culture are by no means independent of 
one another; larger structural relations limit and exert pressure on the symbolization of 
experience, while received definitions are used both to solidify and to challenge existing 
structural relations.80 The perspective of totality must incorporate both axes, as well as their 
mutual interrelations and interdependencies, to be properly ‘total’.  
‘The Culture of Nations’, a chapter in Williams’s last book-length work of social criticism, 
Towards 2000 (1983), strongly echoes Sartre’s ‘The Burgos Trials’ and is perhaps the best 
                                                
79 Or, as D. Williams (2003) puts it, ‘a self-frustrating libertarianism’ in which ‘the “nation” is regarded as a 
vessel in which a limitless plurality of cultures may co-inhabit and coexist with equal validity’ (xxxiv).  
80 See Chapter Three for a fuller discussion of these processes in Williams’s writing. 
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expression of Williams’s mature, totalizing view. Like Sartre, Williams conceives of the 
dominant forms of nationalism and the nation-state as weapons in the arsenal of class 
hegemony. ‘It is an evident historical fact’, says Williams, ‘that the processes of political 
combination and definition are initiated by a ruling class: indeed to say so is virtually 
tautologous. The building of states, at whatever level, is intrinsically a ruling-class operation’ 
(2003g, p. 192). From this proceeds the traditional opposition between socialist radicalism 
and minority nationalism, but this sits uneasily, Williams notes, with the fact that ‘what has 
been most remarkable in the twentieth century has been the successful fusion of nationalism 
and political revolution, including armed struggles, in many other parts of the world, from 
Cuba to Vietnam’ (p. 194). There is clearly, on this account, a bedrock of reciprocity between 
the two which makes itself felt in some historical situations (colonies), and not in others (the 
metropoles). Social democrats imbibe the existing national definitions and this, combined 
with their antipathy to social revolution, exacerbates the problem: 
 
For what [the social democrats] will not challenge, except in selected marginal ways, 
is capitalism itself. Yet it is capitalism, especially in its most developed stages, which 
is the main source of all the contemporary confusions about peoples and nations and 
their necessary loyalties and bonds. Moreover it is, in the modern epoch, capitalism 
which has disrupted and overridden natural communities. (2003g, p. 195) 
 
It is capitalism, in other words, which overrides concrete particularism in favour of abstract 
universality. In the modern period, moreover, the use of nationalist rhetoric by the ruling 
classes veils an ever increasing commitment to international capital flows; what remains of 
‘national’ efficacy is channeled ever more narrowly towards maintaining a ‘socially 
organised and socially disciplined population’ (pp. 196-197), subjects of a capitalism (we 
now call it neoliberalism) ever more detached from the real lives of people in places. Thus is 
continually overridden ‘what might be called the true nation, the actual and diverse people’ 
(p. 197). An atomizing commercial culture, meanwhile, cleaves apart the social connections 
which might have restored a sense of the ‘nation’ concomitant with solidarity. Perverse 
symptoms then abound, such as the counter-intuitive fact that ‘“nationalization” is not 
perceived as connected to “nationalism” …while a transnational strategy, pursued even to the 
point where a national economy loses heavily within unrestricted competition, is by its 
structural retention of the most artificial national images perceived as the “patriotic” course’ 
(p. 197). Such, argues Williams, are the ‘intolerable confusions’ (p. 199) of the modern 
nation-state. 
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Williams’s late critique of the nation-state as a disciplinary technology of the ruling class is 
by no means a restatement of the traditional socialist complaint against proletarian division. 
He remains fully committed to the politics of place, and to forms of common identity which 
incorporate particular forms of ‘placed’ life: ‘It is by working and living together, with some 
real place and common interest to identify with, and as free as may be from external 
ideological definitions, whether divisive or universalist, that real social identities are formed’ 
(2003g, p. 201). Bringing such a condition about, however, will be as much a matter of scale, 
and thus of practical organisation, as the ‘free’ formation of identity. ‘The nation-state, in its 
classical European forms’, argues Williams, ‘is at once too large and too small for the range 
of real social purposes’ (p. 201). The formulation that follows attempts, in two strokes, to 
solve the problems laid along what I have described as the presence/absence axes of cultural 
self-definition. In the first instance, Williams’s analysis recommends the restoration of a 
measure of substance to the empty vastness of the modern nation, which is ‘too large, even in 
the old nation-states such as Britain, to develop full social identities in their real diversity’ (p. 
201). Since no workable combination of meanings and definitions is possible in such states, 
Williams suggests that ‘a large part of the now alienated and centralized powers and 
resources must be actively regained, by new actual societies which in their own terms, and 
nobody else’s, define themselves’, and further, that ‘all effective socialist policies, over the 
coming generations, must be directed towards this practice’ (pp. 201-202). In order for the 
real co-existence of distinct ‘ways of life’ to be achievable under the signifier of a self-
defining society, then, political relations must be reduced to a scale concomitant with lived 
experience. 
 
The recalibration of borders in line with lived experience does not, of course, solve the 
problem of the epistemological opacity or ‘absence’ of structural class relations in developed 
capitalism. Williams, now fully aware of these difficulties, incorporates them into his 
proposed solution: 
 
At the same time it is obvious that for many purposes not only these more real 
societies but also the existing nation-states are too small. The trading, monetary and 
military problems which now show this to be true, and which have so heavily 
encroached on the supposed ‘sovereignty’ of nation states, would not disappear in any 
movement to placeable communal self-management. (2003g, p. 202) 
 
While Williams does not claim that these structural issues are insurmountable, he insists that 
‘we cannot say, at any level, that these placeable self-managing societies could be 
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“sovereign”. Even to say that they could be “autonomous” is taking a very limited sense’ (p. 
202). The determining force of class relations here asserts itself, returning us to Sartre’s 
warnings about U.S. neo-imperialism to the liberal Basque nationalists. It also recalls 
Williams’s critique of the artist who falsely believes himself free from social determination; 
the Sartrean model of subjective apprehension of objective determinants which Williams 
moved towards in his aesthetic theory, is also perceptible in his sharper reckoning with the 
objective determinants of a nation’s range of action and power of self-definition. What is 
wanted, argues Williams, is not autonomy per se, but particularism as a principle and an 
ideal: ‘we have to explore new forms of variable societies, in which over the whole range of 
social purposes different sizes of society are defined for different kinds of issue and decision’ 
(p. 202). This ‘variable socialism’ (p. 203) would replace the current system of localities, 
regions and nations, all subject to a centralized power, with ‘an absolute refusal of overriding 
national and international bodies which do not derive their specified powers directly from the 
participation and negotiation of actual self-governing societies’ (p. 203). Communities would 
interact on the basis of ‘rooted contacts and mobilities’ (p. 203), on selective issues and 
projects, ‘negotiated from real bases’ (p. 203). Such a system will be needed, argues 
Williams, or else ‘we shall be condemned to endure the accelerated pace of false and frenetic 
nationalisms and a reckless and uncontrollable global transnationalism’ (p. 203); in short, the 
contradictions of late capitalist globalization. 
 
It is far from a perfect model. Insufficient emphasis is placed on the fact that Williams’s self-
governing societies would presumably have socialist economies; if they did not, it is difficult 
to see how direct democratic fluidity of political borders could contend with the hard logic of 
capital accumulation in the long run. Williams’s vision may, in this sense, be putting the cart 
before the horse, solving a specifically capitalist cultural problematic by means that would 
require the revolutionary emergence of socialism before they could be instituted. But he does 
call it ‘variable socialism’ and makes it clear in ‘The Culture of Nations’ that capitalism is the 
main problem and must be overthrown. The absence of revolutionary rupture nevertheless 
gives the impression of a smooth or evolutionary progress towards realistic cultural and 
political forms. The missing break or rupture with capitalist social relations is then a missed 
opportunity to discuss what that rupture itself might mean for the nation-state and the self-
definition of effective communities; we might imagine this as a development of the themes of 
Modern Tragedy for the politics of place. As we shall see in the next chapter, Williams is not 
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a pacifist; violence, as part of an expansively defined revolutionary process, is by no means 
disavowed in his work. 
 
It may be that Williams’s ‘variable socialism’ resolves the ‘common culture’ problematic in 
favour of ‘substance’. A system of fluid social scales, aligned with the real diversity of 
experiences and interests, it would free ordinary people, theoretically, from imputed, unitary 
and false definitions of nationhood and community. However, the problem of cultural 
absence, the opacity of structural relations (‘system’) is more stubborn; it remains to be 
explained how class relations are to be made present at the level of consciousness, in other 
words, how dialectical reason/the perspective of totality are to be produced and practiced 
psychologically. If this is not a requirement of Williams’s schema, it remains unclear why 
people would opt for a variable socialism rather than a variable capitalism. For while it is in 
principle reasonable to assume that democratic societies operating at variable scales would be 
free to establish systems of common, democratic ownership, this is only a formal freedom; 
the inclination and capacity to do so, if we take Williams and Sartre seriously, will depend on 
structural class relations appearing to consciousness as fully incorporated features of their 
social identities. If praxis is not to be the preserve of a philosophical or political elite, the 
question of under what conditions an entire people may become possessed of self-definitions 
which are neither imputed (‘socialism from above’) nor false (bourgeois), neither abstractly 
universal nor abstractly particular, must be answered. This is the question of hegemony; it is 
to Williams’s reconceptualization, in the seventies, of Gramsci’s ubiquitous concept that we 
now turn. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Williams and Gramsci: Culture, Submission, Emergence 
 
An outline of Williams’s engagement with Gramsci 
 
There are barriers to assessing the influence of Gramsci on Williams with which we did not 
have to contend in the preceding chapters. There it was possible at the outset to provide 
summaries of Williams’s interactions with the texts of Lukacs and Sartre spanning multiple 
decades, and to map these over developments in Williams’s thought. Due primarily to what 
David Forgacs (1989) calls the ‘fragmentary and posthumous’ (p. 71) nature of Gramsci’s 
writings and their publication in English, there is no significant mention of Gramsci in 
Williams’s work until ‘Lucien Goldmann and Marxism’s Alternative Tradition’ (1972), 
published a year after the English edition of the standard Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (1971). A less adequate selection, The Modern Prince and 
other Writings (1957) had appeared much earlier; Williams may well have read this but, as 
Forgacs notes, the book ‘did not sell well and had relatively little resonance at the time 
beyond a small group of people actively interested in Marxist politics’ (1989, p. 73). Of 
course, Williams may be considered such an interested person, but while Gwyn A. Williams 
named him as someone to whom comparison with Gramsci might be made as early as 1960, I 
think Forgacs is right to describe Williams and Thompson’s work in this period as an indirect 
brokerage of Gramscian themes: ‘It was not so much a question of Williams or Thompson 
having read and been influenced by Gramsci in their own work at this stage … it was that 
their work on culture provided a framework, an intellectual space, within which Gramsci, or a 
certain side of Gramsci, could be made visible and readable’ (p. 74). The more direct 
brokerage came from Anderson and Nairn, whose ‘theses’ explicitly referenced and utilised 
Gramsci, and we have already noted Anderson’s foregrounding, in the mid-sixties, of what 
Williams would later describe as Marxism’s ‘alternative tradition’.81 
 
While I will read elements of Williams’s earlier work, in particular parts of The Long 
Revolution and Modern Tragedy, as broadly Gramscian in orientation, I will refrain from 
                                                
81 See p. 193. 
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claims of direct influence. It is only with the seventies that Gramsci’s influence becomes 
explicit and indeed central to Williams’s development. Even in this period of heightened 
interaction, however, Williams is not dealing with specific texts or passages (although 
Williams had referenced The Prison Notebooks in the 1971 essay), but with a concept: 
hegemony. In ‘Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory’ (1973) and Marxism and 
Literature (1977), Williams develops an original reading of hegemony, focussing it tightly 
around questions of lived experience and cultural production, and moreover temporalizing it 
via the theoretical triad of ‘dominant, residual and emergent’. It is a reading of hegemony 
which is at once narrower and more radical than Stuart Hall’s (1988) better known but 
broader and more orthodox (in the sense of closer to Gramsci) use in his analysis of 
Thatcherism in the eighties. Williams’s earlier reading, I argue, is more of a re-reading, a 
refraction of Gramsci’s political insights through the lens of, yes, a British empiricist 
tradition, but also a firmly totalising perspective learned from Lukacs, Goldmann and Sartre, 
and which found a philosophical expression conducive to Williams in the Critique. This is 
not to say that Gramsci himself was not a totalising thinker, but only that Williams’s reading 
of hegemony is less indebted to versions of ‘ideology’ and ‘culture’ which stem from 
orthodox Marxist applications of the metaphor of base and superstructure. Indeed, the core of 
Williams’s theory of hegemony is a heterodox Marxist critique of this, in Williams’s view 
insufficiently totalising, paradigm.  
 
In the final section of this chapter, in addition, I will relate Williams’s re-reading of 
hegemony, alongside his broader writings on revolution, to another Gramscian concept: the 
war of position. This was Gramsci’s term for the cultural struggle that socialists in the 
developed capitalist countries would need to wage in addition to, or even in replacement of, 
traditional insurrectionary struggle (or ‘war of manoeuvre’). This was a) because of the 
greater repressive capacity of the State in the West, and b) because in the West, civil society 
or ‘culture’ was itself a field of class domination and political contestation, ‘a powerful 
system of fortresses and earthworks’ (2003, p. 238), in Gramsci’s phrase, which would 
prevent and/or survive the felling of the State (even were that materially possible). By tracing 
the development of Williams’s thinking about revolution from the tacitly gradualist and 
‘culturalist’ (quasi-Gramscian) analysis of The Long Revolution (1961) to the bolder 
endorsements of insurrection (or the ‘short revolution’) in ‘You’re a Marxist, Aren’t You?’ 
(1976) and Politics and Letters (1979), I establish the existence of a strict dialectic, in 
Williams’s later work, between war of position and war of manoeuvre, the revolutions long 
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and short. While Williams is not generally considered a ‘theorist’ of revolution, I believe that 
the late re-conceptualization of hegemony permits us to construct a revolutionary theory from 
his work, a task which I look to the crucial interregnum passages in Gramsci’s Prison 
Notebooks for assistance in outlining at the close of this chapter. As might be expected, this 
section is more speculative, interpretative and overtly political than the foregoing.  
 
The significance of Williams’s theorization of hegemony has not been lost on critics. In his 
recent essay ‘The Heirs of Gramsci’ (2016) Anderson, perhaps the most committed scholar of 
hegemony on the British left, has argued that while the reception of Gramsci in Britain began 
in the early sixties, ‘the starting point for the major influence of his writing came with an 
essay by Raymond Williams’ (2016, p. 2). The essay referred to is ‘Base and Superstructure 
in Marxist Cultural Theory’, from which Anderson quotes in the following discussion: 
 
[Williams] at once endorsed and developed Gramsci’s conception of hegemony as a 
‘central system of practices, meanings and values saturating the consciousness of a 
society at a much deeper level than ordinary notions of ideology’. Emphasizing that 
any such hegemony always involved a complex set of structures that had to be 
continually ‘renewed, recreated and defended’, actively adjusting to and where 
possible incorporating alternative practices and meanings, Williams distinguished two 
types of oppositional culture, each traceable to a class, capable of escaping such 
incorporation: residual and emergent – that is, rooted in either a past or in what might 
prove a future. For by definition, Williams insisted, hegemony was selective: ‘no 
mode of production, and therefore no dominant society or order of a society, and 
therefore no dominant culture, in reality exhausts human practice, human energy, 
human intention.’ (2016, p. 2) 
 
Williams’s vital and original move, according to Anderson, was to perform a partial 
disconnect between hegemony and ideology, conceiving of the dominant ideas of a society as 
being formed by a multitude of material practices, rather than simply being foisted onto them 
by a ruling elite. In this way, hegemony was rescued from its predominant sense as bourgeois 
control of culture and ideas. Anderson also notes the distinctively positive valence Williams 
attributes to some forms of hegemony, that is, the possibility of the existence of ‘counter-
hegemony’ or emergent elements within a cultural and ideological structure. For Gramsci, of 
course, hegemony had a very specific meaning: the consensual elements of class rule. While 
Gramsci does relate the idea of hegemony to the idea of a ‘dominant culture’, there is never 
any suggestion that such ‘dominance’ is anything other than that of a class. The degree to 
which Williams’s analysis conforms to the idea of hegemony as some form of class 
domination in or through culture is then the crucial question. Throughout this chapter, I 
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theorize Williams’s reading of hegemony as a movement away from its classical (Gramscian) 
formulation and towards something closer to reification, an accommodation to capitalist 
social relations rooted less in ‘ideology’ and ‘consent’ than in a sense of intractability 
attached to the experience of a persistent social reality. Let us begin, accordingly, with 
hegemony in its dominant valence, as the cultural dimension of class rule. 
 
Hegemonic culture as lived domination 
 
In his essay ‘Base and Superstructure’ (2005c), Williams argues that Marxism errs whenever 
it chooses to ground its analyses in the titular binary. ‘It would be in many ways preferable’, 
he suggests, ‘if we could begin from a proposition which originally was equally central, 
equally authentic: namely the proposition that social being determines consciousness’ (2005c, 
p. 31). Indeed, I would argue that Williams’s entire oeuvre is predicated on a (usually 
implicit) endorsement of this shorthand of Marx’s for the fundamental starting point of 
materialist analysis. It is there in the claim of The Long Revolution (1961) that art is a form of 
the communication of lived experience, where a life materially lived (social being) 
determines the forms of experience and response (consciousness) which arise and may be 
communicated in works of art. It is there in the typology of tragedy in Modern Tragedy 
(1966), wherein shifting experiences of tragedy (consciousness) are analysed as arising from 
transformations in lived social forms (social being). For Williams, the fact that ‘the 
proposition of the determining base and the determined superstructure has been commonly 
held to be the key to Marxist cultural analysis’ (2005c, p. 31) is evidence of a path poorly 
chosen: away from the basic ‘social-materialist’ emphasis on ideas arising from life and 
towards the mechanical and economistic assumptions of base and superstructure.82 We should 
note that the basic difference between ‘social being determines consciousness’ and ‘base and 
superstructure’ is that the former describes a causal relation between material forces/practices 
and ideas, whereas the latter describes a causal relation between two levels, both of which 
may be said to ‘contain’ material practices/forces and ideas. It is thus a more complex and 
falsifiable assertion that there exists a relation of determination between base and 
superstructure, since the assertion is that a number of spheres of social life are determined by 
a single privileged sphere (as opposed to the grander but less controversial notion that the 
                                                
82 It is worth noting that a focus on the ‘diffusely’ materialist over the structural emphasis was also a defining 
feature of E. P. Thompson’s Marxism; indeed, the rejection of base and superstructure in favour of local 
materialist analyses which are regarded as more ‘historical’ than those based on models of structural 
determination is the core theoretical similarity between Thompson and Williams. 
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sum of all ideas results from the sum of all material practices). The determining sphere is 
normally conceived as what Gramsci called ‘the world of production’ (2003, p. 12).  
 
In ‘Base and Superstructure’, Williams proposes a revaluation of the common definitions of 
‘base’ and ‘superstructure’ and their supposedly determinative relation: 
 
We have to revalue ‘determination’ towards the setting of limits and the exerting of 
pressure, and away from predicted, prefigured and controlled content. We have to 
revalue ‘superstructure’ towards a related range of cultural practices, and away from 
reflected, reproduced, or specifically dependent content. And, crucially, we have to 
revalue the ‘the base’ from the notion of a fixed economic or technological 
abstraction, and towards the specific activities of men in real social and economic 
relationships, containing fundamental contradictions and variations and therefore 
always in a state of dynamic process. (2005c, p. 34) 
 
This is a straight-forward repudiation of these terms; with the superstructure rendered as ‘a 
related range of cultural practices’ and the base as ‘the specific activities of men in real social 
and economic relationships’, the distinction between the two is elided. With this blurring of 
the ‘vertical’ distinction, the ‘horizontal’ distinctions between different areas of social life 
within the base (and indeed within the superstructure) are also blurred. There are still partial 
and dynamic determinations (limits and pressures) but they proceed between and among a 
multitude of material spheres. By rejecting the traditional description of the base as 
comprising only the ‘productive forces’, Williams is guarding against the ‘dismissal as 
superstructural, and in this sense as merely secondary, of certain vital productive social 
forces, which are in the broad sense, from the beginning, basic’ (p. 35). Williams is neither 
conflating base and superstructure with ‘social being determines consciousness’, nor reading 
the superstructure as merely ‘immaterial’; he is critiquing base and superstructure where it 
strongly deviates from Marx’s more prosaic materialist binary. 
 
Two things, both crucial to Marxist theory, risk being lost along with the traditional 
definitions of base and superstructure. The first is a properly Marxist theory of historical 
change, normally conceived of as arising from the interaction between the forces and 
relations of production (both ‘base’ phenomena), an issue which Williams does not take up at 
any length. The more salient issue here is that of class influence on the non-economic 
component of the social order. Gramsci’s strategic orientation towards a war of position in 
the West implied that ‘culture’ or ‘civil society’ has at the very least a ‘class character’ 
(valorizing its status as a battleground of hegemony); in stronger versions, culture figures as a 
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reflection and support of class rule. Traditional versions of base and superstructure theorize 
this by attributing to the base, with its clear and determinate class character, a strong causal 
influence on the superstructure/civil society/culture. ‘Culturalist’ positions such as Williams’s 
seek to emphasize the status of culture not as a class-determined or class-reflective sphere, 
but as a contested range of meanings and practices which present the opportunity of building 
the foundations of socialism within spheres of society other than those which, being 
attributed to the base, are thought to have a privileged causal efficacy. The culturalist will 
then be expected to offer, in the absence of the causality affirmed by base/superstructure 
analysis, a replacement process to explain how a culture becomes ‘classed’ in the first place. 
 
Williams acknowledges that the deconstruction of base and superstructure throws the class 
character of culture into doubt, and is keen to correct for it. The ‘levelling’ of base and 
superstructure militates, of course, in favour of the concept of totality, so that the question 
becomes: will a reorientation towards totality permit Williams to retain a Marxist analysis of 
how class influences culture/civil society? Williams argues that totality is ‘in many ways 
more acceptable than the notion of base and superstructure’ (2005c, p. 36), firstly because it 
remains ‘compatible with the notion of social being determining consciousness’ (p. 35), since 
one can theorize the material elements of the totality as determining the ideational ones, and 
secondly, because it avoids the ‘single-sphere’ reductionism of base and superstructure. But 
Williams is also aware that ‘total’ analysis does not automatically foreground class influence 
as immanent to capitalist society (as base and superstructure does), meaning that such 
influence, here figured awkwardly as ‘intention’, must be actively reintroduced into the 
theory: 
 
If totality is simply concrete, if it is simply the recognition of a large variety of 
miscellaneous and contemporaneous practices, then it is essentially empty of any 
content that could be called Marxist. Intention, the notion of intention, restores the 
key question, or rather the key emphasis. For while it is true that any society is a 
complex whole of such practices, it is also true than any society has a specific 
organization, a specific structure, and that the principles of this organization and 
structure, can be seen as directly related to certain social intentions, intentions by 
which we define the society, intentions which in all our experience have been the rule 
of a particular class. (2005c, p. 36) 
 
Here Williams acknowledges that the basic materialism of ‘social being determines 
consciousness’, even refracted through the concept of totality, is not sufficient for Marxist 
cultural analysis; class must remain a central analytic category. The somewhat idealist use of 
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‘intention’ sits uneasily with the avowed materialism of ‘social being determines 
consciousness’. It is a small step, however, from intention to experience (the watchword of 
Williams’s cultural theory), so that I think we may safely read ‘intentions’ as primarily 
attesting to the presence in dominant cultural forms of the communicated experience of the 
ruling class. 
 
Hegemony is the concept which allows Williams to restore to a materialist conception of 
totality the specifically Marxist emphasis on class domination. We know that Williams 
regards ‘totality’ as describing both the immanent relation between the material and the 
ideational (practical activity and consciousness) and the basic interrelatedness of different 
social spheres. Hegemony, Williams argues, incorporates the dimension of oppression into 
culture in a manner which is uniquely compatible with the ‘total’ emphasis:  
 
Hegemony supposes the existence of something which is truly total, which is not 
merely secondary or superstructural, like the weak sense of ideology, but which is 
lived at such a depth, which saturates the society to such an extent, and which, as 
Gramsci put it, even constitutes the substance and limit of common sense for most 
people under its sway, that it corresponds to the reality of social experience very 
much more clearly than any notions derived from the formula of base and 
superstructure. For if ideology were merely some abstract, imposed set of notions, if 
our social and political and cultural ideas and assumptions and habits were really the 
result of specific manipulation, of a kind of overt training which might be simply 
ended or withdrawn, then the society would be very much easier to move than in 
practice it has ever been or is. (2005c, p. 37) 
  
What Williams is critiquing here is essentially the Althusserian model of interpellation, in 
which subjects are constructed as agents by dominant ideological institutions (the educational 
and legal systems, the family etc.), as in Althusser’s phrase: ‘all ideology hails or 
interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects’ (2008, p. 47). Williams restores to 
ideology a firm basis in the lives and experiences of human beings which, in keeping with 
‘social being determines consciousness’, are the only guarantors of ideation. Dominant ideas 
do not arise from indoctrination or implantation, but are immanent in social life itself, a 
notion comparable to Gramsci’s (2003) idea of hegemony as occurring spontaneously (p. 12) 
in the minds of workers due to their experience of capitalist society. 
 
Now, we can agree with Williams that by dispensing with the base/superstructure metaphor 
we might also dispense with the ‘ideological dissemination’ theory of class rule. But if in 
doing so we sever the link between class rule and culture/consciousness entirely, we will be 
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forced to question the validity of the war of position. The utility of engaging in socialist 
struggle on the battleground of culture depends, after all, on culture actually being a site of 
class power; if this is so, but the mediating process is not ideological dissemination, then 
what is it? Of course, while culture may be a site of class power, it is never only this; if it 
was, the probability of counter-hegemony would be nil. But we still need to account for the 
formation of the dominant element in a given culture. Why do some elements in a culture 
produce or contribute to the dominant, for example bourgeois, hegemony? Base and 
superstructure has an answer: culture reflects the class domination active in the materially 
determining (economic) sphere of social life. Williams’s diffuse notion of hegemony cannot 
evade the requirement to posit causality of some kind (indeed, the idea of ‘limits and 
pressures’ gestures towards a causal framework – recall Anderson’s claim of influence 
between Williams and E. O. Wright). The passage below gives us a sense of how Williams’s 
is conceptualizing the ‘dominant’ level of a culture: 
 
I would say first that in any society, in any particular period, there is a central system 
of practices, meanings and values, which we can properly call dominant and effective. 
This implies no presumption about its value. All I am saying is that it is central … 
what I have in mind is the central, effective and dominant system of meanings and 
values, which are not merely abstract but which are organized and lived. This is why 
hegemony is not to be understood at the level of mere opinion or mere manipulation. 
It is a whole body of practices and expectations; our assignments of energy, our 
ordinary understanding of the nature of man and of his world. It is a system of 
meanings and values which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally 
confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense 
of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult for most 
members of the society to move in most areas of their lives. (2005c, p. 38) 
 
Does ‘dominant’, here, do the work of ‘hegemonic’? The utility of ‘hegemony’ vis-a-vis 
‘totality’ was supposed to be that it restored the element of oppression; the danger in 
replacing this term with ‘dominant’ is that we end up describing not the hegemonic (class-
dominated) but the prevalent characteristics of a culture. There is an important advance in the 
acknowledgment that such characteristics emerge out of the lived experience of people in 
their daily lives rather than from ideological and institutional manipulation. But if they are to 
be read as evidence of the class-dominated nature of life under capitalism, Williams will need 
to explain how those ‘dominant’ meanings and values which reinforce class rule are actually 
produced. In Gramsci’s analysis, hegemony results from the class character of certain basic 
processes which found the class character of civil society or culture, wherein hegemony is 
most ‘deeply’ produced and ingrained. One could dispense with those passages in Gramsci 
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which imply direct institutional manipulation and replace them with a more Williams-esque 
emphasis on lived experience without altering that basic causal chain (i. production, ii. civil 
society/culture, iii. consciousness). But wouldn’t this version of Gramscianism still be 
practicing the kind of reductive, base and superstructure analysis which Williams was 
attempting to move beyond? 
 
The contradiction outlined above may be resolved by recognizing that class domination 
inheres in everyday life, that class is a direct property of life under capitalism rather than an 
indirect property requiring the mediation of a ‘mechanism’ to convert economic exploitation 
into specific cultural patterns. It would only be a weakness of Williams’s theory that 
‘dominant’ refers to ‘prevalent’ cultural elements if that culture were not already, by 
definition, classed under capitalism. The life of a worker, from which she draws her 
experience and an often contradictory set of meanings and values, is the life of a worker: 
exploitation is woven through the fabric of her consciousness and activity prior to the 
imposition of the articulate ideology of bourgeois cultural institutions. It is here that I see 
Williams moving away from hegemony as it has typically been understood (as ‘ideological 
leadership’ or ‘cultural domination’) and towards a term we have had ample cause to discuss 
in previous chapters: reification. Lukacs had used this to describe an epistemological 
distortion, rooted in the material reality of commodity production, wherein workers perceive 
reality as a series of fragmentary interactions rather than as a totality of integrated and classed 
social relations. What Lukacsian reification shares with Williams’s analysis of hegemony is 
the idea that reified forms of consciousness are not the product of indoctrination but of the 
experience of workers in capitalist society. As reification naturalizes the social order, 
reactionary elements of consciousness appear as mental concessions to ‘common sense’ or an 
‘absolute because experienced reality’. Individuals adapt to what both is and appears as a 
social reality unchangeable by individual acts of resistance.  
 
In Marxism and Literature (1977), Williams developed his theory of hegemony in ways 
which a) emphasized its class bias in more materialist terms, and b) interpreted it as a kind of 
dialectical synthesis of the terms ‘culture’ and ‘ideology’ as they had previously appeared in 
Marxist theory. Here is Williams’s articulation of that synthesis, worth quoting at length: 
 
‘Hegemony’ goes beyond ‘culture’, as previously defined, in its insistence on relating 
the ‘whole social process’ to specific distributions of power and influence. To say that 
‘men’ define their whole lives is true only in abstraction. In any actual society there 
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are specific inequalities in means and therefore in capacity to realize this process. In a 
class society these are primarily inequalities between classes. Gramsci therefore 
introduced the necessary recognition of domination and subordination in what has 
still, however, to be recognized as a whole social process. 
 
It is in just this recognition of the wholeness of the process that the concept of 
‘hegemony’ goes beyond ‘ideology’ … Ideology, in its normal senses, is a relatively 
formal and articulated system of meanings, values, and beliefs, of a kind that can be 
abstracted as a ‘world-view’ or a ‘class outlook’ … [Hegemony] is distinct in its 
refusal to equate consciousness with the articulate formal system which can be and 
ordinarily is abstracted as ‘ideology’. It of course does not exclude the articulate and 
formal meanings, values and beliefs which a dominant class develops and propagates. 
But it does not equate these with consciousness … Instead it sees the relations of 
domination and subordination, in their forms as practical consciousness, as in effect a 
saturation of the whole process of living … the whole substance of lived identities and 
relationships, to such a depth that the pressures and limits of what can ultimately be 
seen as a specific economic, political and cultural system seem to most of us the 
pressures and limits of simple experience and common sense. (2009 [1977], pp. 108-
110) 
 
Hegemony revivifies the notion of culture by restoring the focus on class oppression lost in 
the transition from a ‘base and superstructure’ analysis to one based on totality. Moreover, it 
‘materializes’ ideology, emphasizing the origin of meaning in practical activity (lived 
experience), and the centrality of processes which naturalize and universalize the dominant 
social order (I have linked these to reification). In an interesting turn of phrase, Williams then 
defines hegemony as ‘a “culture”, but a culture which has also to be seen as the lived 
dominance and subordination of particular classes’ (p. 110). Williams will clarify that while 
this characterisation need not make ‘culture’ coterminous with ‘oppression’, it nevertheless 
militates against prior notions of culture, including Williams’s own, which tended to evade its 
political critique by foregrounding the collective nature of the underlying experiences. Here 
there is a clear recognition that the ‘social being’ underlying cultural experience under 
capitalism is a product of exploitative disparities in access to the (material) means of life and 
self-determination. Culture is still ‘ordinary’, but this is because oppression is an ordinary 
fact of class society. 
 
Is Williams’s not a superstructural argument after all? Isn’t this just a roundabout way of 
saying, albeit with greater attention to lived experience, that economic exploitation produces 
a culture which reflects/buttresses that exploitation? Here we should note that while the 
concept of hegemony can survive without superstructural analysis (i.e. the assertion of a 
direct causal relation between an exploitative economic base and cultural forms which 
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support and augment that oppression), it is not its antithesis, and may in many cases 
incorporate it. Gramsci’s work retains a strong sense of superstructural causation, in which 
much of the hegemonic culture is seen as proceeding from and supporting the exploitative 
economic base. That there are more ‘spontaneous’ or directly experiential elements within 
hegemony (art, for example) does not necessitate throwing out structural causation entirely. 
Eagleton, in his ‘Base and Superstructure in Raymond Williams’ (2007a), offers a version of 
this critique. He argues that Williams is wrong to replace the superstructure with hegemony, 
and that the economic base is foundational in constructing those elements of culture that 
support class power. Eagleton acknowledges Williams’s point that we cannot regard whole 
regions of social life (art, literature etc.) as merely superstructural and therefore politically 
compromised, but he defends superstructural analysis on the grounds that it may still describe 
those elements within a culture which are collusive: 
 
An institution or practice is ‘superstructural’ when, and only when, it acts in some 
way as a support to the exploitative or oppressive nature of social relations … 
‘Superstructural’, in brief, is a relational term: it identifies those particular aspects of a 
social practice or institution which act in particular conditions as supports of 
exploitation and oppression, invites us to contextualize that practice or institution in a 
specific way … [Williams] is right that cultural activity is not superstructural tout 
court … But as soon as you come, for example, to read a literary text for symptoms of 
its collusion in class power, as Williams has also many times perceptively done, then 
you are treating it ‘superstructurally.’ (2007a, p. 174) 
 
While one welcomes Eagleton’s refusal to dismiss culture as merely a reflection of the base, 
it remains unclear why ‘superstructural’ should be preferable to ‘hegemonic’ as a description 
of a given cultural product unless one is asserting a causal link between it and the ‘economic 
base’. Eagleton appears to be using ‘superstructural’ in much the same way as Williams uses 
‘hegemonic’ (not as a descriptor of whole compromised social spheres, but of those specific 
cultural forms and products which are in fact colluding with dominant meanings and values), 
with the result that Eagleton’s preference for ‘superstructural’ appears more as an aesthetic 
preference than a sound analytic discrimination. It seems reasonable to distinguish those 
cultural features which are really superstructural in the traditional sense (proceeding from the 
economic base, e.g. property rights) and those which, while not being superstructural per se, 
nevertheless ‘build’ hegemony (e.g. specific artistic works). But Eagleton’s use of 
superstructural does not accomplish this; it simply describes everything which is collusive 
with class power beyond immediate economic relations as ‘superstructural’ rather than as 
hegemonic. While Eagleton’s critique is insufficient, we should also recognize that 
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Williams’s all-encompassing use of hegemony may also be inadequate for distinguishing 
between properly superstructural and otherwise collusive cultural elements.  
 
My own position is that the ‘superstructural’ ought to be considered a partially overlapping 
sub-set of the ‘hegemonic’. Neither Williams nor Eagleton’s analyses do this explicitly, but I 
think Williams’s work implies such a procedure. Recall that the analytic value of ‘hegemony’ 
is that it names domination within a class system in a wider sense than pure economic 
exploitation. The value of ‘superstructure’ is that it describes a specific causal relation 
between elements of the economic system and elements of culture. Neither term does the 
work of both. There are clearly elements within ‘civil society’ which do proceed from the 
economic base, but are not collusive with class power and thus hegemony (e.g. trade unions), 
just as there are elements which do not proceed directly from the economic base, but do 
contribute to the dominant system of meanings and values (e.g. conservative talk radio). 
Williams’s analysis reminds us that the class domination which hegemony names is 
buttressed at a far greater number of points than are captured by traditionally superstructural 
analysis. An enormous range of material practices with diffuse causal origins produce 
ideations which contribute to the dominant system of meanings and values i.e. the hegemony 
of a class society; superstructural effects contribute to this, but hegemony is not exhausted by 
them. Williams never asserts that economic exploitation and its attendant institutional, 
repressive and legal requirements do not produce profound cultural effects, or comprise a 
significant part of what is called ‘class rule’.83 In Williams’s work, the material and social 
requirements of economic exploitation conspire with lived experience and its attendant (often 
reified) meanings and values to produce a dominant culture (hegemony) that is ‘the lived 
domination and subordination of particular classes’. 
 
I am aware that I am taking certain liberties. For one, Williams downplays the idea of a 
superstructure to a greater degree than in my interpretation of his theory above, at times 
effectively dissolving it into hegemony. However, it is precisely the virtue of hegemony as 
Williams uses it that it does not erase what are normally called superstructural effects, but 
incorporates them into a wider definition of class power. Another possible objection to my 
assessment here is that Williams does not himself use the word ‘reification’ to describe the 
                                                
83 Indeed, quite the opposite. As Williams states in ‘You’re a Marxist Aren’t You?’ (1989r): ‘the essential 
dominance of a particular class in society is maintained not only, although if necessary, by power, and not only, 
although always, by property. It is maintained also and inevitably by a lived culture’ (p. 74). 
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process whereby, via the lived experience of material practices, a historically contingent 
social order is made to seem natural and unchangeable. The reason that Williams does not 
reach for the term in this context is, I think, because he imbibed the term from Lukacs, who 
used it to refer not to naturalization per se, but to a fragmentary and atomized perception of 
social relations which was the mortal enemy of the perspective of totality (naturalization, of 
course, was one effect of this). To explain the omission, then, we need only recall that, for 
Williams, hegemony is precisely the concept that takes us beyond totality by explicitly 
reintroducing the element of class oppression. Lukacsian reification was combatable by the 
perspective of totality; hegemony is a more diffuse enemy, present in a far greater number of 
processes than the commodity fetishism upon which (Lukacsian) reification was based. Such 
a pervasive, lived edifice of ‘common sense’, that sense of ‘absolute because experienced 
reality’, will have to be combated by something which incorporates but supersedes the 
perspective of totality as Williams understood it from Lukacs and Goldmann. 
 
Let us now recall that the whole purpose of Gramsci’s emphasis on hegemony, produced 
within ‘civil society’, was to explain the stubbornness of bourgeois rule in the absence of 
state violence in the capitalist West. The ‘mechanism’ Gramsci offered was consent; through 
a combination of confidence (leadership of the economic system) and ideological 
manipulation (via schools, churches etc), citizens were successfully enjoined to consent to 
living under capitalist rule. Williams’s analysis of working-class passivity, which I have 
linked to a version of reification, problematizes the notion that consent secures class rule in 
the West. Indeed, reification does not index consent, but rather the degree to which human 
beings view their situation as something which is changeable at all (Brecht, whose plays 
dramatized the contingency and human-centredness of history, went further than either 
Lukacs or Sartre in combating reification). By emphasizing hegemony as ‘a sense of absolute 
because experienced reality’, Williams draws us away from both a) the dominant culture as a 
system of ideological manipulation (Althusser), and b) the idea that workers have 
‘confidence’ in the ability of elites to administer society (Gramsci). At the same time, 
Williams’s identification of the ‘dominant’ culture as the ‘lived domination and 
subordination of particular classes’ shows that he views the material day-to-day of capitalist 
existence as producing ideations which are deeply compatible with bourgeois rule. 
 
In the following section, we shall examine the relation between Williams’s triumvirate of 
‘dominant, residual and emergent’ strains within a culture and the prospects for a Gramscian 
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or semi-Gramscian war of position. Crucial to this is establishing the conditions for the 
emergence of a socialist counter-hegemony, and the temporal character of such a shift. 
Gramsci’s crisis theory, the central passages on ‘interregnum’ in the Prison Notebooks, will 
be crucial here. We shall find that Williams’s rough equivalent of a war of position, his ‘long 
revolution’, ought not to be read as a sufficient praxis for the achievement of socialism, but  
rather as designating a preparatory phase of ideological work, to eventually be superseded by 
revolution proper or a war of manoeuvre. Gramsci’s writings on interregnum, as we shall see, 
anticipate something very like a ‘cultural materialism’, a new common sense rooted in the 
materialist self-understanding of historically situated and classed human beings. A link will 
then be drawn between Williams’s radical re-envisioning of Gramsci’s hegemony and the 
crucial epistemological lessons he drew from Sartre’s elaboration of dialectical materialism, 
in which human beings both arise out of and give rise to history.  
 
The long war of position 
  
Was Williams a revolutionary socialist? Our answer may depend on how seriously we take 
Gramsci’s lesson that there are different kinds of revolution, and that different kinds of social 
transformation may be required in different kinds of society. I think Barnett (foreword to 
Williams, 2011b [1961]) is correct when he states, citing Modern Tragedy as evidence, that 
Williams ‘proposed a moral reckoning, neither refusing revolution nor denying what it 
means’ (2013, xxi), and moreover that Eagleton’s reproach to Williams (in ‘Criticism and 
Politics’) that he failed to ‘embrace insurrectionary organisation’ (xxii) was not in the end 
reasonable. As we shall see, Williams endorsed revolutionary violence where necessary, and 
was determined to conceptualize revolution in its fullest possible terms, as the working 
through of social disorder, with full recognition of the scale of human suffering involved. A 
different point, however, is suggested by Barnett’s observation that the ‘customary use of the 
word “revolution” is different from that in Raymond Williams’s [TLR]’ (vii).With the term 
‘long revolution’, Barnett argues, ‘Williams is theorizing a different epochal process, not 
saying “Hey, this revolution is taking a long time” – as if the revolution referred to is self-
evident and he telling us about its duration’ (vii). This is correct; Williams’s ‘long 
revolution’, also described as the ‘cultural revolution’, is a different species of social 
phenomena to what is normally described as revolution within the Marxist tradition. It is of 
the same genus of epochal change as the democratic and the industrial revolutions, and it 
shares with those transformations a youthful and ongoing character:  
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It is evident that the democratic revolution is still at a very early stage … the 
industrial revolution, in its broad sense, is also at a comparatively early stage … We 
speak of a cultural revolution … the aspiration to extend the active process of 
learning, with the skills of literacy and other advanced communication, to all people 
rather than to limited groups … Of course, this revolution is at a very early stage. 
(2011b [1961], p. 11) 
 
Clearly, even nearly sixty years after Williams wrote TLR, both the democratic and the 
industrial revolutions are ongoing; the transformations wrought by their immediate 
‘occasions’ did not produce  self-contained revolutionary moments, but rather ignited parallel 
processes of radical social and economic change that continue to unfold. In this sense, the 
cultural revolution which Williams names as ‘long’ is only one of three long revolutions, or 
three aspects of a single extended transformation. This observation raises a question with 
both historical and strategic weight: towards what end, if any, does the variegated process 
which Williams identified wind? For it remains the case that all three revolutions arose out 
of, and in their continuing development have sustained and powered, the capitalist mode of 
production. If the long revolution excludes, as it seems to in TLR, a traditional revolutionary 
break with the old order, should it be regarded as a gradualist strategy (where socialism, an 
entirely new society, is at least the stated end goal), or as not-even-gradualist, that is to say, a 
description of the ongoing development of capitalism in a progressively more humane 
direction? Neither description, it seems to me, is adequate. 
 
Williams wrote The Long Revolution prior to his rapprochement with Marxism in the late 
sixties and seventies. The trajectory of his political thought in this period evinces a shift away 
from the ‘gradualist’ or parliamentary strategy and towards recognition of the necessity of 
violent insurrection in the long run, as part of an expansively defined revolutionary 
transformation. While Williams was never entirely opposed to insurrection, he was until the 
mid to late-sixties unsure of its salience for the socialist movement in the West where, as 
Gramsci had described, the preconditions for insurrection were lacking. By the late seventies, 
Williams had arrived at a characteristically synthetic position. In conversation with Perry 
Anderson in Politics and Letters (1979), Williams explicitly repudiated the gradualist option 
and asserted the necessity of a ‘short revolution’ (a Gramscian war of maneuver), in which 
State power is dismantled by force. The ‘long revolution’ (a Gramscian war of position) 
remains vital, however, with the two forms of revolutionary activity now conceived as 
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mutually constitutive. In the following passage Williams (1979) clarifies his late position and 
its development: 
 
An East European said to me after reading The Long Revolution: ‘We’ve had our 
short revolution, now we begin our long revolution.’ When I wrote [TLR] I was 
mainly conscious of the immense length of the full social transformation, which has 
usually been under-played, yet which should be intrinsic to all strategic socialist 
thinking. I have no doubt now that the short revolution, to use that phrase, has also to 
occur. I wouldn’t at all dissent from the traditional notions of the violent capture of 
state power, but I would put this revolution in a more specific way: it is accomplished 
when the central political organs of capitalist society lose their power of predominant 
social reproduction – which does not have to mean that some reproduction will not 
continue afterwards. So to make the theoretical position clear – I now believe, though 
I have not always believed, that the condition for the success of the long revolution in 
any real terms is decisively a short revolution, which I would define not so much in 
terms of duration as the loss by the state of its capacity for predominant reproduction 
of the existing social relations …Talking about the run-up to that situation is not a 
form of gradualism …I think the learning of the skills of popular organisation and 
control, over a wide range, would make the prospect of preventing the effective 
reproduction of the existing social relations a much more realistic possibility in 
Western capitalist societies. (2015 [1979], pp. 421-422) 
 
The anecdote about the East European, with a short revolution preceding a long one, is 
instructive; the cart appears to have been put before the horse. Generally, Williams’s analysis 
suggests, the long revolution will precede and lay the foundations for the short. In return, the 
short revolution facilitates the fruition of the long. The short revolution will be an act of 
violence against the state, but it will only succeed if it results, in concert with the long, in the 
destruction of the state’s capacity to reproduce the existing social relations. Focusing on the 
‘run-up’ to that ultimate deconstruction of state power, ‘learning the skills of popular 
organisation and control’ (ingraining participatory democracy and self-determination into all 
spheres of life), is decidedly not gradualism; it is the process whereby a society becomes 
capable of the full range of revolutionary actions. But this preparatory work will also be vital 
for what comes after the short revolution, in the period of socialist construction, and also for 
the prevention of counter-revolution: ‘One crucial pattern since the classical theory [of 
revolution] was formulated, after all, has been that form of crisis of the ordinary capitalist 
state which leads not to the emergence of a new popular power, but to the hardening of the 
state itself into an even more repressive form – into fascism. So I am always uneasy about 
talk of the short revolution when the problems of the run-up to it have not really been 
appreciated’ (p. 422). Following this, the East European anecdote appears less incongruous. 
The long revolution primarily names the period of preparation, but it also evokes a longer and 
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more indeterminate process which extends through and beyond the destruction of the 
capitalist state. 
 
At stake in Williams’s political development is the nature of social breakdown and renewal, 
hegemonic death and rebirth. That Williams eventually comes to believe that a violent 
confrontation with the state will be necessary, that the long and the short revolutions, taken 
together, are the revolution, is not the critical point. What is more important from the 
perspective of Williams’s reception of Gramsci is the character of revolutionary change itself. 
The turning point for the incorporation of war of maneuver elements into Williams’s work 
was 1966 with the failures of the Labour government; this was also the period of Modern 
Tragedy, a socio-literary meditation on the necessity of negativity in massive social change 
and, accordingly, a profound critique of gradualism. There, Williams argued that while most 
revolutions are violent, this is not their fundamental character. The essential process is one of 
total transformation: 
 
We need not identify revolution with violence or with a sudden capture of power. 
Even where such events occur, the essential transformation is indeed a long 
revolution. But the absolute test, by which revolution can be distinguished, is the 
change in the form of activity of a society, in its deepest structure of relationships and 
feelings. (1966, p. 76) 
 
This is written prior to Williams’s most significant period of contact and engagement with 
Western Marxism, including Gramsci, but the conditions of British capitalism and socialist 
struggle are such that he nevertheless channels Gramscian themes. Even violent 
conflagrations, here, have the character of a long revolution, in that they represent the 
culmination of a long process of transformation of the whole social order. The result is a 
change in the form of a society, so that afterwards, one may say that it is a different society, 
rather than that the old society has been altered. This change in the form of society is, says 
Williams, ‘the inevitable working through of a deep and tragic disorder’ (p. 75). It is tragic in 
itself, in that it creates its own forms of suffering (not least that associated with violence), but 
also in that it originates in the suffering produced by the experience of social disorder: ‘It is 
born in an experience of evil made the more intolerable by the conviction that it is not 
inevitable, but is the result of particular actions and choices’ (p. 77). Revolution occurs, then, 
when there exists the conviction that endemic social disorders are the product of and may be 
remedied by human actions. Recalling the previous section, we should add that this humanist 
conviction, insofar as it is true, is also a form of knowledge, an epistemological achievement 
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that marks the defeat of reification or naturalization. The dissolution of reification is thus the 
first step in pursuing revolutionary change; its achievement would indicate that the prevailing 
hegemony, the prevailing sense of ‘absolute because experienced reality’, is breaking down. 
 
As of MT, Williams had not been fully convinced of the necessity of the short revolution, but 
he knew that that neither social-democratic gradualism nor Stalinism were equipped to 
combat reification. Each had only one half of the revolutionary map. Gradualism recognized 
the agential social power of human beings, but not the necessity of total transformation and 
the painful, subjective involvement working through social disorder would entail: ‘[Social 
democrats] have identified war and revolution as the tragic dangers, when the real tragic 
danger, underlying war and revolution, is a disorder which we continually re-enact … The 
only consciousness that seems adequate in our world is then an exposure to the actual 
disorder … a participation in the disorder, as a way of ending it’ (1966, pp. 78-81). Stalinism, 
inverting this, proposed a revolutionary process enacted through rather than by human 
beings: ‘the revolutionary purpose can become itself abstracted and can be set as an idea 
above real men … There is the related imposition of an idea of the revolution on the real men 
and women in whose name it is being made’ (p. 82). In this authoritarian schema, revolution 
is understood to entail suffering, but not tragic suffering; the suffering produced by a 
revolution which absents full human involvement is more akin to the reified liberal 
conception of urban poverty and alienation as the ‘cost’ of industrial-civilizational progress. 
Both the gradualist expulsion of revolutionary tragedy and the Stalinist expulsion of human 
beings from it vastly underestimate of the scale of the problem. The tragic nature of any 
revolutionary assault on social disorder cannot be reckoned with by avoidance (gradualism) 
or endorsement (Stalinism), but only by ‘its experience, its comprehension and its resolution’ 
(p. 83). A properly revolutionary involvement thus proceeds through ‘lived comprehension’ 
or ‘practical consciousness’; the disorder inhering in the social edifice is comprehended 
objectively, as really existing (against the gradualist view), but because that comprehension is 
‘lived’ i.e. experienced subjectively, it cannot be mistaken for a purely objective process i.e. 
one beyond substantive human involvement, as in Stalinism. This is the perspective of 
totality, and we saw in Chapter Two how much Williams would later appreciate Sartre’s 
systemization of such ‘total’ cognition in his Critique.  
 
In the mid-seventies, Williams made a similar critique of extant socialist strategies in terms 
more familiar to the Marxist tradition. In ‘You’re a Marxist Aren’t You?’ (1975) he recounts 
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how the New Left, while seeing Marxist-Leninism as having arrived at ‘an effective dead 
end’, saw also that ‘the apparently alternative tradition – that of Fabianism, the British 
Labour Party, the modern social democratic parties – indeed the whole tradition summed up 
as the inevitability of gradualism, was equally at an end’ (1989r, p. 68). Under the rubric of 
‘modernization’, gradualism assumed ‘that there was not an enemy, there was only something 
out of date’ (p. 69). It had become a means of incorporating the forces of socialism and of 
preserving, updating and strengthening, capitalism. Under a liberal rubric of ‘freedom’, the 
core socialist position that ‘the basic ownership of the means of production, distribution and 
exchange determined the character of the society or at least set limits to the possibilities of 
such relationships’ (p. 69) was abandoned, the result being, in Williams’s view, that it 
‘abandoned the possibility of understanding or changing the modern world’ (p. 69). Against 
this, Williams reaffirms his own allegiance to fundamental Marxist principles: 
 
Now as I think through the basic position of historical materialism, the basic 
definition of capitalist society and its evolution, and then the need to supersede it, to 
go beyond capitalist society, so that a socialist society, as apart from isolated 
measures of a socialist tendency, demands the destruction of capitalist society, as I 
think through these three propositions and try to define myself in relation to them, I 
have no real hesitation. These are all positions from which I now see the world and in 
terms of which I try to order my life and activity. (1989r [1975], p. 72) 
 
Destruction, Williams acknowledges, will usually mean violent defeat, and he locates his 
refusal to deny this in his experience of the war: ‘By 1944 I, who had called myself a pacifist 
in 1938, was in Normandy ... since that time I have never been able to say that the use of 
military power to defend a revolution is something that I am against’ (pp. 72-73). He goes 
further, connecting violent revolutionary struggles the world over to a speculative British 
revolutionary future: ‘When I look at the history of the Chinese, the Cuban and the 
Vietnamese revolutions, I feel a basic solidarity not merely with their aims but with their 
methods and with the ways in which they came to power. If I found myself in Britain in any 
comparable social and political situation, I know where my loyalties would lie’ (p. 73). Such 
unequivocal statements as these on the necessity of revolutionary violence suggest that 
Eagleton’s assessment of Williams’s ‘reticent and ambiguous attitude towards insurrectionary 
organisation’ (p. 10) was not reflective of Williams’s position in the seventies. This may be a 
case of ungenerously importing a reading of Williams’s earlier work into analysis of the later. 
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I belabor the point about revolutionary violence to underscore Williams’s opposition to a) the 
notion that the two strategies of war of maneuver and war of position were mutually 
exclusive, b) the idea that the war of maneuver is a strategy irrecoverably linked to a  defunct 
Marxism, and c) the view that the New Left, with its ‘culturalist’ emphasis, was an anti-
insurrectionary movement. Like Gramsci, the New Left was seeking to describe how 
developed capitalism had made violent insurrection an insufficient, not an inappropriate, 
vehicle for social transformation. Indeed, as Williams explains in ‘You’re a Marxist’, 
Gramsci’s insights were central: 
 
In seeking to define this, it was possible to look again at certain important parts of the 
Marxist tradition, notably the work of Gramsci with his emphasis on hegemony. We 
could then say that the essential dominance of a particular class in society is 
maintained not only, although if necessary, by power, and not only, although always, 
by property. It is maintained also and inevitably by a lived culture: that saturation of 
habit, of experience, of outlook, from a very early age and continually renewed at so 
many stages of life, under definite pressures and within definite limits, so that what 
people come to think and feel is in large measure a reproduction of the deeply based 
social order which they may even in some respects think they oppose and indeed 
actually oppose. And if this is so, then again the tradition of Stalinism and the 
tradition of Fabianism are equally irrelevant. (1989r, pp. 74-75) 
 
This returns us to the centrality of Gramsci in establishing some of the basic directions of 
Williams work. For Williams and for the New Left more generally, the Gramscian emphasis 
on cultural hegemony rendered both major socialist options defunct. Stalinism took a ‘war of 
maneuver’ approach to hegemony, attempting to change the dominant culture through 
‘redirection and manipulation’ (p. 75) and underestimating ‘the real process of human change 
that has to occur’ (p. 75). Fabianism, however, was not merely the obverse of Stalinism when 
it came to hegemony;84 it was rather, Williams argues, the inheritor of utilitarianism within 
the labour movement and ‘[did] not even seem aware of the problem [of hegemony] at all’ (p. 
75). Fabianism, we might say, was a war of position without the war, a non-insurrectionary 
programme which failed even to recognise an alternative arena of socialist struggle. It fell to 
the New Left to recognize that revolution meant a war on two fronts or, as Williams would 
put it in PL, a long revolution on the terrain of culture, meaning and experience, and a short 
revolution against the State’s capacity to reproduce the exploitative social relations of 
capitalism.  
 
                                                
84 The idea of a ‘pure’ war of position is perhaps better conveyed by the usually derogatory term ‘culturalist’, a 
caricature of the New Left position implying an insufficient commitment to revolution. 
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*     *     * 
 
Williams, as Anderson later recognized, took the cultural struggle more seriously than his 
contemporaries, nuancing Gramsci’s insights to develop a distinctive theory of hegemony. 
The first pillar of that theory was the de-ideologization of the received notion of hegemony as 
indoctrination or manipulation, replacing this with the deep, lived saturation of a dominant 
social order into the day-to-day expectations and conceptual frames of individuals (a process 
I have argued is closer to reification). The second pillar is Williams’s tri-partite structuration 
of hegemony via the concepts residual, dominant and emergent. I discussed Williams’s 
analysis of the dominant mode of hegemony in the previous section; I turn now to the 
residual and emergent modes. 
 
Firstly, the dominant mode really is dominant; residual and emergent elements exist within it, 
but in differing degrees of incorporation. In ‘Heirs of Gramsci’, Anderson argues that 
‘Williams distinguished two types of oppositional culture, each traceable to a class, capable 
of escaping such incorporation: residual and emergent – that is, rooted in either a past or in 
what might prove a future’ (2016, p. 2). This may be overstating the case; the class link to 
particular elements is often tacit, with the different modes explicitly paralleled not with 
classes but with different ‘social formations’ or ‘ways of life’ (cultures). There are also 
differences in the ways these links operate across the three modes. Williams initially defines 
the two oppositional modes as follows: 
 
By ‘residual’ I mean that some experiences, meanings and values, which cannot be 
verified or cannot be expressed in terms of a dominant culture, are nevertheless lived 
and practiced on the basis of the residue – cultural as well as social – of some 
previous social formation … By ‘emergent’ I mean, first, that new meanings and 
values, new practices, new significances and experiences, are continually being 
created. (2005c, p. 40-41) 
 
Williams fleshes out what ‘residual’ might mean in practice by citing ‘religious values’ (p. 
40) and, ‘in a culture like Britain … certain notions derived from a rural past’ (p. 40). It is not 
reading too much into Williams’s analysis to cipher this as a feudal social order, but again, 
the structural parallelism is between that whole way of life and its surviving elements, not the 
latter and the delimited values or articulate ideology of a feudal aristocracy.  
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Two issues now suggest themselves for clarification. Firstly, if each mode is not quite 
‘traceable’ to a class, what is each mode traceable to?  Here, it will be useful to recall our 
analysis of the dominant mode. I read Williams’s analysis as suggesting that the dominant 
mode was comprised of, a) elements issuing more or less directly from the imposed values of 
a ruling class and the structural requirements of the mode of production (ideological and 
superstructural elements), and b) from the experiential texture of the given, dominant way of 
life, perceived as an unchangeable reality or common sense (reified or otherwise hegemonic 
elements). In the case of residual elements, however, the balance of superstructural and 
reified elements must be rather different. Assuming that, in the British context, residual refers 
to a feudal/rural way of life, we must immediately recognize that this way of life no longer 
exists, and that a landed aristocracy is no longer the dominant class. The residual elements 
within contemporary, bourgeois hegemony, then, cannot be superstructural, since there is no 
ruling aristocracy to impose its values, and no feudal mode of production requiring a specific 
institutional framework. In a striking confirmation of Williams’s insistence that 
superstructural analysis is never sufficient, we can say that residual elements must be entirely 
non-superstructural; they exist entirely within lived social experience, in traditional practices 
transmitting the values of a previous social formation, the historical elements of a particular 
cultural imaginary, forward in time. Of course, residual elements from monarchic pageantry 
to Imperial nostalgia are routinely used as supports of class rule at home and abroad (they 
are, in other words, ‘incorporated’). It is precisely the value of ‘hegemony’ that it permits us 
to recognise the role of such experiential elements in maintaining systems of oppression.   
 
The situation is more complicated in the case of emergent elements. Here, Williams draws 
both on Gramsci and on the wider Marxist tradition: 
 
We have indeed one source [of emergent elements] to hand from the central body of 
Marxist theory. We have the formation of a new class, the coming to consciousness of 
a new class. This remains, without doubt, quite centrally important. Of course, in 
itself, this process of formation complicates any simple model of base and 
superstructure. It also complicates some of the ordinary versions of hegemony, 
although it was Gramsci’s whole purpose to see and to create by organisation that 
hegemony of a proletarian kind which would be capable of challenging the bourgeois 
hegemony. We have then one central source of new practice, in the emergence of a 
new class. (2005c, p. 42) 
 
The notion of a rising class ‘complicates’ the received base and superstructure model because 
that model addresses itself to the dominant mode, to the requirements of an existing mode of 
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production and its ruling class. This is a good example of why social being/consciousness is 
better than base and superstructure: it permits the inclusion into the complex of meanings, 
values and practices which make up a culture those elements which proceed from oppressed 
or subaltern groups, whose materiality is itself a sector of social being. Insofar as certain 
emergent elements express the interests and values of the rising class, they are in what we 
might call the ‘subaltern superstructure’. But there are also more diffuse emergent elements 
which ‘can be different in quality from the developing and articulate interests of a rising 
class. They can include, for example, alternative perceptions of others, in immediate personal 
relationships, or new perceptions of material and media, in art and science, and within certain 
limits these new perceptions can be practiced’ (p. 44). Here we have an emergent texture of 
lived experience which sits outside what is sanctioned and understood by the dominant order 
(and beyond what is recognizable to the residual). Williams clearly distinguishes, then, 
between those emergent elements which proceed from class consciousness or interest, and 
those which issue from a more diffuse lived experience. ‘At times they can be very close’, 
Williams notes, ‘and on the relations between them much in political practice depends. But 
culturally and as a matter of theory the two can be seen as distinct’ (p. 44). 
 
Before proceeding, let us emphasize again that the two ‘factors’ of hegemony, class interest, 
directly (‘superstructurally’) expressed and lived, ‘textural’ experience (practical 
consciousness or reification) operate differently in each mode. For the dominant mode, 
superstructural effects are important because they proceed from a presently existing mode of 
production and ruling class interest (of course, as we saw in the previous section, the 
experiential or reified element is also vital for a functional hegemony). For the residual mode, 
superstructural effects are next to non-existent, since the mode of production and dominant 
class of the society to which it corresponds no longer exist. The residual mode, therefore, is 
entirely reliant on experiential elements linked to a cultural memory. For the emergent mode, 
things are different. Unlike with the residual elements, the ‘rising class’ to which one part of 
the emergent may be related really exists; that class, however, does not preside over a mode 
of production suitable to its interests. This puts the emergent mode, insofar as it is linked to a 
‘rising class’, in a liminal position. It produces cultural elements which cannot be easily 
incorporated into the dominant mode, and which the residual mode does not recognize, but 
the way of life to which those elements may be ‘referred’ has never existed, does not now 
exist, and has no guarantee of ever existing. 
 
Daniel Robert Gerke  Chapter  3: Williams and Gramsci 
 
216 
 
In Marxism and Literature (1977), Williams nuances the emergent mode, distinguishing 
between elements which are merely new and those which may be said to presage the eventual 
construction of a persistent counter-hegemony, a change in the form of society. ‘It is 
exceptionally difficult’, argues Williams, ‘to distinguish between those which are really 
elements of some new phase of the dominant culture … and those which are substantially 
alternative or oppositional to it: emergent in the strict sense rather than merely novel’ (2009, 
p. 123). Indeed, the word ‘emergent’ connotes not novelty but the early development of 
something more fully formed,  something intimated by culture which has yet to emerge ‘in 
full’ historically. Williams emphasises that not everything which is emergent proceeds from 
the interests and influence of the rising class: ‘there is always other social being and 
consciousness which is neglected and excluded … In practice these are different in quality 
from the developing and articulated interests of a rising class’ (p. 126). Nevertheless, we 
know that Williams accepts the basic propositions of historical materialism, including ‘the 
basic definition of capitalist society and its evolution’ (1989r, p. 74), the need to supersede it 
and construct socialism and the centrality in this of ‘the fundamental resistance to capitalist 
state power’ (p. 74) and the agency of ‘the industrial working class’ (p. 74). When Williams 
speaks of the oppositional emergent, then (as opposed to the novel or otherwise 
excluded/unrecognized), he is describing the stirrings of an oppositional culture, a culture 
concomitant with the ‘total transformation’ of society, a new mode of production and a new 
class structure. In Marxism and Literature, Williams signals the gestational nature of this 
proto-socialist emergent by comparing it to an utterance or sign that has not yet reached full 
articulation: 
 
What matters, finally, in understanding emergent culture, as distinct from both the 
dominant and the residual, is that it is never only a matter of immediate practice; 
indeed it depends crucially on finding new forms or adaptations of form. Again and 
again what we have to observe is in effect a pre-emergence, active and pressing but 
not yet fully articulated, rather than the evident emergence which could be more 
confidently named. (2009 [1977], p. 126)  
 
The idea of ‘pre-emergence’ is consistent with the notion of a war of position as preparatory, 
a phase in which the seeds are planted of something which will come to fruition only with the 
war of manoeuvre or short revolution (as well as ensuring the sustainability of these shorter 
actions). But what is it, exactly, that is emerging? The linguistic metaphor evokes Williams’s 
long-standing emphasis, from The Long Revolution onward, that culture is a form of the 
communication of lived experience. The (oppositional) emergent sector of a culture, then, is a 
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form of the communication of the lived experience of the rising class. ‘Full articulation’ of 
that experience would mean articulation without the influence and distortion of the dominant 
sector of the culture, both in its form as the expressed interest and ideology of the dominant 
class, and as a reified set of assumptions and expectations within the rising class itself. 
 
Even if the above account of pre-emergence is correct, it remains to establish the conditions 
under which full emergence could occur.  This would essentially be the passing from one 
dominant hegemony to another and, on the evidence of both Williams and Gramsci’s 
analyses, this would have two major preconditions. First, the attainment by the emergent 
culture of a certain degree of sufficiency, that is, of successful communication. The emerging 
culture would need to account for the experience of the rising class to the point where it could 
provide an image, both descriptive and affective, of a new social order. Second, the dominant 
hegemony would need to fail, both practically and ideologically, to offer values and 
meanings to a rising class which would then reject the central pillars of the dominant culture; 
historically, this has perhaps its only occasion during periods of economic crisis or war. Even 
if the second condition has been met, however, the emergent culture will fail to take hold if 
the first condition has not. The successful production of an emergent culture, synonymous 
with successful communication of the experience of the rising class, is what prepares that 
class to seize the opportunity afforded by the failure of the dominant hegemony.  
 
Let us pause here to consider some interactions between Sartrean and Gramscian ideas as 
they relate to Williams’s late Marxism. Sartre had warned against ‘abstract universality’, 
wherein the meanings and values of the dominant class are foisted onto the oppressed. 
Williams’s nationalist turn in the early seventies was precipitated by the recognition that 
pluralism, by acknowledging radical differences in experience (‘concrete particularism’), was 
the only cultural programme adequate to taking Sartre’s warning seriously. What Williams 
later came to realize, however, was that acknowledging experiential plurality was not the 
same thing as the perspective of totality. A total or ‘realist’ perspective also required that we 
look beyond experience, using formal and abstract modes of cognition to perceive the 
objective determinants of the social edifice. Williams recognized the synthesis of these 
epistemological strategies in Sartre’s ‘dialectical reason’, in which objective knowledge is 
incorporated into experience (interiority), augmenting experience and making it adequate to 
historical reality.  
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The Sartrean terminology maps neatly onto Williams’s temporal theory of hegemony. What 
Sartre calls ‘abstract universality’ closely resembles Williams’s ‘dominant’ mode as an 
overlaid set of meanings and values which fails to address the experience of the rising class. 
‘Concrete particularism’ is akin to the emergent as that portion of culture which does express 
the experience of the rising class, but is not yet dominant.  What I described in Chapter Two 
as ‘abstract particularism’, the appeal to a no longer existing social formation to provide 
meaning for the present, is not dissimilar to the residual mode. In ‘The Burgos Trials’, Sartre 
presented the fourth term, ‘concrete universality’, as an emergent property of the recognition 
of every particularism; rather than expressing something unique in itself, concrete 
universality was a universality of particularisms, a universal emancipation predicated on the 
recognition of every specific injustice. But hegemony demands that we go further. Concrete 
particularism is already manifest in what Williams calls the ‘pre-emergent’ i.e. the emergent 
as it exists within the current hegemony. Full emergence, on the other hand, cannot be either 
separation, in which emergent meanings and experiences exist as alternatives to the dominant 
hegemony, nor incorporation which, in the manner of Labourist/Fabian ideology, seeks to 
alter the dominant mode so that it can include a portion of the emergent meanings (social 
democracy). The prospect of full emergence enjoins us to build the oppositional elements of 
the emergent to the point of replacement. The production of a culture which is the full 
articulation of the experience of the rising class demands the replacement of one hegemony 
with another. 
 
Clearly, hegemonic replacement is a goal beyond the resources of either the long or the short 
revolutions in isolation. The ‘moment’ of the short revolution, moreover, normally figured as 
the moment of insurrection or war of manoeuvre, is not autonomous of the long revolution; 
indeed, my argument has been that Williams’s theory of hegemony necessitates the active 
presence of both revolutions in the crucial phase of transition from one hegemony to another. 
Gramsci provides us with a crucial theorization of what such a transition may entail in his 
passages on ‘interregnum’ in The Prison Notebooks. He begins by imagining a scenario in 
which, while the capitalist state persists, bourgeois domination at the level of culture and 
experience (hegemony) has broken down spontaneously due to a severe crisis: 
 
If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer ‘leading’ but only 
‘dominant’, exercising coercive force only, this means precisely that the great masses 
have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what 
they used to believe previously, etc. The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the 
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old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid 
symptoms appear. (2003, pp. 275-276) 
 
Gramsci is describing what I suggested was the second condition of full emergence: the 
severe failure of the dominant culture to offer a compelling set of meanings and values to the 
rising class. We can assume that conditions of severe economic crisis or war prevail. The 
capitalist class is now using force only to exercise control; it has lost hegemony but not 
power. What immediately ceases to function here is reification, that sense of ‘absolute 
because experienced reality’ that Williams identified as the root of the dominant hegemony. 
The social order has in fact ceased to operate, proving at once its contingent nature. Thus, 
while the old is dying, ‘the new cannot be born’; we are in an interregnum, a space between 
hegemonies, the great danger of which is what Gramsci calls ‘Caesarism’ or authoritarian 
military rule.  
 
Getting to a new, socialist hegemony will require not just the failure of the old but also what I 
have called, developing Williams’s theory, the full emergence of the rising class’s culture. 
But the same problem which attends the ‘pre-emergent’ under normal conditions also attends 
the rising class in the period of crisis: its emergent culture does not correspond to a ready-
made social formation. Moreover, the ruling class still holds the levers of the state. Consider, 
in this light, Gramsci’s description of the deadlock the interregnum represents: 
 
The problem is the following: can a rift between popular masses and ruling ideologies 
as serious as that which emerged after the war be “cured” by the simple exercise of 
force, preventing the new ideologies from imposing themselves? Will the 
interregnum, the crisis whose historically normal solution is blocked in this way, 
necessarily be resolved in favour of a restoration of the old? Given the character of 
the ideologies, that can be ruled out – yet not in an absolute sense. Meanwhile 
physical depression will lead in the long run to a wider scepticism, and a new 
“arrangement” will be found. (2003, p. 276) 
 
In Gramsci’s scenario, the ruling class uses force to block the ‘historically normal’ passage 
from one hegemony to another. What they forget is that force is neither the source nor the 
guarantor of ideology. Without the restoration of the old political-economic order the old 
ideologies (based, in Williams theory of hegemony, on ‘reified’ assumption and expectations) 
will not reassert themselves85 and eventually, argues Gramsci, ‘a new “arrangement” will be 
                                                
85 In historical fact, of course, the capitalist class was cannier than to rely solely on force; what restored 
something broadly comparable to the old social order after WW2 was not the stubborn exertion of state force 
against rising ideologies but partial capitulation to them under the aegis of social democracy. Gramsci could not 
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found’. The nature of that arrangement is the contingent element in Gramsci’s account of 
hegemonic transition. Whether the emergent hegemony of the rising class can become 
dominant, I argue, is dependent upon the success of Williams’s war of position, the long 
revolution, this being the process whereby that class develops the capacity to communicate its 
own experience (both directly and via the incorporation of formal or abstract cognition) and 
to manifest this in meanings and values which prefigure a realistic and desirable social order. 
In keeping with Williams’s analysis in PL, this must occur both before and after the 
breakdown of the dominant hegemony; the long revolution is both the preparatory phase of 
‘learning the skills of popular organization and control’ (2015 [1979], p. 422) and the 
effective capacity to replace the dominant hegemony with the emergent (in practical terms, to 
resist counter-revolution and begin to construct socialist institutions). The rising class cannot 
construct the idea of its culture in the timescale of a short revolution; it must already be 
envisioning, and to some extent already living, its culture. 
 
What makes the difference between success and failure for the rising class? We know that an 
early goal of Williams’s long revolution was the extension of education, especially adult 
education, to equip the rising class with the tools to articulate their experience (in Sartrean 
terms, the means to assert concrete particularism). In the seventies and eighties, Williams 
became increasingly aware that an important part of this capacity-building would be the 
acquisition of abstract knowledge, whether of structural economic relations, historical events 
or the interpenetration of distant institutions with local ways of life. And yet, as with Sartrean 
interiority, Williams always retains the notion that structural/abstract knowledge must itself 
be incorporated into experience to be politically valid. How is this to be achieved? We know 
that it cannot be achieved by any of the elite usurpations of knowledge which are Williams’s 
constant enemies: monopolization by the closed circles of bourgeois academia; imputation by 
revolutionaries; lofty wielding by technocratic Fabians. In all of these, structural knowledge 
exists outside of the experience of the rising class. But even conscious learning does not fully 
solve the problem since, as Matthew Price discovers in Border Country, a vast gulf separates 
the bare knowing of facts and their lived comprehension.   
 
Williams was not a philosopher; he never fully articulated a solution to the epistemological 
challenges facing the rising class. I contend, however, that his analysis of hegemony in the 
                                                                                                                                                  
have foreseen the unique class compromise of the welfare state from his vantage in the thirties; he was 
imagining a breakdown from which capitalism would not, aided and abetted by socialists, recover. 
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seventies suggests one. Williams’s reworking of Gramscian theory clarified that the 
obfuscating power of capitalism is not simply a function of inequality of access to the means 
and powers of communication. Hegemony also functions by producing a common sense 
linked to everyday immersion in a seemingly intractable social order. This means that neither 
direct experience nor abstract reason will be capable of fully stripping back the sense of basic 
reality that reification lends to the dominant hegemony. Williams understood that conscious 
learning about structural forces could help to fill the gaps left by experience (provided such 
knowledge-processes were not the exclusive purview of elites). But he also recognized that 
reification, with its construction of a sense of ‘absolute because experienced reality’, 
immunizes the social order against the subversive effects of structural knowledge on the part 
of the rising class. After all, it doesn’t matter that exploitation is real and objective if it is also 
natural and unchangeable, a ‘fact of life’. It is this sense of inevitability, more than anything, 
which needs to be overcome if full emergence is to occur.  
 
This returns us to Gramsci’s interregnum scenario which, as I have already noted, offers 
precisely such an epistemological break; in periods of profound crisis, the social order 
demonstrates to experience its own fallibility, its non-commonsensical, non-eternal character 
as a social contingency. In the following passage, the culmination of the interregnum section, 
Gramsci draws out the implications for consciousness:  
 
From this too one may conclude that highly favourable conditions are being created 
for an unprecedented expansion of historical materialism. The very poverty which at 
first inevitably characterises historical materialism as a theory diffused widely among 
the masses will help it to spread. The death of the old ideologies takes the form of 
scepticism with regard to all theories and general formulae; of application to the pure 
economic fact (earnings, etc.) and to a form of politics which is not simply realistic in 
fact (this is always the case) but which is cynical in its immediate manifestations … 
But this reduction to economics and to politics means precisely a reduction of the 
highest superstructures to the level of those which adhere more closely to the structure 
itself – in other words, the possibility and necessity of creating a new culture. (2003, 
p. 276) 
 
During the interregnum, the ‘the old ideologies’ are replaced by the stark, urgent facts of 
economic hardship and political upheaval. This leaves a cultural void, potentially to be filled 
by the meanings, values and practices of the rising class. The capitalist way of life is 
‘reduced’ to those undergirding elements that are most hidden under normal conditions, the 
class basis of society appearing for the first time in solution: exploitation, violence, the threat 
of poverty. Gramsci describes this as a ‘wave of materialism’ (p. 275), a sudden willingness 
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to account for social phenomena by their material bases. Crucially, insofar as this results in a 
flourishing of historical materialism among the working class, this shift in consciousness will 
have an empirical basis. It will spread not because revolutionary intellectuals have 
disseminated knowledge downwards, but because social reality itself has become capable of 
being experienced as having a material foundation.  
 
Gramsci argues that the reduction to materiality announces not just the proliferation of 
historical materialism, but also the ‘possibility and necessity of creating a new culture’. Here 
at least, Gramsci is using ‘culture’ in much the same way as Williams, to refer to a whole 
way of life. What is unique about the interregnum, I would argue, is that the possibility 
emerges of producing a culture the objectivity of which may be experienced subjectively. The 
material basis of social reality is made present to lived experience, rather than having to be 
inferred, imputed or otherwise reasoned into being within consciousness. Suddenly, what 
Williams had always insisted upon, that knowledge be democratised/incorporated into the 
experience of the rising class itself, becomes possible. Williams would have resisted 
Gramsci’s orthodox rhetoric i.e. the idea of the ‘highest superstructures’ being reduced to ‘the 
level of those which adhere most closely to the structure itself’. But we have only to replace 
‘base and superstructure’ with ‘social being and consciousness’ to read Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemonic breakdown in a manner consonant with cultural materialism. For then what is 
happening in the interregnum is that a whole complex of things, from meanings and values to 
social institutions and cultural practices, are rendered visible in terms of their social being, 
their material and historical reality (this need not be a full transparency to be effective 
politically). Gramsci’s interregnum, in other words, offers hope that a severe enough crisis of 
capitalism could provide the material conditions (though not necessarily the political or 
cultural capacity) for a) a definitive triumph over reification and b) that elusive state of 
‘interiority’ theorized in Sartre’s Critique as ‘dialectical reason’ and in Williams’s oeuvre as 
the perspective of totality. 
 
Grasmci’s analysis explains why the long revolution was never going to be sufficient on its 
own, a fact Williams explicitly acknowledged in the ‘Two Roads to Change’ discussion of 
1979. Without a crisis and/or a short revolution, the long revolution, the development of the 
culture of the rising class remains in its preparatory phase, its pre-emergence. To be sure, the 
short revolution will come to nothing if the cultural production of the rising class is not 
already highly advanced. But it requires a crisis of the dominant hegemony to create the 
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space for the rising class to render its culture in a new, ‘fully emerged’ socialist hegemony. 
Such a position could be characterised as idealist, since it appears to assert that a certain kind 
of consciousness is the precondition for historical change. But by reading Williams and 
Gramsci together we can see that it is in fact a realism; it positions the object of perception as 
the final arbiter of the sufficiency of its perception by any observer. While a particular form 
of consciousness, which the Marxist tradition has called class consciousness, must ‘already’ 
be present for revolution to be made, it is the social being (materiality) of society which 
determines whether that consciousness is possible in the first place. The essence of 
Williams’s epistemology, what we have variously called realism, dialectical reason or the 
perspective of totality, is that knowledge arises only out of those cultures the social being of 
which renders them graspable by experience. The political praxis it recommends is what 
might be termed a revolutionary culturalism in which the rising class, in concert with a 
(violent or non-violent) assault on state power, wins hegemony by building and realising a 
culture consonant with its experience and interests. 
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Conclusion 
 
Perry Anderson’s stated reason for excluding Williams from his canon of Western Marxism 
was that Williams was not, in the end, a Marxist. In the introduction to this thesis I showed 
that, underlying the ‘manifest content’ of Anderson’s decision was another, more latent 
cause: Williams could not participate in the Western Marxist tradition because he was British, 
or rather, because his work bore the stamp of a British intellectual inheritance. The logic of 
Anderson’s theoretical discourse, moreover, dictated that the one imply the other. Williams 
was not a Marxist because his work was ‘British’, i.e. empiricist, and his work was ‘British’ 
because it was not Marxist, which for Anderson meant a firmly rationalist historical 
materialism. Where Anderson did find value in Williams’s work was in its totalising 
character which, he argued, was a central feature of European thought but was, Williams 
aside, practically non-existent in Britain. At the core of Anderson’s paradoxical appraisal of 
Williams as both the great hope of the British left and a symbol of its weakness, then, was the 
view that one cannot be both a theorist of the totality and an empiricist. Experience, which 
could know only itself, was the death of knowledge, and what socialists needed was 
knowledge. And this meant that Williams, whose life’s work may be described as the attempt 
to reconcile experience with the totality, could never be ‘our’ Western Marxist. 
 
The argument of this thesis has been a two-fold rejoinder to Anderson. First, that if he is right 
to equate empiricism with a British intellectual inheritance, then any ‘British Marxism’ will 
have to incorporate a strong ‘native’ (i.e. empiricist) element or else amount to a mass 
continental import. I think we can take from Anderson’s eagerness to discover in Williams an 
‘indigenous’ Marxism that he understood this; his theoretical presuppositions, however, 
meant that he could not unreservedly name Williams’s work as ‘it’. The second argument of 
this thesis against Anderson, and which the bulk of it is devoted to, is that Williams was not 
the monolithically British thinker Anderson and his contemporaries believed him to be. In the 
first instance, Williams’s preoccupation with totality is itself a ‘rationalist’ impulse, firmly 
aligning him the European traditions Anderson praises, especially the Western Marxists. In 
addition, Williams was, from at least The Long Revolution, profoundly influenced by 
European thinkers, centrally and formatively so from 1968. That Williams never lost his 
‘British’ affinity with experience does not negate the fact that, from the earliest days of NLR, 
Williams’s was a totalising and in many respects a ‘rationalist’ thought highly critical of 
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English academic orthodoxy even where it shared, for historical and personal reasons, a 
somewhat insular frame of reference.  
 
The perception that Williams was an insular British thinker unmoved by European 
intellectual trends was mirrored by the suspicion that he was a political and/or cultural 
nationalist, and therefore an insubstantial ally of the venerable tradition of internationalist 
socialism. The fact is that Williams viewed both nationalism and internationalism as 
insufficient in their traditional guises as ‘unified national polity’ and ‘unified proletariat 
without nations’. What mattered was self-determination and democracy, the closeness of 
power to given communities of experience. The enemy of democracy was not the nation but 
that dominant culture within the nation which overwrote its own subaltern experiences, the 
forest of ‘abstract universality’ for which the trees of ‘concrete particularism’ could not be 
seen. The dominant English culture which Williams learned about at Cambridge, moreover, 
was characterised by disdain for totalising forms of thought and analysis, by strict 
specialisation of intellectual disciplines and a refusal to engage with the kinds of necessary 
abstraction and sociological bridge-building which Williams thought necessary for social 
analysis. The result was that the European thinkers and ideas which were becoming 
increasingly important for Williams were doing so in part because they signalled an 
alternative to those reified models of cognition which, to Williams’s mind, suffused the 
dominant culture, and which were in fact woven through the values, meanings and practices 
of the British ruling class.  
 
Williams’s Europeanism was, from the early seventies, inseparable from his increasing 
identification with his Welsh roots. In the phrase ‘Welsh European’, Williams fused the two 
elements in his mature formation which stood in opposition to the dominant English 
intellectual culture in which he had been immersed. Wales, which had figured in Williams’s 
earlier work as both a narrative setting for experiential/epistemological conflict in the novels 
and as a model for the ‘common culture’, now became a symbol for the emergent, for the 
alternative or oppositional in British culture. Wales was one example among many of a 
concrete particularism obscured and marred by the abstract universality of English cultural 
and political domination. Its almost symbiotic link to Williams’s Europeanism may then be 
explained by analogy to the dependency Sartre intuited between Basque self-determination 
and the kind of socialist internationalism that could also incorporate the Spanish and French; 
concrete universality, real unity, was only possible between self-determining entities fully 
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recognised as equals. In Williams’s theoretical discourse, both Wales and Europe are 
‘emergent’ elements, insofar as they appear to the dominant English/British discourse as 
aberrant or subversive. But Europe, which Williams associates with a totalising form of 
reason inimical to an ‘analytic’ English intellectual culture, also comes to play the part of 
universality; it symbolises that larger aggregation of entities or emergent impulses promised 
by the vision of concrete universality. The basic universalizing impulse of the (Welsh) 
common culture was transferred, in the seventies, to a heterogeneous Europe, leaving Wales 
as the paradigmatic example of the sort of entity which a new internationalism (Williams’s 
‘variable socialism’) would seek to integrate. ‘Welsh Europeanism’, then, named the political 
geography of Williams’s reconciliation of experience with the totality. 
 
As I outlined in the introduction, Williams was influenced by a wide range of European 
thinkers, not all of them Marxists. It is nevertheless clear that European Marxism, particularly 
the Western Marxist tradition, was of the greatest significance for Williams’s overall 
development. This, I have argued, was primarily due that tradition’s preoccupation with the 
concept of totality. While almost every thinker associated with Western Marxism was a 
‘totalizer’ of one form or another, the trio Williams described as Marxism’s ‘alternative 
tradition’ were connected to the concept in ways which made them particularly germane. 
Lukacs and Gramsci may be regarded (with Korsch) as originators and popularisers of the 
general Western Marxist concern with totality; as such, their writings contain the visible 
seeds of a growth beyond the mechanical assumptions of orthodox Marxism which could not 
have been more salient to the British New Left in the fifties and sixties. Sartre, coming later, 
developed a less politically grandiose version of totality which presaged theoretical 
developments beyond Western Marxism; this appealed to Williams who, while profoundly 
influenced by the tradition, was not originally ‘of’ it and was also engaged in its critique. 
Foregoing either the cultural pessimism of the Frankfurt School or the militantly 
philosophical anti-humanism of Althusser, these three thinkers, for all their differences, 
infused Marxism (European and British) with an analysis of the relation between 
consciousness (experience) and society, culture and social change which was sorely lacking, 
and which was invaluable to Williams’s sense of his own project. 
 
Lukacs’s conception of the totality was as the unification of parts; the perspective of totality 
was thus the enemy of reification, that atomised and fragmentary appearance of things which 
had its source in commodity fetishism (the mistaking of relations between people as relations 
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between things) under capitalism. On this, Williams could not have been more in agreement, 
and Lukacs’s writings on literary realism left him with a profound sense of both the 
desirability and difficulty of representing social relations in their totality. Williams agreed 
with Lukacs that the subjective bias of much modernist writing, its willful inattention to 
totality, was a flaw. The severity of Lukacs’s, critique, however, its insistence on the 
‘decadence’ of modernism revealed a conception of the roots of totality which Williams 
could not accept: the orthodox Marxist position that cultural products and phases are finally 
explicable as the effects of classes in their practical relation to an ‘epochal’ model of history. 
The publication of History and Class Consciousness was a key event for British Marxists, 
and Williams found much to agree with in its critique of reification and advocacy of ‘total’ 
analysis. I have argued that Williams’s critique of Lukacs’s distinction between actual and 
imputed consciousness suffered from an error stemming from the influence of Goldmann. 
Williams read ‘actual’ consciousness as an admission by Lukacs that some forms of 
consciousness evade capture by the dominant system of meanings and values, that is, that 
consciousness is generative and creative. ‘Imputed’ consciousness was then this emergent, 
potentially subversive consciousness raised to the point of apprehending the totality, the point 
of ‘coherence’ (a term of Goldmann’s). This was quite distant from Lukacs’s intention, which 
was simply to show that the ‘spontaneous’ consciousness of the working class was 
inadequate relative to the proper awareness of interests (class consciousness) which could be 
‘imputed’ to it by socialists and intellectuals. While Williams misread Lukacs on this point, 
the conception of ‘actual’ consciousness which Williams took away was undoubtedly an 
influence on his later theorisation of the ‘emergent’, that sector of a culture which was 
alternative or oppositional to the dominant paradigm. Lukacs also provided Williams with a 
strong negative clarification of his own militant anti-elitism. A consciousness ‘imputed’ from 
on high, whether as ‘coherence’ or ‘awareness of interests’, would only reproduce the 
oppression of the working-class; a democratic socialist politics would require the totality to 
be brought within the range of possible experience.  
 
Sartre’s conception of the totality was very close to Williams’s, as the ‘interiority’ or 
presence in consciousness of those objective material relations human beings both produce 
and are produced by. This was precisely the element which was lacking in Lukacs: a firm 
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insistence on the reconcilability of the totality with experience.86 In the early Sartre, however, 
Williams’s found a thinker producing original work within a phenomenological tradition that 
bore too many of the hallmarks of a bourgeois subjectivism. For Williams, Sartre the 
expressionist playwright (and the existentialist philosopher) joined a venerable tradition of 
tragic writing and theory in which the individual and society were set into a relation of near-
total antagonism. Sartre’s plays, with their metaphysical rebellions and pessimistic 
denouements, expressed the inability of the modern tragic tradition to conceive of collective 
routes to the resolution of social disorder. While Brecht’s dramatic art went much further 
than Sartre’s in empowering a critical humanist subject, he too fell prey to the expressionist 
structure of feeling. In Sartre’s later work, the liberal-expressionist deadlock (if not 
necessarily the Marxist-existentialist one) was resolved in favour of a totalising philosophical 
project with which Williams was in firm agreement and which, I have argued, influenced 
both his late essays on commitment in art and his positions on the politics of place. Williams 
shared with the late Sartre a conception of individuality deeply at odds with bourgeois 
individualism, and thus with the notion of the ‘free’ artist who acts without social or 
psychological constraint. Williams’s aesthetic essays of the seventies and eighties critiqued 
the early Sartre’s notion of socialist political commitment in art from a position which drew 
on the Sartre of the Critique; what the writer must ‘commit’ to is neither his own freedom nor 
a specific political cause, but rather what is emergent in his creative response to the world. 
‘Committed’ art, like political praxis in the Critique, is figured as the outcome of a dialectical 
and totalising relation between subject and object, experience and ‘abstract’ reason. Sartre’s 
essay ‘The Burgos Trials’, meanwhile, influenced Williams in a similar direction in the 
political sphere. A totalising perspective demanded that Williams’s old concept of the 
common culture be dropped in favour of that ‘common operation of all particularisms’ which 
Sartre had argued was the only ground of ‘a true universalism’.  
 
In Gramsci, Williams encountered the limits of the totality conceived apolitically. Gramsci’s 
conception of totality was as an integrated field of political struggle.  As such, it also posed a 
                                                
86 It should be noted that, for both Sartre and Williams, the potential reconcilability of objective reality (Sartre’s 
‘practico-inert’) with experience is no guarantee of revolution, much less of history as a whole being intelligible 
or directed. As Jay (1984, pp. 331-360) recounts, Sartre distinguished between ‘totality’ and ‘totalisation’, 
between the simple existence of a ‘whole’, theoretically discernable by dialectical reason, and the prospect of 
‘totalisation’, of man/history actually behaving in a ‘total’ manner, as a ‘unified and intelligible whole’ (p. 353). 
The unstable or non-total character of things implied by Sartre’s totalisation finds a parallel in Williams’s 
insistence, via his ‘residual, dominant, emergent’, on the shifting and contradictory nature of the component 
parts of any given culture.  
   
 
229 
 
question to the more epistemologically-oriented conceptions of totality which Williams had 
imbibed from Lukacs, Goldmann and Sartre: how is the ‘perspective of totality’ concretely to 
be achieved and, once it is, how might it be converted into a successful assault on the cultural 
domination exerted by the capitalist class? Gramsci (one of the few Western Marxists who 
was not a professional philosopher) reinserted the question of power and domination into the 
problematic of totality, and Williams’s original theorization of hegemony was an attempt to 
tackle this question head-on. Hegemony as described by Williams was perhaps the clearest 
example of a synthetically ‘Anglo-European’ position to emerge from Williams’s ongoing 
project of reconciling the totality to experience. Williams’s was an empiricist Gramscianism, 
a redirection of the energy of Gramsci’s hegemonic edifice, constructed as it was from some 
combination of capitalist ‘leadership’ and control of cultural and other institutions, towards a 
diffuse experiential formation, a ‘sense of absolute because experienced reality’ which I have 
argued is closer to reification in its customary usage. Williams’s work contained Gramscian 
elements from much earlier than his engagements with hegemony in the seventies. I have 
argued that Williams’s concept of a ‘long revolution’ bears a striking resemblance to 
Gramsci’s ‘war of position’, the class struggle at the level of culture; both are what might be 
termed ‘experiential preparations’ for the short revolution or ‘war of manoeuvre’. Williams’s 
work is more explicit than Gramsci’s in stating that the long revolution is also an essential 
period of socialist prefiguration, in which the experience of the ‘rising class’ develops from a 
state of ‘pre-emergence’ to one which is capable of seizing upon the opportunity to 
fundamentally transform society. 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have affirmed Williams as both an aesthetic and a philosophical 
realist. I have also affirmed Williams’s own description of his work as a fusion of materialist 
and idealist elements. The relation between these two statements requires a little unpacking, 
for the former is not the resolution of the latter. It is Williams’s epistemology, not his 
ontology, which is realist and this, as the entire argument of this thesis implies, is one form of 
resolution of the empiricism/rationalism dichotomy upon which the interpretation of elements 
in Williams’s work as ‘British’ or ‘European’ relies. Experience, in the final analysis, is our 
primary window on to the world; nevertheless, the world exists independently of our 
cognition. ‘Rational’ or abstract reasoning permits us to intuit, in a limited way, something of 
this non-experiential objectivity, but only insofar as it presents its findings to experience, that 
is, insofar as it can be related, made compatible with or integrated into experience. This, of 
course, is the process of reconciling experience to the totality which I have argued was 
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Williams’s primary concern. Ontologically, Williams is primarily a materialist; he believes in 
the material nature of reality and conceives of consciousness as a kind of ‘embeddedness’ in 
a social-material world which pre-exists and outlives the individual human being. The 
‘idealist’ element in Williams’s work is not idealism in the sense familiar to philosophy, i.e. 
the Platonic/Berkeleyan commitment to ‘ideas’ which exist independently of material bodies 
or even of consciousness. What has been described as Williams’s idealism is finally, I think, 
the combination of his empiricism (centring of subjective apprehension) with his political 
insistence that the achievement of socialism will be dependent upon its prefiguration as an 
‘idea’ in the self-generative emergence of the culture of the working class. But there is 
nothing there that is incompatible with a robust and realist materialism. 
 
Relative to the existing critical literature, my thesis asserts a stronger and more formative 
European Marxist influence on Williams than has generally been supposed; in this it joins 
more recent scholarship in developing the contributions of specific European thinkers to 
Williams’s development. While many critics have noted Williams’s ‘Welsh Europeanism’, I 
have tried to provide a firmer theoretical underpinning for that combination of signifiers. This 
thesis has challenged those readings of Williams which figure him as either a) an Anglophile 
nationalist or unionist, b) a Welsh nationalist or a c) a broad-brush internationalist; the reality 
is clearly more complex. Against the grain of the Nairn-Anderson theses and indeed the 
assumptions of much later scholarship, I assert a stronger British participation in, even 
membership of, the Western Marxist tradition in Williams’s personage. My analysis confirms 
the consensus that Williams was influenced by Lukacs, but develops this account 
considerably using evidence from a broad range of Williams’s writings, in particular the 
reviews, which have received little attention. I have argued for a very strong Sartrean 
influence, in contrast to a largely silent literature, and have made the case for heretofore 
unexplored direct influences with ‘The Burgos Trials’ and the Critique; here again, the 
reviews were critical. While critics have been most forthcoming in attributing a strong 
influence to Gramsci, this thesis has explored Gramsci’s impact on Williams to greater 
theoretical depth and argued for its close connection with the empiricist/rationalist dialectic 
which informed Williams’s approach to totality. In contrast with commonplace accounts of 
Williams’s ‘gradualism’ or ‘culturalist’ inattention to revolution, I have affirmed Williams as 
a revolutionary socialist and detected a putative revolutionary theory in Williams’s work on 
hegemony. 
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There are several avenues of future research which, to my mind, suggest themselves. The first 
and most obvious would be to extend the kind of detailed analysis and comparison performed 
here to thinkers beyond Marxism’s ‘alternative tradition’. More work needs to be done on the 
influence of the Frankfurt School on Williams, in particular Fromm, Adorno, Marcuse and 
Benjamin. Williams’s views on psychoanalysis were largely negative; a thorough analysis of 
why this was so would be useful. While I have briefly discussed the late influence of thinkers 
such as Bourdieu, Timpanaro and Bakhtin on Williams, research looking specifically at later 
European influences (i.e. in the eighties) would extend the present analysis and suggest where 
Williams’s unique approach might have taken him had he outlived the eighties. A second and 
related project would be to apply the comparative and trans-national analysis employed here 
to other figures in the post-war British New Left. While I have gone into some detail on 
Anderson’s relation to European thought, extended analyses of the influence of European 
thinkers on figures such as Eagleton, Hall, Miliband, Barnett and Thompson would 
significantly extend the present account of Anglo-European intellectual transmission.  
 
The question of Williams’s realism is, I think, a paramount question for future research. I 
have discussed this at various points, but a thorough analysis of the links between Williams’s 
aesthetic and philosophical realism in a range of texts, and crucially by relating this to his 
novels, would be invaluable. Such an analysis would benefit from situating Williams’s 
thought within a broader ‘realist’ theoretical literature extending to the present day. In recent 
years, the study of realism has found itself centre-stage in both philosophy and cultural 
studies, not least through the work of Roy Bhaskar87 and the ‘speculative realist’88 philosophy 
of thinkers like Ray Brassier and Graham Harman. This has coincided, in the post-crash era, 
with a general turn away from postmodernist and poststructuralist forms of analysis and 
towards a new concern with materialist analysis,89 including a revival of academic Marxism. 
Williams has not, to my knowledge, been much discussed as a precursor of such heterodox 
materialist and realist trends; my analysis in this thesis suggests this as a fruitful area for 
further work. A fourth area for future study is closely related to this, namely the influence of 
Williams’s thought on what might broadly be described as a shift away from ideology-based 
theories of class rule and toward accounts based on reification within Marxist theory since the 
                                                
87 See Collier, A. (1994) Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy for a relevant 
introduction.  
88 For an introductory collection, see Bryant, L., Harman, G. & Srnicek, N. (eds.) (2011) The Speculative Turn: 
Continental Materialism and Realism.  
89 See, for example, Cooler, D. & Frost, S. (eds.) (2010) New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics.  
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seventies. Marxist theorists from Slavoj Zizek to Mark Fisher and Vivek Chibber have 
participated in a problematisation of the link, most firmly expressed in Althusserianism, 
between ideology, in the sense of conscious beliefs, and action and/or political change.90 In 
Chapter Three of this thesis I showed that Williams’s empiricist Gramscianism, which was 
indeed hostile to Althusserian versions of ideology, was closer in many ways to a theory of 
reification, the sense of ‘absolute because experienced reality’ which limits the range of the 
thinkable and appears to set rigid limits to the doable.91 While the work of Chibber, for 
example, arguably ‘over-excludes’ conscious, ideological beliefs from the formula of social 
oppression, Williams work on hegemony in the seventies may be considered an early 
forerunner of this kind of Marxist analysis.  
 
A final and more urgent area for further research is the need for thorough analysis of 
Williams’s enormous back-catalogue of reviews. In this thesis I made only shallow inroads 
even into the reviews on European thinkers. Williams wrote hundreds of reviews on a 
massive number of texts, thinkers and topics. The ideas contained therein, while they will in 
many cases be reproductions in another format of insights originating in Williams’s books 
and articles, may nevertheless be central for understanding various aspects of Williams’s 
work. I know that I could not have written this thesis without the reviews on Lukacs, Sartre 
and others; indeed, it might not have been a viable project at all without them. While 
Williams’s identification as a ‘Welsh European’ appeared in book form, its essential 
character, which it has been the purpose of this thesis to discern, was discoverable only via 
the reviews. There will undoubtedly be other areas of Williams’s work in which much of the 
central material is in the reviews and nowhere else.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
90 See, for example, Zizek, S. (2008) The Sublime Object of Ideology, Fisher, M. (2009) Capitalist Realism: Is 
There No Alternative? & Chibber, V.  (2013) Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital. 
91 Fisher’s Capitalist Realism is effectively a book-length excursus on this predicament. 
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